

**An Historical and  
Baseline Assessment of  
HOPE VI**

**Volume I  
Cross-site Report**

# **An Historical and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI**

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Prepared for:  
U.S. Department of Housing and  
Urban Development  
Office of Policy Development and  
Research

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July 1996

## FOREWORD

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HOPE VI, also known as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration, is a bold attempt to transform distressed public housing. In HOPE VI, the Congress and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) have shown that they are willing to erase 60 years of program rules and let local actors decide the best way to house and provide social and community services to their poorest citizens. The task of revitalizing the most distressed public housing in America is not an easy one. The easing of Federal requirements for public housing alone does not reverse the conditions that have come to prevail in these distressed developments.

Sixty years of experience with public housing has taught policy makers what *does not* work for public housing and what *might* work. HOPE VI provides an opportunity to test ideas that have promise. These ideas must not only avoid the mistakes of the past, but they must also repair the damage that has already been done. Some of the challenges faced include welfare dependency, the decline of many center cities, poor public housing management, decreasing operating subsidies, crime, the dramatic increase in single parent households, poor design of buildings, inappropriate unit size, and racial and economic isolation. Doug Rae eloquently addresses these conditions in his Elm Haven HOPE VI case study: “A great deal is to be expected of HOPE VI, but we should not expect even the wisest use of HOPE VI funding to quickly reverse problems which have been given two generations’ head start”.

HUD has thus taken a long-term approach for evaluating the program. This report, *An Historical and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI*, is the first step in an evaluation that will closely track the interventions and outcomes at 15 of the HOPE VI grantees for a minimum of ten years. In the long-term, this evaluation will document activities and changes in the sites, the neighborhoods, and, most important, the families, to provide local and national policy guidance on strategies for housing poor families.

This first report explores the first few miles of the HOPE VI journey. It describes the sites as they began the program and identifies the plans for revitalizing each development. One challenge for this assessment is capturing the uniqueness of each site, both in terms of the characteristics of the developments and the residents, as well as in the plans for carrying out HOPE VI. This study addressed this challenge by involving researchers who live near the HOPE VI communities in the evaluation. These local researchers collected historical and baseline information for each of the sites and prepared the case studies that appear in volume two of this report. Each of the case studies is clearly unique in its focus and assessment.

At the same time, national policy-making requires an assessment of the overall effect of HOPE VI. Volume one of this report draws from the case studies and provides insights that can only be learned by comparing and contrasting the site characteristics and the challenges that each faces.

This three volume report shows the conditions that HOPE VI is designed to improve. It describes 15 HOPE VI sites, the processes they used to prepare revitalization plans, and the vision each developed for transforming highly distressed public housing into vibrant urban communities. The report also outlines many of the challenges they will face as they continue to move forward.

Michael A. Stegman  
Assistant Secretary

The contents of this report are the views of the contractor and do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the U.S. Government.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The authors of Volumes I and III of this report—**Linda B. Fosburg, Susan J. Popkin, and Gretchen P. Locke**—acknowledge with thanks the valuable assistance of many others in performing the Historical and Baseline Assessment of the HOPE VI Program. First, we recognize the important contributions of the fifteen Local Research Affiliate (LRA) teams who contributed the Baseline Case Studies for this report (Volume II). The LRA teams included:

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		SAN FRANCISCO	Michael Reisch, Ph.D. Felix Rivera, Ph.D.

Next, the team recognizes the invaluable contributions to the assessment provided by the PHAs and their staff. We sincerely thank them for the contributions of their time and information about their implementation of the HOPE VI program.

At Abt Associates Inc., **Judith D. Feins**, provided the thoughtful and constructive technical review of the assessment materials and reports. **Carissa Climaco** developed the methodology for reading the survey data bases and producing the Exhibits in Volume III. **Stefanie Falzone** provided collaborative support to the assessment team in all aspects of project administration and report production.

The Historical and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI was prepared by Abt Associates Inc. under Contract DU-5889 with the Office of Policy Development and Research, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The authors acknowledge the enthusiasm, guidance, and contributions to the report offered by **Todd M. Richardson**, the Government Technical Monitor. We also thank and greatly appreciate the assistance to the assessment provided by the members of HUD's Office of Public Housing Investments (formerly the Office of Distressed and Troubled Housing Recovery).

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This report synthesizes the findings of the Historical and Baseline Assessment of the HOPE VI Program. The HOPE VI program, formerly known as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program (URD) was created for the purpose of revitalizing severely distressed or obsolete public housing developments. This assessment has two primary purposes: to collect baseline data for a purposive sample of 15 HOPE VI grantees and to develop a data collection system that will serve the longitudinal monitoring and evaluation needs of the HOPE VI program. While the baseline component of the HOPE VI assessment includes an historical description of the public housing developments and early implementation of HOPE VI plans, 5-year and 10-year follow-up assessments<sup>1</sup> will support evaluation of the longer-term impacts of HOPE VI on: the physical structure of the targeted developments; the management systems instituted; the social and economic well-being of the residents; and the condition of the neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI developments.

### BACKGROUND

In 1989, a National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing was named and charged with proposing a National Action Plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing by the year 2000. The Commission made recommendations on ways to address revitalization of three general areas: physical improvements, management improvements, and social and community services to address resident needs. The Commission also proposed that Congress authorize a new partnership program among Public Housing Agencies (PHAs), non-profit organizations, the private sector, and residents to attract additional resources. The HOPE VI Program described in this report grows directly out of the Commission's recommendations and is intended to address the problem areas identified in the Commission's report.

HOPE VI was authorized by the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993 (the Appropriations Act). It was also authorized, with slight modifications (amending Section 24 of the 1937 Housing Act), by Section 120 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992. To be eligible to apply for HOPE VI funds, an applicant had to be either a PHA located in one of the 40 most populous U.S. cities or a PHA on HUD's Troubled Housing Authority list as of March 31, 1992.

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<sup>1</sup>Although HUD currently has no formal agreements to conduct these longitudinal assessments, HUD's long-term strategy for the HOPE VI evaluation relies on a panel of Local Research Affiliates (LRAs). As HUD's prime contractor for the baseline assessment, Abt Associates Inc. recruited and managed the 15 LRAs, designed the LRAs' baseline data collection protocols, acquired HUD and Census data, reviewed the LRAs' baseline data and Case Study Reports, and prepared the Cross-Site Baseline Report. During the baseline assessment the LRAs completed the baseline data collection forms, prepared a Case Study Report, devised additional local data collection protocols, and identified appropriate local impact measures.

Applicant PHAs were allowed to propose a plan that covered up to 500 units in three local areas.<sup>2</sup> Grants were capped at \$50 million, and at least 80 percent of the HOPE VI funds were to be spent on physical improvements in the development(s). The basic options for physical revitalization were: rehabilitation; reconfiguration; demolition with some type of replacement housing (on-site, off-site, or Section 8 certificates); and (using the HOPE VI grant money to leverage private capital) development of additional low-income and market-rate housing. Some or all of these options can be combined into the plan for a single development. Applications were evaluated on the extent of revitalization need, the potential impact of the plan, the capabilities of the applicant, the extent of resident involvement, the extent of involvement of local public and private entities, and the quality of the proposed social and community service components. ***Thus, the HOPE VI grants were aimed at accomplishing a comprehensive revitalization of severely distressed public housing developments by a simultaneous investment in sites, buildings, and people.***

Over three fiscal years, 1993 to 1995, Congress appropriated a total of \$1.6 billion for the HOPE VI program to revitalize severely distressed public housing. A total of 34 HOPE VI implementation grants, ranging in size from \$16 million to \$50 million, were awarded to 32 housing authorities. Additionally, in FY 1995, planning grants were awarded to 27 PHAs and special “leveraged HOPE VI” grants were awarded to five PHAs.

Congress intended the HOPE VI program to remedy the distress of family developments that are too large to be addressed by HUD’s conventional public housing modernization program. The HOPE VI grantees face many problems. Many of the developments are both large and old. The 32 PHAs receiving HOPE VI implementation grants manage 37 percent of all public housing units nationally, but they manage 71 percent of the family units located in developments that are both larger than 300 units and built before 1960. Further, 12 of the 32 selected PHAs were considered “management-troubled” (a PHMAP score of 60 or less out of 100) in 1993.<sup>3</sup> Several of the currently troubled housing authorities have been troubled for years, and many of the others have been troubled in the past.

This Historical and Baseline Assessment of the HOPE VI program focuses on 15 of the 34 HOPE VI grants. The HOPE VI grants selected are: Techwood and Clarke Howell in Atlanta, GA; Lafayette Courts in Baltimore, MD; Mission Main in Boston, MA; McGuire Gardens in Camden, NJ; Earle Village in Charlotte, NC; Cabrini Homes Extension in Chicago, IL; King Kennedy and Outhwaite Homes in Cuyahoga County, OH; Jeffries Homes in Detroit, MI; Ellen Wilson Dwellings in the District of Columbia; Hillside Terrace in Milwaukee, WI; Elm Haven in New Haven, CT; Desire in New Orleans, LA; Coliseum Gardens, Lockwood Gardens, and Lower Fruitvale in Oakland, CA; Springview Apartments in San Antonio, TX; and Bernal Dwellings and Yerba Buena Homes in San Francisco, CA. These 23 targeted developments at the 15 PHAs were purposively chosen to represent the spectrum of physical, management, crime, and family distress found in all

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<sup>2</sup> This constraint was removed after the first round of implementation grant awards in FY 1993.

<sup>3</sup> PHMAP (the Public Housing Management Assessment Program) is an assessment tool developed by HUD for evaluating and comparing the management performance of PHAs across the country.

severely distressed public housing developments; and represent the range of different revitalization strategies.

## **FINDINGS**

The following is a summary of the key findings from the historical and baseline assessment of the 15 sampled PHAs.

### **The Developments**

The HOPE VI development sites span the history of public housing in America. Some in this group include the oldest public housing in the nation; however, seven of the developments are not even 30 years old.

Most of the developments targeted for revitalization have some or all of the serious design flaws associated with unsuccessful public housing: construction on “superblocks,”<sup>4</sup> poorly designed buildings for housing families, small units, and a high number of units per acre. There is, however, considerable variation among the developments in the degree to which they are affected by these problems.

Local Research Affiliate (LRA) assessments of the physical condition of the developments identified eight developments in “very poor” condition and another eight in “poor” condition. Only two developments, Earle Village and King Kennedy Estates, were rated “good;” another four were rated “fair.” In better-condition developments, the most serious problems involved major systems and environmental factors (e.g., inadequate plumbing and/or electrical systems, poor siting and/or drainage problems). Some of the developments with more severe problems were literally crumbling: the wooden-frame construction supporting New Orleans’ Desire is rotting because the development is built on a swamp; 91 percent of Chicago’s Cabrini Extension’s units failed to meet housing quality standards in 1992; and Baltimore’s Lafayette Courts residents reported problems ranging from peeling paint and rodents to unreliable heat and outdated electrical systems.

Besides the Ellen Wilson Dwellings development, which is empty, the vacancy rate in four developments (Techwood, King Kennedy, Jeffries Homes, and Desire) was about 50 percent just prior to grant award; four other developments (Clark-Howell, Lafayette Courts, Mission Main, and Cabrini Extension) had vacancy rates of 20 percent or above. The remaining developments had very low vacancy, despite their distress. The overall maintenance of the development was reported by the LRAs to be “poor” or “very poor” in 14 of the 23 developments in the sample.

The severity of problems with crime, drug trafficking, and physical disorder (e.g., trash, graffiti) varied widely. Developments with less extreme problems (e.g., Earle Village in Charlotte and Hillside Terrace in Milwaukee) were characterized by good property management, less serious problems with gangs, and lower city crime rates overall.

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<sup>4</sup> Large blocks that interrupt normal city street patterns, usually with parking lots scattered around the outside of the site. There are also large open areas between buildings.

Despite their concerns about the condition of their developments, the majority of residents surveyed reported being either “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with their buildings as “a place to live.” These results may represent the views of tenants who feel they lack other housing choices and are fearful of losing the housing they have, however undesirable this housing appears to outsiders. Alternatively, this level of satisfaction may reflect the residents’ point of comparison—if living in a distressed public housing development is acceptable (or very acceptable), then the residents’ prior housing (or lack of housing) was likely to be much worse.

### **Resident Characteristics and Tenant Organizations**

All of the developments had residents who were extremely poor, poorly educated, and heavily dependent on welfare programs. The percentage of residents reporting income from public assistance averaged 84 percent across the 23 developments, ranging from a high of 90 percent in Oakland at Coliseum Gardens to a low of 43 percent in Detroit (which has a large population of elderly residents who receive Social Security.) The majority of the households at baseline were headed by single women. Only one development, Earle Village in Charlotte, had a substantial proportion (over 25 percent) of residents who had earned income.

Some of the most active and well-organized tenant organizations were in the HOPE VI developments in Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, New Haven, and New Orleans. In contrast, resident organizations in Camden, San Antonio, and San Francisco were less organized, consisting of small groups of residents who may not represent the full range of views of the developments’ households.

### **The Neighborhoods**

The revitalization plans developed for the HOPE VI sites often place an emphasis on reintegrating public housing developments into surrounding communities from which they have been physically, economically, and socially isolated. Most of the sample developments are located in communities with a mix of land uses including residential, institutional, commercial, and extensive vacant land. The neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI developments in Baltimore, Boston, Camden, Chicago, Detroit (West Jeffries Homes), New Haven, New Orleans, Oakland, San Antonio, and San Francisco are at least 40 percent residential. The neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI sites in Atlanta, Cleveland, Detroit, and San Antonio have substantial amounts of vacant land (totaling 20 percent or more of total land area.)

Available data on the characteristics of the residents living in the neighborhoods indicate that in most cases they are somewhat less poor than the public housing residents in the HOPE VI developments. Even so, they still typically suffer from high unemployment rates, low incomes, and high rates of dependence on public assistance.

Many of the HOPE VI communities have suffered in the transition from manufacturing-based economies to services-based economies. Evidence of this trend is visible to varying degrees in Baltimore, New Haven, and Oakland; the change has been devastating in Camden, Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee. By contrast, a few communities are experiencing growth and gentrification with increasing economic diversity. Examples include the Capital Hill neighborhood in Washington, DC, Old Town in Chicago, and the site of the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. Several

communities (those in Baltimore, Camden, Cuyahoga Metro, Detroit, Oakland, and San Antonio) have been targeted for federal economic development efforts such as federal Empowerment Zones or Enterprise Communities. In Milwaukee, a state and locally funded Economic Development Zone has been established in a nearby neighborhood.

Despite the socio-economic difficulties faced by these communities and their residents, some also benefit from a rich network of community resources including churches and non-profit organizations whose staffs and members provide important services and political leadership. Access to public transportation and to central business districts are also resources to the HOPE VI communities in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Charlotte. However, basic goods and services such as banks, supermarkets, and department stores are often absent from these neighborhoods.

### **HOPE VI Plans**

Many of the original applications were limited by the time allowed to respond to the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) and thus did not have the luxury of conducting a thorough planning process collaboratively among the local PHA, mayor's office, tenants' council and other residents, and other local institutions. With HUD's encouragement, and often in response to local political pressure, the PHAs have continued to refine their plans.

The major goals of the HOPE VI plans include some combination of the following factors: deconcentration and dispersion, development of mixed-income communities, demolition and/or renovation of current developments, emphasis on family self-sufficiency, and resident management of the properties. Twelve of the sites (all but Camden, New Orleans, and Oakland) planned to redevelop a community for mixed-income families. Some of the revised plans have been heavily influenced by HUD's encouraging the use of leveraged financing. Other sites have broadened their HOPE VI plans to include the revitalization of the surrounding neighborhood in addition to the targeted development.

By August 1995, the physical plans approved or under consideration called for demolition of all existing structures in eight locations (Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, District of Columbia, New Haven, New Orleans, San Antonio, and San Francisco) and selected structures in Oakland. Renovations were planned in Camden and Cuyahoga Metro. A combination of demolition and renovation was planned for Charlotte, Chicago, and Milwaukee while Detroit's plan was undetermined. Only Camden, Cuyahoga Metro, District of Columbia, and Oakland were not planning to reduce the number of units. Of the eight PHAs with approved physical plans, most were planning to use a townhouse design in their renovated or newly constructed developments. Most of the redevelopment plans also called for landscaping, additional outdoor lighting, parks and green space to make the housing more attractive and liveable for the residents.

**Implementation status:** Four of the 15 sites (Atlanta, Baltimore, Cuyahoga Metro, and Milwaukee) had begun some demolition and/or construction as of August 1995.

Of the 13 PHAs with approved management plans, five were planning to place the control of the HOPE VI development under private management. Ten of the PHAs were committed to decentralizing authority for the revitalization effort, thereby allowing local control by a site-based



manager. Management training opportunities will be made available to residents in 10 of the HOPE VI sites. Seven PHAs proposed resident management after revitalization.

**Implementation status:** In most sites, the management plans will be implemented mid-way through the construction process or after redevelopment is complete. Boston and San Antonio have hired new site managers and were beginning to implement management improvements.

Baltimore, Charlotte, Cuyahoga Metro, Milwaukee, Oakland, and San Antonio placed more emphasis on their supportive service programs for residents than other PHAs. In general, an array of supportive services have been proposed, aimed at all age groups.

**Implementation status:** Considerable progress has been made on supportive service plans in at least two sites (Boston and Detroit) where progress on physical plans was at a virtual standstill. In addition, three PHAs with considerable experience providing supportive services (Baltimore, Charlotte, and Cuyahoga Metro) have made significant progress.

HOPE VI planners had considerable difficulty developing the community service plans. One issue seems to be confusion on grantees' part regarding the difference between supportive services and community service.<sup>5</sup> Seven of the case studies did not identify clear community service plans. In sites with clearer community service plans, the goals generally included developing volunteer opportunities for young adults and/or seniors in activities such as crime prevention, neighbor-to-neighbor outreach, peer counseling, foster grandparent programs, and physical revitalization projects. Another strategy offers incentives (such as scholarships or reduced rent) to residents who provide volunteer service.

**Implementation status:** Limited progress has been made on the implementation of the community service plans. Two sites specifically mentioned that developing plans acceptable to the Corporation for National and Community Service had been challenging. One site submitted five draft plans in a seven-month period and was still awaiting final approval.

Economic development strategies included providing job search assistance, training, and support for small business development and self-employment.

**Implementation status:** Little progress has been made on these initiatives to date. Since only six of the PHAs had developed a fairly complete plan and four other PHAs were still developing theirs as of August 1995, one can assume that the economic development strategies will not be pursued until the physical revitalization of the developments is further along.

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<sup>5</sup> Supportive service programs are intended **to serve** physical, economic, education, or social needs of residents. Community service programs are intended **to engage individuals in service** on a volunteer basis or through limited stipends. For example, a day care program so that residents can go to school or work is a supportive service program. Residents that volunteer at the day care center are providing community service.

It is important to note that more than half of the PHAs in the baseline sample experienced turnover of their Executive Director after the initial HOPE VI application was submitted. At nine of the sites (Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, District of Columbia, New Haven, New Orleans, and San Francisco) that experienced senior staff turnover, the subsequent upheaval created serious problems and delayed implementation of the HOPE VI program in all but Baltimore and Atlanta (where the new Executive Director has pushed for rapid change) and in New Haven (where the new Executive Director has been part of the redevelopment effort). In four sites (Chicago, Detroit, District of Columbia, and New Orleans), HUD was forced to intervene in the overall management of the PHA. In contrast, most of the PHAs without Executive Director turnover appear to have made substantial progress on implementing their HOPE VI plans over the 15 months of the baseline study period.

The amount of resident involvement in developing the HOPE VI plans could generally be classified into three tiers. Eight PHAs (Baltimore, Camden, Charlotte, Cuyahoga Metro, District of Columbia, New Haven, Oakland, and San Antonio) willingly involved residents extensively in the planning process and developed strong collaborative relationships among residents, community groups, and the PHA administration. Milwaukee and New Orleans are also probably in this tier, although little is mentioned in the case studies about inclusion of community groups in the planning process. Two PHAs (Boston and Detroit) involved residents more peripherally; a few meetings were held to inform residents of the developing plans. Three PHAs (Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco) appeared to discourage resident and community involvement. Residents in Atlanta and Chicago required legal representation to participate in the HOPE VI planning.

### **Indicators of Long-Term Impacts**

Each LRA proposed appropriate site-specific indicators for tracking the long-term impact of the HOPE VI initiatives.<sup>6</sup> Indicators of the long-term impacts of the HOPE VI program on the physical structures will include process measures such as management of the revitalization process; and accomplishments such as rehabilitation, new physical additions, and replacement units. Ultimately, another question will emerge: are these physical changes sustainable? Management indicators will include: assessment of management strategies put in place, such as tenant selection, lease enforcement, maintenance efficiency, and resident involvement. Indicators of HOPE VI impact on residents will include measures of social welfare, resident satisfaction, and community involvement. Supportive service and employment impacts may be assessed by identifying the extent of access to services and jobs realized by the developments' residents. It will also be important to track neighborhood changes in resident characteristics, business activity, and levels of community collaboration.

### **Prospects for Success**

HOPE VI was conceived to be a partnership among HUD, the PHAs, local government, the private sector, non-profit organizations, and residents. The prospects for the program's success in each community will depend on the capacity of these community partnerships to envision and implement

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<sup>6</sup> As noted previously, HUD has no formal mechanisms in place for on-going monitoring of the sample PHAs.

a comprehensive revitalization plan. Several factors are key indicators of the likelihood of success: the extent of PHA experience and capacity to manage an effort of the magnitude of HOPE VI; the extent of collaboration and support from HUD, the mayor's office and other local government agencies; the extent of support for the HOPE VI program by residents, institutions, and commercial entities in the surrounding neighborhoods; and the involvement and level of participation in the process by the tenants' council and other residents. If the HOPE VI investment in buildings, neighborhoods, and people is to attain the desired outcomes, the community partnerships must be forged in an atmosphere of collaboration and hope.

The LRAs offered a continuum of opinions regarding the likelihood of success in each of the HOPE VI developments. The most optimistic and promising prospects are seen in Baltimore, Cuyahoga Metro, and San Antonio. A second tier of LRAs view HOPE VI as challenging but are still guardedly optimistic about the prospects for success. Camden, Charlotte, Milwaukee, and Oakland are included in this group. LRAs in Boston, Chicago, the District of Columbia, and New Haven are more uncertain than the first two tiers. In this latter group of cases, progress toward finalizing the HOPE VI plan has been slow. The success of HOPE VI program is most in doubt in Atlanta, Detroit, New Orleans, and San Francisco.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION TO THE HOPE VI PROGRAM**

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The Baseline Assessment of the HOPE VI program has two primary purposes: to collect baseline data for 15 sample HOPE VI grantees and to develop a data collection system that will serve the longitudinal monitoring needs and later evaluations of the HOPE VI program. While the initial component of the assessment only includes a description of the early implementation of HOPE VI, the five-year and ten-year follow-up assessments will support evaluation of the longer-term impacts of the program.

HUD's long-term strategy for the HOPE VI evaluation relies on a panel of Local Research Affiliates (LRAs) who are familiar with local conditions and needs, and who can work closely with the local public housing authority and its residents to delineate appropriate and meaningful local HOPE VI accomplishments and eventual program impacts.

This chapter provides an introduction to the HOPE VI program and the Baseline for the Longitudinal Assessment of the HOPE VI program. This HOPE VI Baseline Report begins with a discussion of the background of HOPE VI (Section 1.1) followed by a description of the agencies and developments receiving program grants FY 1993 through FY 1995 (Section 1.2). Next we summarize HUD's strategy for the Baseline Assessment (Section 1.3) and the status of the program at the time the research began (Section 1.4). Finally, we provide an introduction to the remainder of the Cross-Site Report (Section 1.5).

#### **1.1 BACKGROUND OF HOPE VI**

In 1990, Congress began creating a series of programs loosely associated by the title "Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere" (HOPE). These programs include HOPE I and II to promote homeownership of subsidized multifamily rental housing (Public and FHA), HOPE III for non-profits to rehabilitate single-family homes for low-income homeownership, and HOPE IV for elderly independence. The last in this series of HOPE programs is HOPE VI, also known as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD). It was created for the purpose of revitalizing severely distressed or obsolete public housing developments.

##### **1.1.1 A History of Public Housing in the United States**

While the current image of public housing is of large, deteriorated developments with extremely poor and distressed residents, early public housing was intended to replace such conditions in slum communities. The first public housing in America was a product of the Great Depression and the New Deal, with the earliest developments constructed by the Public Works Administration (later

folded into the Works Progress Administration or WPA) starting in 1933.<sup>1</sup> Some of the oldest developments in the nation, including the Techwood Homes in Atlanta, the Outhwaite Homes in Cleveland, and the Jane Addams Homes in Chicago were constructed during this period. These developments were generally regarded as a great improvement over the deteriorated slum dwellings they replaced and were intended to last for at least a 60-year lifespan.<sup>2</sup>

**Reflecting this positive view, President Franklin Roosevelt dedicated the Techwood Homes on November 29, 1935, saying:**

*Within sight of us today stands a tribute to useful work under government supervision—the first slum clearance and low-rent housing project. Within a very short time, people who never before could get a decent roof over their heads will live here in reasonable comfort and healthful, worthwhile surroundings.*<sup>3</sup>

Direct construction of public housing by the Federal Government was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, so in 1937 the Congress passed the United States Housing Act of 1937. This legislation also required “equivalent elimination;” that is, for every unit of new housing constructed, a slum unit had to be destroyed. This Act created the current structure of the public housing program.

Public housing is owned and operated by local housing authorities, created under State law, with the Federal government guaranteeing funding for the housing. Early public housing was expected to be self-supporting, except for the development debt, so that rents were set at a level that would assure payment of all operating costs. The tenants had to have enough income to pay these rents, so public housing served working families, not the very poor. Initially, the Federal government guaranteed bonds issued by the housing authorities, and more recently provided operating subsidies and direct grants for development and modernization.

Thus, the early public housing program was multi-purpose—intended to reduce unemployment, support the housing industry, eliminate unsafe and unsanitary slums, and increase the supply of decent low-income housing. During the first phase of public housing construction between 1936 and 1940, 160,000 units were built. Most of these units were in low-rise townhouses or walk-up

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<sup>1</sup> Meehan, Eugene J. “The Evolution of Public Housing Policy” in J. Paul Mitchell (ed.), *Federal Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1985, pp. 287-318.

<sup>2</sup> Bowly, Jr., Devereaux. *The Poorhouse: Subsidized Housing in Chicago 1895-1976*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978.

<sup>3</sup> Atlanta Housing Authority. *Techwood Homes: 50 Years of Growth, Hope, and Progress*. Atlanta: Atlanta Housing Authority, August 1986.

apartments. The developments constructed during this early phase were generally segregated and primarily housed white, working-class tenants; some housing authorities even initially refused to accept any families on relief. Indeed, families had to have sufficient income to pay rents that supported the costs of operating the housing.

In response to pressure from the real estate and construction industries, the focus of the public housing program shifted after World War II. Title III of the Housing Act of 1949 began to target the program to low-income families. The 1949 Act included a rule that required a 20 percent gap between upper income limits for admission to public housing and the lowest incomes at which the private market was providing a tangible supply of decent housing. Households in the “gap” had few options. They could pay rents beyond their means, accept substandard accommodations, or go homeless. A second rule required the eviction from public housing of families whose incomes rose above an established limit. (This rule was only fully repealed in 1974.) These rules were intended to prevent public housing from competing with the private sector, by keeping people out of public housing who could afford housing in the private market. Finally, the 1949 Act introduced the concept of preferences, giving veterans and those displaced by slum clearance efforts the top priority.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time that federal laws regarding public housing became more restrictive, other alternative types of housing became available for moderate-income families. In particular, it became possible, through the efforts of the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal Highway Administration, for working-class families to own homes in the suburbs. These factors made public housing less attractive to moderate-income households.<sup>5</sup>

Following World War II, there was a very high demand for adequate housing at all income levels. For public housing, this demand was aggravated by urban renewal, which destroyed housing which was then available to the poor. Additionally, in the public housing program, a fad for high-rises clearly influenced housing design in the late 1940’s and 1950’s, allowing for the construction of many more units on the same piece of land.<sup>6</sup> Among these high-rises was Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, which came to symbolize the problems associated with high-rise public housing. At the same time, many large, high-density, low-rise projects for families were also constructed during this period, including Desire in New Orleans. Chicago carried these trends to the farthest extreme, constructing a four-mile strip of high-rises along State Street, including the largest development in the country—the Robert Taylor Homes, with over 4,000 units.

By the late 1960s, many of these developments were already viewed as disastrous for the families that lived in them. Most large-scale construction of public housing ceased by the early 1970s. Beginning with the Housing Act of 1956, incentives in federal legislation shifted the emphasis to

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<sup>4</sup> *Basic Laws on Housing and Community Development*. “United States Housing Act of 1937” (as amended). September 30, 1991, p. 104.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Bowly, 1978.

construction of housing for the elderly. Further, legislation enacted during the 1960s encouraged private development and the leasing of private housing rather than the construction of new public housing. These changes led to the development of the Section 8 certificate and voucher programs which provide eligible tenants with a subsidy to lease privately owned units.<sup>7</sup> The Section 8 New Construction program subsidized the private-sector development of low-income housing.

Civil rights legislation passed during the 1960s prohibited discrimination and opened up public housing developments to minorities and welfare recipients. New regulations issued during the 1980s gave preference to extremely low-income households. The concentration of extremely poor, minority tenants in public housing thus accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s, and public housing came to be viewed as the housing of last resort. Tenant incomes dropped steadily after 1974. ***By 1991, nearly 20 percent of public housing tenants had incomes that were less than 10 percent of the local median.*** The majority of households received public assistance, and approximately two-thirds were headed by single females.<sup>8</sup>

### **Public Housing Finance**

The original plan for financing public housing (in the 1937 and 1949 Acts) consisted of the federal government paying debt service while public housing agencies (PHAs) covered their operating costs through rents and other income (investment income).<sup>9</sup> But rents were not subsidized directly; tenants had to be able to pay rents that covered operating costs.

As moderate income families moved to homeownership in the suburbs, and families displaced by urban renewal were given a preference for admission to public housing, the public housing population grew poorer. Over time, tenants had more and more difficulty paying rents necessary to pay operating costs. Small scale operating subsidies began to be provided in 1961.

In 1969 and 1970, the Brooke Amendments to the Housing Act of 1937 limited tenant payments for rent to 25 percent of income, making public housing affordable to the very poor and requiring the Federal government to begin making substantial payments to local housing authorities to bridge the gap between rental revenues and operating costs. In 1975, these operating subsidy payments began to be distributed through a formula approach, the Performance Funding System (PFS), which is the operating cost subsidy distribution mechanism still in use today.

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 “federalized” public housing rents, changing the rent requirements for public housing tenants from a maximum of 25 percent of adjusted income to a required rental payment 30 percent of adjusted income, 10 percent of gross income or the welfare shelter rent, whichever is the greater.

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<sup>7</sup> Meehan, 1985.

<sup>8</sup> The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. *Working Papers on Identifying and Addressing Severely Distressed Public Housing*. Washington, D.C., December 1992, page 3-3.

<sup>9</sup> Council of Large Public Housing Authorities (CLAPHA). *Public Housing Today*. Boston: Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, 1986.

However, the PFS did not provide funding for modernization. This lack of funding became an increasingly serious problem as older structures deteriorated and major systems (plumbing, electrical, etc.) required replacement. In 1968, HUD began to provide some limited funds for modernization. This funding was insufficient for the amount of need and, further, was often restricted to specific items that were priorities for the federal government (e.g., roof replacement or lead-based paint abatement).

In 1974, HUD introduced the Targeted Projects Program (TPP). This program was HUD's first major effort to improve conditions at problem projects by "targeting" funds for social, physical and management improvements to these projects. It was also HUD's first large-scale attempt to encourage tenant input in the management and decision-making process and to provide for tenant service improvements. TPP was funded at \$441 million.

Originally, the costs for modernization activities were handled by reopening the original development contract for the project and amortizing the additional rehabilitation cost over the remaining years of the 40-year development contract. This system of financing had the unintended consequence of disadvantaging older projects, since they had fewer years left on the original development contract. In 1978, HUD corrected this bias against older projects by establishing the concept of modernization as a separate project, and funding all modernization over a 20-year term.

In 1979, HUD created the "Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program" (PHUIP) which was very much like the current HOPE VI initiative. PHUIP not only provided funding to address physical deficiencies comprehensively at specific troubled public housing projects in large urban areas, but also to address crime and social problems, to bring city resources to bear on the problems of public housing and to provide technical assistance to improve the management of the PHAs. Although a comprehensive evaluation of this program was planned, it was not undertaken.

In 1980, the first substantial modernization funding—Comprehensive Improvements Assistance Program (CIAP)—was enacted. Under CIAP, PHAs applied to compete for funds that would be used to address all needs at each funded project in a coordinated manner. Once the work was completed, the development was expected to have a remaining useful life of another 20 years, and it would not receive capital funding again in that period. The program also provided funds for emergency repairs and special-purpose modernization (e.g., accessibility and vacant unit reduction), as well as a component for lead-based paint abatement. Finally, for the first time, PHAs were allowed to use a portion of their modernization funds for management improvements to upgrade overall systems that affected the developments (e.g., accounting or security).

The Comprehensive Grant Program (CGP), which is allocated to PHAs through a formula rather than a competition, replaced CIAP for PHAs with more than 500 units in FY 1992 (and for those with more than 250 units in FY 1993). However, the CGP formula does not factor in the full costs of treating severely distressed developments. CGP is intended to provide PHAs with a reliable and predictable funding mechanism for capital improvements, as well as to permit PHAs more discretion



in the planning and implementation of modernization activities.<sup>10</sup> Because of the enormous costs involved in addressing distressed properties, legislators began to search for an alternative means of dealing with these developments.

### **1.1.2 Contributions of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing**

In 1989, Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing and charged the Commission with proposing a National Action Plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing by the year 2000. Over an 18-month period, the Commission and its staff visited public housing developments in 25 cities, held public hearings, and talked with the people who were affected by conditions in the public housing developments—the residents, boards, and staffs of public housing agencies, and industry leaders. The Commission identified the following problems:<sup>11</sup>

- Residents afraid to move about in their own homes and communities because of the high incidence of crime;
- High unemployment and limited opportunities for the meaningful employment of residents;
- Programs designed to address distressed conditions with too little funding, too late;
- Programs designed to assist residents of public housing that provide disincentives to self-sufficiency; and
- Families living in physical conditions that have deteriorated to such a degree that the housing is dangerous to their health and safety.

The Commission identified measures to recognize severe distress:<sup>12</sup>

- Families living in distress: low number of households with earned income, low levels of household income compared to the area's median income, or low levels of education compared to the area's median level;

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<sup>10</sup> Abt Associates, Inc. *Assessment of the Comprehensive Grant Program: Volume I*. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates Inc., 1995.

<sup>11</sup> *The Final Report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing: A Report to Congress and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development*. Washington, DC, August 1992, pp. xiii-xiv.

<sup>12</sup> *Case Study and Site Examination Reports of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing*. Washington, DC, December 1992, pp. 14-3 to 14-6.

- Incidence of serious crime: frequency of criminal acts (e.g., drug-related, violent crime and thefts), total number of local crimes, or records of crime in the development (e.g., lease terminations/evictions for criminal activity, police calls for service, incidents of vandalism, or opinions of law enforcement officials);
- Management difficulties: high vacancy rates, high move-out rates and transfer requests, high rejection rates from applicants seeking housing, and low rent-collection rates;
- Physical deterioration/uninhabitable conditions: low levels of modernization expenditure over time, excessive development scale and/or density (as measured in units per acre), level of deferred maintenance, number of units that do not meet Housing Quality Standards (HQS), major system deficiencies, major structural deficiencies, and poor site conditions.

*Based on a prior sample survey on modernization needs of public housing, the Commission estimated that six percent of public housing units (approximately 86,000 units) were severely distressed.*

The Commission developed a National Action Plan to eradicate the problems of severely distressed public housing.<sup>13</sup> To address the needs of residents, the Commission proposed providing increased funding for supportive services, creating a national system to coordinate social and supportive services to enable residents to become self-sufficient, devising a system that requires Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) to solicit resident input into the solutions, and developing a national plan for delivering these supportive services to severely distressed developments. Further, the Commission recommended promoting economic development opportunities for residents, as well as including severely distressed public housing developments in enterprise zones.

To address management needs, the Commission proposed adjusting the public housing operating subsidy to reflect the current needs of severely distressed public housing, developing a new system to appraise the performance of housing organizations, and amending public housing rent calculations and income-eligibility regulations to promote income mixing in public housing developments.

To address the physical conditions of the developments, the Commission recommended eliminating unfit living conditions and (at the national level) providing leadership and guidance to PHAs in the planning, design, and on-going operation of their developments. The Commission also recommended establishing a model planning process, providing encouragement and incentives to achieve coordination among government programs, and providing opportunities for waiving HUD guidelines where appropriate.

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<sup>13</sup> *Preliminary Report and Proposed National Action Plan of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing*. Washington, DC, 1992.

The National Action Plan recommended several other strategies for addressing the problems of severely distressed public housing: encouraging PHAs to pursue private and nonprofit management options, addressing the lack of data on public housing, and eliminating the impediments to private-sector support for addressing the needs of developments. Finally, the Commission proposed that Congress authorize a new partnership program among PHAs, nonprofit organizations, the private sector, and residents to attract additional resources. HOPE VI grows directly out of the Commission's recommendations and is intended to address the problem areas identified in the Commission's report.

### **1.1.3 HOPE VI Overview and Application Requirements**

HOPE VI was authorized by the Departments of Veteran Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993 (the Appropriations Act). It was also authorized, with slight modifications (amending Section 24 of the 1937 Housing Act), by Section 120 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992.

*According to HUD,*

*HOPE VI grants are unique because they are aimed at accomplishing a comprehensive revitalization of severely distressed public housing developments by a simultaneous investment in sites, buildings and people.*

HOPE VI differs from previous attempts to address the problems of severely distressed public housing in two significant ways. First, public housing agency (PHA) plans are required to focus on the economic and social needs of the residents as well as the physical conditions of the development. Second, HOPE VI offers the PHA a great degree of flexibility in determining the approach most likely to be successful in treating the targeted development.

Under HOPE VI, the approach taken by the PHA must be consistent with the overall mandate of providing modestly designed construction and cost-effectiveness in the management of housing for low-income persons. However, HUD has urged the PHAs to "incorporate boldness and creativity" in their plans as they address such difficult problems as high density, crime, poor original design, and oppressive social and economic conditions. Finally, in order to ensure that the plans are as responsive as possible to residents' needs, HUD has urged PHAs to involve residents, neighborhood organizations, local and state governments, community businesses, and local supportive service agencies in the planning process. Thus HOPE VI is a comprehensive program combining physical reconstruction and redevelopment activities with supportive services, community services; and partnerships with residents and community institutions. ***Both planning and implementation grants have been made under HOPE VI.***

**The HOPE VI legislation specified how the grant funds were to be used as follows—(for implementation grants):**

- *at least 80 percent of the funding provided to each PHA shall be used for the capital costs of major reconstruction, rehabilitation and other physical improvements, for the capital costs of replacement units and for certificates under section 8(b) used for replacement and for management improvements for the reconstructed project and for planning and technical assistance purposes and*
- *not more than 20 percent shall be used for community service programs (as defined by the Commission on National and Community Service) and for supportive services, including, but not limited to, literacy training, job training, day care, youth activities, administrative expenses, and the permissive and mandatory services authorized under the Gateway program established in the Family Support Centers demonstration program.*

**Furthermore, the legislation provides that:**

- *each participating city shall make contributions for supportive services in an amount equal to 15 percent of the funding provided for supportive services and that these contributions shall be derived from non-Federal sources.*

HOPE VI *planning grants* cover the costs of studies, plans, designs, and organizational support to involve residents in the process.

In addition, other strategies to complement HOPE VI have been developed by HUD and other housing leaders. Leveraged HOPE VI (sometimes called HOPE VI Plus) is an initiative to use HOPE VI dollars to leverage other funding sources and form partnerships with the private sector.<sup>14</sup> The goals of HOPE VI Plus are to leverage development funding, encourage integrated neighborhood-wide development, and create mixed-income neighborhoods around HOPE VI developments.

There were numerous application requirements for HOPE VI. To be eligible to apply, an applicant had to be either a PHA located in one of the 40 most populous U.S. cities (based on the 1990 U.S.

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<sup>14</sup> The leveraged funding sources include Low Income Housing Tax Credit, CDBG, HOME, state, and private financing.

Census) or a PHA on HUD's Troubled Housing Authority list as of March 31, 1992. (PHAs qualifying on both lists are shown in bold on the Troubled Housing Authority list.<sup>15</sup>)

In addition to being an eligible PHA for a HOPE VI grant, the PHAs were required to meet several program requirements. *Documentation of severe distress*, based on the four categories set forth by The Final Report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing and cited above, was primary. *If severe distress could be documented in one of the four categories, that was sufficient.* Qualification in one category alone has permitted PHAs to propose "severely distressed developments" that range widely on any one distress dimension. For example, the level of physical deterioration of the buildings may range from minimal to extremely high because the developments with minimal deterioration have other severe problems that brought them into the program.

*Other requirements included funding limitations on the number of units and the maximum grant level, sustainability over the long term, cost analysis of alternatives between reconstruction and rehabilitation, resident consultation* (for keeping residents fully briefed and meaningfully involved in the HOPE VI program from design through long-term monitoring),<sup>16</sup> *local government certifications, and assurance of non-duplication of funding.* In addition, other requirements were applicable under specific conditions of the grant proposal: *if supportive services are proposed*, cities in which the PHA is an applicant must provide matching funds for at least 15 percent of the supportive services funds requested; *if demolition is proposed*, units must be replaced on a one-for-one basis,<sup>17</sup> *if persons will be displaced by reconstruction*, these persons must be eligible for occupancy of the replacement units; *if Comprehensive Grant Program (CGP) funds are used in conjunction with HOPE VI*, annual statements must show the use of these funds.

To rate the HOPE VI applications, the following categories were evaluated:

- Extent of revitalization need (0-30 points);
- Potential impact of the plan (0-30 points);

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<sup>15</sup> **Forty Most Populous U.S. Cities:** New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Philadelphia, PA; San Diego, CA; Detroit, MI; Dallas, TX; Phoenix, AZ; San Antonio, TX; San Jose, CA; Baltimore, MD; Indianapolis, IN; San Francisco, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Columbus, OH; Milwaukee, WI; Memphis, TN; Washington, DC; Boston, MA; Seattle, WA; El Paso, TX; Cleveland, OH; New Orleans, LA; Nashville-Davidson, TN; Denver, CO; Austin, TX; Fort Worth, TX; Oklahoma City, OK; Portland, OR; Kansas City, MO; Long Beach, CA; Tucson, AZ; St. Louis, MO; Charlotte, NC; Atlanta, GA; Virginia Beach, VA; Albuquerque, NM; Oakland, CA; Pittsburgh, PA.

**PHAs on the Troubled List as of 3/31/92:** [Bold citations are on both lists.] **Boston, MA;** Bridgeport, CT; New Haven, CT; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ; **Washington, DC;** **Philadelphia, PA;** Chester, PA; **Atlanta, GA;** Birmingham, AL; **Jacksonville, FL;** Puerto Rico; Virgin Islands; Cuyahoga, OH (**Cleveland**); **Detroit, MI;** **Indianapolis, IN;** Lucas County, OH (Toledo); East St. Louis, IL; **Chicago, IL;** Springfield, IL; **New Orleans, LA;** **Kansas City, MO;** **Los Angeles, CA;** **San Francisco, CA.**

<sup>16</sup> Resident consultation was not equivalent to veto power over the HOPE VI plan. PHAs, in consultation with HUD, had the final authority. This issue has not been well understood by residents.

<sup>17</sup> This requirement was later changed in the 1995 Rescission Bill (see Section 1.2.3).

- Capabilities of the applicant (0-20 points);
- Extent of resident involvement (0-15 points);
- Extent of involvement of local public and private entities (0-10 points); and
- Community service component (0-15 points).

Section 1.2 describes the PHAs that qualified and won HOPE VI grants under these program requirements.

## **1.2 SCOPE OF THE HOPE VI PROGRAM**

The Baseline for the Longitudinal Assessment of HOPE VI focuses on 15 of the 34 implementation grants awarded to PHAs in fiscal years 1993 through 1995. However, the scope of the HOPE VI program is much broader. This section introduces all grantees of HOPE VI funds through FY 1995.

### **1.2.1 HOPE VI Grants and Grantees**

Over three fiscal years, 1993 to 1995, Congress appropriated a total of \$1.6 billion for the HOPE VI program to revitalize severely distressed public housing. Through August 31, 1995, 34 regular implementation grants had been announced (and grant agreements had been signed) for a total of \$1.4 billion. Individual implementation grants ranged from \$16 million to \$50 million. In addition, FY 1995 planning grants had been awarded to 27 PHAs. Special “leveraged HOPE VI” grants have also been awarded with FY 1995 funds to five PHAs.


The funding allocation process for this program is shown schematically in Exhibit 1-1. The FY 1993 appropriation for HOPE VI was \$300 million. HUD developed a Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA), with rating and ranking criteria, that was published January 5, 1993. The initial NOFA provided for two types of grants: implementation grants (not to exceed \$50 million), to address not more than 500 distressed units; and planning grants (not to exceed \$500,000). Some 41 applications were received by the closing date of May 26, 1993. A ranking and review process selected 15 sites for 13 implementation grants (6 fully funded, 7 partially funded) and two planning grants. HUD announced the winners of the competition in September 1993.

In October 1993, passage of the FY 1994 appropriation bill provided an additional \$755 million to HOPE VI. The legislation mandated that HUD select the grantees for the FY 1994 appropriation from the partially funded and unfunded applications received for the FY1993 competition. Thus, the first two years of appropriation effectively resulted in a single funding round of \$1.05 billion, providing fully funded implementation grants for 26 sites and planning grants for eight others.

**Exhibit 1-1**  
**FY 1993 through FY 1995 Funding Allocations for HOPE VI and**  
**HOPE VI Grants by Type and FY**

<b>HOPE VI Funding Allocations</b>			
	<b>FY 1993</b>	<b>FY 1994</b>	<b>FY 1995</b>
<b>Appropriation:</b>	<b>\$ 300 million</b>	<b>\$ 755 million</b>	<b>\$ 500 million</b>
<b>Cumulative Funds:</b>	<b>\$ 300 million</b>	<b>\$ 1.05 billion</b>	<b>\$ 1.55 billion</b>

<b>HOPE VI Grant Awards</b>			
	<b>FY 1993</b>	<b>FY 1994</b>	<b>FY 1995</b>



While funding of nearly all of the applications for the program probably resulted in funding some poorly constructed applications, it also created a legal environment that allowed grantees to change their plans after receiving the grant award.

As with the FY 1994 funding, FY 1995 funding came with Congressional mandates about which sites should be funded. The FY 1995 appropriation of \$500 million mandated that HUD provide implementation grants to the eight HOPE VI sites previously awarded planning grants in FY 1993 and 1994, resulting in grant awards totaling \$350 million.

Because the grantees have been allowed to change their original proposals under HOPE VI, HUD offered them an opportunity to request amendment funds through the FY 1995 appropriation. Four housing authorities were provided a total of \$27 million in additional monies based upon their requests. Exhibit 1-2 shows the housing authority, HOPE VI development, and total amount of award (including amendment funds) for the 34 regular implementation grants over the three fiscal years totaling \$1.4 billion.

Not included in any of the following tables or discussions are the new “leveraged” HOPE VI implementation grants and the new planning grants made that used the remaining \$120 million FY 1995 appropriation. These last grants were announced in the Fall of 1995. The 27 new planning awards were based on responses to a letter sent out to all eligible housing authorities; any eligible PHA that could identify a distressed development was awarded a planning grant. The “leveraged” HOPE VI implementation grants were based on a separate competition, with 18 applications and five awards totaling \$100 million.

The 34 implementation grants went to 32 housing authorities; two housing authorities—Detroit and San Antonio—each received two implementation grants. Five sites have been awarded grants for the maximum amount of \$50 million, with 13 others receiving grants of more than \$45 million. Only four sites have been awarded grants of less than \$30 million.

Applicant PHAs were allowed to propose a plan that covered up to 500 units in three local areas. As a result, in eight cases, a HOPE VI “site” actually represents multiple developments.<sup>18</sup> For example, the Oakland Housing Authority is addressing six different developments—Lockwood Gardens, Coliseum Gardens, and four small scattered developments in the Lower Fruitvale area—with its \$25.5 million grant. In several other cases, the HOPE VI “site” is only a portion of the development.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> This is shown in Exhibit 1-2 with a slash (/) between the names of the developments (e.g., Techwood/Clark Howell in Atlanta).

<sup>19</sup> For instance, Philadelphia’s Richard Allen Homes has 1,324 units, of which only 500 are to be addressed by HOPE VI.



**Exhibit 1-2**  
**HOPE VI Implementation Grants — FY 93, FY 94, and FY 95**

Location of PHA	Development Name	Grant Amount
Atlanta, GA	Techwood/Clarke Howell	\$42,412,635
Baltimore, MD	Lafayette Courts	\$49,663,600
Boston, MA	Mission Main	\$49,992,350
Camden, NJ	McGuire Gardens	\$42,177,229
Charlotte, NC,	Earle Village**	\$41,740,155
Chicago, IL	Cabrini Homes Extension	\$50,000,000
Cleveland, OH	Outhwaite Homes/King Kennedy	\$50,000,000
Columbus, OH	Windsor Terrace	\$41,053,408
Dallas, TX	Lakewest	\$26,600,000
Denver, CO	Quigg Newton Homes**	\$26,498,288
Detroit, MI	Jeffries Homes Parkside Homes*	\$39,807,342 \$48,120,149
District of Columbia	Ellen Wilson Dwellings**	\$25,075,956
El Paso, TX	Kennedy Brothers*	\$35,724,644
Houston, TX	Allen Parkway Village	\$36,602,761
Indianapolis, IN	Concord Village/Eagle Creek*	\$30,999,010
Kansas City, MO	Guinotte Manor	\$47,579,800
Los Angeles, CA	Pico Gardens/Aliso South/Aliso North	\$50,000,000
Memphis, TN	Le Moyne Gardens*	\$47,762,182
Milwaukee, WI	Hillside Terrace**	\$44,689,446
New Haven, CT	Elm Haven	\$45,331,593
New Orleans, LA	Desire	\$44,255,908
New York, NY	Beach 41st Street*	\$48,200,952
Newark, NJ	Walsh Homes	\$49,996,000
Oakland, CA	Lockwood Gardens/Coliseum Gardens/Lower Fruitvale	\$25,510,020
Philadelphia, PA	Richard Allen Homes	\$50,000,000
Pittsburgh, PA	Allequippa Terrace	\$31,564,190
Puerto Rico	Crisantimos/Manuel A. Perez	\$50,000,000
San Antonio, TX	Springview Apts. Mirasol Homes*	\$48,810,294 \$48,530,050
San Francisco, CA	Bernal Dwellings/Yerba Buena Homes	\$49,992,377
Seattle, WA	Holly Park Apts.*	\$47,616,503
Springfield, IL	John Hay Homes/Charles Grandon Apt./Johnson Park	\$19,775,000
St. Louis, MO	Darst-Webbe*	\$47,271,000
<b>Total</b>	34 Implementation Grants	\$1,433,343,842
Source:	HUD's Office of Distressed and Troubled Housing Recovery Program Office Files	
Notes:	Excludes "leveraged" HOPE VI FY 1995 grants.	
	* Planning grant included as part of total grant amount	
	**Includes amendment funds	

## **The Housing Authorities with HOPE VI Grants**

The HOPE VI program is designed to target housing authorities in the 40 largest cities in the U.S., as well as large housing authorities (administering more than 1,250 units) that were “management-troubled” as of March 31, 1992. As one might expect, large cities are also the location of most of the large housing authorities. There are approximately 3,400 housing authorities in the United States and its territories, managing over 1.3 million public housing units. The 32 housing authorities receiving grants under this program (less than one percent of all housing authorities) manage a total of 506,000 public housing units, representing 37 percent of the national total. Three HOPE VI grantees in particular—the New York City, Puerto Rico, and Chicago housing authorities—together manage 20 percent of all public housing units nationwide.

In total, 17 of the 20 largest housing authorities received one or more implementation grant.<sup>20</sup> The remaining 15 housing authorities to receive HOPE VI grants were more varied in size. Only six of the next 20 largest housing authorities received grants, while seven of the HOPE VI grantees have less than 4,000 public housing units in management. Among the factors that will be important in the long run is a housing authority’s ability to manage the very large HOPE VI grant.

Congress intended the HOPE VI program to remedy the distress of family developments that are too large to be addressed within the funding and regulatory constraints of the Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program (CIAP) or Comprehensive Grant Programs (CGP).<sup>21</sup> HOPE VI is supposed to be targeted to the relatively few developments that drain a housing authority’s resources and prevent it from adequately managing its other sites and units.<sup>22</sup>

While there is not an all inclusive list of distressed developments nationwide, it is possible to identify developments with two key underlying characteristics that often lead to the distress HOPE VI is intended to address: developments for family occupancy that are large and old. Public housing developments that serve families have very high levels of use.<sup>23</sup> The larger and older the

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<sup>20</sup> Dade County is the 11th largest PHA, but was not eligible to apply for the program because the HOPE VI program was only available to the 40 largest “cities” in the United States (based on 1990 Census data) or troubled housing authorities (as of 3/31/92) with improving management ratings. (See Footnote 15 for the list of eligible PHAs.)

<sup>21</sup> These are the regular sources of federal funding for modernization. CGP replaced CIAP in FY 1992 and FY 1993 for all but the smallest PHAs.

<sup>22</sup> Although the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing estimated that six percent of the public housing program could be considered severely distressed, this estimate was based on a sample survey. An exhaustive list of “severely distressed” developments is therefore unavailable. While the Commission recommended that HUD develop better data on the subject, at this date the information has yet to be compiled.

