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EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

JERSEY CITY, NJ, CASE STUDY

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Prepared by:

Police Foundation
John F. Kennedy School of Government

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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Final Report

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program:

Baltimore, MD, Case Study
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PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

I. Program Setting

A. The City

Jersey City, New Jersey is perhaps the archetype of the white ethnic manufacturing center that has run down at the heels. The second largest city in New Jersey, America's ninth largest state, Jersey City has been known for its shameless politicians and its position as the poor cousin to New York City, a thousand yards across the river. The Jersey City Government has in recent years done much to shed its unappetizing image: the political "machine" is out of power, the waterfront and housing stock are being rebuilt, and manufacturers are being lured back.

The majority of the city's quarter of a million people are white, of Irish, Italian, and Polish descent. About one fourth of the citizens are black and another fifth, and growing rapidly, are Asian and Hispanic. Seventeen percent are elderly, which ranks Jersey City as second, exceeded only by St. Petersburg, Florida, in its concentration of aging residents. The housing stock is old (three-fourths of the apartments were built before World War II) and thirty percent are sub-standard. But in recent years there has been a strong movement to regentrify communities.

The city's economic decline since World War II is reflected in the fact in that in 1979, unemployment stood at 9.3 percent, nearly double the national level. In its efforts to rehabilitate the city, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) received over \$2 billion in Federal grants in the 1970s to renovate the old port, and numerous local agencies had received small awards to rehabilitate residential sections.

As with the rest of the city, the Jersey City Public Housing Authority (JCPHA) has devoted much of its resources to rebuilding. In January, 1973, HUD moved to force the Authority to streamline its patronage-laden staff and

stop the deterioration of its projects. Much of the attention centered on a single development, Marion Gardens. In 1973, an election year, the Mayor used Marion Gardens as a wedge to crack the existing independent PHA administration. The city's Building Superintendent, an ally of the Mayor, called Marion Gardens "unfit for human habitation" and gave the PHA two months to make the necessary physical repairs, otherwise the building would be condemned. At the time, about 12,000 residents lived at Marion Gardens and a group of them filed suit against the Authority to force renovation. The Mayor's opponent defended the Authority and its administrative independence and vowed to close the project outright. The Mayor sought to have the projects placed in receivership, under the control of his administration. When the mayor was reelected, a new PHA administration was created, which included the present Executive Director.

Between 1973 and 1979, the new staff actively sought Federal and state grants by writing proposals to address the needs of the PHA's seven housing projects. The Authority's theme was not only physical change but also tenant management. The PHA's commitment to community autonomy was grounded in reform ideology which embodied a desire to protect the projects from political interference.

Evidently, sensing that the time for improvement had at last come, a group of residents from A. Harry Moore also petitioned the Authority to rehabilitate their deteriorating buildings. The previous PHA administration had declared the project "unmanageable" and impossible to maintain adequately because of tenant abuse. But the new reform group responded to the petition by proposing to combine physical improvements and tenant organization, thus giving residents a share of the responsibility for protecting people and property. From all media reports, this approach worked wonders. A local newspaper editorial lauded the program for "installing new pride in the community;" British housing officials

toured the site and marveled at the strength of tenants' participation; HUD's magazine, Challenge, stated that, "The program has surpassed any of our expectations."

In 1977, HUD money became available to help transfer management authority to tenants at selected "demonstration" sites. The Authority applied for a grant, received an award, and used the funds to create a Tenant Management Corporation. Thus, when the PHA received HUD's Anti-Crime notice in May, 1979, it already had a substantial background in both tenant organization and anti-crime activities.

B. Demonstration Sites and Surrounding Neighborhood

The Authority has selected two sites, A. Harry Moore and Marion Gardens, as the target area for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. The sites are approximately 200 yards apart, separated only by a cemetery and a truck terminal. Both sites were selected, in part, because it was believed that the exclusion of either from participation in the Anti-Crime Program would have led to a displacement of crime from one to the other. Moreover, both sites are socially linked: the children attend the same high school and utilize the same schoolground facilities for winter and summer recreational programs.

The 7.6 acre A. Harry Moore housing development is bounded by a cemetery to the north, a residential strip of two- and three-family homes to the east, a county park to the south, and a state highway to the west. The project is essentially a multi-family complex, comprised of seven twelve story, reinforced-concrete, brick buildings. First occupied in 1954, the buildings are arranged in a rough oval, and contain 647 apartments. In 1979, 2,379 persons occupied 640 units--an average of 313 persons per acre, 3.7 persons per unit.

