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EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES  
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

CLEVELAND, OH, CASE STUDY

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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

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## PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

## I. CONTEXT

### A. The City

Cleveland, situated on Lake Erie at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River, was once a prosperous industrial center with a population almost one million inhabitants, but during the past 30 years, the city has suffered a decline in employment and tax base. Today, Cleveland's population has dropped to roughly half a million and, with many of its steel, shipping, automobile and oil refinery plants closed, unemployment is high. There also has been a major change in the city's demographic composition: as the total population declined over three decades, the black population doubled, creating problems for the traditionally segregated neighborhoods. The symbolic significance of the Cuyahoga River, apart from representing Cleveland's dying industrial base and despoiled environment, is that it has served as a natural barrier between the races, with the black communities on the East Side and the white communities on the West Side. Since, the 1970s, however, there are significantly fewer segregated neighborhoods, so that, on the East Side, one can find isolated pockets of ethnic groups of European descent, and on the near West Side, across the river from the central business district, the population is mixed. Still, the western suburbs remain predominantly white.

Various neighborhoods have spawned community organizations devoted to the goal of preserving and improving the housing stock and quality of life, and in general, an effort is underway to promote the city as an attractive place to live. One of the more determined gentrification attempts has centered on a place called "Ohio City," which is on the West Side close to the public housing sites selected by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority for the Anti-Crime demonstration program. There is a deep rooted suspicion among the residents in

the nearby public housing projects that those promoting Ohio City would like to relocate them elsewhere. There is a strong (especially among merchants) to do something about the prevailing belief that street crime is rising. At the present time, the area is becoming infused with assorted social services, mostly targeted on youth crime. There also are a number of hunger centers which have generated controversy between those who wish to improve the image of the near west side and those who wish to serve the poor.

The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) was created under enabling legislation enacted by the Ohio Legislature in 1933. The first sites built were Cedar Apartments and Lakeview Estates, and the original structures still comprise most of these estates today. CMHA's jurisdiction includes nearly all of Cuyahoga County; it operates 36 projects containing 12,076 dwelling units. The families are generally housed in three story walk ups or row houses, while the high rise buildings are reserved for the elderly and handicapped.

CMHA has its own police force of about 55 officers who hold private commissions from the Cleveland Police Department. For the past three years, the Cleveland Police Department has received federal grants to assist patrolmen to work in public housing, but this special program has raised controversy. The mayor has publicly taken the position that it is CMHA's job to police public housing, and the city police should not get involved. Nevertheless, the Cleveland Police Department continues to deploy two-person response teams in and around selected estates.

B. Demonstration Sites and Surrounding Neighborhood

The CMHA selected two projects about seven blocks apart--Riverview Estates, with 779 units and Lakeview Estates, with 830 units--for the demonstration sites. Both projects are located in the "West 25th Street

Corridor," an area bounded, to the north by Lake Erie, to the east, by the Cuyahoga River, to the south, by Bridge Street, and to the west, by West 25th Street. Each project has a high rise building for senior citizens and low rise garden apartments for families. The two projects share a common property line to the rear of the Authority's central offices. The residents of both projects utilize to a single commercial district, where several shops, a bank, a hospital, and recreation facilities are within easy walking distance.

Riverview is a mixed elderly (578 units) and family (152 units) development, constructed in 1963 as the initial step in the renewal of old Ohio City. A community building for recreational and community programs for the families is adjacent to the 15 story high rise. Located inside the high rise are a diagnostic unit operated by the nearby Lutheran Hospital and a Golden Age Center operated by a private non-profit community organization that runs six other centers in the city.

The 20 story Lakeview high rise with 214 units is fairly new, constructed in 1973. The walk-ups, on the other hand, are among the oldest public housing dwellings in the city and comprise most of the estate with 617 units. Thus, whereas 81 percent of units are for the elderly at Riverview, only 25 percent of the units are for the elderly at Lakeview. Another noteworthy difference between the sites is the racial mix: sixty-three percent of the residents are black at Riverview, whereas only 26 percent are black at Lakeview. Thus, in both estates the walk-ups house black families; the Riverview high rise population is mostly elderly white and in the Lakeview high rise, virtually all the inhabitants are elderly whites.