<sup>23</sup> The “family developments” are typically older and have many small units. Originally designed for “general occupancy,” (prior to the construction of exclusively “elderly developments”), they contain a mix of unit sizes that were appropriate for the original residents—both families and elderly residents. Currently, a unit that is designated for family occupancy may be occupied by an elderly individual who has aged in place or is living with children/grandchildren. Indeed, many developments with all “family” units have high proportions of elderly heads of household. Units

development, the greater the “wear and tear.” Exhibit 1-3 shows how many units each of the HOPE VI grantees manage, and the proportion that are in large and old developments occupied by families.<sup>24</sup>

**Harold Lucas, Executive Director of the Newark Housing Authority, provides this telling example about wear and tear at one of Newark’s high-rise family developments, to partly explain why it was “a failed project the day someone dreamed it up:”**

*Let me tell you about the elevators. Say there are 300 apartments, with 4 bedrooms each. Subtract 300 adults, put 3 kids in a bedroom and you have 2,700 kids. Take an average school day. Each kid rides down in the morning, up when school lets out, down to go out and play, and up for dinner. That’s 10,800 rides a day; forget the adults, the boyfriends, the shopping trips.<sup>25</sup>*

While the 32 housing authorities receiving HOPE VI implementation grants manage 37 percent of all public housing units nationally, they manage 71 percent of the family units located in developments that are both larger than 300 units and built before 1960. Indeed, 42 percent of all the family units that the 32 HOPE VI grantees manage are old and large, compared to 13 percent for all remaining U.S. housing authorities. Several of these HOPE VI housing authorities are confronted with the daunting management task of dealing with a public housing stock dominated by large and old developments. In Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Memphis, New Orleans, Newark, Pittsburgh, Springfield, and St. Louis, more than 60 percent of the family stock is old and large.

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designated as “elderly” are intended for singles or couples over the age of 62.

<sup>24</sup> Note that Exhibit 1-3 does not show the proportion of actual distressed developments. Large and old developments that were well-designed, carefully maintained, and well-managed may never become distressed. On the other hand, large and old public housing developments that had inappropriate design for family housing, poor initial construction, and/or poor management are very likely to be distressed.

<sup>25</sup> Gugliotta, Guy. “Newark Housing Authority Raises Its HUD Rating as It Razes High-Rises,” *Washington Post*, September 2, 1995, A9.

**Exhibit 1-3**  
**Total Public Housing Units, Non-Elderly Units, Large and Old Public Housing Developments\***

Location of PHA	All PHA Units		All Non-elderly PHA units	
	Total	Percent Non-Elderly	Total	Percent Large & Old
Atlanta, GA	14,461	74.0	10,696	56.4
Baltimore, MD	18,053	76.2	13,764	53.8
Boston, MA	11,384	72.7	8,277	85.7
Camden, NJ	2,334	86.8	2,026	40.5
Charlotte, NC	3,416	59.1	2,019	27.7
Chicago, IL	39,055	75.6	29,545	61.4
Cuyahoga County, OH	11,901	62.6	7,449	51.8
Columbus, OH	4,542	58.3	2,648	56.6
Dallas, TX	6,971	84.5	5,891	16.2
Denver, CO	3,604	75.1	2,705	14.8
Detroit, MI	8,159	55.7	4,547	72.7
District of Columbia	11,666	72.7	8,480	39.4
El Paso, TX	6,268	88.1	5,521	17.5
Houston, TX	4,044	83.8	3,387	59.5
Indianapolis, IN	2,729	66.4	1,813	.0
Kansas City, MO	1,751	82.4	1,442	25.4
Los Angeles, CA	9,099	94.7	8,613	76.6
Memphis, TN	7,088	91.2	6,467	65.9
Milwaukee, WI	4,753	52.1	2,476	70.4
New Haven, CT	3,484	64.7	2,254	20.5
New Orleans, LA	13,670	95.6	13,074	76.5
New York, NY	154,910	85.5	132,501	34.1
Newark, NJ	11,553	87.0	10,051	66.3
Oakland, CA	3,124	93.6	2,923	26.1
Philadelphia, PA	22,541	88.5	19,940	42.0
Pittsburgh, PA	9,210	67.3	6,195	63.0
Puerto Rico	56,799	77.6	44,077	16.5
San Antonio, TX	8,086	66.7	5,394	41.3
San Francisco, CA	6,630	67.0	4,445	27.8
Seattle, WA	6,667	50.8	3,384	45.4
Springfield, IL	1,327	55.2	733	77.2
St. Louis, MO	6,769	57.2	3,871	68.0
<b>HOPE VI PHAs Total</b>	<b>476,048</b>	<b>79.1</b>	<b>376,608</b>	<b>42.5</b>
<b>Remaining U. S. PHAs Total</b>	<b>787,506</b>	<b>67.0</b>	<b>527,930</b>	<b>12.5</b>

Source: SMIRPH, 1995

Note: \*Large developments have more than 300 units. Old developments were built before 1960.

Old and large developments require constant management attention and regular infusions of capital replacement/improvement funding, to deal with everyday wear and tear plus the normal life span of systems and materials. The design and density of some developments made their management and maintenance nearly impossible from the start. On the other hand, some otherwise viable developments have become distressed due primarily to poor management by the housing authority. Both scenarios reflect a housing authority's ability (or inability) to manage public housing. Yet, good management alone, absent enough money, will not prevail in the end. For HOPE VI, a housing authority's ability to manage the revitalization of its distressed development(s), while also maintaining the remainder of the stock, is critical.

Exhibit 1-4 shows HUD's Public Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP) average scores for the HOPE VI grantees.<sup>26</sup> Of the 32 housing authorities to receive a HOPE VI grant 12 were considered "management-troubled" (a PHMAP score of 60 or less out of 100) in 1993. A troubled housing authority must enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with HUD stating specific milestones to achieve in order to resolve the troubled status. Several of these housing authorities have been troubled for years, and many of the others have been troubled in the past. Indeed, five of the 20 housing authorities not troubled in 1993 were troubled as of April 1992, when they applied for the HOPE VI program. They have since moved out of troubled status.<sup>27</sup>

The remaining three columns in Exhibit 1-4 show some of the indicators that contribute to the PHMAP scores. High vacancy rates, long times to prepare a unit for re-occupancy, and high fraction of the monthly rent roll delinquent or overdue are indicators of management difficulties.<sup>28</sup> On average, the HOPE VI housing authorities have much higher levels of management problems than non-HOPE VI housing authorities. There are, however, six "high-performing" housing authorities that have received HOPE VI funding for distressed public housing developments: Dallas, Denver, Milwaukee, New York, San Antonio, and Seattle. How housing authority management affects their HOPE VI sites will be important to monitor over the coming years.

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<sup>26</sup> PHMAP is an assessment tool developed by HUD for evaluating and comparing the management performance of the PHAs across the country. Section 2.2.1 of Chapter Two provides a more detailed discussion of the management criteria included in the PHMAP scores.

<sup>27</sup> HUD is requiring the troubled housing authorities to set up mechanisms to manage the HOPE VI grants independently of their other activities. For very troubled housing authorities (Detroit, Washington, DC, New Orleans, and Philadelphia), HUD is requiring designation of an "alternative administrator." The alternative administrator is generally a private management organization that plays the role of the housing authority in managing the HOPE VI grant funds and the rehabilitation process.

<sup>28</sup> As shown in Exhibit 1-4, rent roll delinquency can exceed 100 percent because the numerator is the cumulative total rents delinquent divided by the monthly total rents due.

**Exhibit 1-4**  
**1993 Management Indicators for HOPE VI Implementation Grantees**

Location of PHA		1993 PHMAP Average Score	Percent Vacancy 1993	Average Number of Days to Turn Around a Unit for Reoccupancy	Percent of Rent Roll Delinquent
Atlanta, GA	T	55.45	15.00	159	12.84
Baltimore, MD		73.90	11.10	46	4.59
Boston, MA		70.94	13.00	45	53.48
Camden, NJ		65.12	13.60	38	4.04
Charlotte, NC		86.41	4.10	30	4.56
Chicago, IL	T	46.38	17.00	125	60.90
Cuyahoga County, OH		76.50	26.00	391	1.95
Columbus, OH		74.05	12.80	75	8.03
Dallas, TX	H	95.23	2.00	30	4.25
Denver, CO	H	95.72	0.00	0	1.10
Detroit, MI	T	37.35	39.63	61	79.18
District of Columbia	T	22.38	19.00	223	276.51
El Paso, TX		81.02	7.00	39	8.48
Houston, TX		80.39	13.46	44	3.07
Indianapolis, IN		69.66	27.94	185	3.40
Kansas City, MO	T	51.46	40.00	389	8.09
Los Angeles, CA		84.95	0.49	14	5.25
Memphis, TN	T	56.13	10.40	60	16.61
Milwaukee, WI	H	90.68	3.10	36	4.32
New Haven, CT	T	59.87	12.18	161	8.37
New Orleans, LA	T	48.21	23.92	145	26.89
New York, NY	H	93.70	0.51	14	8.27
Newark, NJ		70.88	30.00	51	1.73
Oakland, CA		78.30	2.00	30	5.16
Philadelphia, PA	T	25.68	24.17	227	154.62
Pittsburgh, PA	T	51.87	26.00	145	6.09
Puerto Rico	T	34.61	NA	9	NA
San Antonio, TX	H	91.14	6.00	29	7.77
San Francisco, CA		69.30	2.00	35	0.57
Seattle, WA	H	92.59	0.80	36	2.86
Springfield, IL	T	57.61	17.57	150	1.85
St. Louis, MO		72.33	26.00	284	26.03
<b>HOPE VI PHA Average</b>		67.49	14.41	103	26.16
<b>Remaining PHA Average</b>		84.19	5.14	29	8.25

Source: SMIRPH, 1995

Notes: PHMAP scale contains 100 points total. PHAs with average scores under 60 points are considered "management-troubled" (T). PHAs with scores over 90 points are considered "high-performing" (H).

### **1.2.2 The HOPE VI Sites**

There is considerable diversity among the 34 HOPE VI sites in terms of development size, age, type of structure, and vacancy rate. Exhibit 1-5 shows the total units in each of the HOPE VI developments,<sup>29</sup> the percent of units that are designated family units, the year the development opened, the type of structure(s) and vacancy rates at two different dates (the time of grant application, and late 1994, when most of the housing authorities had signed grant agreements).

The diversity of development size is the first thing to note, as it ranges from the scattered-site 77-units in the Lower Fruitvale area in Oakland to the mammoth 3,462-unit Lakewest in Dallas. This wide variation in development size has created two issues, which will need to be followed over time:

- If a development is too large to be completely addressed by HOPE VI and other available resources, will the effect of the resources spent be lost due to the inability to address the remainder of the development?
- If a development is relatively small, is it appropriate to use HOPE VI funds when other resources could be brought to bear or other funding sources could suffice?

The developments are also wide-ranging in age, from some of the oldest public housing developments in the United States (Techwood in Atlanta and Outhwaite Homes in Cleveland) to some relatively new developments (Johnson Park in Springfield, IL and King Kennedy in Cleveland).<sup>30</sup>

Most of the HOPE VI developments consist almost entirely of family units. The developments that stand out—with relatively few family units—are King Kennedy in Cleveland and Jeffries in Detroit. In both cases, the developments are comprised of multiple structure types, with elevator buildings containing units for the elderly.

Curiously, despite the focus on family high-rises in the public discussion of distressed public housing, only seven of the 34 HOPE VI developments include family high-rise structures. This relative scarcity of family high-rises among targeted sites does not imply that there is not considerable distress among the family high-rise structures. Rather, it reflects three things: high-rise family living is not the sole cause of distress; relatively few housing authorities house families in large high-rises; and the HOPE VI application process limited housing authorities to addressing a maximum of three local areas with a maximum grant of \$50 million.

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<sup>29</sup> There are 41 developments listed in Exhibit 1-5, to be treated under 34 grants. Some grants are for more than 1 development.

<sup>30</sup> Both the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County were eligible to apply for HOPE VI funds. The application was submitted by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (“Cuyahoga Metro”) for two developments in Cleveland. In this report, we use Cuyahoga Metro for references to the PHA and Cleveland for references to the location of the developments.

**Exhibit 1-5**  
**Size, Age, Type, and Vacancy Rates at HOPE VI Targeted Developments at Baseline**

Location of PHA	Development Name	Total Units	Percent Family Units	Year Opened	Structure Type	Percent Vacant	
						1992	11/94
Atlanta, GA	Clarke Howell	624	100	1940	Walk-up	25	1
	Techwood	457	100	1936	Row	9	94
Baltimore, MD	Lafayette Courts	805	100	1955	Elev/Walk-up	2	29
Boston, MA	Mission Main	849	100	1940	Walk-up	12	29
Camden, NJ	McGuire Gardens	368	100	1955	Row	34	4
Charlotte, NC	Earle Village	409	70	1967	Row	5	16
Chicago, IL	Cabrini Homes Ext.	1,921	100	1958	Elev	33	37
Cuyahoga County, OH	King Kennedy	681	32	1970	Walk-up/Elev	66	59
	Outhwaite Homes	1,013	63	1935/1939	Walk-up	51	46
Columbus, OH	Windsor Terrace	442	100	1959	Row	5	14
Dallas, TX	Lakewest	3,462	91	1954	Row	73	74
Denver, CO	Quigg Newton Homes	400	100	1952	Row	0	1
Detroit, MI	Jeffries Homes	2,170	33	1955	Elev/Row/Walk-up	NA	54
	Parkside Homes	737	100	1938	Row/Walk-up	89	100
District of Columbia	Ellen Wilson Dwellings	134	100	1941	Walk-up	100	100
El Paso, TX	Kennedy Brothers	364	100	1973	Row	2	8
Houston, TX	Allen Parkway Village	1,004	73	1942/1944	Walk-up	95	98
Indianapolis, IN	Concord Village	200	100	1968	Row	21	21
Kansas City, MO	Guinotte Manor	418	81	1954	Row	38	41
Los Angeles, CA	Aliso South/North	336	100	1954	Row	0	1
	Pico Gardens	260	100	1942	Row	0	
<b>Exhibit 1-5 (continues)</b>							
<b>Total HOPE VI</b>		30,512	87	1936-1973	—	35	43
<b>National Total</b>		1,263,500	72	—	—	8	NA

Source: SMIRPH, 1992-1995 and Office of Distressed and Troubled Housing Recovery Programs Office Files.  
Note: No data available.

Vacancy rates are due in part to the type of distress with which a development is afflicted. High vacancies are the result of deteriorated physical structures (e.g., Desire in New Orleans), poor management (inability to prepare a unit for reoccupancy), development reputation resulting in high turnover rates, and/or a specific PHA policy of closing buildings for security and other reasons (e.g., Cabrini Green in Chicago). Developments that are distressed largely due to their occupancy by extremely poor and isolated families or very high crime rates will still be occupied by families that have no other shelter alternatives—especially in the very expensive housing markets of Los Angeles, Oakland, New York City, and San Francisco. Vacancy rates also vary considerably from site to site. The average vacancy rate for the HOPE VI developments was 35 percent at the time of application, compared to a national total of eight percent. While a high vacancy rate can be one of the telling signs of distress, there is an immense range across sites—from zero percent vacancy at Beach 41st Street in New York to 100 percent vacancy at Ellen Wilson Dwellings in Washington, DC.



**Exhibit 1-5 (continued)**  
**Size, Age, Type, and Vacancy Rates at HOPE VI Targeted Developments at Baseline**

Location of PHA	Development Name	Total Units	Percent Family Units	Year Opened	Structure Type	Percent Vacant	
						1992	11/94
Memphis, TN	Le Moyne Gardens	842	100	1941	Walk-up	10	21
Milwaukee, WI	Hillside Terrace	596	91	1950/1956	Walk-up/Row/Elev	9	22
New Haven, CT	Elm Haven	462	100	1941	Walk-up/Low-rise	6	18
New Orleans, LA	Desire	1,832	100	1954	Walk-up	51	74
New York, NY	Beach 41st Street	712	84	1970	Elev	0	1
Newark, NJ	Walsh Homes	630	100	1953	Elev/Walk-up	43	56
Oakland, CA	Coliseum Gardens	178	100	1963	Walk-up	1	2
	Lockwood Gardens	372	100	1942	Low-rise/semi-det.	2	2
	Lower Fruitvale	77	100	1970	Walk-up/Scattered	4	4
Philadelphia, PA	Richard Allen Homes	1,321	100	1941	Walk-up	45	55
Pittsburgh, PA	Allequippa Terrace	1,749	64	1941	Walk-up	19	27
Puerto Rico	Crisantimos	224	96	1976	Elev	0	0
	M.A. Perez	400	80	1964	Walk-up	1	0
San Antonio, TX	Mirasol Homes	500	87	1953	Walk-up	4	2
	Springview Apts.	421	97	1953/1959	Walk-up	13	19
San Francisco, CA	Bernal Dwellings	208	100	1953	Walk-up/Elev.	1	6
	Yerba Buena Homes	276	100	1956	Elev/Walk-up	0	2
Seattle, WA	Holly Park Apts.	893	100	1941	Walk-up	2	9
Springfield, IL	Charles Brandon Apts.	74	97	1971	Semi-detached	42	NA
	Johnson Park	95	99	1978	Single-family	33	25
	John Hay Homes	596	95	1941	Row	46	76
St. Louis, MO	Darst-Webbe	1,000	100	1956	Elev	62	57
<b>Total HOPE VI</b>		30,512	87	1936-1973	—	35	43
<b>National Total</b>		1,263,500	72	—	—	8	NA

Source: SMIRPH, 1992-1995 and Office of Distressed and Troubled Housing Recovery Programs Office Files.

Note: No data available.

In many cases, vacancy rates at the HOPE VI sites changed between 1992 and 1994 from the time of grant application to the time the agreement was signed. Overall, vacancy rates increased, as several housing authorities stopped reoccupying units and some started relocating tenants after award of the HOPE VI grant. Atlanta's Techwood Homes, Baltimore's Lafayette Courts, and Charlotte's Earle Village give the clearest indications of this activity. Housing authority efforts to increase vacancies at these sites allowed them to be among the first to conduct demolitions. Counter to expectations, four other sites actually increased occupancy during the 1992 to 1994 period. In Atlanta and Springfield, the change in occupancy appears to be the product of relocation from another HOPE VI site. The change at McGuire Gardens in Camden is due to relocation of tenants from another development undergoing CGP-funded renovation. Developments with high occupancy face a greater challenge in their efforts to relocate tenants for renovation or demolition. This is particularly the case for sites perceived to be desirable locations for outside private investment and redevelopment, where residents may fear that they will not be able to return to the site or apartment after improvements are made.

Exhibit 1-6 shows the amounts and sources of incomes for households living in the HOPE VI developments. As with all the other development characteristics, household incomes range widely, from an annual median household income in Puerto Rico's Crisantimos development of \$1,200, to a high of \$10,164 at Lower Fruitvale in Oakland. The median household income for residents of HOPE VI developments is \$5,350, compared to a national median of \$6,238 for public housing.

The total household income for families with earned income averages approximately twice as much as that of households with public assistance income, as shown in Exhibit 1-6. Nonetheless, only 18 percent of the HOPE VI households had earned income, compared to 66 percent receiving public assistance.<sup>31</sup> Most of the households in the HOPE VI developments are economically distressed, but only somewhat more so than the public housing population nationally. Indeed, some of the sites have a surprising number of households with earned income; developments in El Paso, Los Angeles, New York, Puerto Rico, and San Antonio all have more than 30 percent of households with earned income. At the other end of the spectrum, HOPE VI developments in Cleveland, Detroit, Oakland, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco have less than 10 percent working households. Similarly, Baltimore, Milwaukee, Oakland, San Francisco, Springfield, and St. Louis have extremely high levels of dependence, with over 80 percent of their households on public assistance.

### **1.2.3 HOPE VI Local Plans**

What plans are these PHAs pursuing for the very diverse developments under HOPE VI? The plans are as varied as the developments themselves—some the product of local initiative, some the product of Congressional and HUD policy priorities, and others the result of local and federal compromises. The first winners (of the 26 FY 1993 implementation grants) were constrained to redeveloping only 500 units with HOPE VI funds. The eight implementation grants provided later (to the sites initially awarded planning grants) did not have such a constraint. Another major change in federal rules occurred in the FY 1995 Rescission Bill. That bill did not rescind money from HOPE VI, but it did eliminate a long-standing statutory requirement that all demolished public housing units be replaced on a one-for-one basis. ***The cancellation permitted all of the housing authorities with HOPE VI grants the option of removing units without replacing them.***

Each HOPE VI plan has multiple components, focusing on three general areas: physical improvements, management improvements, and social and community services. Chapter 5 explores all three areas in more detail. As indicated previously, at least 80 percent of the HOPE VI funding is to be spent on physical improvements in the development(s). Exhibit 1-7 shows the proposed initiatives for physical revitalization. The different basic options are: rehabilitation; reconfiguration; demolition with some type of replacement (on-site, off-site, Section 8); and using the HOPE VI grant money to leverage private capital for development of additional low-income and market-rate housing units. Some or all of these options can be combined in the plan for a single site.

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<sup>31</sup> Households may have multiple income sources and appear in more than one column.

**Exhibit 1-6  
Amount and Type of Household Income in 1993**

Location of PHA	Project Name	Total Households (HH)	Median HH Income	HHs with Earned Income		HHs with Social Security*		HHs with Public Assistance	
				% of HHs	Median Amount	% of HHs	Median Amount	% of HHs	Median Amount
Atlanta, GA	Clarke Howell Techwood	587	\$3,960	14	\$7,436	19	\$5,280	62	\$3,360
		411	\$3,960	15	\$5,491	29	\$5,421	51	\$3,360
Baltimore, MD	Lafayette Courts	797	\$4,644	16	\$10,224	13	\$5,448	81	\$3,768
Boston, MA	Mission Main	725	\$6,641	24	\$13,686	0	NA	73	\$6,468
Camden, NJ	McGuire Gardens	240	\$6,093	18	\$11,997	19	\$5,031	75	\$5,578
Charlotte, NC	Earle Village	394	\$5,064	28	\$8,060	26	\$4,944	60	\$3,264
Chicago, IL	Cabrini Homes Ext	1,251	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cuyahoga County, OH	King Kennedy Outhwaite Homes	230	\$5,448	7	\$11,313	25	\$5,484	77	\$5,064
		497	\$4,092	7	\$7,208	12	\$5,149	77	\$4,008
Columbus, OH	Windsor Terrace	421	\$5,208	13	\$10,759	15	\$5,315	79	\$4,315
Dallas, TX	Lakewest	907	\$3,268	21	\$7,673	22	\$4,500	66	\$2,208
Denver, CO	Quigg Newton Homes	396	\$5,208	17	\$9,467	34	\$5,613	48	\$4,272
Detroit, MI	Jeffries Homes Parkside Homes	998	\$5,508	10	\$6,872	41	\$5,616	43	\$5,376
		35	\$5,508	3	\$9,030	40	\$5,554	46	\$5,508
El Paso, TX	Kennedy Brothers	357	\$3,695	38	\$8,812	14	\$5,206	52	\$2,208
Houston, TX	Allen Parkway Village	27	\$5,107	11	\$3,366	44	\$4,956	48	\$5,064
Indianapolis, IN	Concord Village	158	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Kansas City, MO	Guinotte Manor	292	\$4,104	18	\$9,603	27	\$5,208	49	\$3,504
Los Angeles, CA	Aliso South/North Pico Gardens	335	\$7,956	36	\$9,749	9	\$5,772	67	\$7,241
		239	\$9,888	33	\$10,564	21	\$6,540	70	\$7,284
<b>Exhibit 1-6 continues</b>									
<b>Total HOPE VI</b>		19,394	\$5,350	18	\$8,642	19	\$5,376	66	\$4,260
<b>Total U.S. Public Housing</b>		1.2 million	\$6,238	23	\$9,360	42	\$6,055	43	\$3,828

Source: December 1993 extract of Multi-Family Tenant Characteristic System (MTCS) data.

Note: \*Social Security includes SSI and SSDI.

**Exhibit 1-6 (continued)**  
**Amount and Type of Household Income in 1993**

Location of PHA	Project Name	Total Households (HH)	Median HH Income	HHs with Earned Income		HHs with Social Security*		HHs with Public Assistance	
				% of HHs	Median Amount	% of HHs	Median Amount	% of HHs	Median Amount
Memphis, TN	Le Moyne Gardens	751	\$2,712	11	\$4,801	21	\$5,208	77	\$2,220
Milwaukee, WI	Hillside Terrace	547	\$7,404	17	\$9,201	15	\$5,451	83	\$6,204
New Haven, CT	Elm Haven	429	\$6,972	18	\$15,300	29	\$5,318	67	\$5,676
New Orleans, LA	Desire	893	\$3,792	15	\$8,041	16	\$4,236	78	\$3,324
New York, NY	Beach 41st Street	710	\$7,593	36	\$17,730	31	\$6,240	44	\$5,136
Newark, NJ	Walsh Homes	359	\$5,856	25	\$13,380	29	\$6,459	47	\$5,088
Oakland, CA	Coliseum Gardens	158	\$9,759	9	\$9,382	5	\$4,249	90	\$8,916
	Lockwood Gardens	365	\$7,488	12	\$7,963	12	\$4,961	78	\$7,440
	Lower Fruitvale	161	\$10,164	25	\$15,208	9	\$4,793	75	\$7,740
Philadelphia, PA	Richard Allen homes	715	\$5,964	11	\$10,322	3	\$3,360	68	\$4,836
Pittsburgh, PA	Allequippa Terrace	1,404	\$3,792	2	\$11,684	12	\$5,525	79	\$3,792
Puerto Rico	Crisantimos	415	\$1,200	42	\$1,250	9	\$3,376	28	\$984
	M.A. Perez	396	\$1,560	48	\$1,200	20	\$3,114	31	\$804
San Antonio, TX	Mirasol Homes	468	\$3,623	30	\$6,222	18	\$5,208	66	\$2,652
	Springview Apts.	349	\$2,952	20	\$7,381	24	\$5,448	62	\$2,208
San Francisco, CA	Bernal Dwellings	204	\$7,384	9	\$11,777	1	\$2,413	89	\$6,606
	Yerba Buena Homes	274	\$7,296	9	\$10,578	0	NA	84	\$6,581
Seattle, WA	Holly Park Apts.	858	\$7,141	19	\$12,480	21	\$5,544	74	\$6,372
Springfield, IL	Charles Grandon Apt.	60	\$6,348	10	\$4,836	32	\$5,208	85	\$4,836
	John Hay Homes	330	\$4,836	14	\$5,421	25	\$5,064	53	\$4,260
	Johnson Park	78	\$5,652	13	\$8,234	42	\$5,208	68	\$4,260
St. Louis, MO	Darst-Webbe	176	\$5,448	11	\$9,416	10	\$2,996	84	\$5,208
<b>Total HOPE VI</b>		19,394	\$5,350	18	\$8,642	19	\$5,376	66	\$4,260
<b>Total U.S. Public Housing</b>		1.2 million	\$6,238	23	\$9,360	42	\$6,055	43	\$3,828

Source: December 1993 extract of Multi-Family Tenant Characteristic System (MTCS) data.

Note: \*Social Security includes SSI and SSDI.

**Exhibit 1-7  
Proposed Initiatives for Physical Revitalization, September 1995**

Location of PHA		Total Number of Units	Number of HOPE VI Units	Number of Units To Be:			Replacement On-site/off-site	Leveraged HOPE VI Replacement	Section 8 Replacement
				Renovated	Reconfigured	Demolished			
Atlanta, GA	Techwood/Clarke Howell	1081	500	-	-	1081	360 / 284	540	427
Baltimore, MD	Lafayette Courts	807	500	18	-	771	338 / 0	48	385
Boston, MA	Mission Main	822	500	-	-	822	unknown	unknown	unknown
Camden, NJ	McGuire Gardens	367	367	367	-	-	0 / 0	0	0
Charlotte, NC	Earle Village	409	409	109	-	300	130 / 94	40	75
Chicago, IL	Cabrini-Green	1921	500	60	-	660	493	0	167
Cuyahoga County, OH	Outhwaite Homes/King Kennedy	2208	500	500	-	-	0 / 0	0	0
Columbus, OH	Windsor Terrace	442	442	-	-	442	230 / 142	0	70
Dallas, TX	Lakewest	3500	500	-	-	50	0 / 335	0	167
Denver, CO	Quigg Newton Homes	400	400	375	-	25	unknown	unknown	unknown
Detroit, MI	Jeffries Homes	2170	500	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown
Detroit, MI	Parkside Homes	737	500	-	387	350	131 / 0	350	0
District of Columbia	Ellen Wilson Dwellings	134	134	-	-	134	134 / 0	27	20
El Paso, TX	Kennedy Brothers	364	364	172	68	124	124 / 0	50	0
Houston, TX	Allen Parkway Village	1000	500	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown
Indianapolis, IN	Concord Village/Eagle Creek	310	310	-	-	310	205 / 35	0	70
Kansas City, MO	Guinotte Manor	418	418	172	-	246	246	0	0
Los Angeles, CA	Pico Gardens/Aliso	577	481	-	-	481	265 / 0	0	216
Memphis, TN	LeMoyné Gardens	842	500	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown
Milwaukee, WI	Hillside Terrace	596	496	259	-	119	0 / 79	0	39
New Haven, CT	Elm Haven	462	380	-	-	462	unknown	unknown	unknown
New Orleans, LA	Desire	1832	500	-	-	1,160	unknown	unknown	unknown
New York, NY	Beach 41st Street	712	500	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown
Newark, NJ	Walsh Homes	630	500	-	-	630	502 / 0	0	128
Oakland, CA	Lockwood Gardens/ Coliseum Gardens/ Lower Fruitvale	438	438	424	-	14	14 / 0	0	unknown
Philadelphia, PA	Richard Allen Homes	1324	500	-	376	129	129 / 0	0	0
Pittsburgh, PA	Allequippa Terrace	1749	483	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown
Puerto Rico	Cristantimos/M.A. Perez	624	264	-	-	264	176	56	88
San Antonio, TX	Mirasol Homes	500	500	-	-	500	500	0	0
San Antonio, TX	Springview	421	421	-	-	421	421	unknown	0
San Francisco, CA	Bernal Dwellings Yerba Buena Homes	484	484	-	-	484	353 / 0	0	131
Seattle, WA	Holly Park Apts.	893	500	-	-	893	unknown	400	250
Springfield, IL	John Hay Homes/Charles Grandon/Johnson Park	731	485	132	131	599	unknown	unknown	unknown
St. Louis, MO	Darst-Webbe	1000	500	-	-	758	unknown	unknown	unknown

Those physical plan options are components of several different strategies being implemented to attack the problems at the HOPE VI developments.<sup>32</sup>

- **Strategy 1:** Rehabilitation/reconfiguration of the current units, strongly emphasizing on-site social and community services (as in Cuyahoga County and Milwaukee).
- **Strategy 2:** Decreasing density through demolition and building smaller public housing developments off-site or using “soft replacement”—tenant-based Section 8 (as in Baltimore, Chicago, and Dallas).
- **Strategy 3:** Using the HOPE VI resources to leverage resources from private investors and build moderate- low-income and market rate units (as in Atlanta and Seattle).
- **Strategy 4:** Using the HOPE VI resources for redevelopment but also as a catalyst for overall change in the neighborhood (as in San Antonio and Charlotte).

The Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI focuses on 15 of the 34 HOPE VI grants.<sup>33</sup> The PHAs selected include: Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA; Camden, NJ; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Cuyahoga County, OH; Detroit, MI (Jeffries Homes); District of Columbia; Milwaukee, WI; New Haven, CT; New Orleans, LA; Oakland, CA; San Antonio, TX (Springview Apartments); and San Francisco, CA. These 15 represent the spectrum of physical, management, crime, and family distress found in all of the sites. They also represent each of the different strategies for change. Since the purpose of the Baseline for the Longitudinal Assessment of HOPE VI is to provide the numbers and the texture for these sites’ starting point in the program, it was important to choose those that were representative of dimensions likely to be important to the ultimate effectiveness of the HOPE VI.

### **1.3 SUMMARY OF APPROACH TO THE BASELINE FOR THE LONGITUDINAL ASSESSMENT OF THE HOPE VI PROGRAM**

As mentioned in the introduction, HUD’s long-term strategy for the HOPE VI evaluation relies on a panel of Local Research Affiliates (LRAs). The LRAs are familiar with local conditions and needs, can work closely with the local public housing authority, and can identify meaningful local HOPE VI accomplishments and eventual program impacts. The LRAs have played an important role in the baseline assessment.

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<sup>32</sup> From the information made available to Abt Associates, it is not possible to classify all of the 34 grant awards by HOPE VI strategy. Because some of the PHAs included in the Baseline Sample have not submitted their final plans to HUD, it is not even possible to classify all of these 15 PHAs plans. The Baseline Sample PHAs are discussed in detail in Chapters 2, 3, and 5.

<sup>33</sup> See Appendix A for the methodology used to select the 15 sites.

As HUD's prime contractor for the baseline assessment, Abt Associates' responsibilities included:

- Overall management, identification, and recruitment of the Research Advisory Group and local research affiliates;
- Coordinating meetings, establishing a communication network, and maintaining regular phone contact with the local research affiliates;
- Overall design, including the handbook and three protocols for collection of local baseline data;
- Acquisition of HUD and Census data;
- Review of HOPE VI Baseline Data Forms and the Baseline Case Study reports; and
- Analysis across sites and preparation of the Cross-Site Baseline Report.

The responsibilities of each LRA were to:

- Adapt the case study design to the local site in accordance with the handbook and research protocols;
- Collect core data required for the cross-site analysis (using not only quantitative data but also ethnographic and other qualitative methods, as appropriate);
- Fill out the HOPE VI Baseline Data Form and HOPE VI Windshield Neighborhood Survey Form;
- Administer the HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey to a sample of tenants, if feasible;
- Identify and include appropriate/meaningful local impact measures and devise additional local data collection; and
- Prepare and revise a Baseline Case Study Report.

Exhibit 1-8 identifies the LRAs who led the baseline research activities in each of the 15 baseline study sites. Only four PHAs—Milwaukee, Oakland, Cuyahoga Metro, and Boston—are currently working directly with the LRA. Two others—Atlanta and New Orleans—recommended researchers they had worked with previously and Abt recruited those researchers for the role of LRA.

#### **1.4 STATUS OF HOPE VI AT THE BASELINE ASSESSMENT**

Recognizing that no single prescription will be effective in the most distressed public housing developments, HUD has allowed each Public Housing Agency (PHA) a considerable degree of flexibility in designing the treatment plans for the development selected for the HOPE VI intervention. To underscore the desire for creativity in the HOPE VI plans, HUD has encouraged and permitted continuing changes in the local HOPE VI plans. One consequence is that the HOPE VI program continues to evolve, from the time of its initial conceptualization, legislative enactment, submission of implementation and planning grant proposals, through execution of successive grant agreements by program components, and into early program implementation.

**Exhibit 1-8  
HOPE VI Local Research Affiliates**

**ATLANTA**

**Larry Keating, Ph.D. A.I.C.T**  
Associate Professor  
Graduate Program in City Planning  
Georgia Institute of Technology

**BALTIMORE**

**Tony Whitehead, Ph.D.**  
Professor

**James Peterson, Jr., MHS**  
**Linda Kaljee, MA**  
Research Associates  
University of Maryland  
College Park

**BOSTON**

**Langley Keyes, Ph.D.**  
Professor

**Charles Adams**  
**Elsa Gutierrez**  
**Mary Quesada**  
**David Thatcher**  
Department of Urban Studies and  
Planning  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**CAMDEN**

**Walter H. Moleski**  
Executive Director

**Peter R. Hecht, Ph.D.**  
Senior Associate  
Environmental Research Group

**CHARLOTTE**

**Deborah Weisel, MPA**  
Senior Research Associate

**Deborah Meagher, MPA**  
Research Assistant  
Police Executive Research Forum

**CHICAGO**

**Paul Fischer, Ph.D.**  
Professor  
Department of Politics  
Lake Forest College

**CUYAHOGA METRO**

**Darlyne Bailey, Ph.D.**  
Dean and Assoc. Professor

**Sharon Milligan, Ph.D.**  
Associate Professor

**Linda Persse, Ph.D.**  
Project Manager  
Mandel School of Applied Social  
Sciences  
Case Western Reserve



**Exhibit 1-8 (continued)**  
**HOPE VI Local Research Affiliates**

**DETROIT**

**Robert W. Marans, Ph.D.**  
Chair, Urban and Regional Planning  
Program  
University of Michigan

**John V. Ballard**  
University of Michigan

**DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
(WASHINGTON, DC)**

**Brett Williams, Ph.D.**  
Professor

**Jenell Williams**  
**Jonathan Ortiz**  
**Angelito Palma**  
**Sheri Lawsin**  
Department of Anthropology  
American University

**MILWAUKEE**

**Calvin Brutus**  
Project Manager

**John Merrill, Ph.D.**  
University of Wisconsin-Extension

**NEW HAVEN**

**Douglas Rae, Ph.D.**  
Ely Professor of Public  
Management  
Yale School of Management

**NEW ORLEANS**

**Timothy Joder, A.I.C.P.**  
Director, Louisiana Technical  
Assistance Center

**Johnelle Lamarque**  
**Steve Chozick**  
University of New Orleans

**OAKLAND**

**Victor Rubin, Ph.D.**  
Executive Director of the  
University-Oakland Metropolitan  
Forum  
Institute of Urban and Regional  
Development

**SAN ANTONIO**

**Susan J. Szaniszlo, M.P.A.**  
Consultant  
Public Policy Research

**SAN FRANCISCO**

**Michael Reisch, Ph.D.**  
Professor

**Felix Rivera, Ph.D.**  
Professor  
School of Social Work  
San Francisco State University

This evolution continues as this HOPE VI Baseline Report is being written, and it is likely to continue into the future. As a consequence of the program's flux, the Case Studies and the Cross-Site Report of the Baseline for the Longitudinal Assessment of the HOPE VI Program represent a snapshot of the early implementation of the program through the end of May 1995, unless otherwise indicated.

## **1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE CROSS-SITE REPORT**

The remainder of this cross-site report synthesizes information collected by the LRAs for each of the 15 HOPE VI sites selected for the in-depth study. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Public Housing Authorities, including their management history, provision of services to residents and their current challenges. Chapter 3 provides a baseline description of the HOPE VI developments. Included is a discussion of the physical design, characteristics of the residents, and physical condition of the development at the beginning of HOPE VI. This chapter also contains a discussion of the issues confronting the PHAs including management issues and crime and disorder. Chapter 3 concludes with a description of resident organizations and the social and community services that existed at the developments at baseline. Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI developments at baseline. Included are descriptions of the neighborhoods, economic development trends and activities, resident characteristics, neighborhood resources, and the relationships between the developments and the neighborhoods. Chapter 5 provides an introduction to the HOPE VI plans at baseline and the progress that has been made through May 1995. The discussion of the plans covers the physical plans, management plans, resident services plans, community services plans, and economic development. Chapter 6 provides a description of some of the long term impact measures of the success of HOPE VI, in terms of changes in physical design and management improvements, changes in resident status, and changes in the neighborhood surrounding each HOPE VI development. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the conclusions of the Baseline Case Studies, including the continuing challenges of HOPE VI and the perspectives for success.

Attached to the Cross-Site Report as Appendix B are the Executive Summaries of each of the 15 Case Studies. These Executive Summaries provide a brief introduction to the contents of the HOPE VI Baseline Case Studies.

There are two additional volumes of this report. Volume II contains the 15 Baseline Case Studies. In Volume III are the Technical Appendices. Appendix A contains tables of the all of the data collected by the LRAs using the three protocols. Appendix Tables A-1 through A-142 provide information supplied by the LRAs on the HOPE VI Baseline Data Forms (with the exception of those variables that have been presented in the Cross-Site Report). Appendix Tables A-143 through A-155 provide the data supplied by the LRAs on the HOPE VI Windshield Neighborhood Survey. Appendix Tables A-156 through A-212 present the results of the HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey. Appendix B of Volume III contains the three HOPE VI protocols used to collect the information presented in Appendix A.

## CHAPTER 2

### PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY OVERVIEW

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The baseline assessment of the HOPE VI program focuses on the experiences at baseline of 15 of the first 32 agencies to receive HOPE VI grants in 1993 and 1994. These are large, urban public housing authorities (PHAs), faced with the complex problems of large, aging developments, many of which are extremely high-density and poorly designed. In part, because of the age and size of their developments, these PHAs have been grappling with serious management problems for a number of years. Some of the PHAs in this study are located in cities that are also in severe distress (e.g., Camden, Detroit and New Haven), which means that the cities are able to provide only minimal support for the PHAs or their developments.

The information on these 15 PHAs comes from a variety of sources. The primary sources are the *HOPE VI Baseline Data Forms* and *Baseline Case Studies* completed by the Local Research Affiliates (LRAs) at the 15 sites.<sup>1</sup> In addition, information has been drawn from the original HOPE VI applications and HUD's databases on PHA characteristics.

#### 2.1 PHA CHARACTERISTICS

Exhibits 2-1 and 2-2 show selected characteristics for each of the 15 PHAs, including the number of housing units, the number constructed during various periods of time, the number of developments, the number of scattered site developments, and a breakdown by development size. The first column of Exhibit 2-1 shows that the PHAs in the sample range in size from extremely large (Chicago) to relatively small authorities (Camden).<sup>2</sup> Chicago, the third largest PHA in the nation, has over 39,000 units. Although less than half the size of Chicago, several other PHAs in the baseline sample have a portfolios in excess of 10,000. Baltimore, the next largest PHA, has approximately 18,000 units. Atlanta, Boston, Cuyahoga Metro, Detroit, Washington DC, New Orleans, San Antonio, and San Francisco are also classified by HUD as “extra-large” (with more than 6,500 units in management). In contrast, Charlotte, New Haven, and Oakland have fewer than 4,000 units each.

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<sup>1</sup> Abt Associates Inc. developed several research tools for use by the LRAs in conducting the baseline assessment. The HOPE VI Baseline Data Form focused primarily on the HOPE VI development—its history, current status, and plans for the future. The Windshield Survey focused on the neighborhood of the HOPE VI development—the land use characteristics, other housing stock type and condition, and types of neighborhood businesses by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The outline for the Baseline Case Studies provided a standard for the content and organization of the case studies. Copies of these forms are shown in Volume III, Appendix B.

<sup>2</sup> Although relatively small, Camden still falls in the “large” category. PHAs are grouped into 5 categories: extra large (6,500 units or more), large (1,250 to 6,499 units), medium (500 to 1,249 units), small (200 to 499 units) and extra small (under 200 units).

**Exhibit 2-1  
PHA Characteristics: Number of Units and Construction Period**

PHA	Total Number of Units	Percent Built				
		Pre-1940	1940-1949	1950-1959	1960-1975	Post 1975
<b>Atlanta</b>	14,461	3.2	24.0	20.4	42.7	9.8
<b>Baltimore</b>	18,053	0.0	30.7	18.0	23.1	28.3
<b>Boston</b>	11,384	8.9	33.1	25.9	24.7	7.5
<b>Camden</b>	2,334	22.0	25.1	20.1	32.9	0.0
<b>Charlotte</b>	3,416	0.0	19.1	17.3	48.5	15.2
<b>Chicago</b>	39,055	6.1	13.5	24.0	52.9	3.5
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	11,901	15.0	23.7	6.7	46.3	8.3
<b>Detroit</b>	11,666	2.3	20.1	28.3	46.2	3.1
<b>DC</b>	8,159	10.5	27.0	37.8	17.6	7.1
<b>Milwaukee</b>	4,753	11.0	0.0	28.1	54.1	6.7
<b>New Haven</b>	3,484	0.0	27.7	5.6	28.3	38.4
<b>New Orleans</b>	13,670	0.0	39.3	35.6	24.1	1.0
<b>Oakland</b>	3,124	0.0	29.3	0.0	70.7	0.0
<b>San Antonio</b>	8,086	0.0	28.8	29.0	20.9	21.4
<b>San Francisco</b>	6,630	0.0	26.2	31.0	40.5	2.4

Source: SMIRPH, 1995

Columns 2 through 6 in Exhibit 2-1 show the percent of units in each PHA's portfolio that were built during different periods between pre-1940 and post 1975. As discussed in Chapter 1, older developments tend to have more problems because of the aging of major systems (plumbing, electrical). Six of the PHAs have a portfolio with 30 percent or more units that were constructed prior to 1950: Camden (47 percent), Boston (42 percent), New Orleans (39 percent), Cuyahoga Metro (39 percent), District of Columbia (38 percent) and Baltimore (31 percent). On the other hand, four of the PHAs have a portfolio with 60 percent or more of the units constructed since 1960 (Charlotte, Milwaukee, New Haven, and Oakland).

**Exhibit 2-2**  
**PHA Characteristics: Number of Developments and Size of Developments**

PHA	Total Developments	Total Scattered Sites	Number of Developments with				
			1-100 Units	101-300 Units	301-500 Units	501-700 Units	700+ Units
<b>Atlanta</b>	48	4	8	19	7	7	3
<b>Baltimore</b>	62	17	4	23	7	6	5
<b>Boston</b>	50	2	21	15	5	2	5
<b>Camden</b>	10	0	2	5	2	1	0
<b>Charlotte</b>	16	0	4	8	4	0	0
<b>Chicago</b>	97	13	5	48	9	4	18
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	65	10	25	16	6	6	2
<b>Detroit</b>	64	8	15	27	12	2	0
<b>DC</b>	22	4	2	11	1	0	4
<b>Milwaukee</b>	28	10	2	12	2	1	1
<b>New Haven</b>	32	1	19	11	1	0	0
<b>New Orleans</b>	33	17	0	2	1	3	10
<b>Oakland</b>	75	38	32	3	2	0	0
<b>San Antonio</b>	62	9	32	16	3	1	1
<b>San Francisco</b>	41	4	15	20	1	0	1

Source: SMIRPH, 1995

Exhibit 2-2 shows that even some of the smaller PHAs (e.g., Oakland and San Antonio) have a large number of developments, although in the case of Oakland, many are small scattered-site developments. The last five columns of Exhibit 2-2 show the developments broken down by size ranging from small developments (1 to 100 units) to large developments (over 700 units). Chicago and New Orleans have the largest number of developments with 500 or more units. In contrast, Charlotte, New Haven, and Oakland have no large developments.

Despite the stereotype that most distressed public housing consists of high-rise developments, nearly all of these sample PHAs have primarily low-rise or rowhouse buildings in their portfolios.<sup>3</sup> Chicago and Baltimore are the only sites that have a significant number of large, high-rise family developments. San Francisco has some high-rises, but its stock is predominantly mid- and low-rise. A number of other places (Atlanta, Camden, Detroit, Milwaukee, and New Orleans) have high-rise senior buildings, but no high-rise family housing.

## **2.2 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS**

Examining management indicators from these 15 PHAs is important because it reflects their capacity to carry out modernization efforts under HOPE VI. This section describes HUD's assessment of these PHAs' management capabilities and focuses on Executive Director turnover, a serious management problem that affected more than one-half of the PHAs in the sample during the baseline study period. The issue of turnover provides an opportunity to review some of the historical issues at the 15 baseline PHAs as well as to describe the implications this problem had for these agencies' ability to implement their HOPE VI plans.

### **2.2.1 Public Housing Management Assessment Program Scores**

The Public Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP) is the means established by HUD for evaluating and comparing the management performance of PHAs across the country. Each year, HUD evaluates PHAs on a number of different management criteria, including vacancy rates, modernization expenditures, uncollected rents, energy consumption, unit turnaround, outstanding work orders, inspection/condition of units, tenant accounts receivable (TARS), operating reserves, routine operating expenses, and resident initiatives and development. A composite score is created for each authority and PHAs are given an opportunity to appeal their rating. PHAs whose scores fall below 60 are considered "troubled"; those with scores of 90 or above are considered to be "high-performers." Each troubled PHA is monitored by HUD under a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

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<sup>3</sup> Source: HOPE VI Baseline Case Studies.

Exhibit 2-3 shows the PHMAP scores for each of the 15 baseline PHAs for FY 1992 and FY 1993.<sup>4</sup> Despite the fact that all of the 15 sites included in the baseline sample have at least one severely distressed development in their portfolio, HUD considers a few (Charlotte, Milwaukee, and San Antonio) to be well-managed. As the first column of Exhibit 2-3 shows, however, eight of the 15 sites (Atlanta, Camden, Chicago, Cuyahoga Metro, Detroit,<sup>5</sup> DC, New Haven, and New Orleans) were considered “troubled” in 1992. Cuyahoga Metro showed a dramatic improvement in management performance in 1993; its PHMAP score rose nearly 17 points to 76.5, taking it off the troubled list. Camden also came off the troubled list in 1993, with its score increasing by about 8 points to 65.12. Oakland’s score of 60.34 in 1992 placed it barely above troubled; it too underwent significant improvement between 1992 and 1993, rising nearly 18 points to a score of 78.30. It should be noted PHMAP is based on ratings on a number of factors including tenant accounts receivables (TARS), vacancies, unit turnaround, and modernization spending. PHA’s frequently appeal HUD’s rankings on specific items, often leading to substantial changes in PHMAP scores. Only two agencies’ PHMAP scores declined from 1992 to 1993. San Francisco’s score in 1992 was middle-range and declined only slightly. However, Washington, DC’s scores of 25.60 in 1992 and 22.38 in 1993 made it the “worst-managed” large housing authority in the nation at that time.

### 2.2.2 Executive Director Turnover

As Exhibit 2-3 shows, more than half of the PHAs in the baseline sample experienced turnover of their Executive Director after the initial HOPE VI application was submitted.

Staff turnover is typical of PHAs experiencing management problems: Washington, DC, has had 13 Executive Directors in just 16 years; and Atlanta has had 3 Executive Directors just since 1991. Detroit has lost 2 Executive Directors in the period since applying for its HOPE VI award. Generally, turnover exacerbates existing problems, at least in the short-term, as new, less-experienced staff struggle with entrenched problems.

While this phenomenon is more common among troubled PHAs, two of the better-managed authorities (at least by their PHMAP designation) in this sample also experienced turnover during the study period (Baltimore and San Francisco).

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<sup>4</sup> FY 1994 scores had not been fully negotiated between HUD and PHAs at the time of this report.

<sup>5</sup> DHD’s 1992 PHMAP score was unavailable, but the agency has been on HUD’s troubled list since 1979.

<b>Exhibit 2-3 PHA Management Indicators</b>					
	<b>PHMAP Scores-1992-1993</b>			<b>Management Indicators-1992-1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>1992 PHMAP Score</b>	<b>1993 PHMAP Score</b>	<b>Change From 1992 to 1993</b>	<b>Executive Director Turnover Since HOPE VI Appli- cation</b>	<b>History of HUD Takeover or Receivership</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	51.85	55.45	+3.60	Yes	HACA is on troubled list.
<b>Baltimore</b>	71.02	73.90	+2.88	Yes	
<b>Boston</b>	62.76	70.94	+8.18	Yes	BHA was in receivership in early 1980s.
<b>Camden</b>	56.73	65.12	+8.39	No	CHA recently came off troubled list.
<b>Charlotte</b>	81.41	86.41	+2.00	No	
<b>Chicago</b>	45.65	46.38	+0.73	Yes	HUD took over management in June 1995.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	59.66	76.50	+16.84	No	
<b>Detroit</b>	NA	37.35	NA	Yes	DHD is under HUD MOA; new MOA was issued in June 1995.
<b>DC</b>	25.60	22.38	-3.22	Yes	DPAH was placed into receivership in May 1995.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	86.69	90.68	+3.99	No	
<b>New Haven</b>	58.76	59.87	+1.11	Yes	HANH is on HUD's troubled list.
<b>New Orleans</b>	43.81	48.21	+4.40	Yes	Under a HUD MOA; private management is under consideration.
<b>Oakland</b>	60.34	78.30	+17.96	No	
<b>San Antonio</b>	87.82	91.14	+3.32	No	
<b>San Francisco</b>	69.45	69.30	-0.15	Yes	Mayor is considering asking for HUD assistance.

At six of the sites that experienced senior staff turnover, the subsequent upheaval created serious problems and delayed implementation of the HOPE VI program. The only exceptions have been Atlanta and Baltimore (where the new Executive Directors have pushed for rapid change) and New Haven (where the new Executive Director had been a part of the redevelopment effort for the HOPE VI site). In contrast, 4 of the 15 PHAs in this baseline sample experienced such extreme management problems after being awarded their HOPE VI grants that HUD was forced to intervene. The key issues at each of these PHAs are summarized below; more detail is provided in the case studies in Volume II (HOPE VI Baseline Case Studies) of this report.



**Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta (HACA).** HACA's new Executive Director has replaced senior staff, including her deputy. She has the support of the Mayor and the PHA board and has pushed to revitalize five severely distressed developments, including the two HOPE VI sites. She has also applied for an additional \$13 million in Empowerment Zone funds. However, the case study indicates that residents are highly suspicious of her efforts, fearing that she will fail to protect them from powerful corporate interests. This dissatisfaction is so severe that the city-wide Resident Organization has called for her resignation. Despite these conflicts, HACA is proceeding rapidly with the demolition phase of its HOPE VI plan in the Techwood Homes development; progress in Clark-Howell has been less marked.

**Housing Authority of the City of Baltimore (HABC).** HABC is considered to be a moderately well-managed authority. It has four high-rise developments and has experienced major management problems, particularly with unit turnaround, in those developments. However, the authority has placed a major emphasis on resident services. Baltimore's HOPE VI plan called for the total demolition of one development; in August 1995, after a series of delays, the authority staged a dramatic implosion of Lafayette Courts. However, because of a desegregation lawsuit, the HABC may face more difficulties in moving ahead with redeveloping the site.

**Boston Housing Authority (BHA).** In December 1994, Boston's new mayor requested the resignation of the BHA's Executive Director. Five other senior staff also left, including the original director of the HOPE VI program. A permanent Executive Director has not yet been appointed. Because of the turnover, the HOPE VI program experienced significant delays in implementation. The authority is now working toward resolving these issues and moving forward with a new, even more ambitious HOPE VI plan that will serve as a true community redevelopment effort.