In 1973, A. Harry Moore was one of the PHA's most severely distressed projects. Nine of its fourteen elevators had been inoperable for almost half a year. Approximately 25 percent of the apartments had been abandoned. Vacancies were increasing at a rate of fifteen per month. In spite of these problems, however, the PHA and resident leaders were able to turn the project around. From 1973 to 1974, a building-by-building tenant organizing program was developed and coupled with the refurbishing of interior public spaces. From 1975 to 1976, with support from local, state, and federal sources, the tenant building organizations expanded to a site-wide organization and substantial modernization began. Since 1976, the members of the A. Harry Moore Tenant Management Corporation (TMC) Board have completed management training classes, assumed responsibility for site management, and extended the scope of their duties to include security. By 1979, the vacancy rate had dropped about one percent, and management had become notably more efficient.

The recorded property crime rate at A. Harry Moore has consistently remained lower than that for the city as a whole and has generally been declining, with some variation, for the past few years. Recorded personal crimes, on the other hand, were considerably higher than the city wide rate in 1977, 143 compared to 90/10,000 and remained higher throughout 1979.

The second housing project chosen for participation in the UIACP, the 12.3 acre Marion Gardens, has geographical boundaries similar to A. Harry Moore. It is also bordered by the state highway to the west, and the residential strip of two- and three-family houses to the east. Land reserved for commercial trucking lays to the north and south. The project is essentially a multi-family complex, comprised of 15 three-story garden apartments. First occupied in 1942, the buildings contained a total of 462 dwellings, 37 units per acre. In 1975, 253 units (55 percent) were vacant and totally uninhabitable. The PHA made no

attempt to fill the vacancies until money could be obtained to rehabilitate the apartments. With \$3.6 million in 1976 Modernization funds, \$2.6 million in 1977 Modernization funds and \$4.8 million Urban Initiatives Modernization funds the PHA, working with the current residents, planned to reduce the density of the site. They proposed having six rather than 12 families share an entrance in 12 of the 15 buildings, creating a total of 228 units. The other three buildings would be redesigned to house the PHA's central office, a multi-service center, an above-grade boiler plant, a modified gymnasium, and an elementary school. The plan also called for comprehensive site improvements and installation of exterior building security lobbies. Under the UIP Management Assistance Plan, the PHA planned to establish a resident organization which would participate in a unit marketing effort in order to increase tenant occupancy. Emphasized, would be the racial and economic integration of the sites and site management. During this effort, the population declined from almost 900 (4.3 persons per habitable unit) in early 1977, to 686 (3.28 persons per habitable unit) by the end of 1979, reducing the density from 73 to 56 persons per acre.

Although the problems of the two sites and the Authority's response to them differed, in some ways A. Harry Moore and Marion Gardens were quite similar in 1979. Both were 85 percent black (with slightly more Hispanic residents at A. Harry Moore), most were dependent on public assistance, and the vast majority of households were headed by single, female parents. Nearly 60 percent of the populations were under 18 years of age, and only two percent were over 62. The composition of both projects differed markedly from their surrounding neighborhoods, which were composed mostly of Italian, working class and older residents.

The recorded property crime rate at Marion Gardens rose dramatically between 1977 and 1979, although it never approached the city-wide rate. The rate of recorded personal crime remained more or less stable at approximately the same level as found in the city as a whole.

II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Jersey City's application was judged to be one of the best among all of those submitted, and from the beginning HUD was optimistic about this program. The PHA had a record of showing commitment to the program goals of UIACP-- especially in regard to the role of tenants; there was a nearby Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) project under the direction of the city's Economic Development Agency (EDA); and the Executive Director was directly involved in designing the program. Additionally, the Mayor had a personal interest in the success of Marion Gardens. His previous involvement in the project coupled with aspirations to run for governor, placed the governor squarely behind the effort to restore Marion Gardens' image as a desirable place to live.

The PHA was firm with HUD about getting what it wanted. For example, when HUD suggested revisions to the initial proposal, the Authority's response was usually to indicate that changes were unnecessary, or would deleteriously affect the whole anti-crime effort. The PHA opted not to apply for DOL funds. When asked why, the Authority responded that it considered the UDAG project to be a better source of jobs. With a promise from EDA and the developers to set aside

100 or more jobs for project youth they argued that this was far preferable to the YCCIP, which they perceived to be little more than a summer employment program. HUD also said the proposed linkages to local agencies were insufficient. In response, the PHA did nothing more than produce additional letters of support from city agencies. The grant writers refused to change the community linkage component or to commit to a given program of services, instead emphasizing a solicitation process which would be directed by the residents.