At Riverview, the per capita rate of recorded personal crimes had generally remained higher than for the city as a whole but was lower than for the

surrounding neighborhood among both high rise and low rise residents. Before 1978, the rate among the low rise residents was higher than that among those living in the high rise building. In 1978, however, notable increases in recorded personal crimes occurred in the high rise buildings, sending the rate higher than that in the surrounding low rise units. For recorded property crime, the rate among both high rise and low rise Riverview units had remained consistently lower than for the city or for the surrounding neighborhood. Until 1979, the rate among the low rise residents was lower than among those in the high rise building, sending the rate higher than that found among the low rise units.

Until 1979, the per capita rate of personal crime at the high rise building at Lakeview had been well below that found in the city in general, the surrounding neighborhood or the adjacent neighborhood. In 1979, the rate at the high rise rose above that found citywide but still below the rate in the low rise units or the neighborhood. The recorded property crime rate had remained higher among the low rise units than in the high rise building through 1979, although both were below the rate for the city and the surrounding neighborhood.

Residents from both estates share usage of a common commercial district along West 25th street to the South of Riverview. This commercial district, on the edge of the Ohio City redevelopment area, contains the popular West Side Market, several small business establishments, and many bars. West 25th Street also is the scene of much street crime. The high rise building at Riverview is situated on the corner of Bridge Avenue and West 25th Street, and the elderly are frequently victims of purse-snatching and robbery on that busy corner. The corner of West 25th Street and Detroit Avenue, near the CMHA administration offices, also is the scene of frequent assaults and purse-snatching.

Because many of the dozen or so entrances to the Riverview high rise face a public thoroughfare, it was fairly easy for offenders to come and go. Senior citizens on the upper floors were often victims of assault and theft. The problem of controlling access was compounded by the fact that visitors to the Senior Golden Age Center, located on the first floor, used the same circulation routes, with access to stairs and elevators, as did the high rise residents. In contrast, the Lakeview high rise, with only two entrances, was quite safe before the Anti-Crime Program.

Each estate has a deserted and overgrown area along one side which has been used for illegitimate activities and was a source of concern. At Riverview, on the northeast perimeter, a little-used and poorly-lighted street separates the family units from an overgrown hillside which overlooks the Cuyahoga River. At Lakeview, on the northeast perimeter, there is another seldom-used, dimly lit street that separates the estate from a deserted industrial yard on the river bank.

### C. The Comparison Site and Neighborhood

After consulting with local public housing officials, making site visits and analyzing existing data, it was decided that the public housing development most comparable to the Riverview and Lakeview Estates was Cedar Apartments. This development contains the oldest public housing units in Cuyahoga County, constructed in 1935. The original housing units are walk up apartments, similar in construction to those at Lakeview (which were built a few years after Cedar). In later years, additional apartments and row houses were built along with a 14 story high rise for the elderly. The high rise is constructed so that residents generally use the central entrance. Although there are multiple entrances, the building does not seem to have Riverview's problem in controlling access. Among the low rise apartments, there has been a severe vandalism problem with about thirty of the walk up units unfit for occupancy because of extensive damage.



To the west of the Cedar Apartments are a number of public institutions; on the south, the Campus of Cuyahoga Community College. Only a few blocks lie between Cedar and the Innerbelt Expressway to the north--blocks containing a few run down stores, some churches, a number of vacant boarded up buildings, and an automobile agency. The area to the east of Cedar has several schools including a vocational high school, along with a small residential area. The expressways to the north and west of the project separate Cedar from an area of Cleveland which has a high crime rate--Euclid and Prospect Avenue section from East 18th Street to East 30th Street. Originally, Cedar's proximity to the downtown area and to nearby hospitals made it a desirable location, but today the area is associated with street crime.

Cedar Apartments has had an active tenant organization for a number of years. The leader of the tenant organization also was the president of CMHA's city-wide tenant organization (Central Advisory Council) prior to the changing of the presidency when a Riverview resident was elected in 1981 and served on the ACOT). Cedar has not had an anti-crime program during the period of time of the UIACP, nor were the residents organized or involved in crime prevention activities. However, the residents were engaged in planning a greenhouse on site which was completed in October, 1982. This planning went on jointly by Cedar resident leaders with help from the Urban Center at Cleveland State University. Cedar's greenhouse proposal, submitted to the CMHA board during the summer of 1981, was to be financed partly by a grant from a local foundation. The greenhouse project has provided residents a vehicle to work together toward a common goal at about the same time that residents of Riverview and Lakeview were engaged in the Anti-Crime program. It is possible that the increased

resident activity at Cedar may have affected the residents' feelings about their housing estate.