**Chicago Housing Authority (CHA).** Of the 15 sites in this study, the CHA experienced perhaps the most dramatic upheaval during 1995. The CHA has been on HUD's troubled list since 1981 and has a long history of severe management problems as well as rapidly deteriorating housing stock. In 1987, Vincent Lane, a private real-estate developer, was appointed both Chairman and Executive Director of the authority with a mandate to make major improvements in management. In 1991, he resigned as Executive Director but retained his chairmanship. Starting in the summer of 1994, the agency experienced a series of financial scandals that resulted in the resignation of the next Executive Director. An aide to the Mayor was appointed to fill the vacancy, but resigned in the spring of 1995 after a series of disagreements with Chairman Lane. Although the agency's PHMAP scores improved slightly, the CHA's management problems continued, and new financial scandals emerged. The CHA experienced a number of serious problems in implementing its HOPE VI plan, including resistance from residents, difficulty in staffing the program, problems in negotiating access to vacant land from the City, and problems in developing an acceptable financing plan. In May 1995, HUD demanded the resignations of Chairman Lane and the rest of the CHA board and assumed responsibility for management of the housing authority. A new Executive Director was recently appointed, and HUD hopes to be able to show significant progress in the near future. One encouraging sign was the initiation of demolition at the HOPE VI development (Cabrini-Extension) in September 1995.

**Detroit Housing Department (DHD).** Like the other authorities described here, Detroit has a long history of management problems; DHD has been on the troubled list since 1979. The agency has experienced a great deal of turnover at the executive director level and has been managed under a HUD MOA for many years. Despite this monitoring, DHD has continued to experience severe management problems; HUD nearly took control of the authority in 1993. In an attempt to address these problems, a new Executive Director was appointed in 1994. HUD negotiated a new MOA with the authority during the summer of 1995 and announced intentions to form a five-member “recovery team” to oversee DHD operations. However, the agency experienced another major setback when its relatively new Executive Director resigned in September 1995. DHD is still in the process of revising its HOPE VI plan and has made no progress on implementation. However, despite all of its problems, Detroit was awarded a second HOPE VI grant in 1995.

**Department of Public and Assisted Housing—Washington, DC (DPAH).** In 1993, HUD ranked DPAH as the worst-managed PHA in the nation. DPAH has a long history of management problems including an incredibly high rate of senior staff turnover; *between 1979 and 1995, DPAH had 13 Executive Directors, whose length of tenure ranged from 19 days to 16 months.* The agency has 10 severely distressed developments and a waiting list of 15,000. In 1994, a management review reported that of 50,000 work orders generated in 1991; 30,000 remained to be addressed. Further, 20 percent of DPAH’s units were vacant. Because of the severity of these problems, the reviewers recommended that the agency sever ties with city government, but retain the current Executive Director. Shortly after this review, the Mayor fired the Executive Director, and a judge began proceedings to put the agency into receivership. HUD offered an advisory board as an alternative, but this option was rejected and DPAH was put into receivership in May 1995. The agency was separated from the city government and renamed the “District of Columbia Housing Authority” (DCHA).<sup>6</sup> At the outset of the HOPE VI program, Ellen Wilson appeared to be one of the most promising projects, despite DPAH’s management problems. However, because of the turmoil that overwhelmed the agency during 1994 and 1995, demolition had been delayed numerous times and is now scheduled for fall 1995. Community opposition to the redevelopment may delay the demolition even further.<sup>7</sup>

**Housing Authority of the City of New Haven (HANH).** While HANH’s plan remains in the planning process, the story of the Housing Authority of New Haven (HANH) is more hopeful. A new Executive Director was appointed in 1994, bringing with him professional training, political experience, and resident support. He has been actively working with residents and the Elm Haven Redevelopment Corporation. However, despite the fact that his appointment holds much promise, HANH is still refining its HOPE VI plan and has yet to begin implementing any of its components.

**Housing Authority of the City of New Orleans (HANO).** HANO has also experienced serious management problems for a number of years; a variety of solutions have been attempted to improve the management of the authority. Considered a severely troubled

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<sup>6</sup> Throughout this report we use the newer name, DCHA.

<sup>7</sup> Demolition finally began in April 1996.

housing authority since 1979, HANO has been monitored by HUD under an MOA throughout this period. In 1988, HUD hired a private management firm to manage the authority. However, this management firm had little success in improving conditions and was replaced in 1991. The second firm became embroiled in a dispute with the HANO board, and HUD chose not to renew their contract in 1994. A HUD management team assumed temporary responsibility for the authority until April 1995. A new Executive Director was appointed and given a mandate to privatize many of the PHA's functions, with a goal of reducing the work force from 800 to 50. As of the date of this report, HANO had still not finalized its plans for the HOPE VI site.

**San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA).** SFHA's management had been improving in recent years, although it also faced some of the same kinds of long-standing problems that have afflicted the other PHAs described above. SFHA came off the troubled list in 1992, after eight years of management problems. The agency has had a history of management turnover; the current mayor fired the agency's Executive Director when he took office in 1991. In 1994, the Mayor forced his replacement to resign as well, following allegations of incompetence and mismanagement. The agency currently has only a temporary director, and the Mayor has been pushing to hire a permanent director who has no housing experience. During the spring of 1995, the Mayor also became engaged in a battle with two members of the San Francisco Housing Commission over their apparent failure to meet critical deadlines for HOPE VI funds (The Housing Commission is the official, appointed body of the SFHA to which all staff, including the Executive Director, report). The Mayor fired these two commissioners in June 1995. During this same period, a major scandal erupted at one of the HOPE VI sites, where two convicted drug dealers were accused of intimidating residents. One of these dealers became the head of the tenant organization and in June announced the groups' intent to purchase the development and prevent the demolition from going forward. SFHA is also experiencing conflict with residents on another front; a resident organization, the Council of Resident Management Corporations (CORMCO), recently filed suit alleging that the agency had attempted to sabotage its operations.

### 2.2.3 PHAs Without Executive Director Turnover

Seven of the PHAs in the baseline sample did not experience any management problems related to senior staff turnover during 1994 and 1995. As noted above, HUD considers two of the agencies (Milwaukee and San Antonio) to be high-performers. Most of the PHAs without Executive Director turnover appear to have made substantial progress on implementing their HOPE VI plans over the 15 months of the baseline study period.

**Camden Housing Authority (CHA).** Camden's Executive Director was appointed just prior to the original HOPE VI application deadline. He has managed to bring the CHA off the troubled list and is trying to develop new and innovative programs. However, because the CHA has had such a long history of management problems, and because the city lacks the resources to help, he faces an uphill challenge in implementing the PHA's ambitious HOPE VI plan.

**Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA).** Five years ago, the Charlotte Housing Authority was nearly placed in receivership. However, a new Executive Director was hired who implemented reforms and has been able to turn the agency around. Charlotte is now considered a well-managed authority and received HUD's top financial rating in 1994. The Executive Director's goal is for the CHA to become self-supporting. Charlotte is proceeding relatively rapidly with its HOPE VI plan.

**Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA).** Like Charlotte, CMHA is an authority with a long history of management problems which has made an impressive turnaround. A new Executive Director was appointed in 1990. She implemented a number of reforms and was able to bring the agency off the troubled list in 1993. As part of her efforts, the Executive Director has made a major commitment to improving the lives of CMHA residents and had already invested \$11 million in other modernization funds in one development, prior to applying for HOPE VI funds. Renaissance Village, formerly a section of the King Kennedy Estates, is now considered a national model for how to revitalize severely distressed public housing. CMHA's HOPE VI plan calls for rehabilitating rather than replacing two developments, and it stresses social services. The PHA had made substantial progress on implementing its plan by the summer of 1995.

**Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee (HACM).** HACM is considered a very well-managed PHA; most of its stock is in excellent condition. Indeed, the problems at the HOPE VI site are primarily attributable to poor siting and construction, not poor management. HACM works closely with its residents in maintaining its developments and also collaborates with the county and state governments on self-sufficiency initiatives. Like that of CMHA, HACM's HOPE VI plan called for redevelopment rather than replacement. The authority had already begun the redevelopment effort at its HOPE VI site using other modernization funds.

**Oakland Housing Authority (OHA).** OHA has had the same Executive Director for 23 years. The authority experienced some management controversy in recent years and avoided a proposed city takeover in the 1980s. However, there have been gradual improvements in management and the authority has placed major emphasis on resident organizing and self-help. OHA has also placed an emphasis on developing partnerships with local government and community-based organizations. Implementation of the HOPE VI program in Oakland was primarily delayed by hold-ups in releasing the HOPE VI funds and difficulties in negotiating subcontracting agreements with all of the supportive service providers. Like Milwaukee and Cuyahoga Metro, OHA is primarily rehabbing its developments rather than undertaking massive redevelopment.

**San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA).** Like OHA, SAHA has an Executive Director with a remarkably long tenure—16 years. HUD has raised some concerns about management issues, but generally regards SAHA as a high-performer. The authority maintains a low vacancy rate and has developed a number of not-for-profit affiliates. After some delays, SAHA began moving forward rapidly with its HOPE VI plan during the summer of 1995 and began demolition in August 1995.

## 2.3 SECURITY AND CRIME

Crime is a serious problem for all of the 15 PHAs in the baseline sample. Because of the difficulty in obtaining comparable crime statistics across sites, it is difficult to make any rankings or direct comparisons. However, Chicago and New Orleans are generally regarded as having some of the most dangerous public housing in the nation, and many other sites also reported severe problems with violence and drug trafficking.

Exhibit 2-4 provides an overview of issues related to security and crime at the 15 PHAs in the sample. The first column consists of a brief description of the nature of the crime problem, the second column describes any security programs that the PHA operates, and the third column describes any drug treatment or prevention initiatives that are offered by the housing authority.

Of the 15 PHAs in this sample, Chicago and New Orleans have probably faced the most serious problems with violent crime and drug trafficking. San Francisco had major problems in one development (Bernal Street Apartments), but the problem was not consistent across all of its properties. Other PHAs also reported that the crime problem varied considerably across developments, although Charlotte and San Antonio reported that their developments were generally considered more dangerous than the rest of the city. Interestingly, several sites (Cuyahoga Metro, Camden, Boston, and New Haven) reported that—while the PHA viewed crime in its developments as a serious problem—crime rates in public housing were not significantly worse than those in other areas of the city. In Boston, this was particularly surprising, given that the HOPE VI site is allegedly one of the biggest drug markets in the region. Camden and New Haven are both small cities struggling with major problems associated with urban decline; it may be that in these cases, the public housing developments are simply no worse than other low-income housing in the neighborhoods.

### 2.3.1 Crime Prevention

Because of the serious crime problems these PHA's face, they have developed a number of crime prevention programs. Many PHAs have found it difficult to get adequate police services, due to budget constraints and the reluctance of some officers to work in such dangerous conditions. For this reason, a number have started their own police forces to supplement city police patrols; generally, community policing programs are a joint effort between the two departments. The PHAs in this study have responded to the problems of crime and drug trafficking in a variety of ways, including community crime prevention programs, PHA police forces, hiring off-duty police officers and private security guards, and initiating community policing programs. PHA anti-crime efforts are funded primarily through HUD's national anti-drug program, the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program (PHDEP), which was first implemented in 1988.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> PHDEP was funded under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), which authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development to fund drug control programs in local housing authorities. Between 1989 and 1993, Congress appropriated more than \$500 million for this initiative nationwide.

**Exhibit 2-4  
Security and Crime - Baseline**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Nature of Crime Problem</b>	<b>PHA Security Programs</b>	<b>Drug Treatment and Prevention Programs</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	AHA developments experienced a large increase in crime during late 1980s.	AHA has a small security force that serves elderly high-rises only and hires 45 city police officers for a community policing program.	None.
<b>Baltimore</b>	Crime problems are worst in high-rise developments; many low-rises are low-crime.	HABC has its own police force and hired a Nation of Islam-affiliate to provide security guards for its high-rises.	HABC has extensive resident services including substance abuse programs.
<b>Boston</b>	Rates of violent and property crime are generally lower than the city average, but Mission Main development is a major drug trafficking site.	BHA has its own PHA police force and is developing a community policing program.	Unclear from case study?
<b>Camden</b>	Most developments have a lower-crime rate than the city average, but problems are concentrated in the two largest developments.	City is supposed to provide extra patrols, but because of limited funds, can only offer minimal service.	Drug prevention program is only offered once or twice a year.
<b>Charlotte</b>	CHA developments have a problems with violent crime and drug trafficking.	CHA's SNAP program involves residents, management, and police in crime prevention.	DATOP program includes both prevention and out-patient treatment.
<b>Chicago</b>	High-rise developments are extremely high-crime; many low-rise and rowhouse developments also have high crime rates. Drug trafficking and gang activity are very serious problems in most developments.	CHA has extensive programs including: sweeps, police force, community policing, security force (guards), contract security guards (some Nation of Islam-affiliated), tenant patrols, and target hardening efforts.	CADRE centers offer a variety of prevention programs aimed at youth, sponsor AA and NA programs, and provide referrals for in-patient treatment.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	Crime is a major problem, but CMHA does not have significantly higher crime rates than the rest of the city.	CMHA has a police force and security guards, police foot patrols and police substations in some developments.	Substance abuse prevention and treatment programs are offered on-site in many developments.
<b>Detroit</b>	No site-level crime data were available, but crime is a serious problem.	Security force was cut because of costs. City police provide 41 officers trained in community policing.	Some programs for teens offered on site.
<b>Exhibit 2-4 continues</b>			

**Exhibit 2-4 (continued)  
Security and Crime - Baseline**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Nature of Crime Problem</b>	<b>PHA Security Programs</b>	<b>Drug Treatment and Prevention Programs</b>
<b>DC</b>	Some developments are high in crime.	DCHA has some resident security councils and experimented with Nation of Islam-affiliated guards in one development (they were run out by the drug dealers).	DCHA has no programs.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	Crime is unevenly distributed across developments; mainly a problem in family developments.	HACM has a public safety staff and coordinates services with the Milwaukee Police Department.	Referral services are offered on-site.
<b>New Haven</b>	High-crime developments, but crime rate is not significantly higher than that for the city as a whole.	There are 12 city police substations in the city, 3 of which serve public housing. Community policing effort includes trying to get officers to move into developments. HANH also has some tenant patrols.	HANH sponsors a "youth diversion" program to provide positive alternatives for teens.
<b>New Orleans</b>	HANO's developments are extremely high-crime.	City has a community policing program that targets the three worst developments and maintains substations in those developments.	HANO offers some youth services.
<b>Oakland</b>	East Oakland is a major drug market. Violence peaked in 1991, but is still very high.	OHA has a PHA security force and a community policing program.	OHA is experimenting with on-site services.
<b>San Antonio</b>	Developments are regarded as high-crime relative to the rest of the city.	SAHA hires off-duty police to patrol some developments, uses private security guards, and has some neighborhood watch programs.	SAHA provides information and referral services.
<b>San Francisco</b>	Some developments have extreme problems with crime and drugs. The tenant council for the Bernal St. Apartments is currently controlled by a convicted drug dealer and his family.	Hires city police to patrol the developments and has security guard	

Of the PHAs in this sample, Chicago has the most comprehensive anti-crime program; the CHA currently spends approximately \$78 million annually on its Anti-Drug Initiative. The program includes law enforcement efforts such as sweeps, a PHA police force, police foot-patrols of high-rise buildings, CHA-trained security guards, and private security guards, including a group affiliated with the Nation of Islam. In addition, the CHA sponsors tenant patrols and provides drug treatment referrals and prevention services in many developments. The housing authority is currently in the process of implementing a community policing program for its own police force, which will complement the Chicago Police Department's city-wide Community Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) program.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to Chicago, five other sites (Baltimore, Boston, Cuyahoga Metro, Milwaukee, and Oakland) have their own PHA police forces. Detroit had a police force at one time, but was forced to drop the program due to lack of funds. The city of Detroit now provides the PHA with a force of 41 officers trained in community policing; because of budget problems the actual number of patrols is very limited. Atlanta, New Haven, New Orleans, San Antonio, and San Francisco all rely on off-duty police officers or special police details to patrol their developments. In Camden, the city is supposed to provide extra police patrols; as in Detroit, the city itself has only very limited resources, so the services it can provide are very minimal.

While most of the PHAs have been relying primarily on a law-enforcement approach to their crime and drug problems, Charlotte has developed a very successful community crime prevention initiative, the Safe Neighborhood Awareness Program (SNAP). SNAP involves residents, management, and police in crime prevention and includes efforts such as community crime watches and meetings to share information and address problems. In addition, the program attempts to persuade victims to prosecute their assailants and conducts annual surveys of residents to determine their security needs and their satisfaction with the program. The PHA has demonstrated that the program has reduced crime by 15 percent in targeted developments. In conjunction with SNAP, the CHA sponsors a comprehensive drug prevention program, the Drug Abuse, Treatment, Outreach, and Prevention program (DATOP). In addition to addressing residents' individual substance abuse problems, the DATOP program involves evicting residents found to be engaged in drug-related activities. Finally, the CHA has an extensive Family Self-Sufficiency program, which is linked to its anti-crime efforts.

### **2.3.2 Drug Treatment and Prevention**

While virtually all of the PHAs in the sample have attempted to provide some type of crime prevention or law-enforcement services, only about half offer comprehensive drug treatment and prevention programs. Several PHAs—including Baltimore, Charlotte, Cuyahoga Metro, and San Francisco—have extensive programs that include such services as in-patient and out-patient treatment on-site as well as substance abuse prevention programs. Oakland is experimenting with offering some on-site services. Chicago has on-site drug prevention centers in some of its developments which offer a range of services including treatment referrals, Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, Boy and Girl Scout Troops, Just Say No clubs, youth activities, and parenting

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<sup>9</sup> S. J. Popkin, et al., *An Evaluation of the Chicago Housing Authority's Anti-Drug Initiative: A Model of Crime Prevention in Public Housing*. A report to the National Institute of Justice, (Bethesda MD: Abt Associates, Inc., 1995).



programs. Milwaukee also provides referral services on-site. Two other PHAs have relatively limited programs; San Antonio provides some referral services and New Haven has a “Youth Diversion” program that seeks to offer positive alternatives to young residents. The remaining PHAs either offer no programs or very limited services; for example, Camden offers a resident-sponsored drug prevention program once or twice a year at some sites.

Again, Charlotte’s program stands out as an unusually comprehensive effort. The DATOP program trains residents in drug prevention programs; trains and supports a youth advisory council aimed at developing drug education and prevention; and provides on-site out-patient treatment and after-care. In addition, Charlotte has a Community Assistance Program that trains residents as peer counselors. These residents are educated to recognize the symptoms and signs of drug abuse, among other problems. Cuyahoga Metro also has a very comprehensive program, offering in-patient services to mothers with young children at one site.

## **2.4 RESIDENT CHARACTERISTICS AND SERVICES**

All of these PHAs have residents who are extremely poor, poorly educated, and heavily dependent on welfare programs. Only one PHA, Charlotte, has a substantial proportion (over 25 percent) of residents who hold regular jobs—possibly attributable to the CHA’s extensive Family Self-Sufficiency efforts. Thus, these PHAs have residents who require much assistance in becoming economically self-sufficient. The ethnic composition of the residents varies somewhat across the sites, although virtually all are predominantly minority. At 10 of the 15 sites, the resident population is predominantly African-American; Boston, Camden, and San Antonio also have significant Hispanic populations, and San Francisco and Oakland serve a wide range of ethnic groups.

Nationally, many PHAs are only beginning to offer resident services and develop self-sufficiency programs. Others, however, have had resident service departments for a number of years. Most of the PHAs in this sample offer at least some services to their residents; frequently, these services are provided through partnerships with outside agencies rather than through the PHA itself. As Exhibit 2-5 shows, according to the case studies, five PHAs (Atlanta, Boston, Camden, Detroit, and Washington, DC) currently offer no or minimal services.

At the other extreme, five sites (Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago, Cuyahoga Metro, and New Haven) offer a wide range of services, with many on-site programs run by outside providers. New Haven’s program is perhaps the most extensive; HANH has a group of resident specialists who conduct home visits with every household and provide referrals, crisis intervention, counseling, and case management. In addition to its drug prevention and intervention programs, Charlotte offers its Gateway and Stepping Stone programs, both intended to promote self-sufficiency. These programs provide supportive services such as day care, education, and job training. Cuyahoga Metro and Baltimore are also both considered to be very service-oriented, sponsoring many health care, educational, parenting, day care, and recreation programs. Given its management problems, Chicago’s inclusion in this group is somewhat surprising, but probably reflects the CHA’s effort to address the tremendous needs of its residents. However, it should be noted that the fact that a wide range of services are offered does not necessarily imply that they have been effective; Chicago’s extensive services have not noticeably reduced the level of distress of its residents.

**Exhibit 2-5  
Resident Services - Baseline**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Types of Programs</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	AHA has a small array of programs to support special projects or events.
<b>Baltimore</b>	HABC has a Family Support Services Division that provides a range of services that address education, parenting, household management, and substance abuse.
<b>Boston</b>	BHA services are coordinated through a variety of departments, but there is no central resident services office. The PHA offers some services for the elderly, a youth worker program, and resident initiatives.
<b>Camden</b>	Camden primarily provides referrals through its tenant relations office. A drug prevention program is offered once or twice a year. The only after school program is run by the resident council.
<b>Charlotte</b>	Charlotte has 36 resident organizations and sponsors a variety of services through its SNAP and DATOP programs. DATOP program services include outpatient treatment and community assistance. In the late 1980s, the CHA created two innovative programs designed to help residents make the transition from public housing to self-sufficiency and home ownership. As precursors to the CHA's HOPE VI self-sufficiency plan, the Gateway program and the Stepping Stone program have become national models for transitional housing programs.
<b>Chicago</b>	Chicago offers a variety of services, many through partnerships with outside providers. The CADRE program includes a variety of prevention programs for youth, including recreation, drug prevention and school outreach. It also offers NA and AA and referrals for drug treatment and other services. The PHA sponsors a victim services program in some developments, Midnight Basketball, and several employment-readiness programs including Step-Up. Finally, the PHA has a very strong resident organization. Many other non-PHA services are available on-site.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	CMHA offers a variety of services, mostly through partnerships with outside providers. These include health care, youth activities, buying clubs, counseling, day care, drug prevention, and substance abuse prevention.
<b>Detroit</b>	There is a resident initiatives department, but it does not appear to offer a wide variety of services. Some services are provided on-site by outside providers.

**Exhibit 2-5 continues**

<b>Exhibit 2-5 (continued)</b> <b>Resident Services - Baseline</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Types of Programs</b>
<b>DC</b>	There are resident councils, but DCHA offers few services.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	HACM offers a variety of services through partnerships with local providers. These include nutrition, recreation, social services, education, day care, and health care. This office also provides supportive services to the resident organizations.
<b>New Haven</b>	HANH has had an Office of Resident Services since 1985. Resident specialists conduct home visits and provide referrals, crisis intervention, counseling, and case management. They also work with other service providers.
<b>New Orleans</b>	HANO offers some services including youth services, job training, home health care for the elderly, and support for tenant councils.
<b>Oakland</b>	OHA's Resident and Community Services Department is experimenting with a variety of community-based services including community gardening, peer support recovery programs, inter-racial understanding, and drug prevention.
<b>San Antonio</b>	SAHA provides information and referral for drug treatment, on-site day care at 15 sites, and counseling. It also coordinates services from other providers and has a family self-sufficiency program.
<b>San Francisco</b>	SFHA maintains a network of counseling, support, and recreation services as well as sponsoring on-site drug treatment, Head Start, and employment programs. Most of these services are provided by outside agencies.

## **2.5 CURRENT CHALLENGES**

Not surprisingly, the 15 PHAs in the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment sample face a number of serious challenges that affect their ability to function effectively. Exhibit 2-6 summarizes the major challenges facing each PHA. These problems range from the type of senior staff turnover and HUD interventions described in Section 2.2 to desegregation lawsuits filed at two sites (Baltimore and New Haven) that may block the redevelopment of the HOPE VI site. Although not facing a lawsuit, Milwaukee is also grappling with the problem of desegregation and whether it is feasible to construct new housing on-site.

<b>Exhibit 2-6 Current Challenges as of June 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Challenges Facing PHA</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	AHA has had 3 Executive Directors (EDs) since 1991. The new ED faces challenges from residents and staff. There is tension between residents and other low-income Atlanta residents about how to spend Empowerment Zone funds. Olympic redevelopment will clearly affect the HOPE VI program.
<b>Baltimore</b>	The ACLU has filed a lawsuit against the HABC alleging a practice of racial discrimination in the location of new public housing. This lawsuit may delay the construction of replacement housing. Further, Baltimore County residents are resisting movement of PHA residents into their community.
<b>Boston</b>	The election of a new mayor has led to turnover of the ED and senior staff. There is a move to privatize management of many of BHA's developments.
<b>Camden</b>	Camden is a severely troubled city; 72 percent of residents receive some form of public assistance. The city has very limited service-provision capabilities.
<b>Charlotte</b>	HOPE VI project is part of larger downtown redevelopment effort; there may be competition for the land.
<b>Chicago</b>	HUD takeover of CHA has caused major staff shake-ups at the Authority, and the extent of financial problems is only now being revealed. A new ED was appointed in September 1995.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	The major challenge for CMHA is to sustain the management improvements brought about in recent years.
<b>Detroit</b>	DHD is a troubled PHA in a troubled city; the PHA faces severe management problems and the city has few resources to offer. The ED resigned in September 1995; a new 1 has not been appointed.
<b>DC</b>	DCHA went into receivership in May 1995. The authority faces an uphill battle to correct the extensive management problems it faces as well as community opposition to its HOPE VI plan.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	HACM is grappling with the problem of racial segregation in the construction of replacement housing.
<b>New Haven</b>	HANH is a troubled PHA in a distressed city. The PHA also faces pressures from the Mayor, Yale University, and other city institutions, as well as a fair housing lawsuit.
<b>New Orleans</b>	New Orleans has a new Mayor, and a new Chief of Police; HANO has a new Executive Director. Given the extent of its management problems, the challenge for HANO will be to avoid either receivership or a full HUD takeover.
<b>Oakland</b>	The major challenge for OHA is the complexity of the HOPE VI plan. It involves multiple sites, coordinating many agencies, and dealing with diverse populations.
<b>San Antonio</b>	The local economic situation makes revitalizing the HOPE VI neighborhood more challenging.
<b>San Francisco</b>	SFHA faces numerous problems, including recent senior staff turnover, negotiations with a resident who has taken control of the tenant organization in one development, and a lawsuit filed by this resident to stop demolition.

Other types of challenges affect many of these authorities as well. For example, Atlanta must cope with the impact of the 1996 Olympics as well as conflicts with other low-income city residents about how to spend Empowerment Zone funds. Camden and Detroit are both distressed cities; therefore, the city government can only offer very limited support to the PHA as it attempts to improve its management and revitalize its developments. New Orleans and San Francisco are both attempting to improve their management situations rapidly and thus avoid further, more direct HUD interventions. In contrast, the major challenge for Cuyahoga Metro, according to the case study, is how to sustain the management improvements brought about in recent years while continuing to revitalize its developments.

In sum, the PHAs in this sample are large, urban authorities that operate in a difficult environment. All are faced with the problems of aging and rapidly-deteriorating housing stock and extremely needy residents. With two exceptions (Milwaukee and San Antonio), all of these sites have experienced serious management problems during the past decade. Thus, the PHAs' problems add to the difficulties of successfully revitalizing their most distressed properties. In the next chapter, we describe the HOPE VI developments at baseline, focusing on the conditions that led them to be classified as "severely distressed."

## CHAPTER 3

### BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS OF HOPE VI DEVELOPMENTS

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The HOPE VI developments in the baseline sample vary greatly in terms of physical characteristics and level of distress.<sup>1</sup> Only two HOPE VI developments (Baltimore and Chicago) consist of the high-rise “slabs” housing families that are the typical image of troubled public housing. The majority of the baseline sample developments are predominantly low-rise (two- and three-story) buildings. Some are extremely distressed—for example, in New Orleans, buildings are literally rotting and crumbling. Other HOPE VI developments may represent the worst of their individual PHA’s stock, but are in good condition relative to the public housing stock in other cities. However, all of these developments share the problems of decaying physical stock, crime, and extremely needy residents. In this chapter, we describe the conditions at these developments at baseline. In Section 3.1, we discuss the physical design of the developments. Next, we describe the characteristics of the current resident population in Section 3.2, and the physical condition of the development in Section 3.3,. The next section describes management issues at baseline, followed by a discussion of the level of crime and disorder in these developments (Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively). Finally, the last two sections describe the resident organizations (Section 3.6) and social and community services (Section 3.7) that existed at these developments at baseline.

The information on these developments comes from a variety of sources. The primary sources are the *HOPE VI Baseline Data Forms*, the *HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey*, and *HOPE VI Baseline Case Studies* completed by the Local Research Affiliates (LRAs) at the 15 sites. In addition, data have been drawn from HUD’s databases on PHA characteristics.

#### 3.1 DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS

##### 3.1.1 Age of the HOPE VI Developments

The HOPE VI development sites span the history of public housing in America. Some in this group of developments include the oldest public housing in the nation; others were built during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Seven of the developments included in the HOPE VI baseline sample are not even 30 years old.

As Exhibit 3-1 shows, six developments—Techwood Homes and Clark Howell in Atlanta, Mission Main in Boston, and Outhwaite Homes in Cuyahoga Metro, Ellen Wilson Dwellings in the District of Columbia, and Elm Haven in New Haven—were constructed just prior to World War II. All six

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<sup>1</sup> The baseline sample for the Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI consists of 15 PHAs and 23 developments identified by the PHAs and approved by HUD for inclusion in the first round of HOPE VI.

were designed as slum clearance projects intended to provide quality housing for low- and moderate-income residents. The Outhwaite Homes even included art deco decorations on the buildings. Four other sites (Clark-Howell, Ellen Wilson, Elm Haven, and Lockwood Gardens) were constructed during the early 1940s, also primarily as slum clearance projects. The housing these developments replaced was frequently substandard; the original tenants were, for the most part, working-class white families. According to the historical material presented in the Baseline Case Studies, in the early years of their histories, these developments were viewed as healthy, self-contained communities, representing a significant improvement over the housing they replaced.

In contrast, some of the most troubled developments in this sample were constructed during the 1950's. These developments were much larger and were built at higher density than earlier public housing, reflecting the national trend toward constructing public housing on enormous "superblocks." Further, a national fad for high-rises clearly influenced public housing during this period.<sup>2</sup> While the emphasis in the late 1930s and early 1940s was on providing quality housing to replace substandard apartments, the new emphasis appeared to be on constructing housing as cheaply as possible.<sup>3</sup> In Chicago, the gigantic high-rises of the Cabrini Extension completely overwhelmed the existing Cabrini Homes, a small rowhouse development first opened in 1943. According to the Baseline Case Study, Lafayette Courts in Baltimore was one of several high-rise developments built as "Negro housing" on the edges of downtown. The Jeffries Homes in Detroit were originally planned in the 1940s as low-rise housing for war workers; by the time they were opened in 1952, they had been reconceived as a much larger mix of different types of housing, including high-rises.<sup>4</sup> Although it is not a high-rise, the Desire development in New Orleans was constructed on a massive scale. Desire was built specifically to house poor African-Americans and was constructed on top of swamps and landfill; likewise, McGuire Gardens in Camden was built on the site of an unofficial garbage dump within the flood plain of the Cooper River.

Only a few of the HOPE VI developments in the sample were constructed after 1960; five of these sites are in Oakland and three of them are small, scattered-site developments. The King Kennedy development, completed in 1971, stands in stark contrast to the Outhwaite Homes constructed in the 1930s. While Outhwaite has lasted for nearly 60 years, King Kennedy was constructed out of cheaper, poorer-quality materials and deteriorated very rapidly. Earle Village in Charlotte is also experiencing serious problems with major systems (plumbing, electrical, etc.), despite the fact that it is not yet 30 years old.

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<sup>2</sup> Devereaux Bowly, *The Poorhouse: Subsidized Housing in Chicago 1895-1976*, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978).

<sup>3</sup> E. J. Meehan, "The Evolution of Public Policy." In *Federal Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present* edited by J. Paul Mitchell, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1985).

<sup>4</sup> The Jeffries Homes high-rises were quickly viewed as unworkable for families and converted to housing for the elderly.

<b>Exhibit 3-1</b>					
<b>Project Physical Characteristics - January 1995</b>					
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Year Opened</b>	<b>Total Acreage</b>	<b>Total Number of Units*</b>	<b>Number of Units per Acre</b>	
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood	1937	16.9	457	27.1	
Clark Howell	1941	36.0	624	17.3	
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	1955	21.5	807	37.5	
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	1940	19.6	822	41.9	
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	1954	18.5	367	19.8	
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	1967	35.8	409	11.4	
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	1943	36.4	1921	52.8	
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes	1937	29.4	1028	35.0	
King Kennedy	1971	17.8	216	12.1	
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	1952	47.0	2170	46.2	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.	1941	5.3	134	25.3	
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	1950	24.5	596	24.3	
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	1941	19.2	462	24.1	
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	1956	97.0	1832	18.9	
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	1972	0.6	18	30.0	
2139 Seminary	1969	0.5	12	24.0	
5726 Elizabeth	1970	1.0	20	20.0	
Coliseum Gardens	1963	9.4	178	19.0	
Lockwood Gardens	1942	22.0	372	16.9	
3634 Foothill Blvd.	1969	0.6	16	26.7	
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	1953	49.3	421	8.5	
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	1953	3.9	208	53.9	
Yerba Buena Homes	1956	3.6	276	76.7	
<b>Average</b>	1954	22.4	656	29.1	
Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form					
*Note: The unit counts shown in this table are based on the HOPE VI Baseline Data Form. There may be some inconsistencies with HUD's unit counts, due to the time when the counts were made and the number of units that were considered on-line.					



### 3.1.2 Other Design Factors

It is now generally accepted that in most of the country, high-rise family housing has been a failure.<sup>5</sup> Further, the construction of high-density (high number of units per acre) public housing developments on superblocks is now generally regarded as having contributed to high levels of distress by cutting off residents from the surrounding community. Many researchers have also argued that a major factor is the lack of “defensible space,” (i.e., shared public areas that would encourage territorially protective behavior and that tenants can monitor from their units) or functional public areas. These researchers claim that, as a consequence, tenants have no real sense of security or territoriality to motivate them to be vigilant against crime or to work together to maintain order.<sup>6,7</sup>

The “public” character of public housing is also a fundamental problem.<sup>8</sup> In poorly designed developments, buildings do not have secured lobbies that restrict access to elevators, stairwells, and apartments. Developments constructed on superblocks sprawl over large tracts and are intersected by streets and parking lots, making it easier for drug dealers to come and go. Thus, even if tenants are able to monitor public areas, they have little control over who enters the development.

Most of the developments in the baseline sample have some or all of the serious design flaws: construction on superblocks, poorly designed buildings, poor configuration, and high density. However, there is considerable variation among them in the degree to which they are affected by these problems.

One of the challenges to HOPE VI planners will be to avoid replacing one flawed design with another. For example, the HOPE VI design for Baltimore is to raze the family high rises and rebuild townhouses resulting in a much lower ratio of units per acre and much more open space. If all this accomplishes is exchanging Lafayette Courts’ design for Ellen Wilson Dwellings’ design, then the goals of HOPE VI will not be realized. Instead what is required is the integration of changes in the physical structure with changes in management and changes in the delivery of resident and community services.

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<sup>5</sup> The exception to this rule is New York City, where the housing is virtually all high-rise and is also extremely well-managed.

<sup>6</sup> Newman, Oscar, *Defensible Space*. New York: MacMillan, 1973.

<sup>7</sup> Rouse, W.V., and H. Rubenstein. *Crime in Public Housing: A Review of Major Issues and Selected Crime Reduction Strategies, Volume I*. Washington, DC: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Police Development and Research, 1978.

<sup>8</sup> Skogan, Wesley and Samuel Annan, “Drugs and Public Housing: Toward an Effective Police Response.” In P. MacKenzie and C. Uchida, eds., *Drugs and the Criminal Justice System*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1994: 162-174.

As Exhibit 3-1 shows, the largest developments in the sample are the Jeffries Homes (2,170 units), the Cabrini Extension (1,921 units),<sup>9</sup> and Desire (1,832 units). The unit density of the developments is also high. The average across all 23 developments is 29.1 units per acre, with seven places (Yerba Buena, Bernal Dwellings, Jeffries Homes, Earle Village, Cabrini Extension, Mission Main, and Lafayette Courts) considerably above that figure. As noted above, high unit density is now generally considered to add to the distress of a development. In addition, if the density is much higher than in the surrounding neighborhood, the development becomes further isolated from the community. Many of these developments, particularly those constructed before 1960, have units that are considerably smaller than modern standards, which exacerbates the density problem (i.e. more units can fit in the same space). For example, a typical two-bedroom unit in the Jeffries Homes in Detroit is only 471 square feet. In contrast, HUD's current guidelines call for a standard of at least 725 square feet and new construction projects in Detroit are being built with between 800 to 1,178 square feet.

Exhibit 3-2 shows that a variety of different construction materials were used in these developments. The majority were constructed with brick facades and the high-rises were generally constructed of concrete block. Eleven of the developments include some wood frame. In the case of Desire in New Orleans, this choice of construction materials has been disastrous: the wood frames of these buildings are literally rotting away.

As mentioned above, despite the stereotype of bad public housing as huge high-rise "slabs", the vast majority of these distressed developments consist of low-rise (one to three-story) buildings. As shown in Exhibit 3-3, only one development, the Cabrini Extension, is entirely high-rise. Lafayette Courts in Baltimore and the two San Francisco developments include a mix of family high-rise and low-rise buildings while the high-rise buildings in Detroit and Milwaukee are elderly housing.

Finally, despite the fact all of the larger developments in this sample were constructed on superblocks, as Exhibit 3-4 shows, the majority (16 of 23) have at least some through streets connecting them to the larger community. As noted above, these through streets may cause their own problems, allowing outsiders easy access. Six of the sample developments have cul-de-sacs and seven have no through streets, although four of these are the scattered sites in Oakland. Exhibit 3-5 shows that inadequate parking is also a problem at many of these developments. This situation is not surprising, given the fact that the majority of these sites are at least 40 years old.

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<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that the entire Cabrini-Green development, including the Extension, Green Homes, and Cabrini Homes, consists of over 3,600 units, making it the largest in the HOPE VI baseline sample (and 1 of the largest in the nation). Only a small portion of the Extension is being treated with these HOPE VI funds, although the CHA hopes to eventually treat the entire site.

<b>Exhibit 3-2 Construction Materials - Baseline</b>				
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Wood</b>	<b>Concrete Block</b>	<b>Reinforced Concrete</b>	<b>Brick Facade or Other Masonry</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood			✓	✓
Clark Howell				✓
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts		✓		✓
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main			✓	✓
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	✓	✓		✓
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village		✓		
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.		✓	✓	✓
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes		✓		✓
King Kennedy		✓		✓
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes			✓	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.		✓		✓
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	✓			✓
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	✓			
2139 Seminary	✓			
5726 Elizabeth	✓			
Coliseum Gardens	✓			✓
Lockwood Gardens	✓		✓	
3634 Foothill Blvd.	✓			
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	✓	✓		✓
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings			✓	
Yerba Buena Homes		✓		
<b>Total</b>	11	9	7	14
Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form				

**Exhibit 3-3**  
**Distribution of Building Types by Number of Buildings - Baseline**

PHA: HOPE VI Development	High-rise (6+ stories)	Mid-rise (4-6 stories)	Low-rise (1-3 stories)	Rowhouse (Town House)	Detached/ Semi-detached
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood			17		
Clark Howell				63	
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	6		17		
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main			39		
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens				43	
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village				409	
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	23				
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes			1	1	
King Kennedy			22		
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	13*	4	11	41	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.			13		
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	1*		88	15	
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven				31	
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire			262		
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary			4	2	
2139 Seminary			1		
5726 Elizabeth			2		
Coliseum Gardens			16		
Lockwood Gardens			42		11
3634 Foothill Blvd.			2	2	
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.				158	
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	1		12		
Yerba Buena Homes	2	1	1		
<b>Average</b>	8	3	32	76	11

Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form

\*Note: There are no family high-rise buildings.

<b>Exhibit 3-4 Internal Circulation - Baseline</b>			
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Through Streets</b>	<b>Cul-de-Sac</b>	<b>No Streets</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood	✓		
Clark Howell	✓		
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	✓	✓	
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main			✓
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	✓		
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	✓	✓	
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	✓		
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes	✓		
King Kennedy	✓		
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	✓	✓	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.			✓
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	✓	✓	
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven			✓
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	✓		
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary			✓
2139 Seminary		✓	✓
5726 Elizabeth			✓
Coliseum Gardens	✓		
Lockwood Gardens	✓		
3634 Foothill Blvd.			✓
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	✓	✓	
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	✓		
Yerba Buena Homes	✓		
<b>Number</b>	16	6	7
Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form			

**Exhibit 3-5  
Parking - Baseline**

<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Number of Spaces Available</b>	<b>Spaces Needed?</b>	<b>Parking Convenient to Housing Units?</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood	NA*	NA	Yes
Clark Howell	NA	NA	Yes
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	NA	More	Yes
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	NA	More	No
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	80	More	No
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	300	Less	Yes
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	NA	NA	NA
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes	148	More	Yes
King Kennedy	112	More	Yes
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	1000	NA	No
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.	NA	More	NA
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	300	More	No
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	107	More	Yes
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	1300	More	No
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	18	NA	Yes
2139 Seminary	12	NA	Yes
5726 Elizabeth	20	NA	Yes
Coliseum Gardens	133	NA	Yes
Lockwood Gardens	318	NA	Yes
3634 Foothill Blvd.	16	NA	Yes
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	284	More	No
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	54	More	Yes
Yerba Buena Homes	76	More	Yes
<b>Average</b>	252		

Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form

Note: NA\* = Information not available from Baseline Data Form

### 3.2 RESIDENT CHARACTERISTICS

The original residents of many of these HOPE VI developments were working class, two-parent families. But as happened to public housing developments across the nation, changes in federal policy (e.g., lowered income limits and the elimination of ceiling rents) rapidly pushed out most working families and left behind the poorest tenants.<sup>10</sup> The system of federal preferences then made sure new admissions were heavily weighted to the very poor: the homeless, families in substandard housing, and those paying heavy rent burdens.

Not surprisingly then, at baseline, the residents of these HOPE VI developments were virtually all minority, had extremely low-incomes, and relied heavily on public assistance. Further, according to the Baseline Case Studies, the majority of households were headed by single women at all the sample developments. Exhibit 3-6 shows selected resident characteristics from the baseline sample of HOPE VI developments.<sup>11</sup> With two exceptions the majority of residents in these developments were African-American. The majority of residents in Camden and Boston were Hispanic, and San Antonio also had a substantial percentage of Hispanic residents (23 percent). Oakland and San Francisco had the most diverse tenant populations, including African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and Whites.

All of the developments reported very low median incomes, ranging from \$2,952 in San Antonio to \$11,814 in 3634 Foothill in Oakland (this is a small development with several large families that receive relatively large AFDC payments). The proportion of residents with earned income was very low, with a high of 24 percent in Boston and a low of seven percent in the two sites in Cuyahoga Metro. Dependence on public assistance was high at all sites; a lower percentage tends to reflect an older population with more reliance on Social Security, rather than higher levels of employment. The percentage of residents reporting income from public assistance averaged 84 percent across the 23 developments, ranging from a high of 90 percent in Oakland at Coliseum Gardens to a low of 43 percent in Detroit (which has a very large elderly population).

One site, the Ellen Wilson Homes in Washington, DC, was completely vacant at the time the HOPE VI applications were submitted. However, the Baseline Case Study for this site indicates that the earlier resident population was similar to that of the other HOPE VI developments in this sample—predominantly African-American, extremely poor, and heavily dependent on public assistance.

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<sup>10</sup> Meehan, *op cit.*

<sup>11</sup> These figures are taken from HUD's 1993 MTCS database and may differ slightly from the figures in the Baseline Case Studies. No information was available about Ellen Wilson, in Washington DC, which has been vacant for more than 5 years.

**Exhibit 3-6**  
**Resident Characteristics - 1993**

PHA: HOPE VI Development	Percent African-American	Percent Hispanic	Percent Other	Median Income	Percent with Earned Income	Percent on Public Assistance
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood	95	0	5	\$3,960	15	51
Clark Howell	98	0	2	\$3,960	14	62
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	100	0	0	\$4,644	16	81
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	38	57	5	\$6,641	24	73
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	49	45	6	\$6,093	18	75
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	100	0	0	\$5,064	28	60
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	100	0	0	\$6,000	7	90
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes	99	0	1	\$4,092	7	77
King Kennedy	100	0	0	\$5,448	7	77
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	99	0	1	\$5,508	10	43
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.	V	V	V	V	V	V
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	97	1	2	\$7,404	17	83
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	95	4	1	\$6,972	18	67
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	99	1	0	\$3,792	15	78
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	92	0	8	\$7,596	25	86
2139 Seminary	94	3	3	\$9,972	18	82
5726 Elizabeth	86	1	13	\$10,164	30	66
Coliseum Gardens	60	0	40	\$9,759	9	90
Lockwood Gardens	82	2	17	\$7,488	12	78
3634 Foothill Blvd.	56	0	44	\$11,814	13	87
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	74	23	3	\$2,952	20	62
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	75	12	12	\$7,384	9	89
Yerba Buena Homes	90	5	6	\$7,296	9	84

Source: HUD MTCS Database December 1993

Note: V = Vacant



### **3.3 BASELINE PHYSICAL CONDITION**

At baseline, there was considerable variation in physical conditions at these HOPE VI sites. As part of the Baseline Data Form, the LRAs were asked to rate conditions in the individual developments from “excellent” to “very poor.” These ratings were to be based on the LRAs’ subjective assessment of how the development compared to the surrounding community. Exhibit 3-7 shows the LRAs’ ratings of conditions in the individual developments. Eight sites were rated as “very poor” and another eight as “poor.” Only two developments, Earle Village and King Kennedy Estates, were rated as “good”; another four were rated as “fair.”

Information from the Baseline Case Studies supports these ratings. In sites with better conditions, the major problems tended to involve major systems or environmental factors (e.g., poor siting, drainage, or inadequate plumbing or electrical systems). In contrast, some of the developments with more severe problems were literally crumbling. For example, Ellen Wilson was so deteriorated that DCHA declared it uninhabitable and closed the development in 1988. The development has deteriorated further since then, and is now surrounded by a fence and razor wire in an attempt to keep out squatters and vandals.<sup>12</sup> Lafayette Courts also had serious problems at baseline. As evidence of the severity of the problems, the majority of Lafayette Courts residents surveyed for this project reported that peeling paint, rats and mice, plumbing, and broken windows were all big problems in their development. Further, the heat and hot water were unreliable and the electrical system outdated. In the Cabrini Extension, another very troubled development, 91 percent of the units failed to meet housing quality standards in 1992. Desire, in New Orleans, is one of the most deteriorated developments in the baseline sample. Built on a swamp and constructed of woodframe, some buildings are literally rotting away. The few remaining residents are scattered around the site in the habitable units; in some cases, there is only one occupied unit per building.

The level of the problems in these developments is substantial despite the fact that many of the PHAs have invested considerable amounts of Federal modernization funds in their upkeep over the past 15 years. As Exhibit 3-8 shows, Boston spent \$36 million on Mission Main, Chicago over \$60 million on the Cabrini Extension, Detroit \$27 million on the Jeffries Homes, and Cuyahoga Metro \$27 million on Outhwaite and \$35 million on King Kennedy. Only Cuyahoga Metro and Detroit managed to bring about significant improvements through these expenditures. The section of King Kennedy that has been converted into Renaissance Village now stands as a national model of how to revitalize severely distressed public housing. Likewise, Jeffries East in Detroit is now completely rehabilitated and fully occupied.

Despite the severity of the problems in many places, the Resident Satisfaction Survey showed that residents were surprisingly satisfied with both their buildings and their developments. Survey data were available for only 13 of the 23 developments in the sample. However, these include some of the worst developments (e.g., Desire, Lafayette Courts, and Techwood). As Exhibit 3-9 shows, that overall, the majority of residents surveyed report being either “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with

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<sup>12</sup> In 1992, a group of homeless Vietnam veterans attempted an unauthorized renovation of some of the buildings. Following this incident, DCHA filled in the first floor windows with bricks and put up the fence and razor wire.

<b>Exhibit 3-7</b>					
<b>Condition of the Facilities - Baseline</b>					
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Excellent</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Very Poor</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood					✓
Clark Howell				✓	
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts				✓	
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main					✓
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens				✓	
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village		✓			
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.					✓
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes				✓	
King Kennedy		✓			
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes				✓	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.					✓
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace			✓		
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven				✓	
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire					✓
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary					✓
2139 Seminary					✓
5726 Elizabeth					✓
Coliseum Gardens			✓		
Lockwood Gardens			✓		
3634 Foothill Blvd.			✓		
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.				✓	
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings				✓	
Yerba Buena Homes				✓	
<b>Number</b>	0	2	4	8	8
Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form					

**Exhibit 3-8**  
**Total Modernization Dollars Spent Since 1980 (in millions) thru 1994**

PHA: HOPE VI Development	Amount	Source	Year	All Units
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood	\$ 6.8	CIAP	1981	No
Clark Howell	\$ 8.8	CIAP	1981	No
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	Not Available			
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	\$35.8 \$ 0.1	CIAP CGP	'82-'94 '82-'94	Yes Yes
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	\$18.9	CIAP	'84-'90	Yes
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	Not Available			
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	\$37.4 \$23.3	CIAP CGP	'80-'91 '92-'93	Yes Yes
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes	\$10.6 \$ 5.0 \$12.8	CIAP CIAP MROP	1991 '91-'92 1992	Yes Yes Yes
King Kennedy	\$18.6 \$ 5.0 \$12.0	CIAP MROP CGP	'90,'94 1993 '92-'94	Yes Yes Yes
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	\$ 4.0 \$23.1	CIAP CGP	'90-'91 '92-'94	No Yes
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.	<\$1.0	CIAP		No
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	\$7.9 \$4.0	CIAP CGP	'80-'92 '93-'94	Yes Yes
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	\$ 8.2	CIAP	'83-'93	Yes
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	\$ 1.3 \$ 3.0	CDBG CIAP	'80-'89 '82,'87	Yes Yes
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	\$ 0.0			Yes
2139 Seminary	\$ 0.0			Yes
5726 Elizabeth	\$ 0.6	CGP	1993	Yes
Coliseum Gardens	Not Available			
Lockwood Gardens	Not Available			
3634 Foothill Blvd.	\$ 0.0			Yes
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	\$ 2.0 \$ 0.1	CIAP CGP	'82-'92 1992	Yes Yes
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	Not Available			
Yerba Buena Homes	Not Available			

Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form

**Exhibit 3-9**  
**Resident Satisfaction With Building - March 1995**

		Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Total Responses
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>		Percent				Number
<b>Atlanta:</b>	Techwood & Clark Howell	38	44	8	10	50
<b>Baltimore:</b>	Lafayette Courts	10	31	24	35	49
<b>Camden:</b>	McGuire Gardens	4	38	27	31	52
<b>Cuyahoga:</b>	Outhwaite Homes/King Kennedy	6	41	26	26	34
<b>Detroit:</b>	Jeffries Homes	32	22	24	22	41
<b>Milwaukee:</b>	Hillside Terrace	41	39	12	8	414
<b>New Haven:</b>	Elm Haven	14	43	24	20	232
<b>New Orleans:</b>	Desire	17	44	15	23	52
<b>Oakland:</b>	Coliseum Gardens	48	27	20	5	60
	Lockwood Gardens	31	46	18	5	106
<b>San Antonio:</b>	Springview Apts.	23	35	18	23	65
<b>San Francisco:</b>	Bernal Dwellings	0	43	29	29	14
	Yerba Buena Homes	16	26	16	42	19
<b>Overall</b>		28	39	18	15	1,188

Source: HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey.

their buildings as places to live.<sup>13</sup> Likewise, as shown in Exhibit 3-10, overall the residents in the HOPE VI developments report high levels of satisfaction with their apartments. These results may reflect the fact this survey represents the views of tenants who feel they lack other housing choices and are fearful of losing the housing they have, however undesirable this housing appears to outsiders. Alternatively, this level of satisfaction may reflect the residents' point of comparison—if living in a distressed public housing development is acceptable (or very acceptable), then the residents' prior housing (or lack of housing) was likely to be much worse.

### **3.4 BASELINE MANAGEMENT ISSUES**

All of the HOPE VI developments in this sample have serious management problems, including high rates of turnover, high vacancy rates, high turndown rates, and high rates of delinquent rents. Information on specific management indicators was not consistently available from the 15 baseline PHAs. However, the Baseline Case Studies indicate serious problems in virtually every development. Some developments (e.g., Cabrini Extension and Desire) clearly experienced more severe problems than others, but virtually all reported at least some serious concerns. Exhibit 3-11 shows information on one indicator: vacancy rates as of November 1994 for the PHA and the HOPE VI development just before these PHAs received their HOPE VI awards. The exhibit shows that many of these developments had extremely high vacancy rates. More detail on specific management issues is included in the Technical Appendix, Volume III. Ellen Wilson, Techwood Homes, King Kennedy, and Outhwaite Homes had already been all or partially emptied for the revitalization effort. Of the developments where redevelopment had not yet begun, Desire had the highest vacancy rate—74 percent. This high rate in New Orleans is due to the fact that many buildings have become uninhabitable. The Jeffries Homes, Cabrini Extension, Lafayette Courts, and Mission Main were all more than 25 percent vacant due to high turndown rates, high crime, and other management problems.