The PHA staff, when writing the UIACP proposal, was able to rally a number of important local political forces around their proposal. In addition, the proposal components were well integrated, each description containing numerous cross-references to the others. As borne out by the philosophical introduction and the frequent referrals to the Anti-Crime Guidebook and other HUD literature, the authors had familiarized themselves thoroughly with HUD's approach to the crime problem and its roots in the literature of criminal justice research.

In spite of the PHA's overriding interest in tenant organization, there was surprisingly little tenant participation in the formulation in the program goals. Apparently, the tenant leaders were frustrated from the beginning, feeling that their advice played a minor part in the planning decisions. Once the sites were selected by the PHA for the demonstration, most of the planning work had been finished; the remaining task was to actually write a winning proposal, something the residents had little experience in doing.

The tenants' groups did have a veto power on the full-time personnel selected for the program--the Anti-Crime Coordinator and the Victim/Witness Coordinator. Whether this could have been anything more than a simple ratification is doubtful, however, because the PHA had already selected the candidates by the time the tenant associations were given an opportunity to ratify them.

None of this is to say that the tenants felt the program to be headed in the wrong direction. In letters of support to HUD, the tenants supported the Anti-Crime initiative whole-heartedly, and the associations continued to express enthusiasm for the Program's goals throughout the demonstration.

The Modernization component (\$255,000) was targeted only for A. Harry Moore since massive renovation was already underway at Marion Gardens. One-third of that program was aimed at target-hardening (such as new door locks), the rest was used for ground improvements (such as perimeter fences, redesigned open areas, and new tot lots). Approximately two years before UIACP, A. Harry Moore received Target Project Program (TPP) money to complete a major redesign of the grounds and to construct a community center. UIACP/Modernization funds were seen by the Authority as an opportunity to correct some of the site design errors created through the use of TPP funds. The PHA wanted to install new lobby doors and a buzzer/reply system, in addition to increasing the amount of glass area in the doors and walls in order to create transparent, but vandal-resistant, walls to maximize "natural" surveillance. But, faced with budget constraints in the UIACP Modernization program, the final application to HUD proposed simply to replace the lobby doors and to install vandal resistant plastic in all windows of the public corridors.

In May, 1978, A. Harry Moore began using its rental income to pay off-duty Jersey City police officers to patrol the site in the evening. By June, 1979 when the PHA's anti-crime proposal was written, this off-duty program had been refined, and the Authority, the TMC Board, and the Police Department were all claiming an unqualified success. Consequently, the PHA sought to institute similar off-duty patrols, through Anti-Crime funds, for Marion Gardens. At A. Harry Moore, the officers had patrolled four nights per week, in teams of two. Most officers patrolled in full uniform, on foot, for four to six hours

each evening; they received \$9 per hour for their efforts. The PHA concluded that somewhat greater coverage was necessary for Marion Gardens, partly because it was perceived to have a more serious crime problem, although the police records did not support this impression. Additionally, a great deal of construction work was expected to begin shortly, and the Authority reasoned that a guard would be needed to protect the building materials eight hours a day, seven days a week.

Concerned that the officers treat tenant problems with sensitivity, and not just enforce laws, the PHA prepared a series of on-going training sessions, to be conducted by the Public Safety Coordinator. The Authority promised to emphasize the importance of referrals to social service agencies and crisis intervention techniques. In addition, the PHA hoped to increase the proportion of incidents handled informally by referring disorderly, but noncriminal, behavior to the building managers. This system had worked well in A. Harry Moore for the previous year. The Public Safety Coordinator hoped to include the training sessions in the Police Academy curriculum, and his efforts were reportedly met with enthusiasm by the Academy staff.

Members of other divisions of the Police Department would be brought to the site to hold workshops with tenants on such subjects as crime reporting and police response, crime prevention tactics, and drug abuse. Members of the Narcotics Squad, Crime Prevention Unit, and Juvenile Unit also would meet regularly with project youth and conduct Quarterly Forums with tenants and anti-crime staff. The Forums were also expected to be the major formal method of communication between residents and off-duty officers, giving both groups an opportunity to discuss police-community problems. For several years, the Police Department's Bureau of Housing Security had been based in a police substation at A. Harry Moore. Negotiations were under way with the Department to establish a similar substation in the multi-service facility at Marion Gardens.