By coincidence, the present manager came to Cedar in April of 1981, when she was transferred from Riverview. At Riverview, this woman manager had objected to the proposed Anti-Crime renovations in the Riverview high rise (and the remodeling of the Riverview high rise only gathered momentum after she left Riverview and went to Cedar). Her major concern was that the renovation would eliminate existing office space. Ironically, the manager who came to Riverview in April, 1981, came from Cedar. Thus, both Riverview and Cedar have had some experience with two of the same CMHA managers at some point during the duration of the Anti-Crime program.

## II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

CMHA had several reasons for applying for Anti-Crime money and selecting Riverview and Lakeview estates. The Congresswoman who was instrumental in framing the relevant legislation for the demonstration had particular interest in the welfare of the residents at Riverview (both estates are located in her district), so the PHA felt virtually assured of a grant. Lakeview was included because of its proximity to Riverview and because the CMHA was concerned about the level of crime at both places. Additionally, the Authority reasoned that a comprehensive program would be less effective if all Anti-Crime resources were concentrated at only one site.

A further justification for including Lakeview may have been related to HUD's formula for establishing an upper limit on budget requests from applicants. If the total number of units in the proposed demonstration site or sites was under a thousand, than the PHA could not apply for more than \$500,000

dollars. If the number exceeded one thousand, the PHA could request up to one million dollars. Thus, by adding Lakeview's 830 apartments to Riverview's 779, CMHA doubled the amount of money it could request.

The PHA responded to the opportunity to address crime and fear problems by appointing a planning team composed of the Deputy Executive Director, the Deputy Chief of the CMHA Security Force, the Director of Social Services and three residual leaders from both estates. The principal actor on this team was the Deputy Security Chief, who leaned strongly toward upgrading the physical security of the buildings and strengthening the Authority's security force, and who offers the opinion that this was an "anti-crime" demonstration and not a "tenant employment" or "self-help" demonstration.

The largest block of funds (\$671,000) was proposed to be allocated for the Modernization program, which mainly focused on building security, such as redesigning the entry lobbies in the elderly high rise buildings, installing window security screens and new outdoor lighting. A small portion of these funds provided an add-on to a Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program (PHUIP) grant from HUD to improve management systems. For example, through the latter grant the Authority purchased a computer; with the UIACP Modernization budget, the Authority proposed to purchase terminals to store data which might be used to identify security risks among prospective and current residents.

The Riverview lobby modification plan involved a credit card key system and security guard stations, and at Lakeview Towers, the installation of a closed circuit television monitor (Riverview already had one). About ten percent of the budget was designated for improving pedestrian circulation to control access to the site and upgrade recreation facilities. What was to be done and how

would be worked out later after a security consultant developed a basic scheme and an architect was hired to generate drawings and design specifications.

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds (\$114,000) from HUD were originally intended to cover the salaries of six CMHA patrolmen, three of whom would be assigned to each estate. The remaining amount (\$5,000) would go toward "human relations" training for tenant leaders at Cuyahoga Community College. HUD requested that a larger proportion be allocated to enhancing tenant involvement in the form of an Tenant Imprest Fund which would be controlled by the recognized resident organization, with the remainder used for outside technical assistance as well as training for residents. The PHA opted to use the balance of funds (about \$75,000) to cover part of the salaries of the Anti-Crime Coordinator and three new officers to patrol both estates (the PHA would pay for the other part of their salaries and treat it as an in-kind contribution).

When the basis of CDBG funds was changed from Innovative to Technical Assistance, CMHA was informed they could not use the money to hire the three patrolmen. CMHA decided instead to include their full salaries in the local match budget and to subdivide that amount in the CDBG budget among an Assistant to the Anti-Crime Coordinator and two residents, one full-time and the other part-time. The budget kept the line item for resident training (about \$5,000), but much larger sums were added for administrative "support" (about \$11,000) and media development (about \$16,000).

CMHA proposed to create an Estate Security Commission as the primary vehicle for tenant participation. The advisory council members would serve on a voluntary basis but the support staff would be paid from CDBG and DOL funds.

HUD declared the proposed positions ineligible under DOL and cut the number to one and a half positions under CDBG.

Residents of CMHA have a mechanism for organization that predates UIACP. Candidates are elected to a city-wide Central Advisory Council that has direct access to the PHA's governing board. In addition, individual estates have their own tenant councils; the one at Riverview has a reputation for being active. As the UIACP proposal was being developed and revised, the Anti-Crime Coordinator consulted three tenant council leaders from the target estates. HUD criticized the proposal to create an Estate Security Commission (later renamed the Resident Anti-Crime Commission or RACC) on the grounds that it would not assure a more broad-based effort to involve the general tenancy, but the agency offered no alternatives and CMHA responded by promising that RACC would have "sweeping authority" and, organizationally, it would be "built on existing tenant councils" (at each site the elderly and family residents established separate councils).