As part of the Baseline Data Form, the LRAs were asked to rate overall maintenance and the adequacy of trash removal. Exhibit 3-12 shows their ratings of overall maintenance for the HOPE VI developments. No development was rated as “excellent”; only five developments (Earle Village, King Kennedy, Coliseum Gardens, Lockwood Gardens, and Foothill Blvd.) were rated as “good.” Maintenance in eight developments was rated as “very poor.” The kinds of maintenance problems described in the Baseline Case Studies include: trash accumulating in public areas; failure to make necessary repairs; broken light bulbs; peeling paint; and broken windows. Exhibit 3-13 shows the LRAs' ratings of adequacy of trash removal in the HOPE VI developments. Again, no development was rated as “excellent” and only five were rated as “good.”

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<sup>13</sup> During the design phase of the HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey, Abt provided the LRAs with target sample sizes needed for a 95 percent confidence interval of  $\pm 15$  percentage points. With the exception of Chicago and San Francisco, where it was too dangerous for the data collectors to continue, all of the LRAs met this target. The reader is cautioned that the wide confidence intervals for all PHAs' Resident Satisfaction Survey data (except for Milwaukee, New Haven, Oakland, and San Antonio) make the data difficult to interpret at the PHA level. The overall satisfaction levels in Exhibits 3-9 and 3-10 are more stable estimates of the residents' satisfaction levels.

**Exhibit 3-10  
Resident Satisfaction With Apartment - March 1995**

		Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Total Responses
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>		Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Number
<b>Atlanta:</b>	Techwood & Clark Howell	22	54	16	8	50
<b>Baltimore:</b>	Lafayette Courts	10	30	30	30	50
<b>Camden:</b>	McGuire Gardens	6	45	20	29	51
<b>Charlotte:</b>	Earle Village	39	45	15	0	33
<b>Cuyahoga:</b>	Outhwaite Homes/King Kennedy	15	38	24	24	34
<b>Detroit:</b>	Jeffries Homes	49	27	15	10	41
<b>Milwaukee:</b>	Hillside Terrace	48	39	8	5	410
<b>New Haven:</b>	Elm Haven	13	44	26	17	235
<b>New Orleans:</b>	Desire	10	44	21	25	52
<b>Oakland:</b>	Coliseum Gardens	52	26	18	3	61
	Lockwood Gardens	34	43	18	6	107
<b>San Antonio:</b>	Springview Apts.	18	48	14	20	65
<b>San Francisco:</b>	Bernal Dwellings	29	43	14	14	14
	Yerba Buena Homes	5	48	33	14	21
<b>Overall</b>		31	41	17	12	1,224

Source: HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey.

<b>Exhibit 3-11</b>				
<b>Vacancy Rates Prior to HOPE VI Grant Award</b>				
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Percent Just Before HOPE VI Grant</b>		<b>Reasons for Vacancies at HOPE VI Developments</b>	
	<b>PHA-wide</b>	<b>HOPE VI Development</b>		
<b>Atlanta:</b>	Techwood	15.0	94.0	Being emptied for redevelopment.
	Clark Howell	15.0	1.0	
<b>Baltimore:</b>	Lafayette Courts	11.1	29.0	Refusal or turndown rate by applicants is about 70 percent.
<b>Boston:</b>	Mission Main	13.0	29.0	Fear of crime is one of the primary reasons for the high vacancy rate at Mission Main.
<b>Camden:</b>	McGuire Gardens	13.6	4.0	Units are undergoing renovation. Vacancy rates dropped after PHA moved in tenants from a more distressed development.
<b>Charlotte:</b>	Earle Village	4.1	16.0	There has been normal turnover.
<b>Chicago:</b>	Cabrini Homes Ext.	17.0	37.0	Two buildings are completely vacated. Other reasons include fear of violence, gang takeover, and deterioration.
<b>Cuyahoga:</b>	Outhwaite Homes	26.0	46.0	Primary reason for vacancy was units held off-line to facilitate modernization.
	King Kennedy	26.0	59.0	Units are empty for modernization. Renaissance Village has no vacancies.
<b>Detroit:</b>	Jeffries Homes	39.6	54.0	Reasons include: troubled PHA operations; absence of security; tenant selection and maintenance problems that impede efficient turnover of units; and mismatch of supply of bedroom sizes with applicant demand. Only 56 percent of units are considered marketable. Another 956 units are deemed unmarketable.
<b>DC:</b>	Ellen Wilson Dwell.	19.0	100.0	Closed in 1988 due to unsafe conditions.
<b>Milwaukee:</b>	Hillside Terrace	3.1	22.0	Reasons include: high rejection rates by applicants on first offer; high rates of unit turnover.

Exhibit 11 continues

<b>Exhibit 3-11 (continued)</b>			
<b>Vacancy Rates Prior to HOPE VI Grant Award</b>			
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Percent Just Before HOPE VI Grant</b>		<b>Reasons for Vacancies at HOPE VI Developments</b>
	<b>PHA-wide</b>	<b>HOPE VI Development</b>	
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	12.2	18.0	In February 1994, the PHA stopped admitting new tenants to the Elm Haven development; this policy was intended to facilitate the structural revitalization called for by the HOPE VI plan. Primary reasons for vacancies over the past five years include: eviction; entry into elderly housing; enrollment in a treatment program; availability/desirability of Section 8 or private housing. It is worth noting in this last instance that Section 8 and Connecticut RAP housing cluster very densely around this project.
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	23.9	74.0	Reasons include: flawed design/construction; increasing blight; violence; drug activity; and size of the site. There is no discernable pattern to vacancy locations.
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	2.0	4.0	NA
2139 Seminary	2.0	4.0	NA
5726 Elizabeth	2.0	4.0	NA
Coliseum Gardens	2.0	2.0	NA
Lockwood Gardens	2.0	2.0	NA
3634 Foothill Blvd.	2.0	4.0	NA
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	6.0	19.0	Reasons include: crime; condition of housing; and urban renewal plan.
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	2.0	6.0	Vacancy rates are reportedly due to high crime and drug activity, deteriorated buildings, inadequate maintenance, limited handicapped access, and an extreme garbage problem.
Yerba Buena Homes	2.0	2.0	Reasons include: high crime; drug activity; deteriorated buildings; inadequate maintenance; limited handicapped access; and an extreme garbage problem.
<b>Average</b>	14.4	43.0	
Source: SMIRPH 1995 and Office of Distressed & Troubled Housing Recovery Files			



**Exhibit 3-12  
Overall Maintenance - January 1995**

<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Excellent</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Very Poor</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood					✓
Clark Howell				✓	
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts				✓	
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main					✓
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens			✓		
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village		✓			
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.					✓
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes			✓		
King Kennedy		✓			
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes				✓	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.					✓
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace			✓		
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven			✓		
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire					✓
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary				✓	
2139 Seminary					✓
5726 Elizabeth					✓
Coliseum Gardens		✓			
Lockwood Gardens		✓			
3634 Foothill Blvd.		✓			
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.					✓
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings				✓	
Yerba Buena Homes				✓	
<b>Number</b>	0	5	4	6	8

Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form

<b>Exhibit 3-13 Trash Removal - January 1995</b>					
<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Excellent</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Very Poor</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood					✓
Clark Howell				✓	
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts				✓	
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main					✓
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens			✓		
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village			✓		
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.			✓		
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes		✓			
King Kennedy		✓			
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes				✓	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.				✓	
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace				✓	
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven		✓			
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire					✓
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary			✓		
2139 Seminary				✓	
5726 Elizabeth				✓	
Coliseum Gardens		✓			
Lockwood Gardens			✓		
3634 Foothill Blvd.		✓			
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.					✓
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings					✓
Yerba Buena Homes				✓	
<b>Number</b>	0	5	5	8	5
Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form					

### 3.5 CRIME AND DISORDER IN THE DEVELOPMENTS

As was the case with the PHAs, reliable crime statistics were not available for the individual developments. However, the Baseline Data Forms and Baseline Case Studies provide a sense of the nature of the problems with crime and disorder at these HOPE VI developments. Indicators of disorder include such problems as drug dealing, trash, graffiti, and broken windows. Wesley Skogan, author of *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods*, argues that these physical and social phenomena are indications that the social control processes used to maintain order in a community are weak, or possibly virtually nonexistent.<sup>14</sup>

Exhibit 3-14 shows the LRAs' ratings of the reputations of the developments within the larger community over the past five years. Interestingly, according to the LRAs, only four of these developments are viewed by the public as the "worst" in the PHAs' stock. Seventeen developments were rated as "one of the worst" and two were rated "about average." Of course, these ratings are only relative; for example, Hillside Terrace may be the worst development in terms of crime and disorder in Milwaukee, but it is still much cleaner and safer than some developments in other cities. Exhibit 3-15 describes change in the developments' reputations over time. According to the Baseline Data Forms, the reputations of 12 of these developments have gotten worse over the past five years, generally due to increases in drug trafficking and crime. The bad reputations of three developments (Techwood, Clark-Howell, and Cabrini Extension) have remained consistent over time. In contrast, eight developments are perceived as having improved somewhat over the past five years.

The Resident Satisfaction Survey and Baseline Case Studies offer more detailed information about crime and disorder at these HOPE VI developments. Nearly all of these developments have at least some problems with drug trafficking and physical disorder (trash, graffiti). However, the severity of these problems varies widely across the sample. For example, the ratings of Lafayette Courts suggest that it experienced some of the worst problems. Drug trafficking, drug use, violence, and fear of crime were all reported as "big" problems in the Resident Satisfaction Survey and, as Exhibit 3-16 shows, a majority of respondents reported feeling unsafe outside their building. HABC attempted to address these problems with management improvements, its own police force, and contracting with a company affiliated with the Nation of Islam to provide security in the high-rises. However, none of these measures was very successful and the HABC chose to demolish the high-rises as part of its HOPE VI plan.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Some of these disorders can also be categorized as illegal, criminal activities, but are best understood in the context of other disorders. W. G. Skogan, *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods*. Los Angeles: Macmillan, Inc., 1990.

<sup>15</sup> The Lafayette Courts high-rises were imploded in August 1995.

**Exhibit 3-14  
Reputation of the Development (Over the Past Five Years)**

PHA: HOPE VI Development	Worst	One of Worst	About Average	One of the Better Ones	Best
Atlanta: Techwood		✓			
Clark Howell		✓			
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts		✓			
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	✓				
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens			✓		
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village		✓			
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.		✓			
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes		✓			
King Kennedy		✓			
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes		✓			
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.		✓			
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	✓				
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven			✓		
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	✓				
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary		✓			
2139 Seminary	✓				
5726 Elizabeth		✓			
Coliseum Gardens		✓			
Lockwood Gardens		✓			
3634 Foothill Blvd.		✓			
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.		✓			
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings		✓			
Yerba Buena Homes		✓			
<b>Number</b>	4	17	2	0	0
Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form					

**Exhibit 3-15  
Reputation Change Over Time**

<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Has Reputation Changed?</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood	No	
Clark Howell	No	
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	Yes	Since mid-to-late 1980s, residents describe increasing structural deterioration, lack of maintenance work, increase in crime, all of which have led to a decline in reputation.
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	Yes	Mission Main is categorized as the worst public housing in Boston. It is known as the largest open-air heroin market in New England. Reputation as bastion of crime was made worse with the Charles Stuart incident in 1989.
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	Yes	Reputation has improved and occupancy has increased.
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	Yes	Earle Village has come to be known as a development plagued by high crime.
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	No	Cabrini is still considered crime-ridden and gang-infested.
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes	Yes	Attention to curb appeal, especially along the main thoroughfare, improved perception.
King Kennedy	Yes	Renaissance Village offers a visual model and improved quality of life.
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	Yes	The reputation changed due to an increase of crime abetted by the withdrawal of security and the presence of squatters. Management and maintenance services were sub-par and seldom coordinated. There were episodic interruptions in the provision of heat. There were few effective service initiatives on site.
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.	Yes	By 1988 there was blight and deterioration. Ever since, there has been crime and neglect.
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	Yes	Perceived as a haven for residents who are unemployed and welfare-dependent.
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	Yes	Elm Haven has been full of poverty, crime, drugs, and dependence since the early 1980s. These factors have led to a steady decline in the development's reputation.
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	No	

**Exhibit 3-15 continues**

**Exhibit 3-15 (continued)  
Reputation Change Over Time**

PHA: HOPE VI Development	Has Reputation Changed?	Description
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	Yes	Since community policing, some decrease in crime is evident.
2139 Seminary	No	
5726 Elizabeth	Yes	Community policing and several lease terminations have helped.
Coliseum Gardens	Yes	Positive improvements from the addition of social agencies. There have also been site improvements: painting; new windows; and security doors. Resident organization has also flourished during the past year.
Lockwood Gardens	Yes	Increased resident involvement, site improvements, 24-hour security have all assisted in bringing about an improvement within the development since the peak of violence in 1991
3634 Foothill Blvd.	Yes	Two evictions have occurred for problem tenants.
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	Yes	Violent crime in the development has increased. It became known as a hot spot for the SAPD. Elderly potential residents' turndown of openings are frequent.
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	Yes	The reputation of the Bernal projects has worsened over the years, due to increased crime and drug activity.
Yerba Buena Homes	Yes	The drug trade has increased. Crime incidents have increased, and safety for individuals has decreased.

Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form

<b>Exhibit 3-16</b>					
<b>Residents Reports About Safety Outside Their Buildings - March 1995</b>					
	Very Safe	Somewhat Safe	Somewhat Unsafe	Very Unsafe	Totals
PHA: HOPE VI Development	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Number
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood & Clark Howell	26	48	18	8	50
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	10	28	24	38	50
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	24	53	16	6	49
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	6	25	33	37	52
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	21	27	24	27	33
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes/King Kennedy	21	27	33	18	33
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes	20	37	26	17	35
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	20	38	22	19	407
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	21	49	15	15	53
<b>Oakland:</b> Coliseum Gardens	50	19	26	5	62
Lockwood Gardens	36	51	6	8	106
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	11	18	18	52	65
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings	21	43	7	29	14
Yerba Buena Homes	10	33	14	43	21
<b>Overall</b>	22	37	20	20	1,030

Source: HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey.

As presented in Chapter 2, Chicago and New Orleans have some of the highest-crime public housing in the nation. The Cabrini Extension and Desire are both notorious for the severity of their problems and are extremely dangerous places to live. Cabrini Extension experiences constant problems with gangs, drug trafficking, and violent crime.<sup>16</sup> Desire has a homicide rate five times that for the city as a whole and has been targeted for an extensive community policing effort. However, despite its reputation, most of the residents surveyed for this project said that they felt very or somewhat safe being outside in the development.

<sup>16</sup> Conditions in Cabrini have improved slightly since a gang truce was formed following the shooting of Dantrell Davis, a seven-year old boy, in 1992. However, drug trafficking, gang activity, and disorder remain very serious problems.

The problems in Mission Main in Boston were also quite severe, particularly in terms of violent crime and drug trafficking. Mission Main is a major center for the heroin trade, although gang activity is not a major problem. McGuire Gardens in Camden has serious problems with drugs and crime. Its problems are exacerbated by the fact that little police protection is available in the development—the lack of protection may account for the very high levels of fear reported in the resident survey. Elm Haven in New Haven has relatively high levels of disorder, gang activity, and drug dealing. The homicide rate in the development and surrounding community has risen in recent years. Lockwood Gardens in Oakland formerly was an extremely high crime development and the center of a major drug ring in the 1980s. Conditions have improved somewhat, but the homicide rate in 1991 was 11 times that for the city as a whole. A combination of community policing and fencing around the site have made a significant difference. Violence, drug trafficking, and gang activity are also serious problems in the Springview Apartments in San Antonio. The PHA has hired some security guards in response to a particularly horrible incident (four young boys were kidnapped and assaulted) thus far, however, the security has proved ineffective, and reported levels of fear remain high. Finally, the two developments in San Francisco are both very high-crime locations, experiencing heavy drug trafficking, and violence.

Other developments in the sample have less extreme problems. Good site management, less serious problems with gangs, and lower city crime rates overall all contribute to the better conditions. The two developments in Atlanta have some problems with crime and drug trafficking, but their problems are less severe than those experienced by others in the PHA's stock. Earle Village in Charlotte has few problems with disorder, but the development has a higher crime rate than any other in the city. This relatively high crime rate may account for the high levels of fear reported by residents at this development (see Exhibit 3-16). The PHA is combatting these problems through its drug prevention and community assistance programs (discussed in Chapter 2), in conjunction with a community policing effort by the city. The two developments in Cuyahoga Metro are well-maintained, and the level of crime is not much different from that for the city as a whole. The Jeffries Homes have a high proportion of elderly residents, and the development currently is experiencing relatively low levels of problems with crime and gang activity. Hillside Terrace has some problems with drugs, but not with gang activity or high levels of violent crime. The Foothill development in Oakland, perhaps because it is a scattered site, has no serious problems with crime or drug trafficking.

### **3.6 RESIDENT ORGANIZATIONS**

All the HOPE VI developments in the sample had some type of resident organization in place at baseline (except Ellen Wilson, which was vacant). However, the level of organization varied widely, with some developments having only nominal participation and others having very active groups that worked effectively with the PHA in developing the HOPE VI plan.

Some of the most active and well-organized tenant organizations were in Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, New Haven, and New Orleans. In Baltimore, the tenant organization has been working very well with the PHA. This is part of the reason that the relocation and demolition of Lafayette Courts went so smoothly, even though there is an ACLU lawsuit (apparently with support from some of the tenants) to prevent the rebuilding of Lafayette Courts on-site. The Mission Main Tenant Task Force in Boston, according to the Baseline Case Study, is governed by a 16-member board and has an



office with a multi-ethnic staff. This office provides services including community organizing, education, employment, assistance with welfare programs, legal advisory services, counselling referrals, youth programs, and recreational and cultural activities. In Detroit, one of two organizations, the Jeffries Residents Empowerment Committee, has a grant to fund needs assessments and an infant and toddler care program. The resident council in Elm Haven plays no role in management of the development, but the group's president has played a major role in the development of the HOPE VI plan. According to the Baseline Case Study, the Desire Area Resident Council (New Orleans) is a very political group, which has been very active in the HOPE VI effort. This group is also in the process of trying to form a Resident Management Corporation (RMC).

At the developments in Camden, San Antonio, and San Francisco, resident organizations were much less organized. In McGuire Gardens, participation in the tenant council was very limited; most officers on the council came from a single family and residents generally did not know when meetings were held. The situation in the Springview Apartments was similar, with the only tenant organization being a very small group that failed to represent the range of residents' views. According to the Baseline Case Study, this group maintains control over the other residents through threats and intimidation. The situation in San Francisco was the most extreme. While the tenant association in the Yerba Buena development was well-organized and cooperating with the SFHA on the HOPE VI plans, the tenant association in the Bernal Dwellings had been taken over by two convicted drug dealers. As discussed in Chapter 2, these men and their associates were intimidating other residents and maintained a highly adversarial relationship with the PHA.

### **3.7 SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES ON SITE**

The 15 PHAs varied considerably in terms of the range and level of services offered in their HOPE VI developments. Exhibit 3-17 shows that most developments had at least some recreational opportunities, although the facilities in Mission Main, McGuire Gardens, Ellen Wilson, Hillside Terrace, and Lockwood Gardens were very limited. Ellen Wilson had only green space and Hillside Terrace has only tot lots and a recreational building.<sup>17</sup>

Detailed information about specific services provided on-site at these HOPE VI developments is provided in the Technical Appendix. However, the pattern of services available at the developments mirrors the level of services offered by the PHA as a whole. With the exception of McGuire Gardens and the scattered site developments in Oakland, at least some minimal services are available at all of these developments. At many of these developments, these services are provided through partnerships with outside providers.

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<sup>17</sup> Ellen Wilson has no services because it is 100 percent vacant.

**Exhibit 3-17**  
**Recreational Facilities on Site - January 1995**

<b>PHA: HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Private Yards</b>	<b>Tot Lots</b>	<b>Play-ground for Adolescents</b>	<b>Basketball Court</b>	<b>Sitting Area for Adults</b>	<b>Community Gardens</b>	<b>Wide Side-walks</b>	<b>Green Space</b>	<b>Recreational Building</b>
<b>Atlanta:</b> Techwood		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
Clark Howell		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main									✓
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens		✓						✓	
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	✓		✓	✓			✓		✓
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.			✓	✓	✓				✓
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes			✓	✓	✓				✓
King Kennedy		✓					✓		✓
<b>Detroit:</b> Jeffries Homes		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwell.								✓	
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace		✓		✓					✓
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire								✓	✓
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary	✓						✓	✓	
2139 Seminary	✓						✓		
5726 Elizabeth	✓						✓	✓	
Coliseum Gardens							✓	✓	
Lockwood Gardens		✓				✓	✓		✓
3634 Foothill Blvd.	✓			✓			✓		
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
<b>San Francisco:</b> Bernal Dwellings		✓			✓				
Yerba Buena Homes			✓	✓				✓	
<b>Number</b>	8	10	9	9	8	2	12	12	12

Source: HOPE VI Baseline Data Form

Five developments (Lafayette Courts, Earle Village, Cabrini Extension, the two sites in Cuyahoga Metro, and Elm Haven) appear to offer substantially more services on-site than average. However, it is important to note that the fact that services are offered does not mean that they are well-organized or effective. Lafayette Courts has a family development center, a recreation center with a gym, an elementary school, a youth outreach program, Boy and Girl Scout troops, day care, day camp, drug prevention programs, and several community partnership programs. In Earle Village, residents receive services from the PHA's Safe Neighborhood Awareness Program (SNAP); Drug Abuse, Treatment, Outreach and Prevention Program (DATOP); Family Self-Sufficiency; and Community Assistance programs (described in detail in Chapter 2). Many HOPE VI-related services (e.g., employment and educational programs) are already available on site. A wide range of services are available to Cabrini Extension residents including drug prevention, parenting programs, child care, a community academy, a computer lab, employment and training programs, and Midnight Basketball. Residents also benefit from nearby service providers such as the New City YMCA, the Winfield Moody Health Clinic, and Project Match, a nationally recognized welfare-to-work program. As discussed in Chapter 2, the CMHA has a strong service orientation; services available on-site in Cleveland's King Kennedy and Outhwaite include in-patient drug treatment, Head Start, day care, substance abuse prevention, educational programs, and family life education. In addition, there are pre-existing volunteer/community service programs in place at the developments. Finally, residents of Elm Haven benefit from HANH's strong service orientation; resident specialists conduct home visits and services including health care, day care, tutoring, and "youth diversion" are offered on-site.

In sum, the 23 developments in the HOPE VI baseline sample suffer from a range of problems including aging housing stock, poorly designed and configured buildings, isolation from the surrounding community, poor management, and high crime. However, the number and severity of these problems varies considerably from site to site; some developments (e.g., Desire, and Ellen Wilson) are literally crumbling, while others suffer major system or environmental problems (e.g., plumbing or poor drainage), but have buildings in relatively good condition. Similarly, some of these developments have extremely severe problems with poor maintenance and disorder, but others are better managed and maintained. Crime, particularly drug trafficking, was a problem for all of the developments, but again, the level and severity of the problems varied greatly across the sites. All of these developments have some type of resident organization on-site, but these organizations vary considerably in their effectiveness. All of the developments offer at least some recreational opportunities on-site. Finally, the level of supportive services provided on-site tends to mirror the service orientation of the PHA as a whole. In the next chapter, we discuss the characteristics of the communities surrounding the baseline sample of HOPE VI developments.

## CHAPTER 4

### NEIGHBORHOOD BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS

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This chapter describes the neighborhoods surrounding the developments targeted for HOPE VI and the relationships between the developments and these communities, focusing on the sites included in this baseline for the longitudinal assessment of HOPE VI.<sup>1</sup> The revitalization plans developed by many of these PHAs place an emphasis on reintegrating public housing developments into surrounding communities from which they have been physically, economically, and socially isolated.<sup>2</sup> Sources of information for this chapter include quantitative and qualitative data collected through the HOPE VI Windshield Surveys of the surrounding communities; the HOPE VI case studies of each development; and U.S. Census and other information compiled by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research. In addition, other data were drawn from HOPE VI Baseline Data Forms prepared by the local research affiliates (LRAs).

#### 4.1 NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY

The history of the communities surrounding the HOPE VI developments is presented in Exhibit 4-1. While a number of the neighborhoods began as working or even middle class communities, most were very low income by the time that the HOPE VI developments were built. In more than half of the neighborhoods (Atlanta, Charlotte, Chicago, Cuyahoga, Detroit, Washington, DC, Milwaukee, New Haven and Yerba Buena Plaza in San Francisco), slum clearance was used as the justification for constructing public housing on the site. Atlanta's Techwood Homes, one of the oldest developments in the country, was a slum clearance project. In Washington, DC, the Ellen Wilson Homes were intended to replace "alley dwellings," shanties built by former slaves fleeing the deep south after the Civil War. In Charlotte, Earle Village was built as replacement housing for residents displaced by urban renewal efforts which had cleared the land and replaced most of the former housing with city and county government buildings.

The history of the other HOPE VI neighborhoods is more varied. Spring View Apartments in San Antonio were actually constructed in what was then a thriving, middle and lower class community of single-family homes. Lafayette Courts in Baltimore and Desire in New Orleans were intended as housing for low-income African-Americans; Lafayette Courts was constructed in a former industrial area and Desire was constructed on isolated swamp land that had previously been used for landfill. Likewise, McGuire Gardens in Camden was built on a flood plain in an area that had been used as an unofficial dump, located between a middle class area and a poor community. Finally, Lockwood Gardens in Oakland and Bernal Dwellings in San Francisco were built in industrial areas, as housing for war workers and veterans.

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<sup>1</sup> "Neighborhoods" were identified by the LRAs using locally accepted boundaries. For example, the neighborhoods in Atlanta are defined by ownership (Georgia Institute of Technology and Coca-Cola) and land use (currently mostly vacant land in preparation for construction of Centennial Olympic Park).

<sup>2</sup> Some of the baseline PHAs' plans are still being reconsidered locally. The elements of the revitalization plans (as of the end of May 1995) are discussed in Chapter 5 of this report.

**Exhibit 4-1  
History of the HOPE VI Developments**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	<p>Techwood and Clark Howell are located in the wedge once bounded by a rail line on the west and an old Indian ridge trail (currently Peachtree Street). The northern boundary, North Avenue, was the northernmost reach of development in the 1870s (1¼ miles from the CBD). The wedge, including Tanyard Creek, became known as Tanyard Bottoms (combining the terms for naming a local tannery and the floodplain of the creek). During the 1870s, Tanyard Bottoms evolved into a lower-middle-income area known as Techwood Flats. By the 1890s, it had become a low-income rental district. Fifty years later, these properties (built for rental only), were condemned, demolished, and replaced by the 604-unit Techwood Homes—a segregated, white only, public housing development. Techwood’s initial residents had incomes at the upper end of the rental population income distribution (i.e., those who cleaned the development earned 38 percent of the average income for residents.)</p>
<b>Baltimore</b>	<p>Lafayette Courts is located in what has long been an industrial area. This is consistent with Baltimore’s series of attempts to “maintain” the increasing population of African-Americans within certain neighborhoods by building public housing developments designated as “Negro housing.” This practice began prior to and during World War II. As the city grew after the war, some of these “Negro” communities were razed to make room for government buildings and other businesses. Simultaneously, the African-American population continued to increase as the housing opportunities continued to decrease. To address this housing shortage, 4 family high-rise developments, including Lafayette Courts, were built as “Negro housing” on land adjacent to existing public housing developments. To construct Lafayette Courts, housing for 582 African-American families was demolished to make way for 6 eleven-story high-rise and 17 low-rise buildings designed for 816 families. Currently the area remains 70 percent industrial and 30 percent residential—almost entirely public housing.</p>
<b>Boston</b>	<p>[The history of the development site is not included in the case study.]</p>
<b>Camden</b>	<p>McGuire Gardens, a 367 rowhouse-style public housing development is located in East Camden. Built in 1954 on the flood plain of the Cooper River and the site of a former unofficial dump, it was constructed on marginal housing development land (more likely to be considered “wetlands” today). At opening, the area to the east was a middle class neighborhood and to the north was (and is still reported as) a “rough neighborhood.” During the 1960s and 1970s, McGuire Gardens was described as “a good place to live.” It had play areas, a pool, a small concession stand, and a nearby grocery store.</p> <p>In the late 1970s, shifting ground and foundations forced a federal examination of site safety. Between 1979 and 1980, empty units were not filled and vacancy rates climbed—the community that had existed at McGuire Gardens scattered. New tenants found no community to join—the social fabric was (and still is) gone.</p>
<p><b>Exhibit 4-1 continues</b></p>	

<b>Exhibit 4-1 (continued)</b> <b>History of the HOPE VI Developments</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Charlotte</b>	<p>Earle Village is located the First Ward of Charlotte’s urban quadrants, an area historically recognized as a culturally diverse community. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the 10-square block area home to farmers and merchants, as well as unskilled laborers whose “shotgun” rental homes comprised the community. It had a thriving business district and provided support for its many African-American residents.</p> <p>Between the 1930s through the 1950s, the area declined. Limited employment opportunities following the Depression caused numerous residents to neglect their homes; a 1939 WPA housing survey showed that more than 25 percent of Charlotte’s housing units were in need of major repairs and nearly 45 percent of the units occupied by African-American residents needed major repairs.</p> <p>From 1946 though 1967, federal support for new suburban construction rather than urban revitalization compounded the problem. Suburbanization took its toll on the First Ward; by the mid 1960s, the First Ward had a predominantly poor, African-American population. The urban renewal strategy of the 1960s cleared urban land for the purpose of the construction of city and county government buildings, leaving many First Ward residents with limited housing opportunities. A legal challenge, on behalf of the residents to provide replacement housing, resulted in the 1967 construction of Earle Village, a 409-unit public housing development.</p>
<b>Chicago</b>	<p>The Cabrini-Green development, made up of 3 contiguous sites, is located on a 70.1 acre site in Chicago’s “Lower North” area. The original Cabrini Homes were part of the redevelopment of an area considered to be 1 of the most infamous of Chicago’s slums in the 1930s. The redevelopment occurred in 3 phases; 1943—the low-rise Cabrini Homes, 1958—the high-rise Cabrini Homes Extension, and 1962—the high-rise William Green Homes. The 3 sites contain 86 residential buildings (with 3,606 family units), a physical plant and a community center. Most of the dwelling units are contained in high-rise buildings, ranging from 7 to 19 stories. Cabrini-Green is highly concentrated (51.4 units per acre), has a very high vacancy rate (33.2 percent) and is described as the “most highly publicized and infamous public housing development owned and operated by the CHA.”</p>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	<p>The HOPE VI developments are located in the Central Neighborhood, east of Cleveland’s Central Business District. This was farmland until the mid-nineteenth century when foundries and other industries located in the area. By the 1880s, residential development began with an influx of immigrants. In the early 1900’s, African-American from the South joined the other immigrant groups seeking employment opportunities. As racial segregation emerged; by 1920 the majority of residents were African-American. The Great Depression of the 1930s left Central the most distressed area in the city. During this period, 2 of the nation’s first public housing developments were constructed—Olde Cedar Estates and Outhwaite Estates.</p> <p>Outhwaite Homes, constructed between 1935 and 1939, was located on a site that included the Lonnie Burton Recreation Center, a playground and community center, 3 schools (for elementary, junior high, and high school students), and other commercial/vacant land acquired by CMHA. Designed to be a self-contained community, it was built with high quality materials with low buildings grouped around courtyards. The major design flaw, unforeseen by the 1930s planners, was its lack of parking.</p> <p>King Kennedy Estates, constructed nearly 35 years later in 1971, was designed for maximum density without any sense of “village space.” Built in 2 sections, the North section is comprised of 2 connected six-story high-rise buildings for the elderly and 10 three-story buildings with walk-up family units, while the South section consists of 1 eight-story high-rise and 22 three-story gable-roofed buildings.</p>

**Exhibit 4-1 continues**

**Exhibit 4-1 (continued)  
History of the HOPE VI Developments**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Detroit</b>	<p>Jeffries Homes is located one mile from the central business district of Detroit. The Detroit Housing Commission was established in 1933 through a federal grant for “slum clearance” and construction of housing for low-income residents. This initiative continued with the construction of Jefferies Homes. Both Jefferies East and Jefferies West are built on sites that were once residential neighborhoods that were considered substandard and a source of blight to more stable neighborhoods.</p>
<b>DC</b>	<p>Ellen Wilson Dwellings are located in the Capitol Hill Historic Neighborhood. During and after the Civil War, the neighborhood residents included both property owners (who built row and townhouses along the streets and avenues of the inner city) and refugees from slavery and the South (who moved to the District for employment and built shanties along the alleys that separated the row and townhouse properties). Reform efforts to eradicate the alley dwellings began in the 1890s under private auspices that were hampered by the lack of funding and inability to provide relocation housing. During the first thirty years of this century, public funds were spent on creating and revitalizing the District as a city of monuments. Publicly funded housing reforms began in the 1930s with the establishment of the first housing authority in the country, the Alley Dwelling Authority, an organization with the power to condemn property and convert alley dwellings to “some undetermined use consistent with community development.” In 1941, the ADA chose Navy Place Slums, considered “one of the most sordid alleys in the city,” as the site for 3 housing projects: Ellen Wilson Dwellings (for whites) and, Authur Capper and Carrolsburg Dwellings (for blacks).</p> <p>The Ellen Wilson Dwellings consist of 13 two-story buildings all facing inward. Over the years, the development has become increasingly isolated from the other 2 developments and the rest of the neighborhood. An expressway is located immediately south of Ellen Wilson, separating it from the other 2 developments. By the early 1960’s, the neighborhood was 1 of the most desirable neighborhoods in the District. The residents of the neighborhood were becoming increasingly white. Conflicts dividing the community erupted and continue to this day. Then Ellen Wilson Dwellings became increasingly isolated from the rest of the neighborhood and other public housing projects. By 1988, the severely troubled development was vacant.</p>
<b>Milwaukee</b>	<p>Hillside Terrace is located in the City of Milwaukee. Since the 1840s, this has been a multi-ethnic neighborhood—first for Dutch and German immigrants and, later for Jews, Greeks, Slovaks, Croatians, and Blacks. By the 1940s, absentee landlords had allowed the homes in the area to deteriorate. Needing a site for public housing for war workers and later veterans, Milwaukee declared the area blighted, demolished the prior structures, and began construction of the Hillside Terrace in 1948. An “addition” was added in 1956.</p> <p>The area is considered an enclave. It is separated from the downtown area by major highways on the west and south sides. The area immediately east is a non-residential area with small wholesale, manufacturing, and retail businesses, as well as vacant lots. To the north are 3 public and private multi-family residential complexes and a nursing home.</p>

**Exhibit 4-1 continues**

<b>Exhibit 4-1 (continued)</b>	
<b>History of the HOPE VI Developments</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>New Haven</b>	<p>Elm Haven is located in the Dixwell neighborhood of New Haven within a few hundred yards of Yale University. This neighborhood had been the center of residential, religious, and cultural life for African-Americans since long before the Great Depression. When Elm Haven opened in 1940, the population of the neighborhood was approximately two-thirds African-American and one-third white. The economy was healthy due to the proximity of the Winchester Repeating Arms plant that employed 20,000 full time workers during World War II and again during the Korean War.</p> <p>Elm Haven's 36-structures on 17 acres opened in the fall of 1940. Like the surrounding neighborhood, the early population of the development consisted of two-thirds black households. Nearly every head of household had a job, either at the Winchester plant or in 1 of other industries that supported the other employees of the plant. For the residents of Elm Haven, wages were high, welfare was uncommon, and crime was rare.</p>
<b>New Orleans</b>	<p>The Desire Housing Development is located on a 97-acre tract of low-lying land that is bordered by an industrial canal, railroad tracks, and major highways. The development and the surrounding neighborhood were built on a swamp and landfill site. The construction was done in 2 phases from 1954 to 1956. When finished, there were 262 buildings with 1,860 units designed specifically for housing African-Americans.</p>
<b>Oakland</b>	<p>Lockwood Gardens is located in Central East Oakland. It was ready for occupancy in 1939, but was redesignated in 1942 as housing for war-related shipyard and production workers. During this period, the development housed a segregated, all-white population. In the post-war period, the development reverted to regular, desegregated, public housing. By the early 1960s, the residents were predominately African-Americans. Lockwood Gardens contains 372 units in 53 buildings and covers 22 acres. Its boundaries include a major thoroughfare, the Oakland Coliseum, and Coliseum Gardens (another public housing development).</p> <p>Another location, the Foothill Blvd. site, is located 2.6 miles from Lockwood Gardens in the Fruitvale neighborhood. Opened in 1969, it has 16 units on 0.6 acres. This scattered-site development is bounded by a street (with heavy traffic) and a garbage-strewn abandoned lot.</p> <p>Comparing Lockwood Gardens and Foothill Blvd., the majority of the households are African-American (80 and 50 percent, respectively), headed by women (79 and 69 percent), and receiving AFDC (60 and 75 percent).</p>
<b>San Antonio</b>	<p>Spring View Apartments are located on the predominately African-American East Side adjoining the central city. The early settlers of this area were freedom-seeking refugees from the Louisiana Purchase territory to the Spanish Territory. One "immigrant," a former slave, moved to San Antonio in 1807 and began acquiring land on the eastern part of the mission land, now known as the East Side. By 1833, he owned 5 or 6 houses and additional lots where he grew sugar cane and cotton. As other freedom seekers followed, the area became one where free blacks could prosper. When the development was constructed in the early 1950s, the farms were gone, but the neighborhood had many low-to moderate income families living mostly in single-family homes. Most of the heads of household were employed. It was still a "good place for families to live and prosper."</p> <p>Originally called East Terrace, the development opened in 1953. It had 219 units situated on nearly 50 acres. In 1959, 202 units were added. By 1993, only 366 of the 421 units were habitable.</p>

**Exhibit 4-1 continues**



<b>Exhibit 4-1 (continued)</b> <b>History of the HOPE VI Developments</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>San Francisco</b>	<p>Bernal Dwellings, built in 1953, is located at the southern edge of the Mission District. Prior to construction, the site contained small-scale industry and commercial building. Bernal Dwellings occupies an entire city block zoned for low-density residential use. Instead, on 3.86 acres, there are 12 three-story and 1 eight-story buildings with 208 units or 53 units per acre. When built, the purpose was to provide low-cost housing to working class families, including returning veterans and their families.</p> <p>Yerba Buena Plaza East, built in 1956, is located in the Western Addition of the city. This area was the focus of redevelopment projects in the 1960s and 1970s when most of the other housing in the area was demolished and not rebuilt for nearly a decade. During this time, stores and businesses closed, and hundreds of jobs were lost to area residents. The development contains 276 units on 3.58 acres—a density of 77 units per acre. Although the low-rise building are congruous with the low-rise character of the surrounding neighborhood, the mid- and high-rise buildings are vastly over-sized and easily identified as public housing.</p>

#### 4.2 NEIGHBORHOOD DESCRIPTION

Selected characteristics of the neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI developments in the baseline assessment are summarized in Exhibit 4-2. The descriptions of the neighborhoods do not include the developments in the estimates of land use or condition of housing. Most of the developments are located in communities with a mix of land uses; however, roughly half the land is used for residential purposes. Milwaukee’s and Cuyahoga Metro’s<sup>3</sup> HOPE VI-targeted neighborhoods are the least residential (16 percent), while the neighborhoods in Camden, Charlotte, New Haven, and Oakland are all more than three-fourths residential. On the other end of the spectrum, the Atlanta HOPE VI developments have no residential neighborhood per se beyond the borders, but are surrounded by a university and Coca-Cola Headquarters.

Commercial uses occupy roughly 10 percent of the land surrounding the HOPE VI developments, and institutional uses (such as hospitals and universities) account for 14 percent of land use. Industrial activities occupy almost an additional eight percent. The neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI sites in Atlanta, Cleveland, Detroit, and San Antonio have substantial amounts of vacant land (totaling 20 percent or more of total land area).

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<sup>3</sup> The Cuyahoga Metro Housing Authority serves the City of Cleveland.

**Exhibit 4-2  
Summary of Neighborhood Characteristics - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Land Uses</b>	<b>Type/Condition of Housing</b>	<b>Condition of Physical Environment*</b>	<b>Level of Neighborhood Crime &amp; Social Disorder</b>
Data Sources	Case Studies	Windshield Survey (Exhibit A-143)	Windshield Survey (Exhibits A-144, A-145, A-148, A-153).	Windshield Survey (Exhibits A-149, A-150, A-151)	
<b>Atlanta</b> Georgia Institute of Technology	Georgia Institute of Technology (GIT)	Institutional	The only housing is public housing and GIT student housing.	Excellent	There is a history of some crime associated with homeless population, but they have largely been displaced.
Techwood Park	Techwood Park	Commercial/Industrial		Fair. This is not considered a "clean" area.	
Coca-Cola	Headquarters	Commercial		Excellent	
<b>Baltimore</b>	East Baltimore	Mixed - 50 percent residential	Approximately 75 percent are multifamily buildings (primarily public housing) with more than 10 units; they are average to low quality.	Fair	There are high levels of violent personal and property crimes.
<b>Boston</b>	Mission Hill District	40 percent residential; 50 percent institutional	There are a wide variety of types and quality; 80 percent is in sound to somewhat-deteriorated condition.	Fair	There is a high property-crime rate. Violent crime rates have declined since 1989, but they are still above the city-wide average.

\*Includes condition of streets, presence of trash and vacant lots.

Note: Exhibits A-143, etc. are in Volume III.

**Exhibit 4-2 continues**

**Exhibit 4-2 (continued)**  
**Summary of Neighborhood Characteristics - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Land Uses</b>	<b>Type/Condition of Housing</b>	<b>Condition of Physical Environment</b>	<b>Level of Neighborhood Crime &amp; Social Disorder</b>
<b>Camden</b>	East Camden	78 percent residential; some commercial	About 80 percent of stock was built prior to 1945; 55 percent are rowhouses, 30 percent are 5-10 unit apartment buildings. This is considered a low-quality residential area.	Fair to Poor	There is a high level of prostitution and limited police presence due to lack of city resources.
<b>Charlotte</b>	First Ward	Earle Village development accounts for entire neighborhood.	All public housing rowhouses, built since 1961; they are in sound condition.	Good	See Chapter 3.
<b>Chicago</b>	Old Town	Half residential, 40 percent commercial; extensive vacant land (although some has recently been purchased for development)	There are mixed types and quality levels; the range is from sound to dilapidated condition.	Good	There is limited information, but the neighborhood is perceived to have a lower crime rate than the development.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	Central Neighborhood	Mixed uses, only 16 percent residential; extensive vacant land	Predominantly 10+ unit multifamily buildings; 78 percent have major deterioration or are dilapidated/abandoned.	Fair	A lot of vacant land and buildings, with dumping of debris and litter. There are high property, narcotic, and violent crime rates.
<b>Detroit</b> East Jeffries Homes	Near West Side	Mixed uses; 30 percent residential; extensive vacant land	There are mixed types of housing; roughly one-half single-family; 80 percent of stock were built prior to 1945; 70 percent is in sound condition or has minor/some deterioration.	Good to Fair	This area has the highest violent crime rate in the city. Also, it has the highest drug trafficking, prostitution, and levels of public intoxication.

**Exhibit 4-2 continues**

<b>Exhibit 4-2 (continued)</b>					
<b>Summary of Neighborhood Characteristics - January 1995</b>					
<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Land Uses</b>	<b>Type/Condition of Housing</b>	<b>Condition of Physical Environment</b>	<b>Level of Neighborhood Crime &amp; Social Disorder</b>
<b>Detroit</b> West Jeffries Homes	Near West Side	Mixed uses, 54 percent residential	There are mixed types of housing; roughly one-half single-family dwellings; 80 percent of stock were built prior to 1945; 80 percent is in sound condition or has minor/some deterioration.	Good to Fair	This development also has a high violent crime rate. Assault and robbery are problems.
<b>DC</b> North of Expressway	Capitol Hill	Mixed; 38 percent residential. Also retail and government buildings. Ellen Wilson is a vacant public housing development in a wealthy neighborhood north of expressway.	Housing is 75 percent rowhouses; 80 percent were built prior to 1945.	Fair	There is little information in the case study. It mentions drug-related crime and robbery.
South of Expressway	Capitol Hill	The neighborhood is split literally in half by an expressway. The southern neighborhood is lower income mix of residential, light industry, and the U.S. Navy Shipyard.	Mixed; structures include public housing, run down private homes and small industry. The condition ranges from sound to dilapidated or abandoned; it is considered a "fair" residential area.	Fair	
<b>Milwaukee</b>	North Side	Mixed; 16 percent residential; 40 percent industrial	Housing is of the mixed types; all is in sound condition to minor/some deterioration; there is considered a "fair" residential area.	Good	This is considered a low-crime area.

**Exhibit 4-2 continues**

<b>Exhibit 4-2 (continued)</b>					
<b>Summary of Neighborhood Characteristics - January 1995</b>					
<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Land Uses</b>	<b>Type/Condition of Housing</b>	<b>Condition of Physical Environment</b>	<b>Level of Neighborhood Crime &amp; Social Disorder</b>
<b>New Haven</b>	Dixwell	81 percent residential	Range of housing types (roughly one-half single-family); 84 percent in sound to fair condition.	Good to Fair	It has a very high homicide rate and there is lots of gang activity.
<b>New Orleans</b>	Desi-Flo/Press Park	Mixed; 60 percent residential. Florida public housing development and Press Park single family home development account for most housing.	It is 60 percent single-family; 75 percent of all stock are average to below average quality.	Fair to Poor	The homicide rate is higher than city-wide rates; the rates for other crimes are similar to city-wide rates. The problems include drug dealing, public intoxication, loitering.
<b>Oakland</b> Seminary Avenue; Elizabeth Avenue	Central East Oakland	85 percent residential	The area is mixed; 55 percent are single-family homes in sound to fair condition, but are considered average to poor quality.	Fair	The area has a higher than city average rate for drug offenses, weapons offenses, and murder.
Coliseum Gardens; Lockwood Gardens	Central East Oakland	65 percent residential	It is 80 percent single-family dwellings but are considered average to poor quality.	Sound to fair condition	Highest-crime area in City of Oakland; heavy drug market.
3624 Foothill Blvd.	Fruitvale	70 percent residential	The area housing is mixed; 60 percent are single-family in sound to fair condition, but the area is considered average to poor quality.	Good	No information
<b>Exhibit 4-2 continues</b>					

**Exhibit 4-2 (continued)  
Summary of Neighborhood Characteristics - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Land Uses</b>	<b>Type/Condition of Housing</b>	<b>Condition of Physical Environment</b>	<b>Level of Neighborhood Crime &amp; Social Disorder</b>
<b>San Antonio</b>	East Side	63 percent residential; extensive vacant land	The area is 95 percent single-family housing of average to low quality; it is considered a "fair" quality residential area.	Fair	This area has high crime rates, especially for drugs, theft, assault, rape, and murder.
<b>San Francisco Bernal Dwellings</b>	Inner Mission District	70 percent residential	There are approximately 65 percent 2-4 unit apartment buildings; the stock is in sound to fair condition.	Good	There is extensive graffiti. Gang-related violence, including drive-by shootings, has been a problem.
Yerba Buena	4 distinct neighborhoods around the development	70 percent residential; densely populated	The area is 60 percent rowhouse; 30 percent are 10+ unit apartment buildings; and 90 percent of stock in sound condition.	Good	Litter, graffiti, drug dealing and use, and loitering are problems.

Some of these neighborhoods are clearly distressed in terms of housing and physical conditions. In Cleveland, 78 percent of the neighborhood housing stock (primarily medium to large apartment buildings of 10 or more units) shows major deterioration or is dilapidated or abandoned. This community also holds a large number of deteriorated or abandoned commercial and industrial property, crime rates are high, and dumping of debris and litter is common. Baltimore's Lafayette Courts is also located in a distressed community, characterized by large, multi-family apartment buildings of average to low quality. Property and crime rates are high, boarded-up buildings are numerous, and the streetscape is litter-strewn.

Some of the HOPE VI communities have a wider range of housing and nonresidential property conditions. In San Antonio, the condition of local structures varies considerably from block to block. In Milwaukee, pockets of more upscale residential and commercial properties exist among deteriorated areas. The HOPE VI developments in Atlanta, Baltimore, Charlotte, and Chicago are all adjacent to downtown business districts. In each of these cities, however, the areas closer to the development are consistently in worse condition than those further away. Local observers in each of these sites noted that the presence of a troubled public housing development contributed to disinvestment in the area immediately surrounding the development.

### **4.3 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Economic development trends and activities in the HOPE VI communities are summarized in Exhibit 4-3. Many of the HOPE VI neighborhoods have suffered in the transition from manufacturing-based to services-based economies. Evidence of this trend is visible to varying degrees in Baltimore, New Haven, and Oakland; the change has been devastating in Camden, Cleveland, Detroit and Milwaukee, where tens of thousands of manufacturing jobs have been lost in the past three decades.

A second, related theme that emerges in an assessment of economic development in the HOPE VI neighborhoods is the mismatch between the jobs being created in the "new" economy and the skill levels of the communities' residents. For example, the key expanding sectors in the San Antonio economy are tourism, biotechnology, and the military. Jobs in these industries are either low-wage, low-skill positions with little opportunity for advancement or high-wage, high-skill positions for which most public housing residents lack appropriate training. Further, in San Antonio's case, the jobs are not being created in the East Side neighborhood but rather in other parts of the city. East Side residents who are employed tend to work outside the neighborhood, an area that was once flourishing community of rich farmland and other thriving businesses.

New business development was evident in several of the HOPE VI communities. Charlotte's metropolitan area is growing rapidly, new industries are locating in the city, and unemployment is low. New restaurants, housing development, and retail activity are appearing around the Ellen Wilson development in Washington, DC. Six of the communities surrounding the HOPE VI sites (those in Baltimore, Camden, Cuyahoga Metro, Detroit, Oakland, and San Antonio) are located in or near areas targeted for economic development efforts such as federal Empowerment Zones or Enterprise Communities. In Milwaukee, a state and locally funded Economic Development Zone has been established in a nearby neighborhood. These programs provide incentives (such as wage tax credits, capital gains exclusions, and other benefits) to establish new businesses that will employ local residents. These resources, in addition to the HOPE VI initiatives, are intended to contribute to the economic revitalization of the neighborhoods.

**Exhibit 4-3  
Summary of Neighborhood Demographics and Resources - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Neighborhood Residents' Demographics</b>	<b>Community Resources</b>	<b>Economic Activity</b>
<b>Sources of Data</b>	<b>Case Studies</b>	<b>Case Studies, Bureau of the Census Data compiled by HUD</b>	<b>Case Studies</b>	<b>Case Studies, Baseline Data Form (Exhibits A-2 through A-5, A-28)</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	Georgia Institute of Technology; Tech-wood; Coca-Cola	There are virtually no residents, other than students and public housing residents in Clark-Howell.	The resources are limited due to limited population. The full range of services is available in the CBD, one mile away.	Approximately one mile away, there are some retail stores catering primarily to downtown office workers and tourists. Low-paying jobs are available. Atlanta's economy is generally expansionary.
<b>Baltimore</b>	East Baltimore	Most of the residents live in other public housing. 1990 Census: 95 percent rent, 94 percent minority, 36 percent with public assistance, 66 percent in poverty.	Currently they have wide array of social services; substantial investments are being made in housing and services to benefit low-income people.	The primary activity is located in the urban renewal area; an Empowerment Zone is nearby. Currently there is very limited economic activity—mostly in a few retail stores and limited industry.
<b>Boston</b>	Mission Hill District	The residents are ethnically diverse. They have lower incomes than city-wide median—already low because of large student population. 1990 Census: 89 percent rent, 52 percent minority, 17 percent with public assistance, 28 percent in poverty.	The area is surrounded by hospitals and universities; it has easy access to public transportation; there are some retail services for neighborhood residents. There are also a few churches and some social services.	Despite location near major medical institutions and universities, there are few employment opportunities for neighborhood residents other than low-wage, low-skill jobs. Some new development is on-going in the nearby Ruggles Center.
<b>Camden</b>	East Camden	1990 Census: 56 percent rent, 96 percent minority, 23 percent with public assistance, 35 percent in poverty.	There are schools, a park, and a police mini-station. There are some services locally; other services are available a short distance away in downtown Philadelphia or in Cherry Hill, NJ	There are very limited employment opportunities in Camden; an Enterprise Community may provide opportunities in the future.

**Exhibit 4-3 continues**



**Exhibit 4-3 (continued)**  
**Summary of Neighborhood Demographics and Resources - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Neighborhood Residents' Demographics</b>	<b>Community Resources</b>	<b>Economic Activity</b>
<b>Charlotte</b>	First Ward	Earle Village dominates the Census Tract.	There are schools, churches, and a few convenience stores, but basic services are generally lacking.	Charlotte's economy is expansionary and CBD is close-by.
<b>Chicago</b>	Old Town	The neighborhood is diverse at the macro level, but there is considerable racial and economic segregation within the community. 1990 Census: 92 percent rent, 61 percent minority, 18 percent with public assistance, 40 percent in poverty.	There are parks, churches, YMCA, Children's Center, and schools. The retail stores in the immediate neighborhood tend to be "seedy;" there are an array of social services in and around development.	There are some employment opportunities; the broader neighborhood includes economic activities ranging from industrial to upscale retail/commercial.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	Central Neighborhood	1990 Census: 89 percent rent, 97 percent minority, 53 percent with public assistance, 71 percent in poverty.	There are a wide range of resources including educational institutions, retail, recreation, etc.	There are a lot of deteriorated and abandoned industrial properties; there are few current employment opportunities for people with limited skills. The Federal Empowerment Zone may provide future opportunities.
<b>Detroit</b> East Jeffries Homes	Near West Side	The residents have low incomes and are minority group members; 41 percent are unemployed. 1990 Census: 95 percent rent, 68 percent minority, 31 percent with public assistance, 53 percent in poverty.	Municipal recreation center; several schools; parks (although they suffer from neglect); hospital; social services, churches	There has been a severe loss of manufacturing jobs in past 30 years; currently there are limited job opportunities in the neighborhood and some retail services. This location is near the CBD and is in a Federal Empowerment Zone.
West Jeffries Homes	Near West Side	The residents have low incomes and are minority group members; 18 percent are unemployed. 1990 Census: 81 percent rent, 76 percent minority, 37 percent with public assistance, 39 percent in poverty.		