With respect to tenant involvement, the associations were to sponsor their own community workshops on spouse abuse, with a presentation from the Jersey City Battered Women's Shelter, and welfare rights courtesy of the Hudson County Welfare Department. Technical assistance to the tenant groups on strategies for community linkage was to be provided by the Jersey City Department of Community Affairs. The Police Department would create recreational opportunities through the Police Athletic League and implement Operation I.D. with the help of the Crime Prevention Unit.

The PHA had obtained offers from the agencies to provide direct services in the multi-service facility at Marion Gardens, and the Authority had issued a request to para-governmental organizations to extend currently provided services at other public housing projects to the Anti-Crime sites.

III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Improved Management of Public Safety by the PHA

The functions of the Anti-Crime Coordinator were initially divided between two positions: one as the on-site Coordinator, who would interact directly with residents and resident programs, and a second to handle the program's administrative responsibilities. The first position was initially filled by a detective from the Jersey City Police Department (JCPD).

The PHA had envisioned a large role for the first on-site Coordinator when he started in September, 1979. He was to organize the Community Security Committee, create a youth organization, mediate disputes between residents and city police, help tenants implement team policing, and screen youths for private sector jobs (these activities are described below). During the police detective's tenure, he was consistently preoccupied with partisan political activities and tended to neglect his Anti-Crime responsibilities. From June to October of 1980, the detective's level of involvement in UIACP was minimal.

Apparently, for political reasons, the PHA could not do anything about this. In January, 1981, the HUD UIACP contact was informed that the PHA was having difficulties with the on-site Coordinator but asked that the agency not interfere. HUD agreed, unaware of how bad the situation was. Finally, in October 1981, the officer returned to regular police duties.

The administrative responsibilities were, at the beginning of the program, assigned to a staff member in the PHA's central office who worked directly with the Executive Director and served as the Authority's contact with HUD. Shortly after the police officer returned to his usual duties, this staff member was promoted to a higher position. She was replaced with another PHA staff member who also assumed the responsibilities previously held by the departed police officer.

When the new PHA Anti-Crime Coordinator assumed the dual responsibilities of being the on-site contact and reporting to HUD, he devoted most of his time to resolving implementation problems with the Modernization Program, despite the fact that his previous experience had primarily involved assisting in the organization of resident groups.

The Authority's proposal regarding tenant screening and eviction was to continue reforms previously established. The PHA had begun decentralizing tenant selection to each project with local tenant selection committees doing the screening and making recommendations to management. At the same time, the central office was engaged in a marketing campaign to attract whites and single adults back to the projects.

Eviction procedures have always been informal: a building manager investigates complaints from tenants and, if warranted, delivers written warnings of infractions. If, in the manager's judgment, the resident deserves eviction, the PHA's central office staff reviews the case and, if in agreement, retains a lawyer to take the tenant to court. The PHA believes that in order to evict on the grounds of criminal behavior, sworn resident complaints are required. As a result, a second city police officer was hired in 1980 to work during his off-duty time, to solicit and handle resident complaints about neighbors involved in illegitimate activities. The Authority also hoped to use this individual to collect recorded crime and victimization information which the Police Department refused to give to the Housing Authority. The Department's response to the request was to provide arrest data but not project victimization data, arguing that it was confidential information. In October, 1981, the off-duty officer was released when the on-site Coordinator was transferred by JCPD to another assignment.

B. Rehabilitation to House Anti-Crime Activities and Improvement of Physical Design to Make Buildings and Spaces Harder Targets

In April, 1980, the architect hired by the PHA to design the lobbies and site improvements met with the Authority's Construction Director and the A. Harry Moore TMC Board. At that meeting it was decided to focus on the security hardware work items and hold the plans for the grounds improvement until it was clear how much money would be left over after the costs of lights, peepholes and door locks had been determined. A plan with alternative environmental design strategies and cost estimates was prepared by the architect in September, 1980. A final plan, developed by the Construction Director, was approved by the TMC Board in December, and implementation began in January, 1981.