With respect to the Department of Labor (DOL) component, CMHA originally proposed, in addition to covering the salaries of RACC members (\$25,000), to support a youth drug abuse (\$6,000) and a victim/witness program (\$25,000), and to create a youth career placement institute (\$15,000). The rest would be used to develop a youth patrol program (about \$80,000). The first three, which HUD declared ineligible under DOL and recommended shifting to in-kind services, were to be operated by individuals assigned by different social service agencies. The final DOL budget was targeted to hire, equip, and train 12 Riverview project youths between the ages of 16 and 19. This component also provided the salary for one supervisor. Eight of the youths were designated security "cadets," two others as "emergency maintenance technicians" who would serve as assistants to

the Authority's maintenance crew, and the final two as "problem aides" who would assist mostly with a property identification program.

The final version of the in-kind budget, after line items had been exchanged between the federal and local match budgets in the HUD Cooperative Agreement, included from the CMHA, the salaries for three patrolmen, the partial salary of the Anti-Crime Coordinator, CMHA administrative and legal fees, and management human relations training; from the city, local community development money for major renovations at the Lakeview community center, local CETA money for additional security guards, and the services of a victim/witness counselor were to be provided. The total in-kind budget was \$146,144.

The Authority, mindful that a balance had to be struck between the needs of the two estates and the availability of funding, decided to concentrate most of the Anti-Crime software activities and resources at Riverview. Thus, Lakeview received only Modernization money and the three new officers who patrolled both sites. The Authority also applied for, but did not receive, funds from the special grants from Victim/Witness, ADAMHA and OJJDP.

### III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

#### A. Improve Management of Public Safety by the PHA

The person selected as Anti-Crime Coordinator had joined CMHA's Department of Safety and Security in 1974, and his orientation was that of a professional law enforcement officer. He was a hard-working, able program administrator who was well respected by CMHA staff and HUD. As requested by HUD, CMHA formed an Anti-Crime Oversight Team (ACOT) which, on paper, was quite impressive. The Oversight Team included the Anti-Crime Coordinator, Chairperson of the Central Advisory Council (a resident), representatives from the mayor's office and the Cleveland Police Department, CMHA's Deputy Director, a member of

the Ohio City Association, and a person from the HUD field office. In practice, the ACOT met several times throughout the program and generally performed the narrower task defined by HUD of reviewing the progress of program activities. The ACOT's role as an instrument to leverage additional commitments from the city and private organizations was ineffective.

With respect to administering all program components, the Anti-Crime Coordinator's major weakness was his lack of faith in resident participation and lack of commitment to human relations training. While he followed HUD directives mandating resident participation, he made it clear that, that in his opinion, the residents of public housing did not have the skills and capacity to direct anti-crime components. The extensive training which was to be given to residents did not materialize until the final months of the demonstration, and then it was a matter of too little, too late. There were plans for classes to be conducted at Cuyahoga Community College, but they were cancelled because of increased course prices. In-house human relations sessions were conducted in August and September, 1981, but these sessions lasted only a few days and covered topics superficially.

CMHA began using the services of a local social service clearing house to investigate whether housing applicants had been previously institutionalized. Such information was to be used to screen out applicants with a history of disruptive, violent, or destructive behavior. The effects of this screening process, however, have been minimal because the information was not complete and, more importantly, the legal staff of CMHA rendered the opinion that it would be unlawful discrimination to single out specific estates for a more rigorous screening procedure.

Both the Authority and resident groups wanted more effective procedures for evicting disruptive tenants. In principle, the Authority can evict someone for any lease violation, including anti-social behavior; in practice, however, people are evicted only for non-payment of rent, and even that is infrequent. The Authority decided--perhaps because it is required by the courts--that eviction for anti-social behavior required sworn complaints and testimony from residents. But residents fearful for their safety are unwilling to sign complaints or offer public testimony. Instead, they would prefer that management unilaterally enforce a strict lease agreement.