**Exhibit 4-3 continues**

**Exhibit 4-3 (continued)  
Summary of Neighborhood Demographics and Resources - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Neighborhood Residents' Demographics</b>	<b>Community Resources</b>	<b>Economic Activity</b>
<b>DC</b>  North of Expressway	Capitol Hill	Incomes are more mixed away from the development; a freeway divides the neighborhood into two distinct parts, this one containing Ellen Wilson has distinctly higher incomes. 1990 Census: 52 percent rent, 23 percent minority, 1 percent with public assistance, 7 percent in poverty.	There are churches, social services, and community organizations.	There is some retail activity near the development, although stores are small and expensive; other parts of neighborhood have extensive federal government buildings and uses. There are also a few more upscale commercial/retail entities.
	Capitol Hill	The residents near the development have low incomes; a freeway divides the neighborhood into two distinct parts, this one has distinctly lower incomes. 1990 Census: 36 percent rent, 36 percent minority, 40 percent with public assistance, 54 percent in poverty.		There is an industrial area south of freeway, including the U.S. Navy Shipyard. Only low-wage jobs are available.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	North Side	They are generally low income, although there are pockets of moderate-income households. 1990 Census: 89 percent rent, 97 percent minority, 51 percent with public assistance, 58 percent in poverty.	There are a Boys and Girls Club, a large park, churches, schools, and well-served by public buses.	There has been a severe loss of manufacturing jobs in last 30 years. An Economic Development Zone (using city and state funds) is developing some new job opportunities nearby. Some neighborhood merchants provide retail/commercial services to residents.
<b>New Haven</b>	Dixwell	There has been a significant population loss; 90 percent of the residents are minority; 13.5 percent are unemployed.	There is a reasonable array of retail services, including a large supermarket. There are also social services, recreation, medical, library, and day care available.	The economy has been contracting along with population. Few neighborhood jobs have been created by Science Park facility; some low-wage jobs are available at Yale.

**Exhibit 4-3 continues**

**Exhibit 4-3 (continued)  
Summary of Neighborhood Demographics and Resources - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Neighborhood Residents' Demographics</b>	<b>Community Resources</b>	<b>Economic Activity</b>
<b>New Orleans</b>	Desi-Flo/Press Park	The residents are predominantly African-Americans who have low to very low incomes. 1990 Census: 53 percent rent, 100 percent minority, 32 percent with public assistance, 58 percent in poverty.	The resources include a community center, churches, universities, and a reasonably good bus service.	The CBD is a 20-minute bus ride away. Some industry is in the neighborhood, but there are few job opportunities for residents other than services.
<b>Oakland</b> Seminary; Elizabeth	Central East Oakland	The residents are ethnically diverse and have some diversity of income, although the unemployment rate is still high. 1990 Census: 62 percent rent, 98 percent minority, 39 percent with public assistance, 28 percent in poverty.	There are several strong community and cultural organizations. Churches and CBOs provide services and political leadership.	The shabby commercial strips with few banks or basic services contribute to "capital leakage" (residents shop and do business outside neighborhood). There have been substantial declines in manufacturing employment in recent years. Some growth in jobs, but new jobs either high skill/high wage or low skill/low wage. Have federal Empowerment Zone.
	Coliseum Gardens; Lockwood Gardens			
	3624 Foot-hill			
	Fruitvale	The residents are ethnically diverse and the population is growing.	There is good transit access, several churches and community organizations.	
<b>San Antonio</b>	East Side	The residents are predominantly African-American; of the 36 percent who have year-round employment, only 39 percent make more than \$15,000. 1990 Census: 42 percent rent, 95 percent minority, 24 percent with public assistance, 45 percent in poverty.	The resources include churches, schools, YWCA, medical clinic and a good bus service.	There is a lot of abandonment and deterioration of commercial property. The available jobs require high skills or are low-wage and low-skill jobs. There are few employment opportunities in neighborhood; most residents who work, work outside the neighborhood. There is an Enterprise Zone.

**Exhibit 4-3 continues**

**Exhibit 4-3 (continued)**  
**Summary of Neighborhood Demographics and Resources - January 1995**

<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Neighborhood Residents' Demographics</b>	<b>Community Resources</b>	<b>Economic Activity</b>
<b>San Francisco</b> Bernal Dwellings	Inner Mission District	The residents are predominantly Latino with low to moderate incomes. 1990 Census: 72 percent rent, 83 percent minority, 20 percent with public assistance, 22 percent in poverty.	There are two major parks. The shopping district consists primarily of small, independently owned shops.	The CBD is a 20-minute bus ride away. Some industry is in the neighborhood, but there are few job opportunities for residents other than services.
<b>San Francisco</b> Yerba Buena	Western Addition	The residents of the four surrounding neighborhoods are ethnically diverse with a wide range of incomes from high to low. 1990 Census: 83 percent rent, 64 percent minority, 19 percent with public assistance, 18 percent in poverty.	There are playgrounds, tennis courts, a child-care facility, and a fairly large supermarket.	The shabby commercial strips with few banks or basic services contribute to "capital leakage" (residents shop and do business outside neighborhood). There have been substantial declines in manufacturing employment in recent years. Some growth in jobs, but new jobs either high skill/high wage or low skill/low wage. Have federal Empowerment Zone.

Housing markets also vary considerably across the 15 HOPE VI communities, which affects the eventual marketability of the revitalized HOPE VI developments. For example, San Francisco and Oakland have extremely low vacancy rates and high housing costs overall, meaning that the demand for low income housing is very high. Washington, D.C., Boston, and Chicago are also among the top 10 most expensive housing markets in the country. In contrast, other HOPE VI communities such as New Haven, Cleveland, and Detroit have a surplus of low-cost housing, meaning that the revitalized developments will have to compete for tenants.

#### **4.4 RESIDENT CHARACTERISTICS**

The available data on resident characteristics are summarized in the third column of Exhibit 4-2. The 1990 Census data is based on approximate neighborhood boundaries with the HOPE VI developments subtracted out of the data wherever possible. It appears the residents in the surrounding neighborhoods are, on average, somewhat better off than the public housing residents in the HOPE VI developments in their communities. Even so, they still suffer from high unemployment rates, low incomes, and high rates of dependence on public assistance. Many of the neighborhoods are characterized by high concentrations of very low-income people: 60 percent of the households in East Baltimore (mostly living in public housing) earn less than \$15,000 annually; and almost 1 in 4 of San Antonio's East Side residents receives public assistance. By contrast, as noted above, a few communities are experiencing continuing growth and gentrification—with increasing economic diversity. Examples include the Capitol Hill neighborhood in Washington, DC, where in the area north of the expressway (containing Ellen Wilson) only one percent of the residents receive public assistance. Although less obvious from the Census data, Old Town in Chicago has higher incomes the farther one moves away from Cabrini-Green.

#### **4.5 NEIGHBORHOOD RESOURCES**

As discussed above, the HOPE VI communities generally are characterized by limited economic opportunity, social disorder, and physical decay. In spite of these challenges, a number of the HOPE VI neighborhoods have relatively extensive neighborhood resources. As shown in Exhibit 4-2, these may include community organizations, churches, social service providers, public transportation access, and basic consumer services (e.g., banks, grocery stores, drug stores, and laundromats).

Central East Oakland, for example, is known not only for high rates of crime and poverty but also for strong churches and community organizations, whose staffs and members provide important services, a community network, and political leadership. East Baltimore has an array of social service providers, and significant new investments are being made in housing and services to benefit low-income people there.

In addition to social service networks, some of the HOPE VI neighborhoods feature other important resources such as public transit and proximity to central business districts. HOPE VI sites in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Charlotte are within one mile of major business districts. East Camden is just a five to ten minute drive (for those with cars) from downtown Philadelphia or suburban Cherry Hill, NJ. Otherwise, residents in East Camden can use bus service to downtown Camden, Philadelphia, or the suburbs, although bus service is limited, especially during off-peak hours.

As is common in low-income, urban neighborhoods, retail and other consumer services tend to be small scale of low quality and high cost. With the exception of New Haven and the Yerba Buena neighborhood in San Francisco, larger supermarkets with more competitive prices are frequently too far away for local residents to patronize regularly. Many of the neighborhoods lack branch banks; pawn shops and check cashing services offer similar services but at considerably higher costs.

#### **4.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD**

Many of the HOPE VI developments in the baseline assessment sample have distant relationships, if any, with the surrounding neighborhood. The developments are often not considered to be part of the neighborhoods in which they are located. The physical appearance of the development may contribute to its isolation. Public housing is often architecturally different from the residential and commercial buildings surrounding it. Physical deterioration of the development and lack of through streets connecting the development to neighborhood streets also contribute to a distancing between the development and the surrounding neighborhood.

Strained relationships between the development and neighborhood are also typical of the HOPE VI developments. The sources of tension include neighborhood perceptions that crime and disorder in the community comes from and/or is attracted by the developments. In some communities, such as Detroit and Washington, DC, neighborhood residents mistrust the local housing authority. The Detroit Housing Department is seen to operate in isolation and through centralized organizational structures that preclude collaborative efforts between the development and neighborhood groups. The neighborhood organizations in Washington, DC have expressed concerns over the years since the abandonment of the development. They currently express impatience and distrust; the implementation of any plan has taken too long and they have not been “adequately consulted” about the HOPE VI plans.

New Orleans’ Desire development seems to be an exception to the pattern. While the development’s high vacancy rate and barren site detract from its integration with the neighborhood, local respondents indicated the development still enjoys a relatively amiable relationship with the adjacent Desi-Flo/Press Park neighborhood. Observers noted that residents of the area often have family members and friends among development residents, or were residents themselves at one time.

#### **4.7 SUMMARY**

The key positive and negative features of the neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI developments are summarized in Exhibit 4-4. As shown in the exhibit, most communities have both positive and negative features that affect the social and economic life of the neighborhood. A number of the developments are located near central business districts with good access to transit routes and retail and social services (see Boston, Baltimore, Oakland, Bernal Dwellings in San Francisco). Areas with extensive vacant land such as Chicago, Charlotte, and San Antonio may provide opportunities for additional community development near the revitalized developments. Neighborhoods near Chicago’s Cabrini Extension and Washington, DC’s Ellen Wilson Dwellings are experiencing expanding investment.

<b>Exhibit 4-4</b>			
<b>Factors Affecting the Communities Surrounding HOPE VI Developments</b>			
<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Negative Features</b>	<b>Positive Features</b>	
<b>Atlanta:</b> Georgia Institute of Technology	Institute of Technology has expanded into adjacent neighborhoods multiple times during past four decades.	Very low-density campus offers attractive environment and extensive services for institute oriented/related residences.	
	Techwood Park	Land use is generally inappropriate for residential uses.	Area is being leveled for Centennial Olympic Park—will be more compatible with residential uses.
	Coca-Cola	Coca Cola executives have long sought to eliminate Clark Howell and Techwood Homes.	
<b>Baltimore:</b> Lafayette Courts	Area bisected by heavy traffic routes. Construction blocking several roads. Construction has caused “sink holes” in some residential areas. There are vacant warehouses; commercial property includes gas stations, a McDonalds store, a 7-Eleven, and other public housing developments.	Public library; access to public transportation; elementary, middle, and high schools in the neighborhood; two hospitals (Johns Hopkins, Church); clinics; large post office facility; close to downtown area. Lafayette site has been valued at \$7.5 million if the land is converted to commercial uses.	
<b>Boston:</b> Mission Main	Abandoned housing, churches, commercial buildings; heavy traffic corridor	Longwood Medical Center, Mission Hill Cathedral, access to two subway lines, southwest Corridor Park.	
<b>Camden:</b> McGuire Gardens	The site is bounded on the south by an open lot and immediately to the south of that by a limited access highway. To the west is a high-rise elderly housing project in an area of one- or two-story residences; an open lot that used to be a garbage dump is immediately to the west of the tower. The limited access highway on-ramp has a short cut into the development, making it easy for drug clients to come off the highway, make a purchase or pick-up, and jump back onto the highway. On the limited access highway in the immediate vicinity of the development is a low-grade motel and a liquor store.	There is a park within a half mile of the site across the limited access highway and there is a major shopping street within one-quarter mile to the north. Although the stores are sometimes marginal, it does have potential if the neighborhood comes up. There is easy car access to downtown Camden, Philadelphia, and suburban shopping centers.	
<b>Charlotte:</b> Earle Village	Major thoroughfares cut through the development. It is also surrounded by interstate highways. Large vacant lots attract vagrants.	There is a good transit system to downtown. Vacant land allows for community development.	
<b>Chicago:</b> Cabrini Homes Ext.	In the area close to development are abandoned warehouses, factories, and lots.	Good transportation close to downtown—near affluent area. Long anticipated path of gentrification. Also, there is much commercial activity.	

**Exhibit 4-4 continues**

<b>Exhibit 4-4 (continued)</b>		
<b>Factors Affecting the Communities Surrounding HOPE VI Developments</b>		
<b>PHA Location</b>	<b>Negative Features</b>	<b>Positive Features</b>
<b>Cuyahoga:</b> Outhwaite Homes & King Kennedy	Scrap yards and abandoned industrial buildings. Lack of viable neighborhood retail operations. Few symbols of hope and investment.	Many churches, social service agencies, job training facilities. Public transportation routes.
<b>Detroit:</b> East Jeffries Homes	“Skid row” elements; large non-residential and residential vacant buildings.	Area contains large entertainment-educational complex around park.
West Jeffries Homes	Incompatible land use mixes; fumes/noise from adjacent freeway.	Area contains sports fields of Wayne State University.
<b>DC:</b> Ellen Wilson Dwellings, North of Expressway	Highway divides neighborhood, lots of traffic.	Several parks. It is only four blocks to the Metro and adjoins an affluent neighborhood.
South of Expressway	Highway divides neighborhood, lots of traffic, large abandoned commercial and industrial areas, commercial areas only on a few major streets—lack of access without a car.	Several parks, though only two are well-maintained; Navy Yard. It is only four blocks to the Metro and adjoins an affluent neighborhood.
<b>Milwaukee:</b> Hillside Terrace	Highways to the west and the south. Dominance of commercial/industrial land use exacerbates Hillside Terrace’s “stark” look in some areas.	None in the neighborhood as defined. However, immediately to the east and south, the Milwaukee downtown begins. This is regarded as a high development area.
<b>New Haven:</b> Elm Haven	Vacant land left by earlier Elm Haven high-rise demolition.	Track and playing field
<b>New Orleans:</b> Desire	Landfill and Superfund site	Park/playground.
<b>Oakland:</b> 1905 Seminary, 2139 Seminary, & 5726 Elizabeth	Liquor stores, empty store fronts	Creek, if cleaned up and landscaped.
Coliseum Gardens & Lockwood Gardens	Highway nearby. Empty storefronts. Industrial land use, vacant land.	Transit, baseball field, schools, social service agencies. Proximity to airport, port, and Oakland Coliseum.
3634 Foothill Blvd.	Dangerous traffic, abandoned lot, auto repair shops	Park, shopping, restaurants
<b>San Antonio:</b> Springview Apts.	Vacant property and boarded up buildings. Active freight railroad borders eastern boundary.	Vacant land could be developed into a park, playground or recreational area. Two major community centers are within boundaries of neighborhood.

**Exhibit 4-4 continues**



<b>Exhibit 4-4 (continued)</b> <b>Factors Affecting the Communities Surrounding HOPE VI Developments</b>		
PHA Location	Negative Features	Positive Features
San Francisco: Bernal Dwellings	Lack of supermarkets and banks. High number of commercial properties such as auto body and parts shops. Army St. is a major thoroughfare through the neighborhood.	Schools, hospital, parks. In proximity to good neighborhood shopping.
Yerba Buena Homes	Large number of other distressed public housing units.	Parks and playgrounds in the immediate area

In contrast to these positive features, however, many of the developments are located in neighborhoods characterized by significant crime, violence, unemployment, and physical deterioration. Boston’s Mission Hill District is widely considered to be one of the largest open-air heroin markets in New England. Both Camden’s McGuire Gardens and the East and West Jeffries Homes in Detroit are located near limited-access highways with on/off ramps; local observers note that each development’s location makes it easy for drug and prostitution clients to enter and leave the area quickly. These negative features create significant challenges for HOPE VI planners and public housing residents as they attempt to revitalize these severely distressed developments.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE HOPE VI PLANS

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This chapter describes the plans for each of the developments in the HOPE VI baseline sample. For most of the PHAs, the HOPE VI plans have several versions. The proposed plan was included in each PHAs grant application according to the following instructions.

**The NOFA required that *all HOPE VI applications for implementation grants* contain a description of the development and the proposed activities including:**

- ***Physical plans for revitalization—the number of units to be targeted and a justification for the proposed treatment.*** This discussion was to include a description of the extent of rehabilitation/reconstruction of existing units; the extent of demolition; any changes in the sizes and shapes of units; information about any reduction in the number of units due to reconfiguration; a description of the number of replacement units to be funded and the types of programs (e.g., Section 8, homeownership) that will be used for replacement; a description of any community space alterations, improvements, or additions; and a description of any changes in the use of the site and a post-revitalization site plan.
- ***Resident involvement.*** This discussion was to include a description of resident involvement in the development of the application and planned roles in the execution, implementation, and monitoring of the plan.
- ***Proposed management improvements.*** This discussion was to include a management plan describing the management of the revitalization activity and the proposed management of the development after revitalization (e.g., changes in management and maintenance costs; changes in management process with respect to resident selection, rent collection, and maintenance.)
- ***Proposed supportive services and proposed community service components.*** Where the PHA plans to target a vacant development, the application must also identify the residents who will receive supportive services and participate in community service, and document why this group is appropriate, how the residents will be selected to participate, and how the plan relates to the physical work to be undertaken.
- ***Surrounding neighborhood.*** This discussion was to include the strengths and weaknesses, and proposed treatment of any neighborhood problems (e.g., physical, economic, and security problems).

Subsequent to the grant announcements, HUD offered each grantee (funded PHA) a grant agreement that included the following statement in Article III, Amendments and Approvals:

*As revitalization activities proceed, it is anticipated that the Grantee will refine and amend components of the Revitalization Plan. The Grantee is **encouraged to refine and amend the Revitalization Plan**, as appropriate, to accomplish the goals of the HOPE VI program [emphasis added].*

With HUD's encouragement, many of the PHAs have changed their plans dramatically since the original application. Therefore, in this chapter, we describe the plans as they stood in the summer of 1995, and, where possible, discuss changes that have occurred since the original HOPE VI proposals.

In Section 5.1, we provide an overview of the HOPE VI plan for each PHA and describe the major goals for the developments. Section 5.2 discusses issues related to resident and community involvement in developing and implementing the HOPE VI plan. Sections 5.3 through 5.7 describe specific components of each plan, including plans for physical redevelopment, supportive services, community service, and economic development. Section 5.8 describes the implementation progress on the HOPE VI plans. In addition to examining the dispersal of HOPE VI funds, this section describes the progress on the management plans, physical plans, supportive services plans, community service plans, and economic development plans. The major source of information for this chapter is the HOPE VI Case Studies prepared by the Local Research Affiliates (LRAs).

## 5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE HOPE VI PLAN AND MAJOR GOALS

Many of these HOPE VI plans have changed considerably since the initial application. In most cases, the original proposed HOPE VI plans in the application were limited by the time allowed to respond to the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA). As a result, many were tailored to the specifications of the NOFA rather than evolving from a thorough planning process conducted collaboratively among the local PHA, mayor's office, tenants' council and other residents, neighborhood associations, business and industry council, and other local institutions. However, the intent of the original HOPE VI legislation was that the program be driven by local planning. As a result of encouragement from HUD, and often in response to local political pressures, the PHAs have continued to refine their plans.

Although HUD has an obligation to ensure that the federal funds are spent in accordance with the law and in a manner designed to ensure revitalized sustainable communities over the long term, HUD has set very few parameters on how the funds should be used. As the HOPE VI process has evolved, an increased sophistication about use of HOPE VI funds has emerged. Innovative approaches have been suggested by the PHAs implementing HOPE VI, housing planners, and other outside interests. National policy suggestions have also been offered by HUD and the Congress. Since the HOPE VI grantees have been on different planning schedules, the policy suggestions have had a mixed influence on the locally developed HOPE VI strategies. Exhibit 5-1 presents the policy issues that have influenced the HOPE VI planning process.

**Exhibit 5-1  
Policy Issues That Have Influenced the HOPE VI Planning Process**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Impact on HOPE VI</b>
<b>Mixed Income Strategies</b>	<p>The 1937 Housing Act sets income limits for public housing—all households must be below 80 percent of the HUD Area Median Family Income (HAMFI), and 75 percent of households must be below 50 percent of HAMFI. In the occupied HOPE VI sites, most residents are currently below 15 percent of HAMFI.</p> <p>There are 2 sets of strategies for mixed income—the first uses preference rules to get a range of incomes in the development from the lowest income to 80 percent of median income. This strategy is often combined with ceiling rents and worker preference policies. The second strategy seeks to mix market rate units with public housing units (see Leveraged HOPE VI).</p>	<p>The Chicago HA pioneered the MINCS (Mixed Income New Communities Strategies) initiative, which promotes the range of incomes. Harbor Place, a Boston redevelopment project of the early 1980s, is also a model of mixing market rate units with public housing units. This approach was encouraged more widely for HOPE VI with the promotion of Leveraged HOPE VI.</p>
<b>Site and Neighborhood Standards</b>	<p>Site and Neighborhood Standards are the result of a 1972 court decision, <i>Shannon v. HUD</i>, that required an “institutionalized process” for HUD to determine the impact of project siting decisions. The site and neighborhood standards permit approval of a project site in an area of minority concentration if: (i) sufficient, comparable opportunities exist for housing for minority families in the income range to be served by a proposed project, or (ii) the project is necessary to meet overriding needs.</p>	<p>When the grant agreements were being developed, it was decided that, because HOPE VI is intended to alleviate distressed conditions, HOPE VI grantees are allowed by the grant agreement to build on-site and in the adjoining neighborhood even if those areas are impacted. Any new construction outside of those areas must meet site and neighborhood standards.</p>
<b>Leveraged HOPE VI (HOPE VI Plus)</b>	<p>Leveraged HOPE VI generally describes the use of HOPE VI funds in combination with other investment—via the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, HOME, CDBG, conventional financing, or other resources—in order to develop larger mixed-income neighborhoods, sometimes including market rate units with subsidized units.</p>	<p>Beginning in mid-1994, HUD began to promote this as a way to stretch the HOPE VI dollars, especially for sites larger than 500 units. This became a realistic option once HUD made the ruling that public housing units could be owned privately (which is needed to receive tax credits) as long as they are still run in a manner consistent with public housing.</p>

**Exhibit 5-1 continued**

<b>Exhibit 5-1 (continued)</b>		
<b>Policy Issues That Have Influenced the HOPE VI Planning Process</b>		
<b>Issue</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Impact on HOPE VI</b>
<b>Vouchering Out Public Housing</b>	Under HUD's Blueprint in March 1995, a plan to "voucher out" public housing was proposed. This plan called for giving every public housing resident a portable voucher that they could use for public housing or for private housing. The idea was to give public housing residents freedom to choose wherever they wanted to live and to force PHAs to be competitive on the open market.	HUD tried to promote this idea somewhat under HOPE VI by offering grantees additional Section 8 Certificates if they promoted unit replacement with Certificates if they promoted unit replacement with Certificates instead of hard units. Before one-for-one requirement. Some housing authorities took advantage of this opportunity. HUD stopped promoting this policy following the 1995 Recission Bill, which eliminated one-for-one replacement and new appropriations for Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers.
<b>Decrease of Operating Subsidies</b>	Congress has been promoting a decrease in operating subsidies to PHAs by suggesting that they can increase rents or market units to higher income households.	Some PHAs have been promoting the idea that the new units developed under HOPE VI have to be marketable to all income groups or should be limited only to households who are trying to improve their economic standing. These approaches will make the units viable even if there is a decrease in operating subsidies because the rents from higher income tenants can subsidize the rents of lower income tenants (i.e., rent skewing).
<b>One-for-One Replacement</b>	Between 1988 and 1995, Congress mandated that for every public housing unit demolished another had to be built to replace it. This rule was lifted in the 1995 Recission Bill and as of March 1996 continued to no longer be in effect.	HOPE VI grantees who had completed their planning and submitted demolition and disposition applications before the 1995 Recission Bill had to budget for the replacement of all units they demolished. As a result, many sites rebuilt at higher densities than they might otherwise have chosen or chose to rehabilitate or reconfigure the units rather than use demolition. Sites still planning their physical strategy after the Recission Bill had the option to replace a lot fewer units than they were removing. This was particularly helpful for HOPE VI sites that had more than 500 units with soft housing markets.

Some PHAs have abandoned their original plans altogether and are in the process of developing new ones. Others have had to revise their plans extensively in response to local political pressures or changes at the PHA (e.g., the HUD takeover of the Chicago Housing Authority and the hiring of a new Executive Director in New Orleans). *Because of the constant flux in the plans, those presented in the HOPE VI Baseline Case Studies and summarized here may ultimately bear little resemblance to the final HOPE VI revitalization effort for any specific development.*

The HOPE VI Baseline Case Studies provide information about the overall goals for the program. The major goals presented include the following: deconcentration and dispersion, development of mixed-income communities, demolition and/or renovation of current developments, emphasis of family self-sufficiency, and resident management of the properties.

Exhibit 5-2 presents a summary of the goals for the 15 PHAs in the baseline sample.

Since a minimum of 80 percent of the HOPE VI funding must be used for revitalization of the physical structures, progress toward each of the PHA stated goals is dependent on the PHAs' proposing an acceptable physical revitalization plan to HUD. Hence developing an acceptable physical plan is a very important milestone. However, as of August 1995, the physical plans are still in flux for seven of the PHAs: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, District of Columbia, New Haven, and New Orleans.

The factors that are associated with development of an acceptable physical plan vary among the 15 PHAs in the baseline sample. Prior revitalization planning (or planning and implementation using Comprehensive Grant Program (CGP) funds) began long before the HOPE VI NOFA was issued in Atlanta, Baltimore, Cuyahoga Metro, Milwaukee, New Haven, Oakland, and San Francisco. Exhibit 5-3 shows the relative size of HOPE VI grant in comparison to the average annual CGP grant from 1993 through 1995. Only in the cases of the District of Columbia and Chicago is the HOPE VI grant smaller. However, Camden, Charlotte, New Haven, and San Antonio are challenged with HOPE VI grants that represent six or more years of CGP funding.

Where the prior revitalization plan evolved from a thorough planning process that the PHA conducted in collaboration with the development's residents and other community groups, the proposed HOPE VI plan was more likely to be accepted by HUD with few, if any, revisions. This appears to be what happened in Baltimore, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Oakland. In these communities, the proposed plans were well conceptualized by the driving forces (usually the PHAs executive director and often the community's mayor), fully discussed with the interested parties, and fit HUD's concept of the goals of HOPE VI. Both Camden and Charlotte were also able to achieve an acceptable physical plan for HOPE VI without development of another plan prior to the HOPE VI NOFA. This appears to be largely due to these PHAs' collaboration with a wide range of community groups and to the leadership offered by the PHA.

**Exhibit 5-2  
Major Goals of HOPE VI Plan - August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	<p>AHA's goals for the Techwood and Clark Howell are deconcentration and dispersion. Over the past 5 years, redevelopment goals and plans for Techwood and Clark Howell have undergone 3 separate planning processes. The most recent driving force behind the redevelopment efforts began in September 1990 with the announcement of Atlanta as the site of the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. The Games will be held on a tract of land adjacent to the HOPE VI developments. As construction planning continued for the Olympic Games, changes were occurring at one HOPE VI development; the occupancy of the Techwood declined from 92.8 (in June 1990) to zero (in June 1995). Those households that left prior to August 18, 1994 forfeited rights to be re-housed at a redeveloped Techwood.</p> <p>Although the first plan called for both developments to be <i>renovated</i>, the latest plan proposes <i>demolishing</i> them instead. The current goals for Techwood and Clark Howell are to create mixed-income communities that will enhance the lives of the poorest public housing residents, and to replace the original 1,195 units with 900, units using a combination of HOPE VI and other funding. The proposed distribution of units is 40 percent public housing (362) units, 20 percent low- and middle-income housing tax credits (180 units) and 40 percent market rent (358 units).</p>
<b>Baltimore</b>	<p>The proposed HOPE VI plan was drawn from a prior proposal to HUD developed by Baltimore's Family High-Rise Modernization Task Force to create an alternative to the family high-rises that would be more conducive to family living. When this was not funded, and the HOPE VI NOFA was issued, the planning committee was poised to respond.</p> <p>The proposed goals for Lafayette Courts are: reduce the density by almost 60 percent; demolish the current development; and rebuild townhouses, a community center, and an elderly low-rise complex. The new on-site dual management structure will include both residents and non-residents. In the future, residents will be more involved with maintenance through employment at the development and through training to do minor maintenance in their own unit. The HABC's Family Support Services Division will initiate a family-based case management program to track and assist families to receive needed services. This program is in keeping with the overall plans for supportive services and community service, which will enable residents to become more self-sufficient.</p> <p>By the end of June 1995, residents were being relocated and demolition was scheduled for August 1995. Approximately 50 percent of the current residents were planning to return to Lafayette Courts in 3 years, after the redevelopment is completed. The new Lafayette Courts will be a mixed-income community with services available to assist residents toward developing self-sufficiency.</p>

**Exhibit 5-2 continues**

**Exhibit 5-2 (continued)**  
**Major Goals of HOPE VI Plan - August 1995**

PHA	Local Description
<b>Boston</b>	<p>The primary goal is to comprehensively redevelop Mission Main to: “make Mission Main safe, make the housing sound and attractive, improve BHA responsiveness, integrate the neighborhood into the community and reinforce community.” Other aspects of the plan included creation of a mixed-income community, security reforms, resident monitoring of maintenance. Currently, the BHA is considering new strategies and is developing a new plan, including changes in the plans for physical redevelopment of Mission Main, alternative financing mechanisms, and privatization of management. On October 6, 1995, <i>The Boston Globe</i> announced a major change in the physical transformation: <b>“New plans on Mission Hill: instead of renovating, development would be razed, rebuilt.”</b> Other elements of the new development plan would examine how to reconfigure Mission Main and integrate rather than separate it from the surrounding neighborhood.</p> <p>The driving force behind the selection of Mission Main as the designated HOPE VI site is its close proximity to the Longwood Medical Area—the largest medical complex in New England consisting of 5 teaching hospitals and 2 medical centers. Other forces include the 5 colleges and universities on the perimeter. All of these institutions are thriving and have expansionary plans.</p>
<b>Camden</b>	<p>The goals of the plan are to address residents’ problems, including physical, educational, and psychological needs as well as to improve the physical condition of McGuire Gardens. The plan calls for a comprehensive renovation, including overhauls of major systems, modifications to existing units, exterior improvements, and rehabilitation of unit interiors. The plan also calls for a representative of the tenant council to participate in the management of the development. Other aspects of the plan include providing training to residents in life skills and occupational skills, including residents in the operating businesses serving the community, and involving residents in organizational decision-making and development maintenance.</p>
<b>Charlotte</b>	<p>The CHA’s HOPE VI plan places a strong emphasis on self-sufficiency for residents. The three program components of CHA’s plan include: a Home Ownership Program, a Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program and an Elderly Program. Each component addresses housing and social needs of the residents. The home ownership and FSS programs are designed to help residents eventually move out of public housing equipped with the life skills needed to achieve economic and social independence. Residents of the new Earle Village will be required to participate in the FSS program in order to remain in the development. The elderly program addresses quality of life issues (e.g., nutrition and health care, accessible and comfortable housing, senior social programs and transportation). The plan also calls for renovation and new construction in the development, improved management practices, and efforts to revitalize the entire community, thereby creating a mixed-income community with greater economic opportunities.</p> <p>The CHA leadership has been the driving force behind the HOPE VI program. CHA has already developed a very successful FSS program, as well as drug abuse and crime prevention programs and a community assistance program.</p>

**Exhibit 5-2 continues**



**Exhibit 5-2 (continued)**  
**Major Goals of HOPE VI Plan - August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Chicago</b>	<p>At the time of the Chicago Case Study, the plans for the HOPE VI site were being revised. The original goals of CHA's plan were: to revitalize the development; demolish 3 high-rise buildings (690 units); rehabilitate another high-rise, converting it to a mixed-income, 60-unit structure; and construct new townhomes, both on-site and in the surrounding community. The distribution of the residents after redevelopment would be 50 percent very low income and 50 percent low- to moderate-income households.</p> <p>The management innovations included in the plan included on-site management and expansion of resident management efforts, with the possibility of contracting with a private firm to manage the site. Income mixing, rent ceilings, and improved resident selection procedures were included in the proposed management plan. The supportive services plan would expand services to residents.</p> <p>The vision for CHA's HOPE VI project was developed and promoted by Vince Lane, the Agency's resigned Board Chairman. Even after HUD's takeover of the agency in May 1995, many unresolved problems remain.</p>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	<p>The CMHA's HOPE VI plan is called, "Central Vision." The plan grows out of a model developed by the Cleveland Foundation Commission on Poverty, which calls for community building through the creation of "urban villages" and neighborhood asset development. The major goal of the HOPE VI initiative is to renovate 126 units at King Kennedy and 372 units at Outhwaite Homes to restore these properties as safe and attractive environments, especially for families. The proposed management plan calls for a "bottom-up" approach with residents taking a active role in planning and managing the properties. Since one of the primary goals of CMHA's HOPE VI plan is improving residents' lives and economic self-sufficiency, the proposed plan calls for spending 15 percent of the HOPE VI funds for resident and community service programs.</p>
<b>Detroit</b>	<p>The primary goal of the original proposal was to address the problems of the high-rises in Jefferies Homes through reconfiguration and modernization of the units and site and facade changes on the high-rises. Jefferies is a 2,170 unit development located approximately 1 mile from Detroit's central business district. The official population of the Jefferies Homes is 1,600 residents including seniors and families. Due to severe deterioration over time, the current vacancy rate is 58 percent, but the development also has a substantial number of squatters—a problem that has generated considerable public attention. The original HOPE VI plan was scrapped in August 1994 "because it lacked sufficient design interventions and it discounted the service needs of current residents." The revised revitalization plan is due in February 1996.</p>
<b>DC</b>	<p>The HOPE VI plan for Ellen Wilson grew out of community interest in redeveloping the site. The Ellen Wilson Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation, a community group which includes community residents, ministers, as well as experts (an architect, accountant, and real estate agent), developed the original proposal for the site. This group is recognized as the driving force behind the HOPE VI plan. The goal of the HOPE VI plan for Ellen Wilson is to achieve a racially and economically mixed neighborhood, link the development to the larger neighborhood, and create a successful public/private partnership.</p>
<b>Exhibit 5-2 continues</b>	

**Exhibit 5-2 (continued)  
Major Goals of HOPE VI Plan - August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Milwaukee</b>	<p>The HOPE VI plan for Hillside Terrace grew out of a site-study on conditions in the development and builds on work already initiated by HACM. Using Comprehensive Grant Program funds, HACM renovated the southwest part of the development as a prototype for the rest of Hillside Terrace.</p> <p>HACM applied for the HOPE VI program for Hillside Terrace because the development was on a “topographically problematic site,” not because it was “severely distressed.” Instead the PHA’s stated philosophy was to prevent Hillside Terrace from becoming severely distressed through “comprehensive prevention.” Hence the major goals of the HOPE VI plan are: 1) to reduce the economic and physical isolation of the development; 2) to enhance the marketability of the units; 3) conduct and assess the effectiveness of a five-year welfare reform demonstration, to be undertaken jointly with the Milwaukee County Department of Human Services. The purpose of this welfare reform demonstration is to assist residents to become self-sufficient. HACM hopes that the HOPE VI effort will also attract working families to the development.</p>
<b>New Haven</b>	<p>The Elm Haven HOPE VI plan has a long history. The Elm Haven Coalition was first formed in 1984; in 1988, the Elm Haven Revitalization Committee was created as part of the Dixwell Community Development Corporation. The final plans for the actual revitalization of Elm Haven were still under consideration at the time of the case study. However, the plan had 3 broad goals: 1) To enable Elm Haven residents, in partnership with HANH, the City, and other community organizations, to create a safe, supportive environment in which families can raise children, pursue each family’s vision of the American dream, and enjoy a better quality of life; 2) To build a functioning, more self-reliant community which will empower and support each individual to move toward self-sufficiency; and 3) to integrate public housing, as 1 element of a comprehensive, opportunity-based affordable housing strategy for New Haven. In addition to these broad goals, the plan contains 5 “implementing strategies”: intensified management on a decentralized basis, with tenant involvement; focusing on jobs and income for residents through a variety of training programs, access partnerships, and support for resident-owned businesses; family support and education, including services for children, parenting, academic readiness, and adult education; neighborhood development, including strategic investment in the neighborhood, health services, and security and crime prevention; and capacity building among Elm Haven residents and their organizations.</p>
<b>New Orleans</b>	<p>The HOPE VI plan for Desire was being extensively revised at the time of the baseline case study. The initial plan called for the development to be divided into 2 to 4 townhouse neighborhoods, each with a “unique visual identity,” surrounding a centrally located economic and social service hub. Other goals were to: 1) reduce the number of housing units; 2) provide homeownership opportunities; 3) increase unit size; 4) provide adequate parking; 5) improve vehicular access to units; 6) create recreational space; 7) improve security; 8) establish social services; 9) design new units to accommodate a mixture of ages and family sizes; 10) landscape the area; and 11) identify locations suitable for economic development.</p> <p>The new plan for Desire is currently in development, but will call for the construction of single-family homes in keeping with the housing in the surrounding neighborhood instead of townhouses. The next version of the plan will include a home-ownership component and a commercial hub.</p>

**Exhibit 5-2 continues**

<b>Exhibit 5-2 (continued)</b> <b>Major Goals of HOPE VI Plan - August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Oakland</b>	OHA's HOPE VI plan includes 6 developments, 2 larger developments and 4 scattered-sites. The plan has a strong service focus and hopes to effect change at both the individual and institutional level. There are 6 objectives: 1) To bring about cultural change (including management improvements, resident empowerment, creating community centers, recreational facilities, and multicultural awareness); 2) Support and facilitate neighborhood organizing (including community buildings within developments, public safety/neighborhood watch groups, monitoring and improving delivery of public services); 3) Expand and enhance public safety and social services; 4) Provide new education and employment training; 5) Support local economic development; and 6) Make physical improvements. The last objective does not apply to Coliseum Gardens, where the HOPE VI grant will fund only the building of a new community center.
<b>San Antonio</b>	SAHA's HOPE VI plan for Spring View Apartments represents a comprehensive attempt at community economic and social development, aimed at creating an economically healthy, socially integrated community of mixed-income families. The plan is intended to benefit the entire neighborhood. Specifically, the plan for Spring View would decrease population density, build new one-story townhouses in harmony with the housing in the surrounding neighborhood, and would create defensible space. The plan also calls for improving security through community policing. Finally, the plan has a strong emphasis on self-sufficiency for residents.
<b>San Francisco</b>	The overall goal of the HOPE VI plan is creation of more liveable dwellings on current sites that eliminate courtyards where crime has been allowed to fester. The HOPE VI plan targets two developments, Yerba Buena Plaza East and Bernal Dwellings, and their surrounding communities. The primary goals of SFPHA's plans call for demolition of both developments and replacement with low-density townhouses for mixed-income residents. Revitalization of the surrounding communities is also seen as vital. The plan also calls for support for resident businesses (e.g., recruiting potential entrepreneurs, training them in business management and plan writing, and assisting in business loan applications) and supportive services for youths (especially through community service programs). The major features of the plan are based on the renovations of Robert B. Pitts Plaza (formerly Yerba Buena Plaza West).

**Exhibit 5-3  
CGP Appropriation and HOPE VI Implementation Grants  
FY 93, FY 94, and FY 95**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>1993-1995 Ave. Annual CGP Grant</b>	<b>HOPE VI Implementation Grant Amount</b>	<b>Ratio of HOPE VI to CGP</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	\$28,261,488	\$42,412,635	1.50
<b>Baltimore</b>	\$40,149,013	\$49,663,600	1.80
		\$22,700,000	
<b>Boston</b>	\$35,936,042	\$72,363,600	2.24
		\$49,992,350	
		\$30,400,000	
<b>Camden</b>	\$5,162,368	\$80,392,350	8.17
<b>Charlotte</b>	\$5,556,961	\$42,177,229	7.51
<b>Chicago</b>	\$143,746,581	\$41,740,155	0.35
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	\$36,245,066	\$50,000,000	1.96
		\$21,000,000	
		\$71,000,000	
<b>Detroit</b>	\$30,418,921	\$39,807,342	2.89
		\$48,120,149	
		\$87,927,491	
<b>District of Columbia</b>	\$27,814,352	\$15,671,911	0.56
<b>Milwaukee</b>	\$8,822,342	\$44,689,446	5.07
<b>New Haven</b>	\$6,044,976	\$45,331,593	7.50
<b>New Orleans</b>	\$32,011,756	\$44,255,908	1.38
<b>Oakland</b>	\$10,542,159	\$25,510,020	2.42
<b>San Antonio</b>	\$15,341,436	\$48,810,294	6.34
		\$48,530,050	
		\$97,340,344	

**Exhibit 5-3 continues**

<b>Exhibit 5-3 (continued)</b>			
<b>CGP Appropriation and HOPE VI Implementation Grants</b>			
<b>FY 93, FY 94, and FY 95</b>			
<b>PHA</b>	<b>1993-1995 Ave. Annual CGP Grant</b>	<b>HOPE VI Implementation Grant Amount</b>	<b>Ratio of HOPE VI to CGP</b>
<b>San Francisco</b>	\$20,484,168	\$49,992,377	
		\$22,050,000	
		\$72,042,377	3.52

In contrast, having developed a revitalization plan prior to HOPE VI was no panacea for Atlanta, New Haven, and San Francisco. In each of these communities, no single theme for the redevelopment had emerged. Instead, the driving force(s) in the communities were not in agreement, and replanning was in progress. For example, in Atlanta, where the Olympics Games were to occur in the summer of 1996, demolition of Techwood and Clark Howell was paramount in the physical plan, while the plan for replacement housing was still not “on the table.” Similarly in New Haven and San Francisco, no consensus was drawn from the prior planning processes; multiple agendas were still on the table for local consideration.

Other issues necessitated the development of multiple physical plans. The San Antonio PHA discovered that the original combination of renovation and demolition was inappropriate. When more serious structural problems were discovered, the revised plan called for demolition of all of Spring View. The remaining five PHAs without acceptable physical plans (i.e., Boston, Chicago, Detroit, District of Columbia, and New Orleans), were being affected by changes in leadership at the PHA or the lack of strong ongoing leadership at the PHA. Neither condition was conducive to moving the planning process forward. Clear conceptualization, communication, and cooperation were missing from the planning process.

By August 1995, the physical plans approved or under consideration called for demolition of the existing structures in eight locations (i.e., Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, District of Columbia, New Haven, New Orleans, San Antonio, and San Francisco) and selected locations in Oakland. Renovations were planned for the developments in Camden and Cleveland. A combination of demolition and renovation was planned for Charlotte, Chicago, and Milwaukee while Detroit’s plan was undetermined. Ten of the PHAs were planning to use the physical plans to achieve a deconcentration of the development goal. Only Camden, Cuyahoga Metro, District of Columbia, and Oakland were not planning to reduce the number of units. The physical plan changes were also aimed at achieving a mixed-income community in 12 of the locations. Only in Camden’s, New Orleans’, and Oakland’s case studies was there no mention of achieving a mixed-income goal.

Self-sufficiency goals for the residents of the developments were included in the PHA plans in Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Cuyahoga Metro, Milwaukee, New Haven, New Orleans, San Antonio, and San Francisco. The other common goal was resident management after revitalization planned for residents of the developments managed by the following PHAs: Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, New Orleans, Oakland, and San Francisco.

## **5.2 RESIDENT AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLAN**

The HOPE VI applications required that the potential grantees describe resident involvement in the development of the application and planned roles during implementation and monitoring of the proposed plans. As shown in Exhibit 5-4, the amount of involvement could generally be classified into three tiers. The first tier is characterized by willingness on the part of the PHA to involve the tenant councils and residents of the HOPE VI developments in the planning and implementation process, thereby establishing strong relationships between the PHA administration and the residents, and encouraging broad and active participation of community groups in the planning process. Included in this tier are the PHAs of Baltimore, Camden, Charlotte, Cuyahoga Metro, District of Columbia, New Haven, Oakland, and San Antonio. Milwaukee and New Orleans are probably also in this tier, although little is mentioned about inclusion of community groups in the planning process.

The second tier is characterized by willingness on the part of the PHA to peripherally involve the residents of the HOPE VI developments in the planning and implementation process. Boston and Detroit are in this tier. Planning was fairly centralized at the PHA and outside groups were at least peripherally involved. In most cases a few meetings were held to inform the residents of the developing plans.

The third tier is characterized by the PHA's discouraging resident involvement in the process. In both Atlanta and Chicago legal assistance was required for the residents to have any substantial level of informed involvement. Community involvement was equally marginal, if at all. San Francisco is also in this tier. Although the residents did not receive legal assistance, the resident and community involvement has been described as "next to nil."

<b>Exhibit 5-4</b>	
<b>Resident and Community Involvement in HOPE VI Plan Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	The AHA has discouraged resident involvement over the past five years. Legal assistance has been required to ensure a minimal level of sharing of planning documents with residents. The "Further Assurances Agreement" (negotiated by the Legal Services on behalf of the Techwood and Clark Howell residents) calls for continual involvement of residents throughout the HOPE VI implementation. The Agreement also calls for regular newsletters, sharing of documents supplied to HUD, and "all reasonable efforts" for residents to jobs, training, and economic opportunities. A formal program to accomplish these goals has not yet been established.
<b>Baltimore</b>	The development of the HOPE VI plan has been a collaborative effort among the Mayor's office, the HABC, Lafayette Courts Tenant Council and residents, neighboring organization and institutions, and outside consultants (i.e., CHK architects, OKM). Resident and community organization participation in the bi-weekly planning meeting was high and consistent. The consensus forged by the various participants during these planning meetings has led to a strong positive relationship between the HABC and the Lafayette Courts residents.
<b>Boston</b>	The core planning process included heads of various departments at the central BHA office to ensure their participation in the selection of Mission Main and the revitalization effort. Neighborhood meetings were conducted on Saturdays with Mission Main residents, and representatives from the local institutions and community groups to let them participate in the redesign and begin to envision the future possibilities for the development.
<b>Camden</b>	Participation in the planning process was broad, ranging from residents surveys to feedback from steering committees. The original plan submitted was the result of many groups: public, private, and not-for-profit sectors, as well as residents of McGuire Gardens. The steering committee mailing list included (but was not limited to): Camden City Council Members, County Freeholders, area economic development corporations, the Department of Community Affairs, non-profit housing organizations, police, the parking authority, area hospitals, members of the religious community (churches), public and private social service providers, community residents, and Camden Housing Authority employees.  Through the Family Success Board (a 51 percent resident-member board), resident and community participation will continue through the HOPE VI implementation.
<b>Charlotte</b>	Participation in the planning process was broad; the groups involved included: the city of Charlotte, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission, the CHA, Earle Village residents, area property owners and service providers. Between November 1992 through February 1993, about 30 Earle Village residents participated in a number of early HOPE VI planning and proposal meetings. As a result, the residents' suggestions were incorporated into the HOPE VI proposal.  A resident consultation model, including general sessions, focus groups, and a steering committee were used to involve residents in the physical revitalization as well as plan the implementation of supportive service programs.
<b>Exhibit 5-4 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 5-4 (continued)</b>	
<b>Resident and Community Involvement in HOPE VI Plan Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Chicago</b>	There is considerable tension between Cabrini-Green residents and the CHA over the redevelopment effort. However, residents have participated actively in planning for HOPE VI. After a series of sessions with CHA staff in early 1993, an all-day meeting was held which involved high resident participation. Subsequently, residents requested and received funding to hire legal representation in their negotiations with the CHA. Additional meetings were held in March and April 1993 and a full draft of the proposal was available for resident review through the Local Advisory Council prior to submission to HUD.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	CMHA has historically solicited resident needs through interactions with the Local Advisory Councils (LACs) and Progressive Action Councils (PACs). Resident were asked for suggestions for physical improvements and resident and community services. Other community involvement in the planning process included input of leaders and stakeholders from the community, neighborhood development groups, city government, academic institutions, philanthropic foundations, businesses, churches and health and social service providers.
<b>Detroit</b>	<p>Numerous groups and individuals were involved, at least peripherally, in the development of the original plan. These groups included senior DHD officials, tenant groups, service providers, and municipal government officials. The Jeffries Homes tenant group participants included the Jefferies Residents Council, United Tenants Speak, and the United Community Housing Coalition. The service providers included the 8 agencies that had agreed to provide services to Jefferies resident if the HOPE VI grant were awarded, and 4 other agencies that already had satellite operations at Jefferies. Approvals for the original HOPE VI plan were obtained from the Board of Tenant Affairs, the Board of Commissioners, and the City Council. No other neighborhood support was sought prior to the submission of the original grant proposal.</p> <p>Tenant groups have seldom been asked to participate in the design or implementation of the programs at Jefferies. The tenant participation in the HOPE VI planning process was limited to a series of meetings conducted during the final month prior to submission of the application with seniors far outnumbering the families. While tenant participation was one of the requirements of the HOPE VI proposal effort, the plans generated by those who took part were widely viewed "to have little connection to corrective action." Despite the continuing efforts to redesign the HOPE VI plan, meetings with residents have been seldom and sporadic.</p>
<b>DC</b>	The HOPE VI plan for Washington, D.C., grew directly out of the earlier efforts of local community residents. The Ellen Wilson Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation, a local community group which includes some former Ellen Wilson residents, created the redevelopment plan for the development and worked with DCHA in applying for HOPE VI funds. The HOPE VI plan calls for resident consultation in implementing the plan.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	Nine resident committees were formed to support HACM's management committees working on all aspects of the revitalization effort. These include committees on: agencies, community service, construction, maintenance, management, security, self-sufficiency, welcome, and relocation.
<b>Exhibit 5-4 continues</b>	



<b>Exhibit 5-4 (continued)</b>	
<b>Resident and Community Involvement in HOPE VI Plan Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>New Haven</b>	<p>Elm Haven's plan grew out of a community effort begun in the mid-1980s and, from the beginning, has involved the entire Dixwell community. Control of the new Elm Haven is to be given to the Elm Terrace Development Corporation, a non-profit corporation with a 15 member board, 8 of whom were selected by the Elm Haven Resident Council. Three residents will serve on the board along with ministers, representatives from Yale University, and other community residents. In addition, the design/consulting team has made an effort to involve residents, including hiring residents to conduct a survey in the development.</p>
<b>New Orleans</b>	<p>The Desire Area Resident Council has made resident involvement and job creation their priority of HOPE VI. They have demanded the enforcement of Section 3 requirements for hiring residents, conducted surveys to determine resident preferences, written proposals for specific projects, and given input into the hiring of a HOPE VI grant manager. They also have plans for obtaining training in resident management. The new Executive Director has been holding regular meeting with residents to update them on the progress of the HOPE VI plan.</p>
<b>Oakland</b>	<p>The HOPE VI plan was developed as a result of collaboration of the OHA and the City of Oakland. A consulting firm was retained to identify and recruit community-based organizations. Those recruited offer a wide range of services, including youth employment training and recreation, substance abuse prevention and recovery, mental health services, community economic development, neighborhood organizing, remedial education, environmental improvements, and other areas.</p> <p>Although there were no "official" representatives from resident councils, there were a large number of "active residents" who were involved in the discussions about the physical modernization, and to a lesser extent, the supportive services strategies. As part of its emphasis on "cultural change", the OHA hopes that its HOPE VI project will contribute to a fundamental change in the manner in which the Housing Authority works with its residents to design and implement community improvements. The new approach should empower residents to make many more decisions and take responsibility for more aspects of their community.</p>
<b>San Antonio</b>	<p>Once Spring View was selected by the SAHA for the HOPE VI initiative, the SAHA management met with the residents' association leaders and membership to explain the choice of Spring View and solicit resident input into the design of the proposed plan. Residents, San Antonio Police Department representatives, and supportive service providers provided suggestions and recommendations. The SAHA also met with city's Housing Neighborhood Action Team—a group composed of the heads of all of the city departments and chaired by the city manager—and the San Antonio Housing Task Force. During the implementation, the neighborhood, city, and private developers will work in partnership on the revitalization effort. The president of a neighborhood association will serve on an advisory board for the HOPE VI project.</p>
<b>San Francisco</b>	<p>Resident and community involvement has been "next to nil." The tenants of the two targeted developments view the SFPHA with suspicion and mistrust. At the Bernal Dwellings, residents are intimidated by the current resident leadership and are scared to participate in the HOPE VI effort. At Yerba Buena Plaza East, resident participation has been "spotty at best and chaotic at worst."</p>

### 5.3 PHYSICAL PLANS

In addition to HOPE VI, the physical redevelopment options available to the PHA include: the Comprehensive Grant Program (CGP), Major Reconstruction for Obsolete Projects (MROP), Comprehensive Improvements Assistance Program (CIAP), Public Housing Development Funds, Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), HOME Investment Partnership (HOME) block grant, Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers, Low Income Housing Tax Credits, State and local housing funds, and conventional financing (loans).

At least 80 percent of the HOPE VI grant is targeted to physical redevelopment. In addition to HOPE VI funds, grantees were encouraged to seek out other resources to expand the physical redevelopment on-site or in the surrounding community. The need to seek out additional resources was particularly important for PHAs pursuing the redevelopment of sites larger than 500 units. Some of the other financial options available to PHAs are shown in Exhibit 5-5.