The security hardware aspects of the Modernization program were completed by the end of June, 1981 but the proposed ground improvements (scheduled to be finished by the end of 1981) were delayed because of disagreements between the Authority and the TMC Board. The plans were finally approved in January, 1982 and the landscape changes were implemented several months later. The delays can be attributed, in part, to a design process that passed through several iterations. The architect had to redesign his plans several times and, at one critical juncture, the Anti-Crime Coordinator simply refused to submit plans to the TMC Board, anticipating disapproval. The Authority had implemented a pluralistic approval process that was intended to avoid the kind of design "errors" that resulted with the TPP grant. But the delays were discouraging for the architect because with each iteration, the plans had to be completely redrawn rather than simply be revised. For example, the TMC board, invited to review plans during the summer of 1981, found many of the architect's fundamental concepts--such as replacing recreation spaces with lawns that residents would not be permitted to use, subdividing public access areas with four foot fences, and locating children's facilities at the corners rather than in the center of the project--unacceptable. Revisions were made that satisfied the TMC Board members but, by then, implementation of the Modernization program was well over six months behind schedule.

C. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

The PHA proposed to involve both the Tenant Affairs Board (TAB) and the Community Security Committee (CSC) in anti-crime decisions. The CSC consisted of the original on-site Anti-Crime Coordinator (a detective from JCPD), one tenant representative from each site, the PHA's Resident Training Officer, and later, the second police officer hired to collect crime data and handle resident victimization complaints. In many ways, this Committee substituted for the Anti-Crime Oversight Team (ACOT) by monitoring developments

in the program, receiving and distributing information, and directing coordination efforts. As a result, ACOT's role was limited primarily to reviewing quarterly progress reports to HUD. The CSC would, then, direct the Quarterly Police Forums, the Tenant Dispute Panel, and crime prevention workshops.

In practice, however, the Committee seemed to lack the authority to exercise decision making power, or the willingness to bring a tenant perspective to the Program. The two PHA staffers were not in a position to make decisions at meetings; the on-site Coordinator had little progress to report; the Resident Training Officer was not knowledgeable about program objectives (she was a member of the Committee only because of her familiarity with tenant leaders at all seven housing projects); the two tenant representatives were not elected members of associations but rather PHA employees; and the second police officer remained quiet and loyal to his professional colleague, the on-site Coordinator.

The activities of the Community Security Committee were linked with those of the Tenant Affairs Board (TAB), a separately funded organization consisting of two residents from each of seven housing projects. TAB's involvement in the UIACP was to provide the means for the transfer of lessons learned at Marion Gardens and A. Harry Moore to non-demonstration sites. Unlike the Security Committee, the Tenant Affairs Board did succeed in furthering tenant participation. Both the Authority and the Mayor's Office solicited TAB's involvement in tenant related public housing matters, including crime, and TAB's members helped generate increased interest in the Program among the tenants at both sites.

The Tenant Dispute Panel was established at A. Harry Moore, but it never really functioned as a mediating organization, perhaps because disputing residents did not wish to use the Panel as a forum. The plan to implement a

Panel at Marion Gardens was suspended until after the renovation was completed.

The crime prevention workshop did not materialize, and only three Quarterly Forums were held, two in A. Harry Moore and one at Marion Gardens. Further meetings were cancelled due to a perceived lack of community interest.

4. Increased Full and Part Time Employment of Tenants

As mentioned earlier, the PHA did not apply for DOL/YCCIP money. The Authority hoped to rely on tenant-hiring agreements with housing and commercial developers who had received federal aid. The plan depended on tenant organizations working out deals with developers. This component failed completely. Only three tenants obtained jobs, and it is questionable whether the UIACP had anything to do with their success.

The Authority had targeted three opportunities: the Truck Plaza project funded through UDAG (\$16.4 million), the UIP Modernization grant (\$4.8 million) for Marion Gardens and the UIACP Modernization grant for A. Harry Moore. The Authority planned to hire a Job Developer who would initiate contacts with prospective employers in the area. While there were no guarantees that a developer would hire tenants, the Authority hoped its personal recommendations would make tenant candidates attractive to developers. The Authority also hoped that, as part of the contract award for UIP Modernization, the developer would agree to hire one in eight workers from a housing project.

Unfortunately, the Truck Plaza project was terminated by the city. The only bid initially received for the Marion Gardens UIP contract was deemed unacceptable by the PHA; the construction firm that ultimately got the job forced the PHA to drop the hiring restriction. Finally, it was decided that the UIACP Modernization grant was not large enough to use as a vehicle for tenant

employment. The PHA decided not to hire a job developer when the employment prospects dimmed.

E. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist
Victims and Witnesses

This is another program component that did not materialize as planned. The failure here can be attributed to the Authority's inadequate planning and decision to hire an inexperienced director. The PHA originally wanted to establish a youth organization which would be run by the original on-site Coordinator. A local chapter of People United to Serve Humanity, a black consciousness organization headed by Reverend Jesse Jackson, and the Police Athletic League also were to be involved in some way (it was never explained clearly by the PHA). HUD was asked to contribute the modest sum of \$9,000 for uniforms and equipment, and the rest of the funds would come from LEAA and CETA. As an afterthought, apparently, the Authority applied for the \$20,000 Victim/Witness grant. When it received an award, the detective contacted a member of a politically active group, "Citizens Against Crime," and offered him the position of director if he agreed to assume responsibility for replying to HUD's questions, that is, receiving the proposal. The HUD grant, the PHA thought at the time, would be added to the one from LEAA.

Unfortunately, the Authority failed to obtain funding from LEAA and no more CETA money funds were available by September 1980. Thus, the Victim/Witness program became, not an elaborate youth organization envisioned by the Authority, but a one-person operation. The project director felt that the Authority failed to provide him with promised support, particularly in terms of supplying victim assistance aides to help with his outreach effort. He had established a hotline but soon disconnected it because resident volunteers never showed up to take calls. Only 36 clients, all but three referred by the PHA staff, were seen

during the course of the program. Most of the time the director showed people how to fill out victim compensation forms.

When the political reform forces, with whom the Victim/Witness director allied himself, emerged triumphant from the city elections in June, 1981, he accepted a job as a Councilman's aide. At about the same time, he was admitted to a local law school. Despite these demands on his time, the director suggested to the PHA that the Victim/Witness program be extended to additional public housing sites since so few people at the demonstration sites used the service. (In September, 1981, the Victim/Witness Program was approximately \$10,000 under budget; no money had yet been spent on supplies, little on travel to victim/witness-related conferences, and none on consultants to train volunteers). While the new Anti-Crime Coordinator considered the proposal, the Victim/Witness director decided to quit and proposed that this component be picked up by the project managers whom he could train. As of March, 1982 the managers had not been trained, and no victim/witness program was operating. By the end of the fiscal year (September 30, 1982) all funds had been expended with very little to show for their effectiveness during the preceding year.

F. Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers

The off-duty patrol program was singularly successful in achieving its goals of increased tenant participation and better police/community relations. The other elements of the police component, however, failed as conclusively as the police patrols succeeded. As mentioned earlier, the Quarterly Forums were canceled after three meetings. Police participation in youth programming was restricted to Police Athletic League (PAL) activities, and similar recreational activities for younger children who commit few crimes. The most ambitious element of the police component--establishing a police substation at Marion Gardens--was foiled at the very start when the Jersey City Police

disbanded its Bureau of Housing Security in April, 1980. A. Harry Moore, which provided the headquarters of the Bureau, lost its own substation as a result of the economy drive.

G. Stronger Linkages with Local Governments and Other Agencies

The Authority never developed a coherent plan to involve outside community agencies. It submitted to HUD letters of interest and hoped that a process of contacting specific individuals in the city would bear fruit. The PHA had assembled an array of local governmental and nongovernmental agencies and had suggested to them a variety of worthwhile projects, most of which were only tangentially related to crime control. The major linkage components were jobs, Operation I.D., PAL, crime workshops sponsored by city agencies, and meetings with community associations from the neighborhood.

The jobs component, as discussed in Section D, failed due to factors outside the control of the Authority. Operation I.D. also failed; of the 800-plus households in the two sites, only 22 (3 percent) participated. The Anti-Crime Coordinator was not conscientious about organizing Operation I.D. and failed to solicit participation from JCPD's Crime Prevention Unit.

Through PAL, the police did help give youths structured recreational activities during the summer of 1981 and seem to have fostered better youth/police relations. Also, the Department's Community Relations Unit conducted a workshop on crime reporting and police response. Related, but not the responsibility of the JCPD, were the workshops on spouse abuse and welfare rights to be conducted by other city departments. No such workshops were scheduled.

There is also no indication that the PHA ever met with the local neighborhood associations. Contact had been made with a local church but, as discussions with tenant leaders started, the pastor accepted a new position, and the Authority and tenant leaders found that little progress could be made with

his replacement. The PHA's lack of success here is not surprising, given the strong feelings of suspicion and hostility expressed by the neighborhood residents about the project dwellers.

The PHA has done a good job of keeping tenants informed about services available in the city. A series of on-site presentations by agency representatives were held monthly. In addition, each project's Social Coordinator, a tenant on the PHA payroll, provided information and referral services for tenants seeking help.