The physical plans for the revitalized HOPE VI developments were discussed extensively in Section 5.1 with respect to both the current status of the proposed plan (accepted vs. in revision) and choice of demolition, renovation, or both by the PHA. Since the physical plans for the seven PHAs with no approved plans are undetermined, we provide no further discussion in this section of the plans for Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, District of Columbia, New Haven, and New Orleans.

The plans for the remaining PHAs (Baltimore, Camden, Charlotte, Cuyahoga Metro, Milwaukee, Oakland, San Antonio, and San Francisco) were remarkably similar in their design. As shown in Exhibit 5-6, most were planning to use a townhouse design in their renovated or newly constructed developments. San Antonio was planning to use a one-story townhouse design. In addition most of these redevelopment plans included landscaping, additional outdoor lighting, parks and green space to make the housing more attractive and liveable by the residents.

To compensate for the deconcentration proposed by Baltimore, Charlotte, Milwaukee, San Antonio, and San Francisco, all PHAs will attempt to locate units off-site. There was considerable skepticism in the San Francisco case study about the feasibility of locating off-site Section 8 units in the city.

**Exhibit 5-5**  
**Physical Redevelopment Options for the HOPE VI Grantees**

<b>Program</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Use</b>	<b>Restrictions</b>
<b>HOPE VI</b>	HUD - 1993 to present, competitive	Grant - RE, RC, DE, NC, HO, S8	None
<b>CGP</b>	HUD - 1988 to present, block grant	Grant - RE, RC, DE, NC	1937 Housing Act
<b>MROP</b>	HUD - 1986 to present, competitive	Grant - RE, RC	1937 Housing Act
<b>CIAP</b>	HUD - 1981 to 1987 for large HAs, competitive. Many HAs still have unspent CIAP	Grant - RE	1937 Housing Act
<b>Public Housing New Development</b>	HUD - 1937 to present, competitive	Grant - NC	1937 Housing Act
<b>Section 8</b>	HUD - competitive	Grant - S8	Used for housing families outside of public housing in private market.
<b>CDBG/Section 108 loan guarantees</b>	HUD - block grant/loan guaranteed by future block grant allocation	Grant/loan to city government - RE, DE	Benefit low and moderate (L/M) income persons.
<b>HOME</b>	HUD - block grant	Grant to city - RE, NC, HO, RC	Cannot be used at a public housing site. Benefit low and moderate (L/M) income persons.
<b>Low Income Housing Tax Credits</b>	IRS through state housing finance agency, competitive	Equity Fund NC	Requires establishment of a separate for-profit entity to own new development. Limited to households below 60% of median income.
<b>State or Local Housing Funds</b>	State or Local Government, competitive/grant/loan	Grant/Loan - RE, RC, DE, NC, S8, HO	Depends on city/state
<b>Conventional Financing (loan)</b>	Bank or other mortgage company	Loan - HO, NC	Homebuyer or HA must be able to pay back bank

RE=Rehabilitation, RC=Reconfiguration, DE=Demolition, NC=New Construction, HO=Homeownership, S8=Certificates or Vouchers

<b>Exhibit 5-6 Physical Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	<p>[There was no final plan at the time of the baseline case study.] Plans include demolishing all of Techwood Homes and Clark Howell (providing pending HUD funding is approved). Ultimately there will be 900 units of mixed-income housing—362 public housing units, 180 Low Income Tax Credit Units, and 358 market rate units.</p> <p>The architectural plans were being revised and were not available for the case study.</p>
<b>Baltimore</b>	<p>Plans call for demolition of all high- and low-rise buildings at Lafayette Courts. The replacement housing will include 210 townhouses, 1 three-story elderly building, and 18 renovated units for young mothers. The proposed total of 338 units is a reduction of 58 percent from the total units in Lafayette Courts development. The redeveloped HOPE VI site will include green spaces; a residential square; and a community building to house the management offices, family support and community service, a recreation center, and a day care center.</p>
<b>Boston</b>	<p>[There was no final plan at the time of the baseline case study.] The original plan called for the renovations of all of the buildings on the site. The plan called for a reduction in units from 822 to 538 (a corresponding density reduction from 42 to 24 units per acre). A dilemma identified by the BHA in the proposal was the reduction in operating subsidies. The proposed compensation was combining 2 units into 1. Other goals were to be addressed by separate entrances, varied roof styles, porch stoops, front yards, and semi-private rear courtyards. The new plan, currently being developed, will call for the demolition of the entire development and construction of new housing.</p>
<b>Camden</b>	<p>The HOPE VI plan calls for reconfiguration and rehabilitation of the existing units rather than new construction. The revitalization will not change the number or location of units. However, the renovations will provide handicapped access to 18 units, including widening doorways, location of baths and bedrooms on the first floor, and installation of appropriately configured kitchens and bath. The entire sewer and storm drain system will be improved; site landscaping will be done; and 155 units will be converted to individual water heaters and heating units. Exterior improvements will include increased courtyard lighting; addition of playgrounds, a tot-lot, benches, trees and low curved walls, and exterior trash areas; and general upgrade of exteriors of units including doors, windows, repair of wall cracks. Interior improvements will bring all of the units up to HUD's Housing Quality Standards and include: bath and kitchen configuration, lead-based paint removal, electric work, plumbing, repair/replacement/installation of smoke detectors, windows and screens, front and rear door locks, door frames, tile flooring, and sound insulation between units.</p>
<b>Exhibit 5-6 continues</b>	

**Exhibit 5-6 (continued)**  
**Physical Plans Through August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Charlotte</b>	<p>The goals addressed in the master site plan (called Transitions), include softening the impact of Earle Village's large size, reducing high traffic volumes, and improving accessibility to programs and services. It also outlines modifications and construction of residential structures for participants in the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program, the elderly and homeowners.</p> <p>The master plan proposes to reduce the sprawl of Earle Village by creating a "town center" at the crossroads of 2 major streets and reducing the number of units from 409 to 239. New construction, a day care center, and the Community Services Center will be concentrated on these 4 blocks. Homeownership units will consist of 40 newly constructed townhouses. The elderly housing will also be new construction near the Community Service Center. The FSS units will include 63 units of new construction and 109 renovated existing units.</p>
<b>Chicago</b>	<p>[There was no final plan at the time of the baseline case study.] The HOPE VI funding covers a 15-acre area at the center of Cabrini and includes about 20 percent of the total housing stock of Cabrini-Green. The 4 structures included in HOPE VI have a total of 725 housing units of which 500 are covered by the HOPE VI funding. Two of the structures (containing 398 units) have been vacated and sealed. The proposal for the 1158 North Cleveland building of 65 units is for rehabilitation to accommodate 60 units upon completion. After redevelopment, 50 percent of this structure would be retained for very low-income families and 50 percent would be available for low- and moderate-income families under the Mixed Income New Communities Strategy (MINCS) program. This program would bring economic and social diversity to Cabrini. The CHA has promised a one-to-one replacement of units lost. As of February 1993, the HOPE VI site had 296 occupied units. CHA had proposed replacing 690 units through off-site construction, Section 8 certificates, and Public Housing Development Fund financing.</p>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	<p>The HOPE VI improvements in the physical sites will include modernization of 126 units at King Kennedy South and 374 units at Outhwaite Homes. The South high-rise is being converted into a Social Services Mall and transitional housing for residents in recovery programs.</p>
<b>Detroit</b>	<p>[There was no final plan at the time of the baseline case study.] According to the Detroit Case Study, the final design for reconstruction of Jefferies Homes remains to be determined.</p>
<b>DC</b>	<p>[There was no final plan at the time of the baseline case study.] The HOPE VI plan calls for the demolition of the existing units, replacing them with 161 new townhouse units and a community building. This will add 27 units to the site. The new units will be a combination of single-family townhouses, townhouses with 2 flats, and carriage houses. The new units will have private entrances, air conditioning and other enhancements, and be energy efficient. The site will be open to vehicular and pedestrian traffic and will be architecturally integrated into the neighborhood. The community building will include a day care center, learning center, public meeting room, and administrative offices. The plan also calls for creating 2 new roads and a park. A revised plan was submitted to HUD in September 1995.</p>

**Exhibit 5-6 continues**

<b>Exhibit 5-6 (continued)</b> <b>Physical Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Milwaukee</b>	The HOPE VI plan calls primarily for reconstruction and reconfiguration of existing units. However, to reduce the physical isolation of the development, the plan also includes demolition of 15 buildings to permit the construction of 2 through streets. The 118 units lost through demolition will be replaced by 79 units on scattered sites within a 3-mile radius of the development and 39 units with Section 8 certificates or vouchers. The plan will add green space, upgrade/replace systems (water, electrical, phone, cable, and heating), upgrade unit interiors, and modify 25 units to bring them into compliance with ADA requirements. The plan also calls for expanding the Hillside Community Center—adding day care, an outdoor amphitheater, and improved parking—and the construction of a family resource center.
<b>New Haven</b>	[There was no final plan at the time of the baseline case study.] No physical plan had been selected by the time of the baseline case study. However, 6 early prototype plans and 2 additional options were considered during the summer of 1995 and consensus was emerging on a final plan by August. All plans include reduced density, income-mixing, homeownership, and integration into the larger community. The plan, being considered in August 1995, has a total of 455 units, including those redeveloped at the Edith Johnson Towers. Of these units, 240 would be developed on the present Elm Haven site and arranged in 11 private courts. Creation of a community park was included in the plan. The entire effort would be financed partially using a HOPE VI Plus model.
<b>New Orleans</b>	[There was no final plan at the time of the baseline case study.] The original plan called for the development to be divided into two to four townhouse neighborhoods, surrounding a centrally located economic and social-service hub. The latest plan called for the construction of single-family homes, more in keeping with other housing in the surrounding community. The newly constructed homes will be available for homeownership.
<b>Oakland</b>	The HOPE VI plans for Oakland vary by development. Most of the six developments will receive major physical improvements including renovating units and common areas, fire safety improvements, disabled access, improved lighting, new parking lots and sidewalks, security doors and windows, and improved landscaping. However, in Coliseum Gardens, which was renovated using other funds, the only planned physical improvement is the construction of a community center.
<b>San Antonio</b>	The plan calls for decreasing density, building one-story townhomes in keeping with other housing in the neighborhood, arranging units in courtyards, and constructing a new community center. The Urban Land Institute will consult on the construction. The original plan for a combination of demolition and renovation had to be changed to all demolition and new construction when additional serious structural problems were found.
<b>San Francisco</b>	Large, two-story townhouses with individual entrances will replace the current structures in both targeted developments. These townhouses will face “centers of commerce.” The plan will slightly reduce the number of units at each site and will increase the number of three and four bedroom units. The plan also calls for extending through streets to link the developments to the larger neighborhood.

## 5.4 MANAGEMENT PLANS

According to the NOFA for HOPE VI, the proposed management plan was to include a discussion of how management would be handled during and after the revitalization period. For the period after the revitalization, changes in management were to be specified.

The options that the HOPE VI grantees could consider for the management plans included use of a private manager, decentralization with local control of authority to make decisions, fiscal autonomy of the HOPE VI development, inclusion of residents in management of the development, hiring of residents to maintain the development, and changes in resident selection and grievance procedures.

As shown in Exhibit 5-7, by the end of the summer of 1995, all but two of the management plans were completed by the grantees. A revised management plan for Detroit and New Haven had not been submitted for approval. Among the 13 other PHAs, six (Atlanta, Camden, Charlotte, Chicago, District of Columbia, and New Orleans) were planning to place the control of the HOPE VI development under private management. Boston was also considering this option. According to Boston's plan, the goal was to decentralize authority and give greater autonomy to a site-based manager. If this reform could not be achieved under the current BHA management, then Mission Main would be turned over to private management to ensure success of the redevelopment effort. Nine of the PHAs were committed to decentralizing authority for the revitalization effort, thereby allowing local control by a site based manager. These PHAs include Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Camden, Chicago, Cuyahoga Metro, New Orleans, Oakland, and San Antonio.

Opportunities for training to assume responsibility as management support or as a certified Public Housing Manager will be offered to residents of nine HOPE VI grantees developments: Baltimore, Camden, Chicago, Cuyahoga Metro, District of Columbia, Milwaukee, New Orleans, Oakland, and San Francisco. Opportunities for training and employment in development maintenance will be offered to residents in HOPE VI developments under the following PHAs: Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago, and Cuyahoga Metro.

<b>Exhibit 5-7 Management Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	After the 1.5 year demolition phase, the AHA plans to place the site under private management on a month-to-month basis. After redevelopment, the AHA will sign a long-term lease (50 years or greater). Responsibilities of the private manager will be to lease the property, hire and supervise property personnel, handle maintenance, and collect rents.
<b>Baltimore</b>	The proposed management plan calls for dual management including residents and non-residents. The new development manager's responsibilities will include more local control for the financial matters affecting Lafayette Courts. A new computer system will provide network communications between the development and the HABC. Residents will be trained and employed for maintenance and Lafayette Courts management support.
<b>Boston</b>	The primary goal of the management plan is to decentralize authority and give greater autonomy to the site-based manager, including: fiscal autonomy, personnel authority, legal support for evictions, on-site screening, and on-site training. The plan claims if reform fails, the BHA will turn to private management to ensure success of the redevelopment effort.  Another aspect of the plan depends on a mix of incomes at Mission Main. With waiver approvals, the ceiling rents would be pegged at 80 percent of the fair market rent. Another waiver would freeze rent levels for residents who move from public assistance to employment. Greater control over Mission Main would allow development-based screening for new residents and a development-based waiting list.
<b>Camden</b>	Lacking the resources to manage the HOPE VI project, the CHA will delegate authority to Success Against All Odds (SAAO), a non-profit corporation created by, and responsible to, the CHA. Policy will be guided by the Family Success Board, a 19 member group, (51 percent of whom shall be residents of McGuire Gardens).
<b>Charlotte</b>	An on-site management model has been designed to deliver supportive services to participants in each of the program components. Case managers will monitor and provide counseling to FSS participants. Property management services will be available to those in the Home Ownership program. Case managers trained in gerontology will assist the elderly with their special needs. All routine management and maintenance will be the responsibility of private management.
<b>Chicago</b>	The HOPE VI management plan consists of 3 initiatives: resident management, private management, and revitalized public management. Plans for resident management include training of additional Resident Management Councils (RMCs) to work with public and private managers on screening and related services and/or to manage parts of Cabrini. Management would be on-site and a new general manager position created.  [The Chicago Case Study describes, under resident services, expanded training of residents to increase their involvement in the continued planning, implementation, and operation of Cabrini. According to the CHA, \$600,000 in HOPE VI funds has been set aside to support this activity.]
<b>Exhibit 5-7 continues</b>	



<b>Exhibit 5-7 (continued)</b> <b>Management Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	Under HOPE VI, the site-based management plan will be continued at the target sites. Both managers and maintenance staff will live in the developments. Selected residents will be offered training as a certified Public Housing Manager. The assignment of managers and maintenance staff will be by “villages” of approximately 90 units. The village managers will be responsible for monitoring resident behavior in accordance with the lease agreements. Estate managers will have responsibility of enforcing these agreements.
<b>Detroit</b>	[According to the Detroit Case Study, the final management plans for Jefferies Homes remain to be determined.]
<b>DC</b>	DCHA’s troubled status means that the agency cannot administer the HOPE VI grant directly. A joint venture between two private companies, McHenry/TAG will serve as an alternate administrator and will work in conjunction with the Ellen Wilson Redevelopment Corporation. They will also provide management training for DCHA staff.  The new development will be privately managed by C.J. Management Co. C.J. has committed to involving resident organizations in the management of the development. The Ellen Wilson Cooperative Board will serve as an advisory board and include residents from the development, community, and the Ellen Wilson Redevelopment Corporation.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	HACM plans to move to a centralized management model and create 3 positions: a Redevelopment Director, a FSS Coordinator, and a Maintenance Supervisor. The agency will develop plans for resident management. Hillside Terrace will be divided into 12 micro neighborhoods. “Mentors” will be selected from each micro neighborhood; their role will be to foster good neighbor relations and resident involvement in organized activities. The agency will also initiate block watches and tenant patrols, and formalize mediation and eviction procedures.
<b>New Haven</b>	[According to the New Haven case study, no clear management plan had yet been developed.] However, decentralized management and channels for tenant input are goals.
<b>New Orleans</b>	A public benefit corporation is likely to be developed to administer the revitalization project and manage the Desire and Florida developments. The corporation would be legally separate from HANO. An on-site grant manager will be hired. The resident council may receive training in resident management.
<b>Oakland</b>	As part of its emphasis on “cultural change”, OHA intends to institute management improvements and stress resident empowerment. The goal of these improvements is to provide tools, incentives, and a clear path for change, relying on 3 key changes: 1) screening of new tenants, 2) reducing vacancies, and 3) evicting residents found to be trafficking in illegal substances. Further, the plan calls for supporting neighborhood organizing, including community building within developments.
<b>Exhibit 5-7 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 5-7 (continued)</b> <b>Management Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>San Antonio</b>	The management plan for Spring View calls for continuing with the site-based management structure created in 1994. A HOPE VI Coordinator will be based in the central SAHA office.
<b>San Francisco</b>	No changes are proposed as “new.” The same resident management system continues, according to the HOPE VI proposal. The plan is based on obtaining the cooperation of the current tenants. [This seems unlikely given the current level of hostility between residents and SFPHA.]

## 5.5 SUPPORTIVE SERVICES PLAN

The supportive services options open to the HOPE VI grantees are numerous. These include:

**Programs for all residents:** health care services, HIV and AIDS prevention programs, alcohol and drug abuse prevention and treatment services, and crime prevention programs.

**Programs for preschool children:** day care and Head Start.

**Programs for school-age children and youth:** tutoring and mentoring programs, computer learning programs, after school recreational programs, arts programs, programs addressing problems of youth (e.g., gang prevention, dropout prevention, and conflict resolution), volunteer programs, and pre-employment programs.

**Programs for school dropouts and those over 18 years of age:** continuing education (e.g., basic education, GED programs, and other continuing education programs such as computer training), life skills programs (e.g., budgeting and household management), volunteer programs, vocation education, job training, and small business management training, employment placement, and small capital loans.

**Programs for parents:** teen-age pregnancy prevention, special education programs (e.g., teacher-aide training, food buying, child care, and parenting), family counseling, and family self-sufficiency.

The supportive services plans were addressed in all of the case studies except New Orleans. In general, the supportive services described in the case studies were aimed at all age groups except seniors.

As shown in Exhibit 5-8, there were a wide range of services described in the case studies. Five of the PHAs placed more emphasis on their supportive services programs for residents than other PHAs: Baltimore, Charlotte, Cuyahoga Metro, Milwaukee, Oakland, and San Antonio. Not surprisingly, these were some of the same PHAs that placed strong emphasis on building good relationships with residents and involved them in the HOPE VI planning process.

<b>Exhibit 5-8 Supportive Services Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	The draft plans for resident services include continuation of several existing programs: Families in Action (a substance abuse prevention program) and 2 tutoring/mentoring programs by Georgia Institute of Technology student volunteers—the Techwood Tutorial Program (TTP) and Partners in Education (P.I.E.). Other proposed resident and community services to be developed include: 3 levels of Computer Learning Centers for pre-school, school age, and persons over 18 years of age, training and implementation of a Neighborhood Block Watch Program, parent training in preparation for becoming teacher’s aides and tutors, an after-school youth development and support program, and a day care center. All programs have been endorsed by the Resident Task Force.
<b>Baltimore</b>	The proposed HOPE VI plan for resident and community services relies heavily on providing services which empower residents to become self-sufficient, (i.e., childcare, job training, and educational opportunities). The plan calls for enhancement of many existing programs including: pre-school child care, other child care, family counseling, food buying assistance club, drug elimination program, volunteer program, and the substance abuse prevention program. Other proposed resident and community services programs to be developed include: Tenant Council Outreach Program, Maryland School Alliance, Student Service Program, Civic Works, Inc., Youth Cadet Corps, a food cooperative, a mentored affinity group, and a tenant council food cooperative.  The plan has a strong family and community focus. The new community building and recreation center will support this philosophy. There is also an intergenerational approach to supporting families—the elderly building will be located adjacent to the renovated units for young mothers. The objective is to encourage development of one-on-one relationships between the “young mothers” and an elderly “foster grandparent.”
<b>Boston</b>	The primary goals of the resident services plan were to encourage family self-sufficiency and promote resident empowerment. The proposed solution was a “Coordinating Agency” to oversee a case management network located in the Family Center, a new facility to be constructed on site. The responsibilities would include referrals to social and community services located on-site, as well as follow-up sessions. The range of services available included health care from several agencies.
<b>Camden</b>	The proposed programs to address resident needs include: case management, training in coping skills to address substance abuse problems, medical care, life skills training (to improve parenting, budgeting, homemaking skills), youth programs, and basic education (available on-site for school dropouts).  [Other components of a supportive services plan were described in the Camden Case Study under the community service plan. The major concern was the availability of funding (in the changing political environment at the state and federal level) to provide the matching requirements of HOPE VI to support these activities.]
<b>Exhibit 5-8 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 5-8 (continued)</b> <b>Supportive Services Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Charlotte</b>	<p>According to the CHA's Annual Report 1993-1994: "The Charlotte Housing Authority serves those Charlotte families for whom conventional housing is not affordable. Our mission is to provide these families with safe, decent and sanitary housing while encouraging them to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency." Many of the resident services pre-date HOPE VI. The Community Services Center is proposed to make the services more accessible to the residents.</p> <p>The FSS families, to remain in the HOPE VI program, must sign a contract committing the adults and children to participation in a variety of programs aimed at the opportunity for success, including community service, and must agree to leave assisted housing at the end of 5 years. Since the FSS is voluntary, current residents who did not want to sign the contract were offered relocation and/or Section 8 certificates.</p> <p>CHA will also continue its SNAP and DATOP programs, aimed at reducing crime and providing drug abuse treatment and prevention services, as well as its Community Assistance Program.</p>
<b>Chicago</b>	<p>[The resident services plan described in the Chicago Case Study describes support for resident participation in management activities.] The plans for resident services include: family support services (e.g., case management; CADRE, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program; and expanded day care facilities and programs on-site); creation of new sports and recreation programs (e.g., Midnight Basketball and Biddy Basketball); and educational programs (e.g., Life Long Learning, the Cabrini Community Academy for dropouts and adults, the Lighted Schoolhouse Arts Program for 8-14 year olds, a Common Sense Decorating Class and a computer learning lab).</p>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	<p>One of the strengths of CMHA's approach to residents has been a strong supportive services component. These programs have been designed to provide interventions leading toward economic self-sufficiency, the strengthening of families, the empowerment of residents to improve and sustain their community and increased resident participation in estate management. Estate-based managers and social service coordinators will provide support and access to needed programs. To the extent the rental agreements have clauses regarding resident participation in activities, residents will have incentives to participate in the programs. In addition, CMHA will provides drug abuse treatment and prevention services on-site.</p>
<b>Detroit</b>	<p>The original plan proposed using one of the high-rise buildings for a combination of service provision and residential uses. Two floors each were to be allocated to two transitional shelter programs: a YMCA program would serve single men and a YWCA program would serve battered women and children. While this plan would have benefitted the homeless population in the neighborhood, it was not focused on the current residents. As a consequence, the focus of the supportive services programs has shifted from support for new residents to address the social and economic needs of the current residents, and provide the latter with new opportunities. The revised program includes substance abuse prevention services for families; services to parenting teens: personal development, academic support, and recreation programs to families; tutorial support and job training; and a substance abuse prevention program and conflict resolution strategies for teenagers.</p>
<b>Exhibit 5-8 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 5-8 (continued)</b> <b>Supportive Services Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>DC</b>	A comprehensive resident services program will be located on-site in the new Ellen Wilson development. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation will manage and coordinate the services, which will include employment, business development, literacy, youth programs, a learning center, a day care center, community policing, and family assistance.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	The HOPE VI project will place a strong emphasis on self-sufficiency and be part of a welfare reform demonstration. The Family Resources Center that will be constructed as part of the project will offer GED classes, vocational education, job training, job readiness training, computer classes, and day care. It will house the Hillside Family Health Center and the Day Care/Head Start center. Programs available for the community's children include after-school tutoring, recreation, and interventions designed to address potential problems, e.g., drug use and teenage pregnancy. In addition, the project will continue and/or expand existing services for teens including drug prevention mentoring and classes for teenage parents.
<b>New Haven</b>	The supportive service plans were still in development at the time of the case study. Some priorities are: youth programming, the Wexler Family Services Center, a gospel singing program, expanded child care, some small retail development on-site, and drug abuse and crime prevention efforts.
<b>New Orleans</b>	[The New Orleans case study provides no specific information about planned supportive services.]
<b>Oakland</b>	According to the case study, the heavy emphasis on resident and community services and economic development components is perhaps what most distinguishes Oakland's HOPE VI approach. In terms of resident services, the plan calls for expanding and enhancing substance abuse, violence prevention, and other safety-related services. It also calls for providing new education and employment programs such as learning centers, young adult work crews, and youth services, job training, small business/self-employment incubation, capital for business expansion, and technical assistance and training.
<b>San Antonio</b>	SAHA's HOPE VI plan has a strong Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) focus. The supportive services to be provided under HOPE VI were planned in response to a resident survey. This package includes: drug abuse and prevention services, continuing education for adults, after-school tutoring and other educational opportunities for youth, day care for infants and toddlers, recreational activities for children and youth, health care for children and adults, and job training for adults. The FSS program will require that each head of household develop a personal program with the FSS coordinator, including goals for self-sufficiency and how to meet them. Residents will be required to sign a contract with SAHA agreeing to work to meet these goals. Participating in the program and/or completing the contract is a requirement for returning to the new Spring View.
<b>Exhibit 5-8 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 5-8 (continued)</b> <b>Supportive Services Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>San Francisco</b>	A development organizer will be assigned to each development as part of the HOPE VI plan to establish and coordinate services. Services identified so far include Head Start, tutoring, learning centers, recreation programs, gang prevention, drop-out prevention, women's support groups, job training and placement, resident organizing and empowerment, economic development activities, and HIV and sexually transmitted disease services. In addition, the plan calls for the expansion of child care services to provide services for 50 children annually and enable 5 program participants to obtain licenses in home care; collaborative efforts with City College of San Francisco and San Francisco State University to train 30 residents per quarter; a tutoring program; and a crime prevention program.

## 5.6 COMMUNITY SERVICE PLAN

The component of the HOPE VI program that the grant application writers and PHA staff had the most difficulty with was the community service plan. The Appendix B of the HOPE VI NOFA included the following Program Requirements for the Community Service Component:

There are several community service strategies that are available to the HOPE VI grantees. One of these strategies is based on the Commission on National and Community Service model. Another is based on a Community Assistance Program model. A complementary strategy is to offer incentives for volunteer service including education, job training, or free rent.

By the end of August 1995, seven of the case studies (i.e., Boston, Camden, Chicago, District of Columbia, New Haven, New Orleans, and San Francisco) either did not provide any description of the community service plan or did not contain information to confirm that what was being described was a community service plan. Some of the case studies indicated the PHAs were still working on a revised plan that could be approved by the Commission on National and Community Service (CNCS) as shown in Exhibit 5-9.

<b>Exhibit 5-9</b>	
<b>Community Service Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Types of Programs</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	The plan identifies the following as community service: low-income healthy seniors will volunteer to assist other low-income and frail seniors residing in the HOPE VI developments; Greater Atlanta Community Corps will run the Techwood Redevelopment Area Neighborhood Resources Corps to provide job training and education to 18- to 22-year olds (who will address physical and direct service needs of the neighborhood); selected low-income seniors will provide community service to children through the Foster Grandparent program. All programs are new and approved by the Resident Task Force.
<b>Baltimore</b>	The community service plan is based on a concept of volunteerism by both adults and adolescents who will be encouraged to participate in programs "to begin to take pride in their community, and start early in understanding the need to give back to the community." The programs that will participate include: a volunteer program, the Student Service Program, and the Youth Cadet Corps.
<b>Boston</b>	[The community service plan mentioned in the Boston Case Study contains no detail and is combined with the supportive services plan.]
<b>Camden</b>	[The community service plan, described in the grant application, was more appropriate as a resident service plan (see the supportive service plan above). At the time of the Camden Case Study, the revised community service plan was being developed. No further information was available.]
<b>Charlotte</b>	The community service plan is modeled after the Community Assistance Program (CAP) which has for the past 5 years trained residents who are "natural helpers" to be volunteers who help other residents by identifying the signs of substance abuse, domestic violence, HIV/AIDS and directing them toward supportive services agencies. Under HOPE VI, additional organizations will offer training to peer counselors to provide a wide variety of volunteer services, including problem solving skills, money management, reading and literacy education, and other topics.
<b>Chicago</b>	[The community service plan mentioned in the Chicago Case Study contains no detail. Instead there is a mention of a collaborative efforts with CNCS for the HOPE VI revised plan, with no further elaboration.]
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	For the HOPE VI community service component, 16 Vista Volunteers have been selected and a coordinator hired. The Civilian Conservation Corps, already active in CMHA developments, will expand to estates where construction is ongoing. Other volunteer opportunities will be in areas supporting the ongoing assessment of HOPE VI, in neighbor-to-neighbor outreach, crime reduction, and sustaining the improvements generated by the HOPE VI Project.
<b>Exhibit 5-9 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 5-9 (continued)</b> <b>Community Service Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Types of Programs</b>
<b>Detroit</b>	The community service program has been revised to offer several programs on-site. Operation Get Down will operate the Jeffries Homes Neighborhood Corps to provide education and training for residents aged 18 to 22. Those enrolled in this program will engage in projects that support the HOPE VI revitalization. Catholic Social Services will operate 2 programs involving seniors: the Senior Companion Program will provide care and companionship for frail elderly, and Foster Grandparents Program will provide support to parents to reduce the abuse and neglect of children.
<b>DC</b>	[The community service plan mentioned in the DC Case Study resembles a planning process for the delivery of supportive resident services.] The community service plan calls for the Youth Policy Institute to create a Policy Action Corps, made up of neighborhood youth, to plan and coordinate services. [The services planned were listed in the supportive services section.]
<b>Milwaukee</b>	The HOPE VI plan includes both youth and adult programs. Scholarships will be offered to youth who volunteer at least 500 hours with area agencies. Adults will receive 1 month's free rent for volunteering 240 hours, and two-months' rent for volunteering 400 hours. The intent of these scholarship programs is to encourage residents to gain exposure to the work world. The plan was approved in June 1994.
<b>New Haven</b>	[New Haven had no formal community service plan at the time of the case study.]
<b>New Orleans</b>	[The New Orleans case study provides no information about the community service plan.]
<b>Oakland</b>	Oakland's plan places a great emphasis on community service and calls for a range of interrelated programs. These can be broken down into four major categories: mobilizing and organizing tenants; developing a program focusing on youth-driven community service; linking resident organizing with planning physical changes; and linking community service to the physical improvements.
<b>San Antonio</b>	Families participating in the FSS program will be encouraged to perform volunteer community service on-site or elsewhere in the community. St. Phillips College has agreed to provide tuition assistance, child care, and transportation to adult education classes or job training for residents who volunteer in the new Spring View Learning Center.
<b>San Francisco</b>	[The San Francisco case study provides limited information on the community service plan.] The community service plan calls for creating a "Block Builders Program", involving 16 residents at each site. A crime prevention program would involve the implementation of a "Block Captain" program and neighborhood watch.



The community service programs that are described in the case studies adopt several strategies. One strategy follows a CNCS-affiliated corps model. This corps model targets two groups of volunteers: those aged 18 to 22 years (the typical ages of persons volunteering in CNCS-affiliated corps programs), and seniors. The objectives of these programs are to provide education and training to residents aged 18 to 22 to engage in projects to support the HOPE VI revitalization, and encourage healthy senior residents to volunteer to be either companions to frail seniors or companions to children through a Foster Grandparents Program. This strategy is being implemented in the community service programs in Atlanta and Detroit.

**The HOPE VI legislation provided that each HOPE VI plan include:**

*a community service component to be approved by the Commission on National and Community Service (CNCS).*

**HUD provided the following rationale for the community service component in the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA):**

*Physical urban revitalization cannot be sustained without a revitalization of the spirit of the people of the community such that the people begin to view themselves as collective owners of the community. A sense of collective ownership of the community engenders not only concern for people who live in the community but also caring for and pride in the physical structure in the community. Through community service, the sense of collective ownership of the community can be developed, thereby revitalizing the spirit of the people of the community. Thus, beyond the bricks and mortar of the physical structures, community service can be the glue that holds an urban revitalization program together, sustains it, and nourishes it.*

**The following CNCS definition of a community service program was also provided in the NOFA:**

*A program organized, administered, overseen or funded by a public housing authority or its designated representative, engaging individuals in meaningful service on a volunteer basis or through limited stipends to address unmet human, environmental, educational, and/or public safety needs through youth service and conservation corps, residents' associations, community-based organizations, K-12 schools, institutions of higher education, churches or other religious entities . . . and other such similar organizations.*

A variation on the first strategy follows a CNCS-affiliated corps model but primarily targets youth and young adults. These programs recruit and train the volunteers to participate in revitalization, crime prevention, and neighbor-to-neighbor outreach projects. This model is being implemented in Baltimore and Cleveland.

A second strategy follows a Community Assistance Program (CAP) model. The objective of this program is to identify and train residents who are “natural helpers” to become peer counselors to other residents in need of volunteer peer assistance. This model is being implemented in Charlotte and New Haven.

A third strategy offers incentives for volunteer efforts. The program in Milwaukee has both youth and adult programs. In return for youth volunteer service, those completing 500 hours receive scholarships. In return for adult volunteer service, those completing 240 hours receive one free month’s rent and those completing 400 hours receive two free month’s rent. A similar program in San Antonio targets youth and young adults. The incentives offered include scholarships for adult education classes and job training.

## **5.7 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

As shown in Exhibit 5-10, the economic development plans for the HOPE VI developments and the surrounding neighborhoods were available and fairly complete for six of the PHAs: Atlanta, Baltimore, Charlotte, Oakland, San Antonio, and San Francisco. On the other hand, the economic development plans for Boston, Camden, Chicago, District of Columbia, and New Orleans were fairly general and sketchy, at least as described in the case studies. The plans for Cuyahoga Metro, Detroit, Milwaukee, and New Haven were not described in the case studies and were still being developed by the end of August 1995. However, there were brief references contained in the latter case studies to some of the elements that would likely be included in a revised economic development plan.

Several of the PHAs were relying on the experience of other programs, such as Empowerment Zones and neighborhood revitalization efforts, to formulate the economic development plan for HOPE VI. Developments selected by five of the PHAs border on Empowerment Zones. Coordination with the activities in the Empowerment Zones will be part of the economic development plans in Baltimore, Camden, Detroit, Milwaukee, and San Antonio. The Charlotte plan was also benefitting from the City’s experience with neighborhood revitalization in two other downtown areas.

The programs typically included in the economic development plans are creation of an “enterprise center” where residents can participate in a wide range of services including assessments for job readiness, job skills training, entrepreneurial training, employment placement, and small business loans; and creation of spaces or hubs where residents can find jobs or operate their own business. Eight of the PHAs (Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Cuyahoga Metro, District of Columbia, New Orleans, Oakland, and San Francisco) were planning to develop an enterprise center for the residents. PHAs in Baltimore, Charlotte, New Orleans, Oakland, and San Antonio were planning to create economic development space to attract business and consumers. Seven of the PHAs (Atlanta, Charlotte, Chicago, Cuyahoga Metro, Oakland, San Antonio, and San Francisco) were planning to provide programs that would support small business development, self-employment, and entrepreneurial opportunities.

**Exhibit 5-10**  
**Economic Development Plans Through August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	Proposed in the Community and Supportive Services plan are two programs: implementation of a Training and Employment Center for individual assessment and training and creation of opportunities for resident-operated businesses out of the Techwood Redevelopment Area Museum/Park and Cultural Enrichment Center. A small retail center is planned just south of the HOPE VI developments that will support the mixed-income community created by the development related to the Olympic Games and the construction of dormitories for Georgia Tech.
<b>Baltimore</b>	Lafayette Courts is adjacent to the East Side empowerment zone. The City is currently collaborating with community groups and neighborhood organizations in the development of "town centers" that will have the power to decide how best to utilize the empowerment funds. These funds will be used to develop businesses and employment opportunities in the economically depressed surrounding area. Some business and institutions are planning to locate at Lafayette Courts. McDonald's Restaurant chain will have a restaurant and management training program on site; Greater Baltimore Medical Center will establish a clinic at the development; and Johns Hopkins University and Hospital is considering establishing social and economic program on-site.
<b>Boston</b>	The HOPE VI proposal did not discuss the economic development plans in detail, although it stated that one of the primary goals was to connect residents economically to the community and increase family self-sufficiency. A general plan offered the "Partnership for Economic Development," with the surrounding institutions, primarily the medical community.
<b>Camden</b>	The goal of the economic revitalization of the community includes providing residents with necessary vocational, professional and/or entrepreneurial skills for attaining desired employment and/or successful business development. Designed to expand residents views of job opportunities, the programs proposed are based on the extensive planning process conducted prior to the grant application.
<b>Charlotte</b>	Charlotte has experience in neighborhood revitalization; the city has successfully revitalized two other downtown areas as a result of public-private partnerships, particularly between the city and NationsBank Development Corporation. At the time the Charlotte Case Study was written, the CHA was exploring several options: forming an economic development corporation to assist the creation of public-private partnerships; building an economic development center next to Earle Village to accommodate the CHA offices, offer rental office space, and provide retail space for Earle Village residents; and plan and develop the currently vacant real estate owned by the CHA in the First Ward. All of these options could leverage economic development in the Earle Village neighborhood.
<b>Chicago</b>	The major focus of the economic development strategy is on self-employment programs for Cabrini residents. The CHA's Economic Development Department will provide training to residents in becoming self-employed and local businesses will provide additional training, mentorship, and technical assistance. HOPE VI funds will be used to support this activity with funding for the training staff and the costs of space and equipment.

**Exhibit 5-10 continues**

<b>Exhibit 5-10 (continued)</b>	
<b>Economic Development Plans Through August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	[The economic development plan is not described in the case study.] Plans for an Enterprise Center are proceeding. This will serve as a center for the delivery of job readiness and skills training programs, as well as education and training for nurturing business and entrepreneurial opportunities.
<b>Detroit</b>	[According to the Detroit Case Study, the final economic development and neighborhood plan remains to be determined.] It will be included in the revised HOPE VI plan. It will be subject to the Empowerment Zone strategies since Jefferies Homes and its surrounding neighborhood have been included in Detroit's Empowerment Zone.
<b>DC</b>	The plan calls for the creation of an Economic Development Center which will include job training, placement, entrepreneurial training, and a fund for small business loans. [It is unclear from the case study what other activities are planned for the surrounding neighborhood.]
<b>Milwaukee</b>	[The Milwaukee Case Study does not include an economic development plan.] There is an Economic Development Zone that borders part of Hillside Terrace. Development in this area may provide some opportunities for residents of the development. However, the employment base in the area is eroding and poverty rates in Milwaukee are increasing. The HOPE VI project has a strong emphasis on self-sufficiency and includes a welfare-reform demonstration, targeted mainly at Hillside Terrace residents, although employment opportunities may be limited.
<b>New Haven</b>	[No specific plan has been developed, but all proposals under consideration call for the revitalization of the entire Dixwell area as well as the Elm Haven development using a HOPE VI Plus strategy.]
<b>New Orleans</b>	Job creation is planned as part of the HOPE VI effort as well as the creation of an economic hub at the center of the new development.
<b>Oakland</b>	One of the six goals of Oakland's HOPE VI plan is to support local economic development. In addition to job training, the plan calls for small business/self-employment incubation, capital for business expansion, technical assistance and training, and facade improvement for neighborhood shopping districts.
<b>San Antonio</b>	The HOPE VI plan is a joint effort of SAHA, the City, and private developers and is aimed at the entire community. The plan includes not only the redevelopment of Spring View, but also clearing and rebuilding of most abandoned and substandard property in the surrounding neighborhood. Rezoning, tax incentives, and promotional activity will be used to attract investment in the community. The project will be linked to a nearby enterprise zone. There will also be a focus on promoting resident-owned businesses.
<b>San Francisco</b>	Planned economic development activities include job creation, creating a temporary employment agency, and support for resident entrepreneurship.

## **5.8 IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS ON THE HOPE VI PLAN**

In virtually all of the HOPE VI sites, implementation of HOPE VI initiatives have proceeded more slowly than anticipated. A number of sites have abandoned all or substantial parts of their initial revitalization plans and started the planning process over again. Even among those sites with approved strategies, planning is an ongoing process; changing circumstances and obstacles to implementation require constant reassessment of planned activities. This section summarizes the early implementation experience of the 15 sites included in the baseline for the longitudinal assessment of HOPE VI.

As shown in Exhibit 5-11, only about three percent of the funds committed to the 15 HOPE VI baseline sites has been disbursed as of July 1995, roughly 22 months following grant award.<sup>1</sup> Cuyahoga Metro Housing Authority has drawn down the largest proportion of its award, 15 percent of their \$50 million grant. At the other extreme, Chicago, New Haven, and New Orleans have not requisitioned any HOPE VI funds; these three sites are making major revisions to their initial HOPE VI revitalization plans and have not yet begun implementing the program. An additional four sites (Boston, Camden, Detroit, and San Antonio) have less than one percent of their total grant award. The remaining sites have between one and seven percent of their total allocations.

Turnover in senior PHA staff may be contributing to delays in HOPE VI implementation in several sites, in addition to the challenges inherent in the implementation of a program as large and complex as HOPE VI. As discussed in Chapter 2, over one-half of the PHAs in the study replaced their executive directors, and in some cases other senior management staff, during the baseline study period. At six of the sites that experienced senior staff turnover, the subsequent transition to new staff contributed to delays in HOPE VI implementation. Five of the PHAs experienced such extreme management problems that HUD was forced to intervene.

The 15 sites have made varying progress on their management, physical, supportive services, and community service plans. The status of each site's implementation of plans is summarized in Exhibit 5-12. The components are discussed in turn in the following sections.

### **5.8.1 Progress on Management Plans**

Some sites intend to implement management plans either mid-way through the construction period or following re-occupancy. Cuyahoga Metro's management plan will not be implemented until construction is completed, and Atlanta plans to begin management initiatives during the later stages of the construction period. The Milwaukee HOPE VI Management Plan Committee has completed several preliminary tasks in their management plan, such as revising the development's lease agreement and screening standards.

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<sup>1</sup> Data obtained from HUD's LOCCS system. The "disbursed" amounts refer to the amounts the housing authorities have drawdown from HUD. It is possible additional funds have been spent, but reimbursement has not yet been requested from HUD.

**Exhibit 5-11**  
**Grant Status Summary - July 28, 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Total Grant Awarded</b>	<b>Date of Last Drawdown</b>	<b>Total Amount Disbursed</b>	<b>Percent Disbursed</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	\$42,412,635	July 14, 1995	\$1,715,216	4.04
<b>Baltimore</b>	\$49,663,164	June 27, 1995	\$915,744	1.84
<b>Boston</b>	\$49,992,350	July 21, 1995	\$154,574	0.31
<b>Camden</b>	\$42,177,229	July 24, 1995	\$217,438	0.52
<b>Charlotte</b>	\$34,685,155	July 27, 1995	\$951,379	2.74
<b>Chicago</b>	\$50,000,000	NA	\$0	0
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	\$50,000,000	April 28, 1995	\$7,759,765	15.50
<b>Detroit</b>	\$39,807,342	July 28, 1995	\$46,802	0.12
<b>D.C.</b>	\$15,671,911	July 21, 1995	\$236,994	1.51
<b>Milwaukee</b>	\$40,003,646	July 6, 1995	\$2,890,734	7.23
<b>New Haven</b>	\$45,331,593	May 11, 1995	\$0	0
<b>New Orleans</b>	\$44,255,908	NA	\$0	0
<b>Oakland</b>	\$25,510,020	July 26, 1995	\$1,328,723	5.21
<b>San Antonio</b>	\$48,810,294	July 26, 1995	\$728,861	0.75
<b>San Francisco</b>	\$49,992,377	July 28, 1995	\$620,401	1.24
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$572,638,067</b>		<b>\$17,566,636</b>	<b>3.07</b>

*Source: Drawdown information from HUD's LOCCS system as of July 28, 1995.*  
NA = Not available.

**Exhibit 5-12  
Progress on Physical, Management, Resident Services, Community Service and Economic Development Plans Through August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Physical Plans</b>	<b>Management Plans</b>	<b>Resident Services Plans</b>	<b>Community Service Plans</b>	<b>Economic Development Plans</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	The demolition of Techwood began in May 1995. The replacement housing drawings are being developed.	This is not scheduled until construction is partially complete.	This is waiting for HUD approval of plan.	This plan is waiting for HUD approval.	[Although the economic development plan proposes 2 programs, there is no mention of progress in the case study.]
<b>Baltimore</b>	All residents have been relocated. Demolition of 6 high-rise buildings was completed August 1995. An ACLU lawsuit is pending that alleges housing discrimination and would prevent replacing housing on the site.	The wiring for computers has begun. There is no other progress on planned "dual management" plan.	They already had a Family Support Services Division so they were able to augment services. They are developing supportive service plans for residents.	There was some confusion about distinction between resident and community services. A task force is working on developing a community service plan.	[Although the economic development plan proposes to use Empowerment Zone money to establish businesses and employment opportunities, there is no mention of progress in the case study.]
<b>Boston</b>	The original architectural firm underestimated the costs of improvements by \$10m. As a consequence the PHA is rethinking HOPE VI strategy, both physical and financial. There is an increased emphasis on neighborhood revitalization and leveraging of additional resources. Physical improvements are currently on hold.	There have been significant improvements in management since a new manager was named in May 1994. There has been limited resident involvement in the management plan, however.	There is some progress on social services, although there are problems with limited participation and contracting issues. The delay in construction of the planned community center has created a space crunch for providers.	According to the case study, this appears to be considered part of social services. There is no discussion of community service specifically.	According to the case study, no economic development activities have been initiated except job training programs through ABCD and Harvard Medical School.

**Exhibit 5-12 continues**

**Exhibit 5-12 (continued)**  
**Progress on Physical, Management, Resident Services, Community Service and Economic Development Plans Through August 1995**

PHA	Physical Plans	Management Plans	Resident Services Plans	Community Service Plans	Economic Development Plans
<b>Camden</b>	Some pre-construction engineering work has been done.	They have appointed a temporary board, although its legal relationship to the CHA has not been established. They are exploring hiring a legal counsel for the board. HUD initially approved the nonprofit entity idea, but then pulled back. They are still negotiating. They are reorganizing the resident council.	Potential state budget cuts are threatening services.	The plan is "almost under agreement" with CNCS. AmeriCorps staff are reported to have been "heavy-handed" with local staff.	[Although the case study contains the outline of an economic development plan, there is no information on progress.]
<b>Charlotte</b>	The relocation began in August 1995.	[No progress was indicated in case study.]	The plan is to build on existing services provided by PHA and other providers. There is no progress yet.	Plan to build on existing Community Assistance Program's peer counseling model. The residents are to decide on mix and form of augmented services. There is no progress yet.	According to the case study, no final plans for economic development were available at the time of the baseline data collection.
<b>Chicago</b>	Major changes in plans have hinged on ability of nonprofit lead agency to issue tax-exempt bonds to leverage new housing. HUD ultimately rejected this plan. Demolition began in September 1995. The sites for replacement housing are being bought up by other entities.	They have been slow to hire staff. Eventually, they contracted with a local nonprofit. (The HUD take-over also has created problems.)	The plan is to "farm out" resident services to the United Way. There is no real progress.	[The community service plan described in the case study is a supportive services plan.]	[The case study does not indicate any progress.]

**Exhibit 5-12 continues**



<b>Exhibit 5-12 (continued)</b>					
<b>Progress on Physical, Management, Resident Services, Community Service and Economic Development Plans Through August 1995</b>					
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Physical Plans</b>	<b>Management Plans</b>	<b>Resident Services Plans</b>	<b>Community Service Plans</b>	<b>Economic Development Plans</b>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	Targeted units as Outhwaite are vacant and awaiting interior demolition. Good progress is being made at King Kennedy; the first 4 floors are to be ready by winter 1995-96.	Nothing is planned until construction is completed.	The resident services contracts have been completed. Many initiatives were already underway or are extensions of existing programs.	They have hired 17 VISTA volunteers plus a coordinator.	[There is no economic development plan included in the case study.]
<b>Detroit</b>	They are currently working on relocation. They are also developing a revised plan with a new contractor.	They are still developing plans, but will probably propose a "village" approach.	The original plan was revised and service provider contracts developed. HUD has released funds for these programs.	Two of the service providers will operate the community service programs. (No details)	[There is no economic development plan included in the case study.]
<b>District of Columbia</b>	There has been no progress due to DPAH's receivership. CDC is working on pre-development plan, but has no access to HOPE VI funds. Demolition was initiated March 1996.				
<b>Milwaukee</b>	They are making good progress on the demolition; this is expected to be completed by mid-August 1995.	The staff have been hired. The management plan committee has completed several preliminary tasks such as revising lease agreements and the screening standards.	They are seeking legal commitments from service providers.	List of agencies and organizations where residents may serve has been drawn up, but no further progress has been made on the recruitment or implementation.	[There is no economic development plan included in the case study.]
<b>New Haven</b>	They had just presented the revised plans to residents in July 1995.				
<b>New Orleans</b>	They began some demolition, but they had to stop due to asbestos problems and a fired contractor. The original plan was abandoned. The new plan calls for single-family homes.	They are proposing the Public Benefit Corporation to manage development. They are in the process of hiring a grant manager.	[The New Orleans case study provides no specific information about supportive services plans or progress.]	[The New Orleans case study provides no information about community service plans.]	The plans are to develop a commercial hub; but details and whether there should be two commercial clusters in the development have not been decided.
<b>Exhibit 5-12 continues</b>					

<b>Exhibit 5-12 (continued)</b>					
<b>Progress on Physical, Management, Resident Services, Community Service and Economic Development Plans Through August 1995</b>					
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Physical Plans</b>	<b>Management Plans</b>	<b>Resident Services Plans</b>	<b>Community Service Plans</b>	<b>Economic Development Plans</b>
<b>Oakland</b>	The overall plan places heavy emphasis on services and less on physical changes. The architectural work is underway for all sites. The final approval for changes in demolition and construction has not yet been received.	Extensive security improvements have been undertaken, although not necessarily with HOPE VI funds.	The two-year delay has been a problem for some providers who intended to fund staff with HOPE VI money that has not materialized. Most of the contracts are now signed. The work plans are in progress.	There has been confusion over distinction between supportive and community services.	After much confusion over definitions with CNCS, many of the community service activities are being carried out in conjunction with "economic development activities" such as remedial education or career counseling.
<b>San Antonio</b>	The plan is to begin demolition by the end of August 1995. The PHA will also demolish an abandoned nursing home at the same time. HA has also acquired nearby county-owned property for development of replacement housing.	The new site manager has improved operations significantly, including maintenance, communication with residents, and security.	The Family Self-Sufficiency program has 32 participants, with 36 others waiting to develop contracts. They are establishing linkages with training programs.	The site has been unable to establish a plan acceptable to CNCS, despite several revised plans and meetings with CNCS.	[The case study does not indicate any progress.]
<b>San Francisco</b>	They have made very limited progress. There have been significant problems with the resident groups. They have selected architects, although the process was slow. They anticipate beginning relocation in October 1995.	The interim plan was submitted February 1995. Two project managers were hired to work with existing staff. It is not clear who will manage the development after redevelopment. Tenant's Union has expressed interest in buying Bernal Dwellings and the PHA is reportedly considering this option.	The plan was submitted April 1995. Residents complained they were not involved in issuing the RFP for services.	The Plan was submitted as part of resident services plan in April 1995. It appears that the RFP issued for support services also included community service.	[The case study does not indicate any progress.]

Other HOPE VI PHAs hired new site managers early in the HOPE VI process and are implementing management improvements more aggressively. For example, the site manager for Mission Main in Boston, hired in May 1994, has improved maintenance responsiveness, reduced graffiti and vandalism, and started preparing for resident relocation (despite delays in physical construction plans). San Antonio's new site manager has improved operations considerably, including addressing the backlog of maintenance problems, developing better communication with residents, and improving security. Oakland has implemented significant security improvements, particularly at Lockwood Gardens, using other sources of funds.

Some HOPE VI sites have experienced significant delays due to the need to revise revitalization plans and management strategies under HOPE VI. Chicago's housing authority planned to hire new CHA staff members to coordinate the HOPE VI program from within the agency, but it was unsuccessful in recruiting qualified personnel. The CHA then contracted with a local nonprofit housing development organization to manage HOPE VI. But HUD's take-over of the CHA has put this plan in doubt and delayed HOPE VI implementation. Camden's initial plan, to set up a nonprofit entity to manage the redeveloped site, was subsequently questioned by HUD. Camden staff established a temporary board of directors for the nonprofit organization, but as of August 1995 they were still negotiating with HUD over the organization's legal relationship to the Camden Housing Authority. In San Francisco, it is still unclear who will manage Bernal Dwellings following the site's redevelopment. The Tenants' Union has expressed interest in buying the redeveloped site and has indicated they have some financial backing to pursue the purchase. The PHA is reportedly considering the offer. The proposed revised plan for New Orleans also calls for an alternative management structure, in which a "public benefit corporation" would manage the development.

### **5.8.2 Progress on Physical Plans**

As of August 1995, some demolition and/or construction had begun in four of the 15 sites: Atlanta, Baltimore, Cuyahoga Metro, and Milwaukee.<sup>2</sup> By August 1995, all of the units designated for renovation at Cuyahoga Metro's Outhwaite Homes were vacant and ready for interior demolition. Substantial progress had been made on site demolition, utility line installation, and renovations to King Kennedy's South High-Rise building, Cuyahoga Metro's second HOPE VI site. Demolition at Atlanta's Techwood Homes began in May 1995 and at Baltimore's Lafayette Court in August 1995. Milwaukee's demolition effort was scheduled for completion in May 1995. In addition, three replacement units (new construction) were completed; residents moved into these units in January 1995.