IV. PROGRAM IMPACT

A. Resident Survey Analysis

Resident surveys were conducted at both sites approximately one year after the demonstration officially began. From May 22 to July 15 interviews were conducted with 85 residents of Marion Gardens and 371 residents at A. Harry Moore. It was concluded, after examination of available data and discussions with PHA officials, that no appropriate comparison project existed in Jersey City. Furthermore, based on process evaluation findings, which revealed serious implementation difficulties, it was concluded that a second wave of resident interviews would not be sufficiently cost effective to warrant the expense. As a result, only one wave of surveys were conducted to evaluate the impact of the program. To supplement the survey data, the JCPD compiled recorded crime data for the two sites from 1979 through 1981.

At the time the interviews were conducted, the on-site Anti-Crime Coordinator had been hired for over a year and a half, the Victim/Witness coordinator for over six months, installation of peepholes and lighting had been underway for six months, an Anti-Crime liaison person and off-duty police officers had been at Marion Gardens for about four months, and off-duty officers

had been patrolling at A. Harry Moore for three months. In April, 1981, lobby construction had been completed at Marion Gardens; Operation I.D. began at A. Harry Moore and the first anti-crime workshop was held there.

1. Program Awareness and Participation. The findings on program awareness generally reflect the failure of the demonstration to implement most of the proposed activities. Only 11 percent of Marion Gardens residents said they knew about crime prevention meetings; the percent aware of such programs was higher (39 percent) at A. Harry Moore. The opposite was found regarding the Victim/Witness Program, with 30 percent at Marion Gardens indicating awareness and only 16 percent at A. Harry Moore. Such a finding is not surprising since the program director spent much more time at Marion Gardens.

At A. Harry Moore only 5 percent of the households indicated that a member had participated in the V/W program; at Marion Gardens, 11 percent of the sampled households were indicated to have had a participating member. With respect to the other program component, given the extremely low levels of awareness, it is not surprising that the levels of participation were consistently below five percent at both sites.

2. Fear and Victimization. The majority of respondents, 67 percent at A. Harry Moore and 87 percent at Marion Gardens, indicated that they felt safe. When asked how serious they thought specific crimes were about 70 percent of the respondents at both sites agreed that burglary was not a big problem. But with respect to other crimes, a much higher percentage of A. Harry Moore than Marion Gardens respondents thought there were serious problems. For example, 34 percent of A. Harry Moore respondents felt that robbery was a problem; only 15 percent at Marion Gardens felt this way.

At both sites the percentage of respondents who reported being personally victimized was very low in all categories. For example, at both sites, less than two percent reported robberies and less than ten percent reported being threatened or intimidated. The same was true for crimes against households: five percent of A. Harry Moore residents reported burglaries, while only two percent did so at Marion Gardens.

4. Perceived Change

The respondents at the two sites differed significantly in their opinions of whether their projects had become a better or worse place to live during the previous year. Marion Gardens residents thought that things had improved somewhat, while A. Harry Moore residents thought that things had gotten much worse. This difference has to be interpreted against the fact that a massive rehabilitation program was underway at Marion Gardens.

Similarly, the responses at the two projects were quite different in terms of whether the crime problem was perceived to have become better or worse. Marion Gardens residents thought that crime had become quite a bit less of a problem, whereas residents of A. Harry Moore thought crime had become much worse.

B. Recorded Crime Analysis

From 1977 through 1980, the number of recorded personal crimes per 10,000 persons at A. Harry Moore had, despite large monthly fluctuations, remained generally higher than the rate of such crimes in the city as a whole and in Marion Gardens. This variability generally continued in 1981, suggesting no notable effect attributable to the anti-crime program. The rate of property crimes also appeared unchanged, remaining higher than that at Marion Gardens but lower than that in the city as a whole.

At Marion Gardens, the pattern of highly variable, personal crime rates continued during the program implementation period, although the level appears to have declined during 1981. In general, the property crime rate also remained highly variable, although considerably higher in 1981 than in 1980. Contrary to this trend, however, is the fact that from January 1980 through the end of 1981 only two burglaries were reported. Because significant changes of various kinds were occurring at Marion Gardens at that time, it is difficult to attribute responsibility for this change and too early to determine if this reduction will be sustained. Because so many difficulties were encountered in the anti-crime program, the only aspect of that effort that could have contributed to this decline was the off-duty patrol program. However, since these patrols did not begin until February, 1981, almost a year after the decline occurred, other explanations appear more plausible.