Several sites had not finalized their physical design plans, even though in some cases construction or demolition had begun. In all, eight sites did not have final, approved physical plans for redevelopment of HOPE VI developments as of August 1995.<sup>3</sup> Atlanta, the District of Columbia, and Oakland had incomplete plans, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, New Haven, and New Orleans had abandoned their initial plans entirely and were developing new strategies.

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<sup>2</sup> San Antonio planned to begin construction by the end of August 1995.

<sup>3</sup> Chicago began demolition in September 1995.

Despite delays in finalizing physical plans, some sites had begun construction activity. The Atlanta Housing Authority began demolishing Techwood in the spring of 1995, but the agency's plans for replacement housing have not been finalized. Architectural drawings are still being developed. In Boston, the architects originally hired by the Boston Housing Authority determined they had underestimated redevelopment costs by \$10 million. In addition, the BHA and other local actors had begun to rethink their entire approach to HOPE VI, placing greater emphasis on using HOPE VI as a mechanism for leveraging funds for a broader neighborhood revitalization strategy. All physical plans were put on hold.

### **5.8.3 Progress on Supportive Services Plans**

Supportive services initiatives have progressed in some sites where physical plans have moved more slowly. For example, the Detroit Housing Department has abandoned virtually all of its original HOPE VI plans. Revised physical plans are still being developed; however, a revised supportive services plan has been approved, service provider contracts have been executed, and HUD has released funds for supportive services initiatives. Space designated for service provider use has been renovated as part of current modernization efforts.

Despite significant delays in the physical redevelopment of Boston's Mission Main development, HOPE VI staff have made notable progress in establishing and improving services for residents. There have been problems with getting residents to participate (due to such factors as language barriers and child care responsibilities). There have also been more systemic barriers to implementation of the supportive services plan (such as state prohibitions on contracting for services that conflict with the BHA's own policies against providing services). But the site has still made important progress toward meeting the service needs of the development's residents. Construction delays have, however, interfered with full implementation of Boston's supportive services plan. Service providers planned to use space in a newly constructed community center. The providers are outgrowing their current limited space, yet construction plans for the community center that is supposed to house the providers' programs are on hold.

Baltimore and Cuyahoga Metro have made significant progress in implementing their supportive services plans. Both agencies already had well-established supportive services initiatives. In these sites, HOPE VI funds are being used to build on the local resource base to expand existing services and start new programs. San Antonio has focused efforts on implementing a Family Self-Sufficiency program; as of August 1995, the San Antonio FSS program had 32 participants with contracts of participation and another 36 residents in the process of developing contracts.

In contrast, other sites have made minimal progress. Atlanta does not yet have an approved plan. Camden's efforts have been largely limited to reorganizing the resident council. The two-year delay in service plan implementation has been a problem for some service providers associated with Oakland's supportive services plans. Some agencies that initially indicated they would participate had to withdraw when the funds were not available as scheduled. This has slowed implementation of the supportive services plan, although most contracts have now been signed and work plans are being developed. Like Baltimore and Cuyahoga Metro, Charlotte plans to build on existing programs offered by the CHA and other local agencies, but little progress has been made in integrating these existing initiatives into the HOPE VI strategy.

#### **5.8.4 Progress on Community Service Plans**

For the most part, the original proposals reflected the PHAs' lack of understanding of the distinction between supportive and community services. When asked to provide more detailed plans, especially for the community service component, it was obvious that little progress has been made on the community service component of HOPE VI. In fact, most sites do not have approved community service plans in place, and many site staff have continued to express confusion about the elements the community service strategy should include. In a number of sites, the community service component seems to be incorporated into the supportive services plans, but site staff were not able to articulate clearly the distinction between the two components. For example, the Detroit Housing Department has contracted with a number of supportive service providers. According to PHA staff, two of these providers will operate community service programs—Operation Get Down will focus on opportunities for residents 18 to 22 and Catholic Social Services will offer two programs for seniors.

Signed community service agreements do exist for Atlanta and Oakland. Baltimore, Chicago, and San Antonio are still developing plans or are waiting for Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) approval. Camden's community service plan was described as "almost under agreement," and will require the non-profit management corporation to contract with an AmeriCorps-sponsored group to run the community service component. Cuyahoga Metro had hired a coordinator and 17 VISTA volunteers, although the role of these community service volunteers is unclear and does not reflect the intent of the community service component. Milwaukee has a plan in place and has drawn up a list of agencies and organizations where residents may provide community service; however, no further progress has been made on recruiting participants or implementing this component.

HOPE VI staff from San Antonio and Camden specifically mentioned that developing plans acceptable to CNCS has been challenging. Despite repeated meetings with CNCS staff, HOPE VI staff in both sites said they have not received a clear definition of what the community service component should include. San Antonio staff reported that they had submitted a total of five revised community service plans between January and July 1995 and were still awaiting final approval. One issue seems to be confusion on grantees' part regarding the difference between supportive services and community service, as noted above. Descriptions of community service plans often refer to how community organizations and resources will be coordinated to provide supportive services to HOPE VI community residents, rather than how the community's residents will be mobilized to provide service to their neighborhoods.

#### **5.8.5 Progress on Economic Development Plans**

The HOPE VI grantees have proposed economic development strategies that include providing assessments for job readiness, job skills training, job search assistance, entrepreneurial training, employment placement, small business loans and creation of spaces or hubs where residents can find jobs or operate their own business. According to the case studies, only Boston has implemented a job training program for residents who are interested in working at the Longwood Medical Center.

Otherwise, all of the HOPE VI grantees appear to be preoccupied with the physical planning process. Since only six of the PHAs had developed a fairly complete plan and four other PHAs were still developing theirs as of August 1995, one can assume that the economic development strategies will not be pursued until the physical revitalization of the developments is further along.

In summary, as of July to August 1995, nearly two years after the announcement of the first round of HOPE VI grantees, the PHAs were refining and amending components of their revitalization plans. Given the challenging scopes of the HOPE VI plans and the numbers of local organizations that have been participating in the planning process, it is not surprising that implementation has proceeded more slowly than was initially anticipated. In the two chapters that follow, we provide a discussion of the Indicators of the Long Term Success of HOPE VI and a summary of the LRAs' estimates of the Prospects for Success of the HOPE VI initiative and their Conclusions about the program.

## CHAPTER 6

### INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM IMPACTS

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From the beginning of the HOPE VI Program, HUD's intent has been to assess the long-term impacts of HOPE VI in the 15 communities included in the baseline sample by conducting on-going annual monitoring and by initiating other evaluations of the program after several years (probably at 5- and 10-year intervals after the first program grants were announced). This chapter provides an overview of the methodology that could be used to assess the long-term impacts of the HOPE VI Program.

HUD's Request for a Proposal (RFP) for the Historical and Baseline Assessment of the HOPE VI Program offered the following guidance on HUD's plans for the *baseline assessment*:

#### **Contractor's Role**

The contractor's (Abt's) role is to: subcontract with 15 local research affiliates (LRAs) to carry out case studies of the baseline sample of 15 HOPE VI sites; coordinate the LRAs' collection of comparable (and site-specific) historical and baseline data on each of the HOPE VI developments, including persons living at the development before redevelopment, the structures and landscape of the HOPE VI developments, and the surrounding neighborhoods; *document the HOPE VI planning process and final plan*; and *note the intended outcomes from the PHA's intervention*.

#### **Purpose of the Baseline Assessment**

The purpose of the baseline data collection is to provide material for a baseline report and data files to *document the situation before the implementation of HOPE VI*.

Another purpose of the baseline data collection is to *develop flexible methodological procedures to collect comparable data at similar stages of the HOPE VI developments* for long-term tracking of the HOPE VI developments, the current residents, the neighborhood(s), and the interventions to permit HUD to:

- *Prepare annual progress reports, and*
- *Conduct impact assessments after several years have elapsed.*

Although the longitudinal assessment was not included in the scope of work for the baseline assessment, we designed the assessment tools as the baseline measurement for the long-term indicators of the outcomes of HOPE VI. To ensure that the LRAs collected a uniform set of historical and baseline information, we developed four research tools for the use by the LRAs. The

**HOPE VI Baseline Data Form** focused primarily on the HOPE VI development—its history, current status, and plans for the future. The **Windshield Survey** focused on the neighborhood of the HOPE VI development—the land use characteristics, other housing stock type and condition, and types of neighborhood businesses by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The **HOPE VI Resident Satisfaction Survey** provided a baseline view of a small sample of the residents in the HOPE VI developments before the program implementation had begun—their satisfaction with their unit, problems with their unit, sense of safety and security, incidents of victimization, participation in community service programs, needs for supportive services, and standard demographics. The **Outline for the Baseline Case Studies** provided a standard for the content and organization of the case studies and included a section for the description of the methodology to be used to collect the historical and baseline assessment and recommendations for long-term impact measures.

When the annual tracking and periodic overall assessment of the long-term impacts of HOPE VI begin, all of these tools will again be important to those who undertake the task. The description of the baseline methodology in each site and the recommendations for long-term impact measures will provide a strategy to follow in each of the baseline sample communities. The evaluation methods that will be used in most of the HOPE VI sites include review of documents, on-site observations, and interviews with residents, key PHA staff, and community leaders.

The remainder of this chapter provides a summary of the measurement categories or topics and the impact measure questions *that the LRAs included in their case studies*. Section 6.1 addresses the impacts in terms of the physical structures. Section 6.2 summarizes the management impacts that might occur. Sections 6.3 through 6.5 pose the topics that can be used to examine the impacts on the residents of the developments receiving HOPE VI grants. Included are three clusters of resident questions: the impacts on the residents of the developments at the outset of HOPE VI, the impacts on the residents after HOPE VI redevelopment, and the impacts of the supportive services, community services, and economic development efforts that have been targeted to the residents. In Section 6.6, we provide a summary of the possible impacts on the neighborhoods surrounding the HOPE VI developments. The final section, 6.7, provides several issues for HUD to consider for accomplishing the long-term monitoring of the impacts of HOPE VI.

It should be noted that the impact measures of interest are framed as generic questions. Each of the baseline case studies contains a discussion or set of questions that is unique to the HOPE VI plan for that community. Both the generic questions and the site-specific questions are likely to be useful for the longitudinal assessment of the HOPE VI program.

## **6.1 INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURES**

Exhibit 6-1 shows topics that were mentioned by many of the LRAs. A substantial number of the measures of interest are process measures (e.g., management of the revitalization process, demolition, and relocation units). Other topics address the question of what was accomplished (e.g., rehabilitation and redevelopment, new physical additions, replacement units, and density). These are the topics that address the impacts of at least 80 percent of the HOPE VI funding. Ultimately, another question will emerge: are these physical changes sustainable?



<b>Exhibit 6-1 Impacts on Physical Structure</b>	
<b>Impact Measure Category</b>	<b>Impact Measure Questions</b>
<b>Management of Revitalization Process</b>	Were the fund obligations timely? Were the site inspections timely? What was the level of budget compliance? How many work changes were required? Why? Was the work carried out according to specifications?
<b>Demolition</b>	Was demolition conducted on schedule? Were sufficient funds available for the entire demolition plan? Did demolition achieve the intended result?
<b>New Physical Additions</b>	Were the new additions to the development constructed? Was the location of the construction the same as in the plan? Was a community center added? If so, how has this addition changed the development?
<b>Relocation units</b>	Was sufficient replacement housing constructed or rehabilitated in relatively stable neighborhoods? Was the relocation housing located in mixed-income neighborhoods?
<b>Replacement units</b>	Were the required replacement units constructed or rehabilitated? Were the units physically adequate? What is the size of the replacement units compared to the original units? Was replacement housing located in mixed-income neighborhoods? Was the replacement housing located in stable and viable social communities (i.e., near economic opportunities, social services, educational institutions, and/or retail services)? Were the real estate deals which produced the replacement housing prudent uses of public money? Were Section 8 certificates made available in a timely manner?
<b>Density</b>	What is the population density in the development? What is the visual density of the development?
<b>Rehabilitation Redevelopment</b>	How comprehensive was the physical transformation? Were the changes perceived as effective by the PHA residents? By the community? Did the changes accomplish of the goal of integration into the neighborhood? Were all parts of the physical plan completed? What was the quality of the work? Were the units and buildings acceptable for mixed-income rentals?
Source: Baseline Case Studies	

## 6.2 INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON MANAGEMENT OF THE PROPERTY

Exhibit 6-2 summarizes the topics and the impact measure questions that were the rationale for requiring the PHAs to specify changes to management structures and procedures as part of the HOPE VI plans. The topics or categories delineate the problems that had been found to be associated with the distressed development's decline in the HOPE VI grant proposal. These topics include on-site management, funds allocation and management of resources, resident involvement in recommending and implementing management changes, improving maintenance efficiency, revision of lease enforcement procedures, rent collection, tenant selection procedures, activities of the tenant council, and improvements in development security.

**Exhibit 6-2  
Impacts on Management of the Property**

Impact Measure Category	Impact Measure Questions
<b>Tenant Selection</b>	What are the screening criteria? What is the turnover rate? How long does it take to prepare a vacant unit for leasing? What is the turndown rate? What procedures are followed in the selection of tenants? What is the degree of local control?
<b>Rent Collection</b>	What proportion of rents are collected on time? What is the vacancy rate? What factors are contributing to the vacancy rate? Are the vacancy rates comparable to other developments in the PHA? Is there a mixed-income waiting list?
<b>Lease Enforcement</b>	What is the degree of enforcement of conditions of occupancy? What are the recertification procedures? Are equitable grievance procedures applied? Are evictions carried out?
<b>On-site Management</b>	Is this accomplished through privatization and/or resident management? What is the structure of the management team, e.g., does it include residents? Are funds allocations determined on-site or by some other entity? Are the necessary agreements in place? What is the utilization of computer services? What are the residual barriers to effective management?
<b>Funds Allocation and Management of Resources</b>	What proportion is spent on management, maintenance, and supportive services? What are the operations budgets, staffing levels, inventories? What is the status of management support systems?
<b>Resident Involvement</b>	Have residents been involved in the implementation of management changes? Have residents been trained to participate in management? What employment opportunities for residents are available in management?
<b>Maintenance Efficiency</b>	Is maintenance reasonably responsive, (percentage of emergency orders completed within 24 hours, backlog of work orders, general site conditions)? How is maintenance regarded by residents? What is the level of resident participation in maintenance training? What employment opportunities for residents are available in maintenance?
<b>Tenant Council</b>	How many residents are active in the tenant council? What is the representativeness of the tenant council? How many meetings are held annually? What is the degree of participation in development management? Is the tenant council able to communicate effectively with the residents? What is the relationship between the tenant council and the PHA?
<b>Security</b>	What strategic planning has been done to reduce crime? What is the level of police presence and security? What is the visibility of illicit activity? What is the incidence of calls for service? What is the incidence of reported crimes? How many residents have been evicted for crime-related reasons? How willing are residents to be out-of-doors during the day and evening hours? Can children play in the yards without fear? Is there a resident watch group?

Source: Baseline Case Studies

### **6.3 INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON RESIDENTS AT THE OUTSET OF HOPE VI**

The purpose of the topics summarized in Exhibit 6-3 is to examine, to the degree possible, the impact of the HOPE VI process on those who lived in the development at the beginning of the program. Because of the impacts of deconcentration and dispersion, it may not be possible or practical to follow all of the former residents. However, for some of them, it will be possible to determine how the PHA handled: the planning process (e.g., resident involvement in the HOPE VI plan); the disruptions to the residents' lives (e.g., moves to relocation housing; moves back to the HOPE VI development, and moves to replacement housing); or did not provide adequate transition (e.g., residents could not be located). The social welfare indicators of each sub-group may provide an insight into the ultimate impacts on the residents.

### **6.4 INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON RESIDENTS AFTER THE HOPE VI REDEVELOPMENT**

After the HOPE VI redevelopment is accomplished, changes will occur. Neither the residents housed in the redeveloped site nor the residents' situation will be the same. Not only will the resident population change—especially in those developments where the goals include deconcentration and creation of a mixed-income community—but the returning residents' stage in life will have changed. Even if the disruption is only three years, changes will occur that are not associated with HOPE VI. Therefore changes between the baseline measures about residents and the followup measures about residents will have to be carefully assessed for their appropriateness as an impact of HOPE VI. The topics summarized in Exhibit 6-4 will permit the researchers in the future to examine the status of the residents and provide a cross-sectional or longitudinal assessment of the residents' demographics and situation after HOPE VI.

### **6.5 INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON SUPPORTIVE SERVICES AND EMPLOYMENT**

Part of the HOPE VI plans for residents addresses providing supportive services and economic development opportunities. The objective of these services and opportunities for residents is to increase the residents' possibilities for self-sufficiency and decrease their need for public housing over the long term. The measures of interest are the provision of supportive services to residents of all ages, the participation levels of the residents, the changes in employment levels, and the types of employment that are available to residents. Exhibit 6-5 shows the research questions that will permit examination of the services that were offered and their impacts, particularly on the adults' employment levels.

**Exhibit 6-3  
Impacts on Original Residents**

Impact Measure Category	Impact Measure Questions
<b>Resident Involvement in HOPE VI Plan</b>	To what extent were residents involved in the planning and implementation of HOPE VI?
<b>Moves to Relocation Housing</b>	<p>How many former residents moved to relocation housing?                      Was this a safe and secure environment?                      How did the new environment respond to the influx of new residents?                      Were there changes in the numbers and types of disruptions, e.g., rates of drug-related crime?                      Was "family services" able to maintain contact with the families throughout the process?                      What proportion used Section 8?</p>
<b>Moves Back to HOPE VI Development</b>	<p>How many former residents returned to the HOPE VI development(s)?                      How long did the relocation take?                      What are the impacts on residents returning to the redeveloped communities?                      Do mixed-income communities change the lives of former residents?                      Is criminal activity decreased?                      Are relations between different social and income groups positively reinforcing?                      What are the effects on returning children?                      Was "family services" able to maintain contact with the families throughout the process?                      What evidence is there of resident control of the site?</p>
<b>Moves to Replacement Housing</b>	<p>How many former residents moved to replacement housing?                      Was this in a safe and secure environment?                      How did the new environment respond to the influx of new residents?                      Were there changes in the numbers and types of disruptions, e.g., rates of drug-related crime?                      Did "family services" maintain contact with the families?                      What proportion used Section 8?</p>
<b>Residents Could Not Be Located</b>	How many former residents have been lost to the "system"?
<b>Social welfare indicators</b>	<p>What is the infant mortality rate?                      What is the access to medical care?                      What is the level of victimization?                      To what extent do residents feel empowered to influence factors that promote their personal well-being?                      What is the level of substance abuse?                      What proportion of households have earned income?                      What proportion of households are receiving public assistance?</p>

Source: Baseline Case Studies

**Exhibit 6-4**  
**Impacts on Residents after HOPE VI Redevelopment**

Impact Measure Category	Impact Measure Questions
<b>Residents</b>	How is this group different from the former residents with respect to: education? types of employment? median income? family size? median age of children? use of day care? family composition? ethnicity?
<b>Social situation</b>	What are the attitudes of residents toward each other and the development? What evidence is there of resident control of the site? Are there reports of problems among neighbors? What is the residents' level of involvement in programs? What are the school attendance records of children in the development? What are the trends in high school graduation?
<b>Social welfare indicators</b>	What is the infant mortality rate? What is the access to medical care? What is the level of criminal victimization? How many tenants have criminal records? To what extent do residents feel empowered to influence factors that promote their personal well-being? What is the level of substance abuse? What proportion of households have earned income? What proportion of households are receiving public assistance? Have the income mixing goals been achieved?
<b>Resident satisfaction</b>	How satisfied are residents with their individual units? How satisfied are residents with management? How satisfied are residents with their relationship with management? How satisfied are residents with their safety and sense of security in their unit? How satisfied are residents with their safety and sense of security in the development? How satisfied are residents with the security of leaving personal property outside their unit? What is the average length of occupancy?
<b>Homeownership</b>	Has there been an increase in homeownership? Are any programs supporting "homeowners of the future"?
<b>Volunteer Activities</b>	How many residents (including youth) are volunteering? What is the number of hours of volunteer work? Are volunteers qualifying for volunteer incentives, e.g., scholarships, free rent? What are the volunteers' attitudes about themselves and their community?

Source: Baseline Case Studies

<b>Exhibit 6-5</b>	
<b>Impacts on Supportive Services and Employment</b>	
<b>Impact Measure Category</b>	<b>Impact Measure Questions</b>
<b>Services On-site</b>	What services are offered on-site? What is the capacity of these services? How many residents can be served simultaneously? How many programs were expanded and/or created? What are the participation levels? What are the retention rates? What services are provided over time? What proportion of residents graduate from programs? What is the education level of the residents?
<b>Services Off-site</b>	What services are offered for residents off-site? What are the transportation arrangements? What proportion of residents graduate from programs?
<b>Community center</b>	Is the community center used by residents of the development? Is the community center used by residents of the neighborhood?
<b>Youth services</b>	What programs are designed for adolescents? How many youth participate in programs? What are the school drop-out rates?
<b>Child services</b>	What proportion of children in the development are enrolled in programs?
<b>Other Programs</b>	Are there other programs in the neighborhood that residents cannot access? Why? What programs are available? What do these programs offer to the residents? What is the capacity of the community services programs?
<b>Employment</b>	What percent of residents are employed? How many residents have become employed due to the program? How does the job training mesh with job market needs? What is the mix of job skills required for current employment? How much upward mobility do the jobs offer? What are the typical fringe benefits that the jobs offer?
Source: Baseline Case Studies	

## 6.6 INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE HOPE VI DEVELOPMENT

The purpose of the topics summarized in Exhibit 6-6 is to determine whether the economic development plan resulted in improvements in the neighborhood surrounding the HOPE VI development. Included in the measurement categories are the situational variables, like the regional economic conditions, which might have an overriding impact on the local economy and mask the impacts of HOPE VI. Also included as impact measure categories are the residents of the neighborhood, and the changes in residential, commercial, and institutional presence. Two other topics, community collaboration and municipal services, are included as indicators of the acceptance of the HOPE VI redevelopment in the surrounding community and in the city at large.

<b>Exhibit 6-6 Impacts on Neighborhoods</b>	
<b>Impact Measure Category</b>	<b>Impact Measure Questions</b>
<b>Regional Economic Conditions</b>	<p>Are there situational variables, such as economic conditions, that have affected the neighborhood?</p> <p>What is the number of business openings in the region?</p> <p>What is the number of business closings in the region?</p> <p>What type(s) of employment are available in the region, city, neighborhood?</p>
<b>Neighborhood Residents</b>	<p>How is this group different from those in the development in: education, types of employment, median income, family size, median age of children, use of day care, family composition, ethnicity?</p>
<b>Neighborhood Residential Changes</b>	<p>Are there changes in the population of the area?</p> <p>What are the impacts of dispersal of former residents on the immediate neighborhoods?</p> <p>What is the current condition of the neighborhood?</p> <p>What is the proportion of homeownership?</p> <p>What is the extent of lending for new homeownership?</p> <p>What is the proportion of public or subsidized housing in the neighborhood?</p> <p>What is the proportion of vacant residences?</p> <p>What proportion of the residents intend to remain in the neighborhood?</p> <p>What proportion of the residents prefer to leave the neighborhood?</p> <p>What are the assessed valuations?</p> <p>What is the proportion of tax delinquencies?</p> <p>What are the fair market rents?</p>
<b>Commercial Changes</b>	<p>Are there changes in retail and commercial operations?</p> <p>What are the changes in employment opportunities for residents?</p> <p>Are there improved services in the neighborhood, e.g., a nearby grocery store?</p> <p>What is the small business loan activity in the area?</p> <p>What are the assessed valuations?</p> <p>What is the proportion of tax delinquencies?</p>
<b>Institutional Changes</b>	<p>Are there changes in the number of institutions, e.g., churches, schools, and hospitals?</p> <p>Are ties to the institutions improving?</p> <p>Are there continued ties to educational institutions to provide training to residents?</p>
<b>New Development</b>	<p>What new economic development is taking place?</p> <p>Are new residential communities being constructed?</p> <p>What is the small business loan activity in the area?</p> <p>How many permits have been issued?</p> <p>How many variances have been granted?</p> <p>Are there changes in land use?</p> <p>What is the proportion of vacant lots?</p>
<b>Community Collaboration</b>	<p>Are bonds between the development and the community being maintained and/or improved?</p> <p>Are development residents participating on boards of broader neighborhood institutions?</p> <p>What are the patterns of interaction between the residents and others in the neighborhood?</p>
<b>Municipal Services</b>	<p>What is the level of municipal services in the neighborhood?</p> <p>What are the current programs to address crime problems in the neighborhood?</p> <p>Is the level of municipal services similar to other neighborhoods in the city?</p>
Source: Baseline Case Studies	

## **6.7 ISSUES FOR LONG-TERM MONITORING**

There are several issues for HUD to consider for accomplishing the long-term monitoring of the impacts of HOPE VI. These issues include the scope of the monitoring and impact assessments, longitudinal versus cross-sectional assessment, Local Research Affiliate assignment, and coordination and management of the assessment team. All of these issues will ultimately be considered in the context of the resources available for continuing assessment of the impacts of HOPE VI.

**Issue 1: Scope of the Monitoring and Impact Assessment.** The current intention is for the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment to provide a basis for tracking the progress and impacts of the HOPE VI program on the developments, the neighborhoods, and the residents. To the extent the resources are made available, continued assessment of all three objectives of the HOPE VI program is recommended. Most of the needed assessment tools were developed under the Baseline Assessment. However, adding a neighborhood resident and/or business community assessment would provide complementary information about the impacts of HOPE VI from the perspectives of others in the larger community. The opinions of the latter group may provide some of the best indications of the ultimate sustainability of the HOPE VI redevelopment.

**Issue 2: Longitudinal versus Cross-Sectional Assessment.** Related to Issue 1 is consideration of what is gained through a longitudinal assessment in comparison to what is likely to be understood from a cross-sectional assessment. During the development and implementation of the Baseline Assessment, the difficulty of tracking the developing HOPE VI plans was obvious. Changing personnel and loss of records at the PHA coupled with the loss of institutional knowledge and information is likely to continue. Major assessments are planned for 5 and 10 years after the HOPE VI grants were awarded. If the 5- and 10-year assessments were conducted cross-sectionally without the benefit of longitudinal tracking, much of the information about what actually transpired could be lost. Investment in annual monitoring is recommended and will greatly reduce the difficulties in understanding what HOPE VI produced and how.

**Issue 3: Local Research Affiliate Assignment.** If HUD chooses to conduct annual monitoring of the HOPE VI program in the same locations as the baseline assessment sample, then having LRAs on the assessment team is recommended and cost effective. Using an LRA in this role does not guarantee continuity, however. Even if contracts for the 15 sites were issued shortly, replacements would have to be found for some of the LRAs. In several cases, graduate student affiliates of the primary LRA conducted much of the work, have graduated, and are no longer in the community. In other cases, the primary LRA has left the community or may not be interested in continuing the assignment. The assignment of LRAs in each of the 15 sites will have to be reevaluated when the contracting arrangements are made.

**Issue 4: Coordination and Management of the Assessment Team.** This issue is related to Issue 3. Coordination and management of the LRAs during the Baseline Assessment required considerable time and effort. If HUD decides to assume that responsibility, it must supply sufficient management time to coordinate the LRAs' activities. Although it is possible that the experienced LRAs could assume responsibility for their local monitoring activities following the long-term monitoring plan in their case study, the results would be unlikely to produce information that would be acceptable for a longitudinal or a cross-site report. The long-term monitoring plans are frequently sketchy with



few common themes across sites. Aggregation of the information would be difficult. Our recommendation is to manage the LRAs with a similar arrangement to the Baseline Assessment team. The level of effort in the tracking years could be fairly low, but it would be coordinated and provide assurance that the 5 and 10 year followup assessments would have a common set of information to report on all 15 HOPE VI developments.

If HUD decides to assign the coordination function to an outside contractor, then it would be useful to reexamine the division of responsibilities between the contractor and the LRAs. Some of the quantitative data collected by the LRAs could have been more reliably collected by several teams of individuals on the prime contractor's staff who would visit each site to collect the needed information more systematically across the HOPE VI sites. This direct contact with the sites would provide points of contact with the PHAs that the contractor could use to verify information if necessary. Ultimately, HUD must make the decision and commit the resources that are deemed appropriate for the continued assessment of the impacts of HOPE VI.

The next chapter summarizes the LRAs' perspectives on the potential of HOPE VI for their sites. Some of the LRAs are optimistic; others are less so. The rationale behind their perspective is provided wherever possible.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS FROM THE HOPE VI BASELINE

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The Historical and Baseline Assessment of the HOPE VI program provides an early opportunity to examine the prospects for success of the program and the conclusions that the Local Research Affiliates (LRAs) have drawn. Both of these perspectives are discussed in this chapter.

#### 7.1 PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS

The prospects for the success of HOPE VI are summarized in Exhibit 7-1. As one might expect, there are a continuum of opinions offered by the LRAs. We have classified these opinions in four tiers.

The most optimistic and promising prospects are seen in Baltimore, Cuyahoga Metro, and San Antonio. Each of these communities have forged strong bonds among the PHA, residents, and other community groups. Even though HOPE VI is seen as an ambitious undertaking, these groups have made long-term commitments to see this program through and have developed a shared level of mutual trust that makes the process worth undertaking despite the challenges.

The second tier views HOPE VI as challenging but is still guardedly optimistic about the prospects for success. Included in this group are Camden, Charlotte, Milwaukee, and Oakland. Ultimately success will hinge on the sustained leadership of the PHA, HOPE VI administrator, and the mayor. While this organizational and administrative strength may ensure the implementation of the plans for physical redevelopment, there are questions about the supportive and community services impacts on residents' outcomes. So far, the residents do not consider themselves a part of the HOPE VI team and therefore a part of the solution.

The next tier views the prospects for the success of HOPE VI as unclear. Boston, Chicago, the District of Columbia, and New Haven are more uncertain than the HOPE VI initiatives in the first two tiers. In all cases, the progress toward finalizing the HOPE VI plan has been slow. The HOPE VI developments in Boston, Chicago, and the District of Columbia are situated on very valuable real estate, thereby leading to competing recommendations for what the goal of the plan should be. New Haven's shrinking size provides other challenges to proposing the best plan. All of the PHAs in this tier will continue to struggle to develop an acceptable and achievable HOPE VI plan.

The fourth tier includes Atlanta, Detroit, New Orleans, and San Francisco. These are the PHAs in the baseline sample where the HOPE VI program is in the most doubt. Both Atlanta and San Francisco have a history of not delivering on promises to public housing tenants. There is considerable underlying suspicion on the parts of the residents. So far, there is evidence that HOPE VI may lead to a repeat performance. Weak leadership at the PHA and poor management practices for capital construction projects are likely to leave this HOPE VI project in doubt. New Orleans has a problem similar to New Haven's. Redevelopment at the Desire site, as opposed to other available scattered sites throughout the city, may not be a good choice.

**Exhibit 7-1  
Prospects for Success - August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	In the past decade the AHA has been unable to deliver on promises for replacement public housing. Examples include: replacement housing for units lost to highway construction; never- developed new public housing (even with funds already allocated); and incomplete architectural plans for replacement housing of Techwood units demolished for Olympic athlete housing. New AHA management hopes to reverse the past poor performance and reputation among public housing residents. AHA support of resident and community involvement in the implementation process is doubtful.
<b>Baltimore</b>	HABC has been working toward the redevelopment of Lafayette Courts for over 6 years. During this time, strong ties have been forged between the residents and the HABC; the process of achieving this level of mutual trust has been highly successful. There is a shared sense that the HOPE VI program offers new opportunities and could serve as a model for low-income urban family housing. However, the ACLU has filed a lawsuit that could prevent any new construction on the site; a settlement is being negotiated, but no final agreement has yet been reached.
<b>Boston</b>	Uncertainties about the future of national housing policy, a transfer of BHA leadership, and a shifting city-wide housing agenda have slowed implementation of the HOPE VI plans, and caused the Authority to rethink some of its original goals. The consequences include: uneven and slowed progress on HOPE VI and questions about who will be responsible for executing the plan. The comprehensive redevelopment of the site remains the primary goal of HOPE VI. However, it remains unclear how much of the initial vision in the HOPE VI plan will move forward.
<b>Camden</b>	McGuire Gardens is not only a challenging HOPE VI development, but “a truly uphill battle to improve.” The ambitious plan will be difficult to implement; it will require enormous organizational and political skills. The new administrator is working with HA staff to address the changing federal policies and requirements. The potential is great; achieving it is a daunting task.
<b>Charlotte</b>	HOPE VI in Charlotte is an ambitious undertaking. Success is hinged on continued strong CHA leadership, commitment of CHA management to stay the course, creation of sound CHA staff-resident relationships, and economic development of the area. Strict contract management will be critical to the success of HOPE VI; sanctions must be used for those who do not make progress in the FSS program.
<b>Chicago</b>	The current political situation at the CHA and the future of Chicago’s HOPE VI are in question. Chaos at the CHA has led to little to no progress in finalizing the HOPE VI plans. Continuing resistance to income and class integration in Chicago is very much reflected by the city’s lack of cooperation in the offering of vacant and affordable land, and the continued gentrification of the area. Residents remain suspicious due to the past history of unfulfilled promises. Thus, at this point, it is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of the HOPE VI effort.
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	The prospects for success look promising. The Social Services Mall is nearing completion and progress is being made on other construction projects. Since the buildings are vacant, renovation can proceed without delays due to relocation of residents. Land has been obtained for the Enterprise Center—a major component.
<b>Exhibit 7-1 continues</b>	

**Exhibit 7-1 (continued)  
Prospects for Success - August 1995**

<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Detroit</b>	The revised HOPE VI plan is unfinished. The slowness of the planning process is a reflection of the weakness in leadership by the DHD. This agency has been plagued by severe management problems for many years. Since this agency is critical to the success of HOPE VI, unless it can change many of its past management practices (e.g., being "subject to the policies, regulations and contracts of local municipal government . . . [and] obliged to 'purchase' financial, legal, procurement, and management information services from municipal government with federal funds, without benefit of competitive bid processes."), the revitalization effort is not likely to succeed.
<b>DC</b>	DCHA's plan has great potential and grows out of a grassroots community effort. However, DCHA's management problems have severely impeded program implementation and local political problems may ultimately undermine the HOPE VI effort. Given the current chaos at DCHA and in the District of Columbia, it is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of this plan.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	There is a high probability that at least the physical change components of this plan will succeed; the redevelopment was begun using other funds and significant progress has already been made in improving at least some sections of the development. However, the supportive and community service components have a much lower probability of success. There is a substantial gap between the magnitude of the HOPE VI demonstration (including the complexity of the plans) and the organizational capabilities of the HOPE VI staff. Further, HACM's vision for the project has not been effectively communicated to residents and resident leaders.
<b>New Haven</b>	Because the plans have still not been formed, it is difficult to predict what will happen to the HOPE VI effort. It is a very ambitious project undertaken in the context of a shrinking city; if it succeeds, it may hold lessons for the future of public housing in America.
<b>New Orleans</b>	The potential for success for this project is seen as slim, despite the enthusiasm of the new mayor and the appointment of a new, more effective, Executive Director. Residents are wary of OHA and the City government. The target area is not really suitable for multi-unit development. Further, the current tenant-income mix is insufficient to maintain the buildings. In addition, nearby industrial land use and a Superfund site has reduced the area's residential value. There is insufficient economic activity in the area to provide resident employment and the resident council is not adequately prepared to assume management of the site.
<b>Oakland</b>	The HOPE VI project calls for a complex and multi-faceted partnership. The relationship between OHA and city hall has been running smoothly, but thus far, the social service agencies involved have not created a successful collaboration. It is also not clear whether the project can truly bring about greater neighborhood improvements. However, HOPE VI represents a major advance for OHA and is consistent with the general enthusiasm in Oakland for collaborative approaches to neighborhood revitalization and services.
<b>San Antonio</b>	The potential for change is good, but it depends on the long-term commitment by all parties to the initial agreement including HUD, SAHA, Spring View residents, social service providers, educational institutions, neighborhood residents, the City, private developers, and banks. As such the HOPE VI plan is ambitious. Moreover, the plan proposes not only revitalization of the physical structures, but personal changes in the residents' lives as well.

**Exhibit 7-1 continues**

<b>Exhibit 7-1 (continued)</b>	
<b>Prospects for Success - August 1995</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>San Francisco</b>	Numerous problems make the prospects for success very slim. There is an inadequate supply of replacement housing in San Francisco to use for even temporary relocation. There is a great deal of suspicion and hostility on the part of the tenants, based on past experience. In particular, tenants believe that replacement housing will never be built. Management problems and turmoil at SFPHA will hamper and delay implementation.
Source: Baseline Case Studies	

None of the PHAs in the fourth tier have shown evidence that they are pursuing a course toward a HOPE VI plan that is likely to be widely accepted.

## 7.2 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions drawn by the LRA are parallel to their prospects for the success of HOPE VI. The conclusions are summarized in Exhibit 7-2. We examine the conclusions using the same four tiers.

The conclusions for the first tier show progress, especially in Baltimore and Cuyahoga Metro. Lafayette Courts have been demolished and high-rises for demolition in King Kennedy Estates and Outhwaite Homes are vacant and the Social Services Mall is nearing completion. While little progress has yet been made in San Antonio, its “holistic” approach to a revitalized development incorporated into a rejuvenated community is encouraging. The collaboration among the PHA, residents, private development, and local government provide a solid basis for progress in the future.

The conclusions about the second tier HOPE VI PHA are less optimistic. Included in this group are Camden, Charlotte, Milwaukee, and Oakland. The future challenges are more obvious. Camden is in danger of having the matching funds withdrawn, but there is still a “rosy view” of what can be leveraged. Charlotte’s HOPE VI plan is viewed as ambitious, and the residents have seen prior revitalization attempts not deliver on promises. The most pressing concern is whether sufficient economic development funds can be leveraged attract mixed-income residents. Milwaukee is another location which can achieve at least part of the HOPE VI plan, but the residents have not internalized the HOPE VI plan and are not yet part of the process. In Oakland the dynamics of the process are positive, especially between the Mayor’s office and the PHA. The proposed collaboration among community-based agencies is having to be replanned. If new partnerships can be forged, Oakland’s plan can work.

<b>Exhibit 7-2 Conclusions</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Atlanta</b>	<p>The AHA has embarked on a “grand experiment.” Whether the social and economic integration of the community can deliver on the promise of transforming the lives of public housing residents is “both noble and excessively optimistic.” While dispersal and integration cannot eradicate the generators of impoverishment, the new environment may enrich the lives of the low income people who live there.</p> <p>The social costs of HOPE VI for the former residents of Techwood are enormous. During the emptying of Techwood beginning in 1990, residents were not offered replacement housing. Moreover, the AHA has not produced replacement housing for those residents who were affected by the first phase of demolition and who had not surrendered their rights to be rehoused. Current proposals to use current revenue for demolition and future revenue for replacement housing raise serious questions about the AHA’s commitment to uninterrupted housing of current residents.</p>
<b>Baltimore</b>	<p>An air of cooperation and collaboration exists between the residents of Lafayette Courts and the HABC. The successes to date are based in part on this relationship. Lafayette Courts have been demolished in a atmosphere marked by festivities—marching bands, invocations, speeches, and refreshments. The event has been called a “new beginning” for Baltimore. There is a “shared sense that the redevelopment of Lafayette Courts has the potential for new opportunities and as a model for future low-income urban family housing.</p>
<b>Boston</b>	<p>Numerous changes are in process. Renovation has become reconstruction because the costs of rehabilitation were embarrassingly high. The BHA architects, involved in the other HOPE VI project at Orchard Park, offered another view—pieces of the site could be traded for off-site parcels to make a better redevelopment site plan. The development potential of the land, rather than the buildings themselves, provided alternative and compelling opportunities for a redevelopment of Mission Main that is integrated into the fabric of the neighborhood. Management may ultimately be private, but many of the other elements of the plan are undecided and not yet approved by HUD.</p>
<b>Camden</b>	<p>Although it is early in the HOPE VI implementation, the program is already seen as very ambitious and based on a “rosy view” of what leveraged dollars can achieve. Some of the expected matching funds have evaporated in the current political climate. The CHA and HOPE VI administrator have not abandoned the high goals. Many challenges await the SAAO, the non-profit administrator. The range of skills among the residents is considerable—some are capable self-starters while others have few skills and less motivation. What all residents need is experience in doing for themselves and/or getting organizational activities done rather than having things done for them or to them.</p>
<b>Exhibit 7-2 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 7-2 (continued) Conclusions</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>Charlotte</b>	<p>HOPE VI is an ambitious undertaking. Earle Village residents recognize that elimination of the development could be a lucrative undertaking for the CHA; the property is very valuable. Past attempts at revitalization have left the residents suspicious that this may be another attempt to strip them of their homes and community. The challenge for the CHA is to break this perception and create an atmosphere of collaboration and hope. Continued involvement of residents in meetings is essential to overcoming distrust and building strong trusting relationships between the residents and the CHA. The other side of the challenge for the CHA is with the private investment community. For HOPE VI to succeed, economic development of the First Ward is essential. This will attract mixed-income residents and commercial development in the community.</p>
<b>Chicago</b>	<p>Although questions remain about the long-term success of HOPE VI, the three high-rises were demolished in 1995. It is also possible that the fourth building will be rehabilitated and eventually house some working class families. Also likely is the construction of some low-rise public housing in place of the demolished high-rises on other vacant land owned by the CHA in or near Cabrini. Uncertainties remain about whether the redeveloped public housing units will attract market-rate families, whether the needed numbers of new public housing units can be built in the surrounding community, and whether Section 8 certificates will be a feasible substitution for Cabrini's lost units. The demolition is easy and will be supported in the neighboring community; rest remains in doubt.</p>
<b>Cuyahoga Metro</b>	<p>There is considerable evidence that progress on the HOPE VI project is being made. The Social Services Mall is nearing completion and there is progress on the other construction projects. Since the high-rises to be demolished are vacant, this work can begin without further delays. Progress on the supportive services programs is ensured by the already existing relationships with many of the providers. Expansions are also underway for the community service component. Importantly, the required matching funds for additional resident and community service activities have been committed. Successful implementation does not assure sustainable results. Without improvement in the social and economic conditions of the surrounding area, desirable new residents are unlikely to stay. Other economic revitalization initiatives have to succeed for the goals of HOPE VI to be realized.</p>
<b>Detroit</b>	<p>Much of the planning for HOPE VI remains unfinished. Although there is considerable interest in the outcomes of HOPE VI, concern about outcomes may be premature, unless the processes are put in place to ensure development of a good strategic plan and compliance with that plan. The DHD has not been successful with previous revitalization efforts for this and other organizational reasons. Development of a good plan that is acceptable to the residents will require consultation and development of a trusting relationship with the residents of Jefferies Homes—a new endeavor for the DHD.</p> <p>The current HOPE VI grant will enable renovation of approximately 25 percent of the current development. Creation of a sustainable community will require additional funds. Attracting other capital investments will require conducting the revitalization process using commonly accepted business practices, especially a "bona fide" competitive bidding process. Some activity has begun: vacant units are being reoccupied and modernization and relocation have begun in Jefferies West. Ultimately the location of Jefferies Homes within an Empowerment Zone may be the catalyst that leads to a successful HOPE VI initiative.</p>
<b>Exhibit 7-2 continues</b>	

<b>Exhibit 7-2 (continued) Conclusions</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>DC</b>	The HOPE VI plan offers opportunity for economic and racial diversity to work in the District. If the plan's potential is attained, Ellen Wilson Dwellings could be one of the showcases for a genuinely mixed-income neighborhoods that addresses the needs of all of the residents. The redevelopment effort was initiated by neighborhood residents who met together to plan strategically for neighborhood improvement. This neighborhood group then chose to partner with DCHA to become part of the HOPE VI initiative.
<b>Milwaukee</b>	The HOPE VI physical changes have a very high probability of being completed successfully and on schedule. Those under contract to perform this work are highly regarded and carefully overseen by highly-trained HACM staff professionals. There is more doubt about the supportive services and community services components. The "vision of HOPE VI" has not yet been effectively communicated to a critical mass of Hillside Terrace residents and resident leaders. Although the concepts and issues have been presented, the residents have not internalized the information, nor exhibited changes in attitudes and behaviors. To date there is little evidence that the residents are engaging in HOPE VI as "their project" too.
<b>New Haven</b>	As of late August 1995, the HOPE VI plan was still in flux. Although some consensus was forming around a low-density, duplex-dominated option, the final decisions in the context of other neighborhood and city issues were likely to postpone the final HOPE VI plan until late 1995 to early 1996. Cost is another issue that is being discussed. The cost of the new units is estimated between \$85,000 and \$100,000. A scattered-site solution would probably be less costly and ultimately more cost effective for the community since New Haven is a shrinking city with 6,000 more housing units than families. Rehabilitation and replacement of units that were created at the peak of the city's manufacturing era could simply result in the continuing marginalization of other housing units nearby.
<b>New Orleans</b>	A successful implementation of HOPE VI at Desire is viewed as slim. Although Phase I of the demolition (using CGP funds) was imminent in June 1995, the costs of this 186-unit initiative was estimated to be \$100,000 per unit, including infrastructure improvements. Alternatively, the cost to purchase and renovate enough of the 16,000 neglected single-family homes scattered throughout New Orleans to provide one to each family living in Desire would be considerably less than the estimated \$100 million needed for the revitalization of Desire. The residents, too, are skeptical. Their low incomes are insufficient to support the upkeep of a home either scattered site or on the Desire site. In addition, leaving the Desire community and social networks is unacceptable to residents. The HOPE VI plan is far from finished.
<b>Oakland</b>	The dynamics of the HOPE VI project are positive. The PHA and the Mayor's Office are collaborating in the implementation of HOPE VI. The OHA is responsible for overall policy direction and overall management, while a staff member from the Mayor's Office provides day-to-day coordination. The OHA is emphasizing services to qualified legal residents of the HOPE VI developments as their first priority. This emphasis extends to asking contractors to hire qualified residents for positions funded through HOPE VI. Community-based agencies are rethinking their role in the HOPE VI initiative. The revised inter-agency relationships may ultimately be more workable than what was originally proposed. The early outcomes of HOPE VI include a forging of new partnerships between the OHA and many community-based organizations and the creation of new opportunities for resident involvement in decision-making.

**Exhibit 7-2 continues**



<b>Exhibit 7-2 (continued)</b>	
<b>Conclusions</b>	
<b>PHA</b>	<b>Local Description</b>
<b>San Antonio</b>	While the HOPE VI plan for Spring View is ambitious, it addresses many issues that may help it succeed. It views a revitalized development incorporated into a rejuvenated community. The SAHA has proposed incentives for residents to view public housing as a temporary location while they are searching for permanent security in private-sector housing, and is leveraging low community support for incorporating “public housing” and “low-income housing” into mixed- income communities. The collaboration among SAHA, the private development community, city government and neighborhood residents predates HOPE VI. The potential for change is good if the collaboration continues under HOPE VI.
<b>San Francisco</b>	The residents are very skeptical about whether HOPE VI is another program for “Negro removal.” Earlier urban renewal programs did not live up to the promises for building of replacement housing until ten years after the demolition. If a similar delay were experienced by the current residents, they fear that the lack of acceptability of the Section 8 vouchers by landlords would force them out of the city. Given the current disruptions and political turmoil within the SFPHA, the perception of many residents of the developments and the community at large, is that the HOPE VI project will never be implemented.
Source: Baseline Case Studies	

The conclusion for the next tier HOPE VI PHAs, including Boston, Chicago, the District of Columbia, and New Haven are more uncertain. Boston is essentially starting over and the BHA is not solely in control of the process. Chicago’s plan to demolish three high rises was accomplished in 1995, but questions remain whether the area will attract market-rate families. Without changing the income mix of the residents, the redevelopment may not be sustainable. Similar to Chicago, the sustainability of the District of Columbia’s plan hinges on that ability of the redevelopment to attract mixed-income residents. New Haven’s plan, too, was still not final and serious questions were being raised about what was best for the development and the City. With per unit cost estimates approaching \$100,000 per unit, it was little wonder that the HOPE VI plan was facing scrutiny.

The conclusions regarding the fourth tier were less promising than those above it. This tier includes Atlanta, Detroit, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Many questions could be raised about the events in Atlanta. No replacement housing had been offered to residents who were affected by the demolition needed to begin the Olympic Village construction. Other proposals were to use current funds for more demolition. Only future funds would be used for replacement housing. In Detroit, much of the HOPE VI plan remains unfinished. Sustainability is questionable since only 25 percent of the development will be affected by the current funds. Attracting other capital will be necessary to the success of the HOPE VI project. In New Orleans, the success of the current plan is slim. With cost estimates per unit approaching \$100,000 and the site in question, major changes will be needed to ensure success. San Francisco, too, has broken prior promises to residents. Many remember that it took a decade before the SFHA provided replacement housing for other demolition projects. Given the current political changes, and disruptions at the PHA, it seems much more likely that the HOPE VI will never be implemented here.

In summary, the HOPE VI program will undoubtedly succeed in some of the sites included in the baseline for the HOPE VI assessment. The PHAs' plans in other locations are much more tenuous. Several factors are key indicators of the likelihood of success: the extent of PHA experience and capacity to manage an effort of the magnitude of HOPE VI; the extent of collaboration and support from HUD, the mayor's office and other local government agencies; the extent of support for the HOPE VI program by residents, institutions, and commercial entities in the surrounding neighborhoods; and the involvement and level of participation in the process by the tenants' council and other residents. If the HOPE VI investment in buildings, neighborhoods, and people is to attain the desired outcomes, the community partnerships must be forged in an atmosphere of collaboration and hope.

The startup of HOPE VI has been slow and difficult for the PHAs. This is not surprising given the circumstances. Two-thirds of the PHAs in the baseline sample were on HUD's Troubled List as of 3/31/92.<sup>1</sup> Nine of the PHAs have experienced turnover in the Executive Director since the HOPE VI application. All have evidenced serious management problems in the forms of high turnover rates, high vacancy rates, high turndown rates, and high rent delinquency rates. HUD has been forced to intervene in the management of four of the PHAs in the baseline sample.<sup>2</sup> Although HOPE VI is not the only target of the HUD interventions, the presence of HUD's professional staff may provide the PHAs with the additional experience and capacity needed to improve the chances for success of the HOPE VI initiatives in those communities. Presumably HUD will share the lessons learned through technical assistance to and improved capacity building with the other PHAs with HOPE VI grants.

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<sup>1</sup> To be eligible to apply for HOPE VI, an applicant had to be either a PHA located in 1 of the 40 most populous U.S. cities or on HUD's Trouble Housing Authority list as of March 31, 1992 *and making substantial progress to eliminate the troubled status.*

<sup>2</sup> In early 1996, the San Francisco became the fifth PHA in the baseline sample that required HUD intervention.

# **Appendices**

## **APPENDIX A**

### **SELECTION OF 15 PHAS FOR IN-DEPTH ASSESSMENT**

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A committee of HUD staff was assembled in March 1994 to select 15 HOPE VI implementation grants for in-depth assessment. That committee was comprised of Todd Richardson (PD&R Evaluation), Milan Ozdinec (HOPE VI Office), Bobby Benjamin (PIH Policy Office), Elena Van Meter (PD&R Policy Office), and Kevin Neary (PD&R Evaluation). The committee's mission was to select 15 diverse grantees based on their location, development type, types of distress, and proposed interventions.

The committee made its selection from the 26 implementation grants that had full funding at the time. The committee noted the characteristics of each site and grouped the sites according to those characteristics. One or 2 sites were then selected from each grouping. The committee initially agreed on the selection of Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Camden, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, New Orleans, Oakland, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. (The sites not selected were Columbus, Dallas, Denver, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, Philadelphia, Puerto Rico, San Antonio, and Springfield.)

In August and September 1994, Abt Associates contacted each of the sample grantees to identify potential local researchers. In those initial site contacts, Abt staff learned that Pittsburgh and Houston were both in political stalemates with residents, which appeared likely to drag on indefinitely. Abt staff suggested to HUD that alternates be selected for those sites. HUD agreed; San Antonio was selected to replace Houston; while New Haven was selected to replace Pittsburgh.

## **APPENDIX B**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF HOPE VI BASELINE CASE STUDIES**

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For each of the 15 HOPE VI study sites, a Local Research Affiliate (LRA) prepared a Baseline Case Study Report. The LRAs were asked to develop the case studies within a general outline developed by Abt Associates. The LRAs were encouraged to expand beyond the outline and focus on the issues considered most central to the HOPE VI site they were studying. As a result, the case studies in Volume II are similar in format but quite different in focus. The executive summaries from those case studies tend to reflect the issues each LRA felt was most important to explore at the site they were studying.

In general, the executive summaries should be seen as a baseline through May 1995. While some later events have been noted, most activities at the sites since May 1995 are not included. A future report will capture changes and events that have occurred since that time.

The opinions expressed in the following executive summaries are those of each Local Research Affiliate. They do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the U.S. Government.

**TECHWOOD AND CLARKE HOWELL - ATLANTA, GA**

Larry Keating, Larry Keating Associates

The redevelopment of the Techwood and Clarke Howell communities is, as of this writing, a work in progress. The demolition of Techwood Homes has begun and current plans are to demolish all 1081 units of both communities and replace them with 900 units of mixed-income housing. Mixed income is defined as 40 percent public housing, 20 percent low-income tax credit units and 40 percent market rate units. Management of the public housing is to be contracted with a private, as-yet-unnamed, firm. Replacement housing for the 721 public housing units not constructed on site is to be in scattered site, mixed-income developments throughout Atlanta.

In many respects, the outcome of the revitalization plan depends on two things, (1) the successful completion of redevelopment and (2) on negotiating and executing joint venture contracts with private developers and owners of existing rental housing. If these tasks are completed, the public housing will have been reconfigured into mixed-income communities. Significant variables which will affect the completion of these tasks are the proportion of replacement housing which is owned or leased by the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA), the proportion of the replacement housing which is supplied through the Section 8 program, the future funding of the Section 8 program and, finally, the success of the pending AHA application for the final \$36 million projected to be required to complete the project.