IV. CONCLUSION

Clearly, the impact data suggest positive developments at Marion Gardens. Although there were observed reductions in recorded crime and improvements reported by the incidents in the survey, it is questionable whether the Anti-Crime program is primarily responsible for these changes, given the Authority's inability to implement most of the proposed activities and the generally low levels of program awareness and participation. The results for A. Harry Moore, in general, do not suggest positive program effects. There was no discernible effect on the highly erratic annual levels of recorded crime; nor were the survey results especially supportive.

Perhaps the off-duty patrol program was sufficiently effective and singularly responsible for the reduction in crime at Marion Gardens. But this explanation raises the question of why these officers were so effective at Marion, where they had been working for only a year, and less effective at A. Harry Moore where they had been working for over three years. The Authority is inclined to attribute the striking reduction in crime to increased cohesiveness

among the approximately 400 residents who chose to remain during the rehabilitation period. Such cohesiveness may have discouraged criminal intrusion.

With respect to most program components, the implementation problems were so severe that the theoretical principles underlying the demonstration could not be adequately tested; the fact that the Public Safety Coordinator's activities were not satisfactorily documented leaves unanswered the question of what he did to improve public safety management within the Authority. Some crucial program activities--job development, victim/witness, and youth organization--were either not implemented or were so limited in scope that it is very unlikely that observed positive or negative program effects can be attributed to them.

With respect to tenant participation, the slight effect of the associations on program activities may stem from a conviction by resident leaders that the Authority was already trying to do what the residents wanted, and rather than seek responsibility for day-to-day management, the leaders chose to devote their energies to other issues or save their energies for times when the Authority's implementation goals appeared to be at variance with the associations'. Thus the residents' interest in the Program may have become self-limited to merely ensuring that the money was spent to further mutual goals. Although the tenant associations were not asked to play an active role in the formulation of program activities, it does not appear that residents objected to any of them. For their part, PHA officials have indicated that they would have preferred the tenant associations to be more active than they were. The Authority's Anti-Crime staff, in particular, felt overworked and were eager to have residents play a larger role in handling implementation issues and monitoring activities.

Many of the Anti-Crime Program activities were new for the Authority and for the residents, so there were few available yardsticks for assessing how well given individuals were performing or whether certain activities were having the desired effects. When it became clear to the PHA staff that certain programs were failing, it was not then clear what realistic alternatives existed and presumably the resident leaders, if aware of these implementation difficulties, had no solutions to offer.

The one program area where both management and residents had previous experience and, therefore, a basis for evaluating progress, was the implementation of the Modernization program at A. Harry Moore. Unlike the other components, the TMC Board was involved in the preparation of the application and played an official role in reviewing each phase of this effort. Everyone agreed that the capital improvement funds should be used to enhance the security of the buildings, so the work items for new door locks, peepholes, and other such hardware were approved with little discussion or delay. The "defensible space" improvements, however, were a different story. Fences that "define space" rather than keep people in or out, and asphalt sidewalks, color-coded to establish territorial zones, are improvements whose influence on crime is unclear and, at best, indirect. Such proposed improvements, however, had a clear effect on resident concerns: the fences would divide up open space that already was at premium, and the grounds would be subdivided into functional areas which conflicted with current use patterns. Thus, the more direct, non-crime-related aspects of these "security" improvements raised considerable discussion over the exact form of the physical modifications, and each time one aspect of a plan was revised (such as relocating a fence), the rest of the plan had to be revised because of the influence of this environmental on the intended use of the functional zones. This multi-sequence of a design and review process

greatly increased the complexity of negotiating a plan which all participants could agree to, and probably added to the difficulty in finding a contractor willing and able to work exactly as planned.


In summary, it would not be fair to say that the demonstration in Jersey City was a failure, since program benefits can indeed be discerned. However, neither can it be judged a wholehearted success. Relative to HUD's high and, in the Executive Director's judgment, naive expectations, the results are disappointing. For a Public Housing Authority previously active in promoting security and involving residents, UIACP funds failed to significantly advance both causes. It is unfortunate that the implementation problems precluded an opportunity to properly assess the hypothetical principles and processes underlying the originally proposed anti-crime strategies.

JERSEY CITY

A. Harry Moore


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES Per 10,000 Occupied Units



JERSEY CITY
Marion Gardens


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)



RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units