In the past ten years, AHA has not been able to complete similar but smaller tasks: Replacement housing for units lost to highway construction was not accomplished; development of new public housing for which funding had been allocated was not accomplished; and replacement housing for Techwood units demolished for Olympic athlete housing is incomplete. New management at AHA hopes to reverse the past poor performance of the Authority.

During the past 5 years, planning for the redevelopment of Techwood and Clarke Howell has proceeded through three phases, each of which came to different conclusions regarding the final outcome. Simultaneously with the 3 planning processes, occupancy levels at Techwood Homes declined from 92.8 percent in June 1990 to zero. The circumstances surrounding the emptying of the development are unclear. Attrition accounts for an indefinite proportion. A former chair of the AHA Board of Commissioners has indicated that more than attrition was involved, and the rates of the decline in vacancies exceed typical AHA turnover rates, but no hard data on specific instances of non-attrition departures has been uncovered. Those households who moved out of the development prior to August 18, 1994 have surrendered whatever preferential rights they might have had to be re-housed in the new mixed-income communities. Empowerment of existing residents is one goal of the HOPE VI program; the opportunity to empower most of the former residents of Techwood Homes was lost. Some previous residents appear to have been unjustly required to move.

The present redevelopment plan is predicated on the hypothesis that mixed-income communities will enhance the lives of their poorest residents. This proposition incorporates many complex issues, some of which are examined in greater detail in the concluding sections of the report. In general, if AHA is able to implement its plans successfully, the primary test of the redevelopment will turn on the extent to which the hypothesis is verified for those poor households who are able to participate.

**LAFAYETTE COURTS - BALTIMORE, MD**

Tony Whitehead & Linda Kaljee, Cultural Communication Systems

Lafayette Courts, built in 1955, is both the largest and the oldest of 4 family high-rise public housing developments in Baltimore City. The other 3 high-rise family developments, built in the 8 years after Lafayette Courts, are Murphy Homes, Lexington Terrace, and Flag House. In addition to the 4 high-rise developments, there are 27 other family public housing developments. Lafayette Courts currently consists of 6 eleven-story high-rise buildings (645 efficiency, one-, two-, and three-bedroom units), and 17 low-rise buildings (162 three and four-bedroom units). In 1990, there were 2,277 individuals living in Lafayette Courts. One hundred percent of the residents are African-American.

Lafayette Courts and the other family high-rises share a multitude of problems including antiquated plumbing and heating systems, high maintenance costs and an extensive backlog of maintenance orders. Management problems endemic to the high-rises are high rates of vacancy, 'turn-downs', and past-due rent. Lafayette Courts also has a high crime rate, particularly in regards to drug trafficking, a lack of recreational space for children and youth, high unemployment, and lack of neighborhood resources, i.e., grocery stores. While Lafayette Courts represents only 5 percent of the HABC housing stock, maintenance and management costs at Lafayette Courts account for 25 percent of HABC's operating costs.

In 1989, Mayor Schموke commissioned a Family High-Rise Modernization Task Force. The 1992 task force report concluded, "that high-rise living was not conducive to nor supportive of family living." Its members recommended redesigning and implementing an alternative living environment. In 1993, HABC responded to the HOPE VI initiative, and were granted \$50 million to redevelop Lafayette Courts. Since HOPE VI was awarded to HABC, residents, the housing authority, and private and public institutions have continued to work together to refine the goals and objectives of HOPE VI at Lafayette Courts. Residents and HABC continue to meet, and close ties have been developed between the Tenant Council, residents, management, and HABC. The HOPE VI project has provided an opportunity for establishing a new process of resident-management-administrative cooperation and communication.

Under the HOPE VI program, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) will demolish all of the current construction and rebuild townhouses, a community center, and an elderly low-rise (three-story apartment complex). The current construction plan will reduce the density at Lafayette Courts by almost 60 percent. The new on-site management will be a dual management structure, and will include both residents and non-residents. In addition, there will be a management/resident board which will include 2 residents, 2 managers, one individual from Family Support, and one "outsider." It is anticipated that the new construction will require less maintenance, and that residents will be more involved in that maintenance both as employed at the development, and through training workshops which will help individuals to do minor maintenance repairs on their own unit. Within the HOPE VI project, the HABC Family Support Services Division will initiate a family-based case management program to track families and assist them in receiving those services which they feel they need. The overall philosophy of the resident and community services plan is to provide services

which will enable residents to become self-sufficient, (i.e., childcare, job training, educational opportunities).

At the time of this report, residents are being relocated out of Lafayette Courts, either into other public housing, or Section 8 housing. Approximately 50 percent of current resident plan to return to Lafayette Courts after redevelopment. The demolition date is set for August 19, 1995. Re-occupancy of the new development is anticipated to be in approximately 3 years.



**MISSION MAIN - BOSTON, MA**

Langley Keyes, Charles Adams, Elsa Guttarier, Mary Quesada, and David Thatcher  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This reports chronicles the year one progress, from September 1994 to September 1995, on the \$50 million HOPE VI plan at Mission Main Public Housing Development located in Southwest Boston. The purpose of the document is twofold: one to establish a baseline for future analysis of the project five and ten years from now, and two, to document how the project has proceeded in its first year of implementation.

In general, the history of the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) is not unlike that of the typical large-city housing authority. Successes as well as failures marks its past. Like other Authorities, policy changes motivated both internally, as well as externally, (from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and Congress), have impacted management, resident characteristics and the physical maintenance of the housing stock. Unlike other Authorities, however, the BHA operates without a Board of Directors (a consequence of the Receivership of the organization from 1980 to 1984) and the Executive Director serves at the pleasure of the Mayor. The city accordingly plays a very active role in the affairs of the Authority. In the future, the BHA and the city will have to cope with a number of challenges, including general confusion over the future of public housing, the loss of rent control in the city, and the loss of leadership at the BHA, including the currently vacant position of Executive Director. The reports shows that these Authority level challenges have impacted the first year progress at Mission Main.

Mission Main, constructed in 1940 as family housing, is one of the BHA's largest developments. Currently, the development consists of 822 units spread throughout 39 three-story buildings. When the HOPE VI application was written in May of 1993, the physical condition of the buildings was extremely poor. The majority of roofs, doors and windows were in need of major repair or replacement. Hallways were filled with trash and many wreaked of urine. Site condition were equally squalid. Fences, trees, and bushes were long gone and no through streets crossed the development. Trash and other debris littered the grounds. Consequently, the turndown rate for residents offered a unit at Mission was 74 percent and the move-out rate was 21 percent. This made for a vacancy rate of nearly 17 percent. Those residents who did live in the development were young, poor, poorly educated, and predominantly African-American or Hispanic. Crime was extremely pernicious—violent crimes of murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault occurring three time more often than in Boston as a whole. Drugs seemed to be the focal point for crime. Mission was cited as the largest outdoor heroin market in New England by police authorities. Social and community services were not well established to address the needs of the residents and the Mission Main Tenant Task Force lacked the leadership to support families in need. Overall, Mission Main was one of the most distressed developments in Boston in significant need of renewed leadership, reform and repair.

Mission Main is located in a community rich with institutions. The development is adjacent to the Longwood Medical Center—the largest medical complex in New England. Five colleges surround the site as well. The Museum of Fine Arts is also just down the road. Opportunities for support programs, jobs, and resources are significant, but few liaisons with local entities have materialized.

Conventional housing in the area is architecturally distinct from Mission. The majority of the stock is privately-owned one- and two-family homes. Retail and commercial activity is not well developed although plans are currently in the works for significant redevelopment of the commercial district. Consequently, few jobs exist for residents in the neighborhood outside of the those at the medical center. But the majority of residents do not have the educational background or job experience to be competitive for them. Crime in the neighborhood is higher than the rest of Boston but not epidemically so. Overall relations between the residents and the community have been strained.

The overall goals for the HOPE VI project went beyond the revitalization of the development. Mission Main was to signify a new way of doing business for the BHA. The hope was that reforming Mission would be a means for reforming the BHA as a whole and would improve the way in which the Authority renovates developments, manages its properties, and delivers services to residents. The redevelopment of Mission was to be comprehensive and would include physical, economic, social, management, and security reforms all geared toward six major goals: make Mission Main safe, make the housing sound and attractive, improve BHA responsiveness, integrate the neighborhood into the community and reinforce community. The backbone of the plan was assembled over the course of several Saturday workshops that brought residents and community leaders together. Specifically the physical component of the plan called for reconfiguring the buildings—creating a hierarchy of public and private spaces, increase entrances so no more than two families shared an entryway, and redoing the facades of building to give residents a sense of belonging. With respect to economic development, the plan called for the establishment of a “Partnership for Economic Development” with the surrounding institutions that would support small business activities. The Community and Social Services component called for establishing a Task Force, comprised of resident and community folks that would identify the needs of the residents and would locate on-site or off-site service for them. Management reforms included greater autonomy for the on-site manager. Tools the plan specified as necessary for such independence included: the ability to set and determine own budget and hire, train, and fire own staff, additional legal support for evictions, and on-site screening of tenants. The BHA also would seek waivers to create a mixed-income community and ceiling rents to keep residents from moving out. Finally, security reforms for Mission Main included the establishment of a community policing program and the formation of hallway monitoring committees that would be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of public areas around the development.

Progress on the Mission Main plan has been uneven with some components of the plan progressing more rapidly than others. Physical redevelopment of the site has not begun but great strides have been made in social services. Management has improved significantly with the arrival of a new manager, Carol McCaffrey, but structural management reforms have not been forthcoming. Security issues are only now being considered in a more comprehensive manner and economic development activities have not yet been initiated, nor do they appear to be imminent. Many of the challenges facing the BHA as a whole—namely a loss of leadership at the BHA and changing policies at the national level have impacted the progress of the HOPE VI plan at Mission Main and caused the BHA and the city to rethink some of the plans basic goals. New emphasis is being placed on thinking about the project in the larger context of the neighborhood and possibilities for redeveloping some of the land around the site are being pursued. Privatization of the redevelopment process and management are also being evaluated.

**MCGUIRE GARDENS - CAMDEN, NJ**  
Peter Hecht, Environmental Research Group

Peter J. McGuire Gardens is a 367 unit rowhouse-style public housing development in East Camden. Built on the flood plain of the Cooper River and on the site of a former unofficial dump, it is an unappealing development run by the Camden Housing Authority. With a residential population that is very low on employment, income and education measures while at the same time very high on crime and community fragmentation measures, it is a severely stressed and distressed development. There is a high degree of resident apathy and withdrawal from any joint activities with other tenants. The Camden Housing Authority which manages the development is itself a troubled agency with long term operational problems that contribute to conditions at McGuire Gardens. The City of Camden adds another layer of problems, with a devastated economic and tax base and a history of political intrigues and scandal. This set of conditions made McGuire Gardens not only a candidate for HOPE VI funds but also a truly uphill battle to improve.

The HOPE VI proposal outlines a wide range of social and community services to be implemented at McGuire Gardens along with physical improvements. Part of this is development of a new management organization separate from the Camden Housing Authority to run the site. This plan recognizes the Authority's inability to handle the site or the grant program. The breadth and scope of the proposed program will be hard for any group to implement in its totality as it requires tremendous organizational and political skills. Some matching funds and programs that would have supported the HOPE VI project have already disappeared with political changes in New Jersey in the past couple of years.

Implementation of the HOPE VI program at McGuire Gardens is just in the beginning stages. A program administrator has been hired. Working with staff borrowed from the Housing Authority, the program administrator is reworking plans according to changes in HUD's approach to the HOPE VI grants. This has brought another set of hurdles for those implementing the project through changes in policies and requirements at the federal level. These changes may or may not address local conditions, and almost certainly take away from local resources.

The potential for improvement is great given the low level functioning of the development to date, but barriers at every level, from the site itself through the Housing Authority, City, State, and Federal governments make managing and implementing the HOPE VI project a truly byzantine undertaking.

## **EARLE VILLAGE - CHARLOTTE, NC**

Deborah Weisel & Deborah Meager, Police Executive Research Forum

The Housing Authority of the city of Charlotte manages and operates 3,897 conventional public housing units which house more than 11,000 residents. Of the authority's 26 public housing developments, Earle Village ranks as the largest and most troubled development.

Constructed in 1967, Earle Village's 409 row townhouses stand in stark contrast to the modern skyscrapers of its neighbor, Charlotte's prosperous Central Business District. Other than a small grant from the city of Charlotte for landscaping and porch enhancements, Earle Village has received no modernization funds since construction.

Physical characteristics isolate Earle Village from the downtown area. The development sprawls across 36 acres of urban land that is dotted by parking lots and vacant parcels of land, and is dissected by major thoroughfares that feed commuters from the nearby interstate to the downtown area.

Social as well as physical stress characterize Earle Village. Some 1,200 of Charlotte's most economically and socially-challenged residents call Earle Village home: the median annual income in Earle Village is \$5,639 compared to a city-wide median of \$40,600; 67 percent of Earle Village residents are unemployed while Charlotte boasts an unemployment rate of 5 percent; Earle Village residents complete, on average, only nine years of school; and 95 percent of the heads of household are female. Crime impacts the quality of life of Earle Village residents. While 1994 data indicate that city-wide crime rates decreased, the violent crime rate in Earle Village remained 13 percent higher than in the city. Part II crimes, such as burglary, were 106 percent higher in the development than in the city.

Solid physical structures, a prime urban location and a business sector interested in more downtown residential development form a foundation for the revitalization of Earle Village through the ambitious HOPE VI program, initially funded with \$34.6 million in funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. A later amendment to the grant increased its total award to \$41,740,155 to reflect changes in the Master Plan for Earle Village. The program, as the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) envisions it, consists of a plan to address the physical distress of the development as well as the social and economic distress of its residents. Through partial demolition and landscaping, Earle Village will be altered to soften the scale of the development's large expanse and minimize the impact of major streets. In addition, renovation and new construction of units are proposed to meet the housing needs of the elderly and families participating in the HOPE VI program.

HOPE VI, however, is more than a physical renovation. The CHA has designed three specific programs, the home ownership, self-sufficiency and elderly programs. An intensive case management program troubleshoots problems residents may encounter in achieving their goals. These programs are aimed at assisting residents, particularly in the self-sufficiency and home-ownership programs, in becoming economically and socially independent and getting out of public housing. As such, a variety of supportive and community service programs will be provided by public and private agencies to Earle Village residents. Programs include job skills training, high

school completion programs, day care services, nutrition and parenting classes, after-school tutoring and senior and prenatal health care programs, among other services.

Revitalization of the entire community is seen as key to the success of HOPE VI. As part of a larger community-wide revitalization scheme, the CHA is pursuing a variety of strategies, such as the creation of a non-profit Economic Development Corporation, to involve the public and private sectors in the redevelopment of this area. This plan to bring mixed-income and commercial development to the Earle Village community intends to afford greater economic and social opportunities to area residents.

Charlene F., a 28-year old mother of two small children in Charlotte, NC, has called the deteriorated Earle Village public housing development home for nearly two years. She moved into public housing because of the unpredictable nature of her job: seasonal layoffs caused her to develop severe financial problems. She was happy to find a “safety net” at Earle Village, where she would not worry about the small family being evicted.

“Being in public housing gives you the opportunity to go to school and get training to get out on your own and not worry about being put out,” says Charlene. She views dependency on public housing as a temporary condition.

Public housing has not been temporary for Frances R., 46, who has lived in Earle Village for more than 20 years, raising two children to graduate from high school. Her nine-year-old granddaughter lives with her now. Earle Village was a nice neighborhood when Frances moved into the development, but drug problems and children with little parental supervision have changed the neighborhood. The apartment “is not worth it any longer,” she says. She pays \$390 per month for rent (including utilities), based on the salary she earns working as a housekeeper for the county, a job she has held for five years.

Vanessa B., 35, is unemployed and has lived in Earle Village for four years. Currently enrolled in GED classes held on the development’s property, she wants to secure her degree, then get computer training so that she can go to work in a local bank. “I’m sorry I waited as long as I did [to go to school],” says Vanessa. “My children have been an inspiration to me.” Her son is in the military and her daughter works in a bank. A third child, 13, lives with her now in Earle Village. But Vanessa stopped working a year ago when health problems prevented her from continuing her job at a nearby hotel.

The Charlotte Housing Authority’s HOPE VI overall goal is to develop economic self-sufficiency for the residents of Earle Village -- assisting Frances with owning her own home and aiding Charlene and Vanessa in getting back on their feet and moving out of public housing within five years. By providing a battery of services including training and education, on-site day care, assistance with money management, and one-on-one counseling to overcome any barriers facing these women, the housing authority will require these residents and 209 other program participants to become economically independent and self-sufficient within five years. It is a challenge for many of the residents of Earle Village, some of whom are multi-generational occupants of public housing. But the program provides hope for those residents who want a better life: “At last we’ll have something that’s ours,” says Frances. “I’ll feel good [about it]—for once in my life, I can say I have something—a house. It’s something I’ve always dreamed about.”

**CABRINI HOMES EXTENSION - CHICAGO, IL**

Paul Fischer, Lake Forest College

The Cabrini Homes Extension is the Chicago Housing Authority's (CHA) focus for the HOPE VI revitalization effort. It is one of three developments that comprise the area nationally known as Cabrini-Green. The Extension is considered the worst of the three developments. On the 36.4 acre Extension site are 6 seven-story buildings, 11 ten-story buildings, and 6 nineteen-story buildings, containing 1,921 units. Cabrini was designed to be separated from the outer world with only one road that goes through the development.

The Cabrini Homes Extension has a population of 3,695 residents. Two-thirds of the residents are children under the age of 19. Over 90 percent of households are receiving AFDC and/or are below the poverty level. According to a 1991 study, only 22 percent of the adult resident population at Cabrini had completed high school. The Cabrini Homes Extension is the type of development the creators of HOPE VI were seeking to address - high density high-rises home to a vulnerable and dependent population in a community experiencing high crime rates.

Although CHA has several other high-rise developments with similar distress to the Cabrini Extension, the location of the Extension makes it a promising choice for HOPE VI. Located near the Old Town neighborhood of the affluent Lower North area of Chicago, this area is experiencing significant revitalization with many new stores and small malls under development. Currently, however, Cabrini-Green remains isolated from its affluent neighbors. It is feared by its neighbors for its crime ridden reputation and despaired by its residents who feel ignored and rejected by the city. The preliminary HOPE VI plans for Cabrini Extension are to integrate it with its more affluent neighborhoods.

At the time of this case study, the plans for Cabrini Extension were being revised. According to CHA's original proposal, the plan is to physically revitalize the development, demolishing 3 high-rise buildings and rehabilitating one. The rehabilitated high-rise would be converted into a mixed-income, 60-unit structure. Fifty percent of the residents would be very low income (10-50 percent of the median) and 50 percent would be low-moderate income (50 to 80 percent of the median). In addition to the rehabilitated high-rise, 285 new units would be developed in a series of mixed-income construction projects in the surrounding neighborhood. These units would blend in with a much larger number of new market-rate units (approximately 852). An additional 48 replacement units would be built in the larger Chicago metropolitan area. Another 167 units would be provided via Section 8 certificates. One factor that may affect HOPE VI at Cabrini in the long-run, however, is that less than half of Cabrini Extension will be affected by HOPE VI (and less than one-quarter of all of the units at Cabrini-Green will be affected). While the hope is that the revitalization efforts funded by HOPE VI will be a catalyst for the redevelopment of the rest of Cabrini-Green as well as the immediate neighborhood, a more pessimistic view is the remaining Cabrini-Green site will negate the revitalization efforts of HOPE VI.

The HOPE VI plan also called for a number of management innovations. As part of the CHA-wide effort, the plan calls for shifting to a site-based management model and the expansion of resident management efforts, with the possibility of contracting with a private management company to run

the site. The plan also called for income mixing, by instituting rent ceilings so those with increased incomes would not be pushed out. Improved resident selection procedures with greater resident participation and easier eviction processes would be instituted to assure greater resident stability and fewer crime and vandalism problems, particularly in the low-density mixed-income off-site developments. The social service package focused on expanding existing services and adding others that addressed the social and economic needs of the residents.

The CHA's plans for Cabrini are ambitious, yet it is difficult at the time this case study is being written to believe that HOPE VI, as described in the original plan, will ever come to fruition. Since the HOPE VI grant was awarded, HUD has taken over the housing authority due to CHA's long term management difficulties. Furthermore, there has been very limited progress in finalizing a plan, there is resistance to income and class integration in Chicago, the continued gentrification of the surrounding neighborhood has taken away land planned for the new construction of mixed income housing, and there is a past history of unfulfilled promises to CHA residents. In all probability, the three high-rises will be torn down over the next year. It is possible that the fourth building will be rehabilitated and it will eventually contain some working class families. It is becoming clear that some low-rise public housing will be built on the site of the demolished high-rises and other vacant land owned by the CHA in or near Cabrini. But it is not certain that market-rate families can be attracted to low-rise housing on the Cabrini site. It remains uncertain whether significant numbers of new public housing units can be built in the surrounding community, as well as the feasibility of using Section 8 certificates to compensate for the absence of new public housing units. The easier things will probably happen, like tearing down already abandoned high-rises. The rest remains in doubt.

**KING KENNEDY ESTATES AND OUTHWAITE HOMES - CLEVELAND, OH**

Darlyne Bailey, Sharon Milligan, & Linda Persse, Case Western Reserve University

King Kennedy Estates and Outhwaite Homes, the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) developments selected for comprehensive renovation through the HOPE VI Project, are located on the near-east side of the City of Cleveland, an area that has become a focus of public and private sector community revitalization efforts. The Project is being implemented by a public housing authority that has undergone significant management changes since 1990. This report offers a baseline overview of CMHA, the Project planning and implementation process and the demographic, socioeconomic and physical conditions in the target developments and the surrounding community prior to implementation of HOPE VI initiatives.

CMHA is a large public housing authority responsible for more than 20,000 dwellings, located primarily in conventional public housing developments or estates. Throughout the 1980's CMHA was a troubled housing authority based on the evaluation criteria of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and public perception. Problems cited included vacancy rates that reached almost 50 percent, high crime rates in many developments, poorly maintained dwellings and inadequate fiscal management. In 1990 Ms. Claire Freeman was appointed Chief Executive Officer and charged with improving the overall management of CMHA and the conditions at the Authority's properties.

Positive changes promoted by Ms. Freeman and her administration enabled CMHA to be removed from the "troubled public housing authority" list in 1993. By 1994, rent collection increased to 98 percent, vacancy rates fell to below 4 percent, emergency and routine maintenance backlogs were significantly reduced, public safety personnel increased more than 10-fold and site-based management was strengthened. Renovation and modernization funds were pursued aggressively, resulting in more than 3,000 (26 percent) units being placed "under modernization." Ms. Freeman's leadership has supported a commitment to developing the human capital of CMHA residents, as well as improving the physical conditions in the estates. Many challenges lay ahead.

Outhwaite Homes was built between 1935 and 1939, a period in which public housing construction included thoughtful site planning and the use of quality materials. The grouping of buildings around courtyards was intended to create a sense of enclosure and relatedness among residents. King Kennedy Estates on the other hand, constructed approximately 35 years later, was built to provide the maximum number of units without sensitivity to the benefits of creating "village space." The buildings and grounds were stark and institutional in appearance, and common entryways, halls and stairwells reduced the safety and orderliness of the development. In both estates, years of inadequate maintenance and minimal upgrading of structures and grounds have caused physical decline. This factor, along with the safety concerns and economic depression that extend into the surrounding neighborhood, have resulted in the relocation of residents who have sufficient resources to do so. Among the consequences of this selective out-migration are the absence of people who can support a thriving local economy and a loss of role models and individuals with access to resources.

For the residents who remain in the target sites, median household incomes are considerably below the federal poverty threshold, labor force participation is less than one third and the formal



educational attainment is typically below that required by most employers. Households are most commonly composed of single females or single females with children for whom public assistance programs are the primary source of income.

Prior to being chosen as a recipient of HOPE VI funds, CMHA had undertaken efforts to improve the condition and image of several of their properties, including part of King Kennedy Estates. Renaissance Village is a transformation of 8 buildings into 66 renovated units with private doorways, refinished exteriors, landscaped community spaces, decorative fencing that defines the “village” boundaries, and resident initiated and monitored conduct expectations for all tenants. Completed in 1993, it provides a model for future revitalization efforts such as HOPE VI.

Cleveland’s Central Neighborhood displays many signs of the economic decline that followed the loss of almost 40 percent of the city’s manufacturing jobs over the past 2 decades. The neighborhood is comprised primarily of vacant lots and residential, commercial and industrial properties that are empty or in need of repair. Notable exceptions are a few recently constructed or renovated homes, municipal buildings and commercial establishments, a community college branch and health care and social service facilities. Numerous churches and several public schools and libraries are additional assets. The anticipated expansion of major wholesale food distribution operations will probably contribute to the area’s revitalization, and benefits are likely to accrue from the neighborhood’s proximity to federally designated Empowerment Zones.

Most area residents live in public housing estates or low-income apartment complexes. Unemployment is greater than 50 percent and the median household income is well below the federal poverty threshold. Residents contend with one of the highest crime rates in the city. Choices in retail establishments are limited and prices are typically inflated. Selective out-migration as described in the target sites occurs throughout the community. Sustaining changes instituted by HOPE VI interventions will be linked to the overall improved well-being of the Central Neighborhood.

CMHA included input of leaders and stakeholders from resident organizations, the community, neighborhood development groups, city government, academic institutions, philanthropic foundations, businesses, churches and health and social service providers in the HOPE VI Planning Process. Improvements in the physical sites will include modernization of 126 units at King Kennedy Estates and 374 units at Outhwaite Homes, construction of an Enterprise Center, renovation of community and recreation centers and the creation of a Social Services Mall in the King Kennedy South high-rise building. Additional programs and activities are intended to provide interventions leading toward economic self-sufficiency, the strengthening of families, the empowerment of residents to improve and sustain their community and increased resident participation in estate management. Mr. Edwin Robinson, the HOPE VI Project Administrator, has convened meetings with stakeholders to keep them apprized of the plans and implementation and to solicit their input.

Physical site renovations offer the most visible evidence of plan implementation to date. All buildings designated for modernization are vacant, site demolition is completed on several and interior framing has begun on two. Proposed improvements to community buildings have reached

the design stage, and land has been acquired for construction of the Enterprise Center. The Social Services Mall is scheduled for occupancy by Fall 1995.

Implementation of the Social and Community Services Plans is underway, also. Contracts with providers were completed by early 1995, and most of the services are operational. Vista Volunteers and a coordinator for the program have been selected. The plans for site-based management and maintenance are determined, but await completion of the renovations for implementation.

The creation and maintenance of a physical environment that elicits satisfaction and pride in residents and supports a positive impression of public housing among the general public and community stakeholders is a planned outcome of HOPE VI implementation. The extent to which these views are sustained over the coming years is one long-term indicator of success.

Other long-term measures should assess the impact of the Project on residents' economic self-sufficiency, health and social well-being and involvement in community activities. The extent to which they are able to improve their lives and their community are indicators of the long-term success of the resident empowerment goals. Because the well-being of residents is closely tied to the revitalization of the neighborhood, the ways in which they are connected and support each other should be examined.

Even the successful implementation of the HOPE VI Project does not assure sustainable results. The renovated dwellings and community buildings will not attract and maintain desirable residents over time if social and economic conditions in the surrounding area do not improve. Plans for the revitalization of nearby CMHA estates, and the successful implementation of neighborhood-wide efforts will be essential supports to the sustainability of gains realized by HOPE VI.

**JEFFRIES HOMES - DETROIT, MI**

Robert Marans & John Ballard, University of Michigan

Jeffries Homes is a 2,170 unit development located on the near west side of Detroit, 1 mile from Detroit's central business district. Completed in 1955, Jeffries Homes contains a mixture of rowhouse, low-rise, mid-rise, and high-rise structures located on 4 superblocks. One superblock is separated from the rest by the below grade Lodge Expressway. Jeffries Homes and its immediate neighborhoods have been subject to severe decline over several decades and have been included within Detroit's Empowerment Zone.

Jeffries Homes has a population of over 1,600 residents, that includes a mixture of seniors and families. Most socio-economic statistics indicate conditions of severe distress at Jeffries Homes. The 1995 median household income for Jeffries Homes is \$5,664.

Jeffries Homes has undergone severe deterioration over time and now has a vacancy rate of 58 percent. Jeffries Homes is managed by the Detroit Housing Department (DHD). The prolonged failure of DHD to meet basic management responsibilities earlier stimulated the selective outmigration of residents, contributed to the structural deterioration of Jeffries Homes, and now jeopardizes its potential revitalization.

Since 1979, DHD has been on HUD's "troubled" list. DHD has a system-wide vacancy rate of 55 percent. DHD has been unable to meet most negotiated performance standards set forth in past strategic plans to relieve its "troubled" status. The previous Memorandum of Agreement between DHD and HUD expired June 1992. A new Memorandum of Agreement between HUD and DHD was scheduled to become effective July 1, 1995. In June 1995, HUD announced their intention to form a committee that would oversee DHD in an effort to focus and accelerate efforts to relieve its "troubled" status. In August 1995, the current DHD Director announced her intention to resign at the end of September 1995.

The original HOPE VI Program plan for Jeffries Homes was submitted to HUD in May 1993. The original plan was scrapped in August 1994 because it lacked sufficient design interventions and it discounted the service needs of current residents. Plans for support and community service programs were renegotiated in the fall of 1994. A revised and supplemented Revitalization Plan is scheduled for completion in February 1996. TTR Associates has been selected as the Program Coordinator to facilitate the design and implementation of the final Revitalization Plan.

In the meantime, a site Administrator has been appointed to coordinate revitalization efforts at Jeffries Homes. Stabilization, relocation, and modernization efforts are moving forward. Such efforts are expected to reduce impediments to the implementation of the final Revitalization Plan.

Countless decisions, some of which will be contested, remain to be made. Such decisions need to sufficiently account for the causes of severe decline at Jeffries Homes. Plans need to emphasize human needs over institutional prescriptions. Plans need to be sensitive to "market" opportunities and constraints. Plans need to emphasize "product" over "function" outcomes. Plans need to be based on consensus goals and objectives, rather than on the competitive interests of involved

personalities. Plans need to emphasize shared roles in solving problems, rather than the sole exercise of institutional control. Plans need to provide for evaluation processes that can inform corrective actions.

It would be premature to forecast potential outcomes except to suggest that DHD management performance is the linchpin to potential success. DHD will need to forge collaborative relations that will sustain revitalization efforts at Jeffries Homes and in its environs. Jeffries Homes residents will need to take central roles in these efforts. Continuous progress in a positive direction is needed to restore a collective sense of confidence in the future of Jeffries Homes.

**ELLEN WILSON - DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

Brett Williams, Jenell Williams, Jonathan Ortiz, Angelito Palma, & Sheri Lawson  
American University

The Ellen Wilson Dwellings are currently vacant and distressed. The development was built in 1941 on the site of the Navy Place Slums, replacing inadequate alley dwellings occupied by the poor. Located in the Capitol Hill Historic Neighborhood, the Ellen Wilson Dwellings over the years have become increasingly isolated from the rest of the neighborhood. The Capitol Hill Neighborhood is characterized by row and townhouses facing the street, while the Ellen Wilson Development consists of 13 two-story concrete block and brick facade buildings that face inward. In addition to being architecturally distinct, the Ellen Wilson Dwellings were occupied almost entirely by low-income African-Americans, while the rest of the neighborhood is mixed by race and income. Exacerbating these differences is an expressway that runs south of Ellen Wilson. South of the expressway are 2 other public housing developments and several industrial facilities. Though connected by a few underpasses, residents describe the expressway as “the Great Wall of China,” serving as a social barrier between the north and south parts of the neighborhood.

Residents were vacated from Ellen Wilson in 1988. They left a development that was severely troubled. The District of Columbia’s Public Housing Authority was ranked the worst housing authority in the country. To correct a cumbersome and inefficient bureaucracy that did not serve residents well, DPAH has recently gone into receivership under David Gilmore and now operates separately from the city as the D.C. Housing Authority. Gilmore is the third chief of the housing authority since 1992, when Ellen Wilson was selected by HUD to be a HOPE VI site. Poor management and leadership turn-over caused residents of Ellen Wilson to suffer prior to 1988, and the resolution of these issues has delayed HOPE VI redevelopment efforts. Currently plans are proceeding expeditiously under the Alternate Administrator, McHenry/TAG Associates.

The plan developed by the Ellen Wilson Redevelopment Corporation and the District of Columbia’s Public Housing Authority offers an original, thoughtful, many-faceted plan for redevelopment. The guiding principle for the plan is the mixed-income concept. Architecturally, the new development will be consistent with the neighborhood, and mixed income housing is designed to break the social barriers that exist between Capitol Hill neighbors. The plan is holistic, involving physical redevelopment, community services, economic development, and new management and maintenance plans.

Demolition of the existing structure has not yet begun, but abatements are well under way, and the site has received Historic Preservation approval. While this case study is therefore limited, we emphasize the economic and community context of the Ellen Wilson project. We provide evaluation criteria that will ensure appropriate and creative measures of redevelopment. These criteria include social integration with the Capitol Hill neighborhood and improvement in residents’ quality of life. Most importantly, we include ethnographic material emphasizing residents’ perceptions and experiences of home and community in the Capitol Hill neighborhood. Interviews and case studies provide essential insight into the success or failure of social integration and neighborhood stability expected as a result of mixed-income development. The redevelopment of the Ellen Wilson Dwellings should provide safe, affordable, and pleasant housing for Washington’s low-income citizens.

**HILLSIDE TERRACE - MILWAUKEE, WI**

Calvin Brutus, University of Wisconsin-Extension

The Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee (HACM) was chartered in 1944 and now provides homes for more than 12,600 residents. It manages 4,756 units of public housing, including 2,522 units of family housing. HUD considers HACM to be one of the better managers of public housing in the U.S.. HACM administrators emphasize that their request for HOPE VI funding had to do with the need for comprehensive (and costly) work on deteriorated physical and social environments, but that these conditions were not caused by poor management. The physical factors have to do with the original siting of the Hillside Terrace development on a hill and the consequences of rain runoff and other topographic factors that have caused environmental degradation. The social conditions have much to do with the Milwaukee economy, as well as local, regional and national social and political forces.

Hillside Terrace, the second oldest and second largest development operated by HACM, was constructed between 1948 and 1950 in a collaborative effort between the federal government and the City of Milwaukee. An “addition” was completed in 1956. With 596 units on 24.5 acres, Hillside Terrace has the highest unit density among HACM’s developments. In addition to the public housing units, Hillside Terrace includes the Hillside Community Center, HACM’s on-site maintenance facility, and St. John’s Lutheran Church, a private church that has been on site since the 1800s.

There is a high percentage of single- and female-headed households at Hillside Terrace. These households are either totally or heavily dependent on various forms of public assistance. For the family development alone, only 12 percent report receiving no form of public assistance.

Hillside Terrace marks a boundary between a stable downtown (which starts at the southern end of the development and moves south and east), and a revitalizing eastern boundary three blocks away on King Drive (North 3rd Street).

Prior to applying for HOPE VI, HACM had already begun renovation of the exteriors of 44 units in the “Model neighborhood”. The HOPE VI plan calls for the interior renovation of those units along with the total renovation of the remaining non-elderly units on site (there are 56 elderly/handicapped units in an 8 story high-rise). Beyond physical revitalization, the heart of HACM’s HOPE VI plan is to use various means to assist present Hillside Terrace adults to become educated and skilled enough to get and hold jobs that pay wages on which families can live independently of public assistance. An integral part of the HOPE VI revitalization of Hillside Terrace is a 5-year welfare reform demonstration involving mainly the Division of Jobs, Employment and Training Services of the Wisconsin State Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) and the Milwaukee County Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS).

It is view of the UW-Extension team that, although the bulk of the HUD’s HOPE VI grant to Milwaukee is going into physical revitalization, the ultimate success of HOPE VI rests almost completely on radical changes in the way residents live, work, play, educate themselves and their children, etc. The revitalization is very much a matter of how residents take charge and manage their

community *as a community*. Some residents themselves express this view clearly. In response to questions in a survey of all households at Hillside, residents were pleased at the physical revitalization but expressed skepticism about if it could all be “kept up” without changes in the people. Unfortunately, it has become improper to criticize certain groups in the population. We are unequivocal: part of the problem is caused by residents, whether through commission or apathy. Yet, it is not all the fault of residents. Those who claim that they are policy-makers, implementers of policy, social service providers, educators, religious and civic leaders, all need to come to the table to work on a project that is probably the widest ranging experiment in public housing since the early 1970s. That is what Hillside Terrace and HOPE VI sites across the country represent. These people must educate residents on how to request assistance, and then how to work with those who show a clear pattern of commitment to residents’ interests.

In short, residents have to be educated into a vision about what they need for self-sufficiency and independence, the skills to get and use effectively what they need, and, perhaps most critically, how to work together with others—mainly other residents—to achieve their goals.

**ELM HAVEN - NEW HAVEN, CT**  
Douglas Rae, Rae Research and Consulting

The Department of Housing and Urban Development has selected Elm Haven public housing in New Haven, Connecticut as a HOPE VI demonstration project. With a \$45.3 million budget, expectations for physical, economic, and human revitalization run high. This study is meant to provide a baseline for the long-term evaluation of this large-scale intervention.

The Elm Haven site is unusual in its strategic location and in the severe economic downdraft it has endured over the past generation. Elm Haven is located in the Dixwell neighborhood, within a few hundred yards of the city's largest and most visible institution, Yale University. This has given Elm Haven special strategic importance, and has helped to mobilize unusual support for the redevelopment effort. The neighborhood was nurtured by a powerful economic engine when Elm Haven was opened in 1940. The Winchester Repeating Arms plant just north and east of the project employed as many as 20,000 full time workers in the 1940s and again during the Korean War years. It is now all but closed, and its vast campus has been deeded to the Science Park Development Corporation. This incubator facility, designed to tap Yale technology, has not so far provided any substantial number of jobs to neighborhood people. This economic background must temper expectations for employment gains among Elm Haven householders, fewer than 17 percent of whom have jobs in 1995.

The Housing Authority of New Haven has had a checkered history since its creation in 1938. Its low-income holdings fall into two groups. A first wave of projects—Elm Haven, Quinnipiac Terrace, Farnam Court—were relatively large and had highly visible locations in the city. All the later projects—Brookside, Rockview, Westville Manor, Eastview Terrace, McConaughy Terrace, and several others—are located peripherally or are very small. The authority has had repeated difficulty managing its far-flung, often-aging projects, and its difficulties have not been fundamentally changed by large federally-funded modernization efforts over the past 15 years. The authority is governed by a 5-member board, provisionally scheduled to become a 7-member board. It is ably directed by Bryan Anderson, who is unusual in the combination of professional background and grass-roots resident support.

New Haven is a city under very considerable economic stress at this time. Its population has fallen from the 160,000 range when Elm Haven was young to the 125,000 range at this writing. Its census of households, running at about 48,000, is far short of its housing capacity, running close to 54,000. Blight and abandonment are major issues, and the city is just beginning to come to terms with the evident need for lower densities in most neighborhoods.

These issues are complicated by two major features of public housing in New Haven. The first, a major object of litigation, is the tendency of public housing to worsen racial segregation, both within the city, and, more profoundly, between the city and the region. The second feature is the exceptionally high density of public and subsidy housing in so small a city. New Haven combines large concentrations of low-income project housing, HUD elderly housing, Section 8 housing, and Connecticut RAP housing. It is quite arguable that the total quantity of such housing is too great for the central city and should be curtailed or spread across the city's region in more equitable fashion.



The Elm Haven site is located in an area of falling population, with a declining job base and substantial evidence of economic contraction in the 1990's. It appears desirable that HOPE VI be deployed in the service of high quality low-density housing. It may also be necessary for the city to link HOPE VI with density-limiting strategies in nearby areas.

Elm Haven is a classic low-income project with a preponderance of female-headed African-American families, with widespread reliance on AFDC and other transfer payments, with relatively serious crime problems, with often unfavorable educational outcomes, and with a sharp pattern of isolation from middle-class populations. The project is physically unattractive and suffers many major flaws of design.

A non-profit corporation known as the Elm Terrace Development Corporation (ETDC) is in charge of the redevelopment effort. Eight of its 15 board members were chosen by the Elm Haven Residents' Council (RC). Mae Ola Riddick, RC President, is a major voice in ETDC's deliberations. The HANH staff person on HOPE VI is Al Gentry, and a professional team of consultants is in place. Among the most visible members of that team are Gayle Epp of Epp Associates and Steve Tice of Tice, Hurwitz and Diamond. Bridgeport architect Charles Jones is also a team member. ETDC has attracted substantial people from many walks of life in Dixwell and the city at large.

HOPE VI/Elm Haven taps into a design history which began in 1984 with the Elm Haven Coalition, continued with the Dixwell Community Development Corporation's Elm Haven Revitalization Committee, which produced the winning HOPE VI proposal. Rank-and-file residents of Elm Haven have participated in unprecedented numbers in a June 1995, resident survey (70 percent of all households!) and in a July 27, 1995 rally leading up to the adoption of a redevelopment plan.

The physical redevelopment plan for Elm Haven appears headed toward a low-density design clustering homes around private courts. At about 12 dwelling units per acre this would be exceptionally low density for public housing, but would fit with underlying neighborhood needs quite nicely. A Family Resource Center, located at a redeveloped Wexler School on Elm Haven's northern boundary, constitutes another major design feature for which something close to consensus exists at this writing (August 7, 1995.)

Other features of the Elm Haven Revitalization Plan include: (1) an intensified, decentralized management system, giving residents a measure of control over priorities and evaluation if not direct management; (2) a rich menu of job-training, access partnership, and technical support programs designed to help residents establish themselves in the workplace; (3) a family support center located at the Wexler school, offering a wide range of services and referrals to residents; (4) an effort to integrate Elm Haven with the Dixwell neighborhood, and to support economic and human development projects in the wider community; and (5) capacity building among residents, designed to increase powers of self-governance, community organizing, and participation in mainstream institutions. A community service component, based on resident service, is also anticipated.

In planning for the long-term evaluation of HOPE VI, it is useful to distinguish between the program's overall human impact and that fraction of its impact which remains specific to each site over time. A fair evaluation should include a panel study for 1995 residents who remain at Elm

Haven and 1995 residents who move on to other places, perhaps on the basis of opportunities created by HOPE VI. Evaluations focused only on site-specific impacts may lead to falsely negative conclusions if, as might be hoped, some of Elm Haven's most successful households elect to move on to other places as the years go by.

**DESIRE - NEW ORLEANS, LA**

Timothy Joder, Johnelle Lamarque, & Steve Chozick, University of New Orleans

The Housing Authority of New Orleans, established in 1937, operates about 13,500 units in 10 conventional public housing developments and a number of scattered-sites throughout the city. HANO estimates that about 50,000 New Orleans residents live in public housing. Approximately 99 percent of these residents are African-American.

Built in 1956 as public housing for African-Americans, the Desire Housing Development is by far the most dilapidated of HANO's properties. It is the most visible sign of a seriously troubled public housing authority.

In 1979, The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) designated HANO a "financially troubled" housing authority. In 1988, HUD required the Authority to hire a private management firm. Despite the intervention of three different management firms HANO has continued to fail HUD evaluations. High vacancy rates and an inability to spend approved modernization funds were cited among its biggest problems. These problems stem from a lack of accountability in its management structure. HANO's current managing director, Michael Kelly, plans to shrink the overall size of HANO by turning over many of its current responsibilities to the tenants and the private sector.

HANO developments also suffer from extremely high rates of crime and disorder. In 1994, 25 percent of the 425 New Orleans murders occurred in HANO developments. A community policing program was initiated in February to help control the crime problem. Three Community-Oriented Policing Squad (C.O.P.S.) units began patrolling from substations located in the city's most violent housing developments.

HANO's social services arm, Resident Affairs, is responsible for activities involving resident social services. Five departments, comprised of 70 percent residents offer a multitude of services.

The Desire Housing Development is 97 acres and bordered by a freeway, railroad and canal. It has virtually no landscaping. Only 1306 of its original 1860 units still exist, all of which would likely fail HUD's Housing Quality Standards (HQS). As buildings continue to rapidly fall apart, numbers of occupied units decline. Only 591 Desire units are currently occupied. Desire has the highest vacancy rate of all HANO properties.

The Desire development households are predominately headed by single women. The average household size is four residents and the median age of residents is 15. The average rent charged is less than \$90 a month, with the average annual income between \$5,000 and \$6,200.

A baseline survey revealed residents were dissatisfied with both their buildings and apartments. Rodents and peeling paint were their biggest concerns. Residents were mostly satisfied with current management, although they have been attempting a move toward self management since receiving a Technical Assistance Grant a few years ago.

Tenant organizations operating in Desire are a beautification crew and a resident council. The resident council, which has been responsible for acquiring and implementing grants, lobbying government officials, and disseminating information to development residents is the driving force behind the residents' self management objective.

The area considered the Desire neighborhood contains part of the Florida neighborhood, the Florida Housing Development and the Press Park area. This area is overwhelmingly African-American and low to very-low income.

The Desire Neighborhood receives no spillover effects from New Orleans' tourist based economy. Most jobs in the neighborhood are service oriented and there is little evidence of economic development in the area. However, a program has been started to give public housing residents the knowledge to create economic opportunities themselves.

The surrounding neighborhood provides some social services, as well as basic commercial uses such as a pharmacy and grocery store. Public schools and a university are located nearby and the neighborhood has a recreational playground/park. Bus transportation is easily attainable from the Desire development.

The number of crimes per resident in this neighborhood is about the average for the city. However, the murder rate is much higher. While the neighborhood is in better condition than the development itself, it still suffers from deferred physical maintenance and "Desire type" social disorder.

HANO started working on its master plan for the Desire development in 1992. The original plan broke Desire into four visually unique, mixed-age and family-size communities with ownership opportunities. These four communities were to surround a commercial and social service hub. Phase I of this plan was to be completed by 1995, but the plan has been halted due to various demolition related problems. The plan is currently undergoing major revisions, and should be finished by September 1995.

The new proposal for Phase I will be similar to the original, but, is likely to include single-family homes and a Public Benefit Corporation to manage Desire and Florida. The corporation would legally separate the developments from HANO. A bid package for Phase I is scheduled for the first week in September, and the work is scheduled to be completed within a year. Bids for Phase II will go out during the construction of Phase I.

Residents are demanding an active part in the revitalization effort. They want to insure contractors abide by the Section 3 mandate. Residents have also asked for a major role in the grant administration process, as well as future management of the PBC. Kelly is working closely with the residents to facilitate this process.

Without an established plan, it will be difficult to detail long-term impact measures. However, certain measurements will obviously deserve review in five and again in 10 years. Long-term evaluations should address the physical conditions of the buildings and the neighborhood, the changes in the situations of the residents and management's performance.

We can draw no conclusions concerning the implementation and success of revitalizing Desire through HOPE VI without the plan. However, there are myriad problems facing the new executive director of HANO and Desire residents who want to remain in their community. While Kelly's enthusiasm and actions are encouraging, the potential for successful implementation of the revitalization of Desire seems slim.

**LOCKWOOD GARDENS, COLISEUM GARDENS, AND LOWER FRUITVALE - OAKLAND, CA**

Victor Rubin, University-Oakland Metropolitan Forum

The Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) is implementing the HOPE VI program by modernizing one large development and four small, scattered-site developments, adding a training center to another large development, and by conducting an ambitious strategy of resident empowerment, supportive services and community services in partnership with more than a dozen nonprofit organizations and units of local government. HOPE VI in Oakland represents a continuation of the collaborative approach to neighborhood revitalization, crime prevention and integrated human services which has characterized community action in the Fruitvale and Central East Oakland areas for the past five years. Although residents still face serious problems at these sites, the actions taken in recent years appear to have reduced crime rates in some places and increased resident involvement from low points in the early 1990's.

Lockwood Gardens and Coliseum Gardens, two adjoining large, low-rise developments in Central East Oakland, are home to the majority of HOPE VI residents. Lockwood, which was constructed in the late 1930's, will receive extensive rehabilitation of its apartment units and redesign of its public spaces and facilities. Coliseum Gardens, which underwent extensive rehabilitation recently, will receive a new community center and other smaller improvements. Four scattered site apartment complexes will be remodeled to increase security and will have their units extensively renovated.

The HOPE VI program calls for OHA residents to take a major role in decision-making about the future of their development, and to engage in community service not only on their own site but in the surrounding neighborhoods. Physical improvement of the commercial districts of Fruitvale and Central East Oakland is one of the high priorities of the program. In the process of these rehabilitation activities on and off site, OHA residents will gain valuable job training and entrepreneurial skills.

Providers of social and educational services to OHA residents will be supported by HOPE VI, and will extend their drug abuse recovery, youth development, remedial education, and other programs to more residents. Community organizers hired through HOPE VI will conduct outreach not only to OHA residents but also to residents of surrounding neighborhoods.

The complex array of activities, the large numbers of sites, and the diversity and number of service providers will create a managerial challenge for the Oakland HOPE VI effort. It appears to have the greatest number of sites, partners, and strategies of any HOPE VI program in the country. Also, since some of the activities were designed with the expectation that other federal funds would be available to complement HOPE VI expenditures, the absence of those funds means that certain activities will not be able to move forward as planned. The wait of nearly two years from the time at which the partners were assembled and the proposal written, until the start of activities in the Fall of 1995 has also presented a challenge, as several organizations have dropped out or asked that their roles be changed, and several new ones have been added.

As this report is being completed, work plans are being finalized for the community-based organizations and the physical rehabilitation is proceeding largely on schedule. Resident councils have been elected in the two large developments and members are being trained and oriented for a major role in oversight and community service.

**SPRINGVIEW APARTMENTS - SAN ANTONIO, TX**

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The San Antonio HOPE VI site included in this study, Springview Apartments, is located on the predominantly African-American East Side adjoining the central city. The neighborhood was once a flourishing community of rich farmland, modest to substantial homes, and thriving businesses. Today the farms are gone, most businesses have closed or gone elsewhere, and although some substantial and well-kept homes remain, the majority of the property within the one-to-two mile radius of this site is substandard or abandoned. The incidence of crime in the area is among the highest in the city. Housing values, income values, and employment are among the lowest. Even the schools serving area residents are troubled.

The San Antonio Housing Authority's (SAHA) HOPE VI plan calls for demolishing Springview, as well as much of the abandoned property in the immediate area, and bringing economic revitalization to the entire neighborhood through a cooperative effort with the City of San Antonio and private developers. It is fairly clear that Springview residents, the city, social service providers, educators, and private development interests were included in the planning process. It also appears that there is support among those players, as well as neighborhood residents who have been involved, for the plan's goals. At least an initial commitment is there from each of these groups to fulfill their part in making the goals a reality.

Some aspects of the plan were put into effect almost simultaneously with the signing of the HOPE VI grant agreement in September 1994. Particularly in the areas of site-management, resident relations, and crime and disorder, HOPE VI has already made a significant difference. The implementation process has been slowed, however, by unresolved questions between the housing authority's proposal and final approval by The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS). These questions include specific commitments by the city, private developers, financial institutions, and social service providers, as well as definitive plans for community service.

In spite of the delays, key elements of the plan are falling into place, and the potential for change is good. Success with this sizable endeavor, however, depends upon the long-term diligence and commitment by all parties to the initial agreement, including HUD, SAHA, Springview residents, social service providers, educational institutions, neighborhood residents, the city, private developers and banks.

**BERNAL DWELLINGS AND YERBA BUENA HOMES - SAN FRANCISCO, CA**

Michael Reisch and Felix Rivera, San Francisco State University

Through the use of federal funds from the HOPE VI Project, the San Francisco Housing Agency wants to demolish the graffiti-scarred buildings at Bernal Dwellings and Yerba Buena Plaza East, home to about 1,160 people, and replace them with low-rise townhouses and flats. The overall goal of the Project is to create more livable dwellings on the current sites while simultaneously eliminating the courtyards and hallways that have allowed crime to fester at the complexes. In the summer of 1994, the Housing Authority received these funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development on the condition that it meet certain guidelines. These included the development of a community services plan by the agency and the creation of job training, drug rehabilitation and other social service and community support programs.

Although there have been some significant differences in the experiences of the two sites, the Housing Agency's efforts to date represent a missed opportunity to involve established and trusted community non-profit agencies and organized tenant groups. Such involvement would have given tenants a sense of participation and partnership in the decision making process that will so dramatically affect their lives. One important example of this lack of consultation was in the selection of the last two Executive Directors for the Housing Authority. In both cases, the Mayor's office failed to consult public housing residents before making the selection. This isolation from the decisionmaking process provided fertile ground for the exploitation of the tenants' natural fears by two activists at the Bernal Dwellings site.

These activists have been a major roadblock to the HOPE VI process. One activist, Malik Rahim, was initially hired by the San Francisco Public Housing Agency to help organize the tenants and facilitate their cooperation with the HOPE VI plans. His results, however, were the opposite of what the Housing Agency intended. With the assistance of Jeffrey Branner, Rahim was so successful in organizing the Bernal tenants that some militant tenants have gone out of their way to attempt to block the development of the HOPE VI Project. On the other hand, some Bernal residents have complained about the intimidation tactics used by these two men.

Considering the severity of the crime and drug problems at these sites and their immediate surroundings, their dilapidated condition, and the original design of the public housing projects (Bernal Dwellings and Plaza East) themselves, their replacement seems to represent a worthwhile opportunity for the tenants to have a second chance to obtain a positive living environment. But the city's failure to include the community in formulating and implementing this critical decision has caused a backlash, which is also due, in part, to misinformation and a lack of information among the tenants. For example, the tenants are apparently unaware that the Housing Authority is obligated to find other housing for them to relocate. They will not be forced into homelessness onto the streets of San Francisco even if some of them have to be housed temporarily in neighboring cities. This lack of communication has given rise to some of the tenants' legitimate concerns.