As part of the Anti-Crime program, the Authority implemented a new Notice to Violator "ticket" system at Riverview. CMHA police issued citations to tenants observed by neighbors and others in lease violations. The tenant served was asked to sign the notice, but with or without voluntary signing, a personal response had to be made to the manager in 48 hours. The resident organizations were overwhelmingly supportive and had high expectations of its success, although by the official end of the demonstration in December, 1981, there was no evidence that any evictions resulted because of this system. Indeed, except for blatant criminal actions, it would take time for a given resident to accumulate enough tickets for CMHA to take action.

The effort to archive information about residents was assisted by a computer terminal, funded through UIACP Modernization. The terminal was installed in November, 1981 in the Department of Safety and Security and was connected to the Authority's master computer, funded through the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program. The UIACP Modernization funds were instead used to purchase and adapt a Computer-Assisted Crime Analysis software program developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.



B. Rehabilitation to House Anti-Crime Activities and Improvement of Physical Design to Make Buildings and Spaces Harder Targets

In December, 1979 the Vulnerability Analysis was completed by an outside consultant, who in May, 1980, also prepared a comprehensive plan for architectural modifications. This comprehensive plan was passed on to a local architectural firm in charge of developing construction specifications and putting out separate design packages for bids. By autumn of 1981 the first work item was installed: the CCTV monitor at Lakeview high rise. The installation of outdoor lighting was delayed until early 1982 because the resident organizations wanted additional vandal resistant protection.

As of November, 1982, approximately half of the work items in the Modernization budget have been completed. The first work item--the CCTV monitor at Lakeview high rise--was installed in the autumn of 1981. Since then, the new outdoor lighting and the vandal-resistant mailboxes have been installed, but because the PHA noted significant implementation errors, the contractors may be asked to redo some of this work.

None of the proposed grounds improvements has been started, because RACC wanted to resolve all cost-related items concerning the security windows and screens before permitting funds to be used for such items as redesigning walkways, recreation facilities or landscaping. RACC and the Authority entered into many discussions over several months about which types of windows and screens to purchase and where to put them. By the spring of 1982, it was agreed to use the funds to replace the windows on the first floor and balconies of the high rise, and to use the screens for the low rise units. As of November, a contract for the security screens had been awarded but work had not yet begun; and, for the new windows, a contract still had to go out for bids.

The plan to redesign the Riverview high rise lobbies has faced a similar fate, but for different reasons. The Authority awarded a contract in December, 1981. The work was to be completed by February, 1982, but the contractor asked for an extension, ostensibly because parts and materials were not immediately available. In May, there had been little progress and the Authority became concerned that the contractor might not fulfill his commitment; it was possible that he had significantly underbid the job. The contractor provided assurances, to the contrary but in July, he announced that he did not have the money to complete the work. The Authority asked the bonding company to accept responsibility, which it did, but indicated that restitution might not be achieved for some time. The Authority did not wish to have this situation prolonged or to bid the project again, so it worked out an arrangement where the bonding company agreed to cover all of the subcontracts. Thus, while the lobbies are currently being redesigned, the work will not be finished until early 1983.

A particularly unusual aspect of the UIACP Modernization program--for CMHA-- is the heightened involvement of residents. The impact of such increased participation produced more refined plans as the architects revised drawings in accordance with resident criticisms. The Anti-Crime Coordinator felt that such increased participation, although useful, was also costly in terms of delays and expended resources.

C. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

In February and March, 1980 several meetings were held involving residents, the Anti-Crime Coordinator, and other CMHA staff for the purpose of establishing the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC). It was decided that

the Commission should consist of twelve persons--three from the elderly and family units, respectively, at each estate. For the first six months, RACC reviewed plans presented by the Anti-Crime Coordinator. However, the group was frustrated by its inability to have direct control over the budgets. Additionally, the Chairman of RACC and the Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator did not trust one another. Both individuals resigned their positions in April, 1981, and when the new Assistant Coordinator arrived, she seriously initiated technical assistance efforts. However, the attempts to train residents in budget analysis and parliamentary procedures came late and fell short of resident expectations. Thus, the delay in providing useful technical assistance, as promised in the original proposal, left RACC members floundering, uncertain of how to proceed. Also, it did not help that the members from the two estates tended to compete and quarrel over the distribution of UIACP resources. In time the Commission became a viable group, using the imprest fund for resident outreach purposes (e.g., newsletters, slide shows) and continuing to meet after the demonstration ended. Current members serve as a special resident anti-crime organization. They recently submitted a proposal to the city for community development money to start a juvenile delinquency prevention project. Thus, as late and as brief as the training may have been, it appears to have assisted in the development of an effective resident group over the long run.

D. Increased Full- and Part-Time Employment of Tenants

As mentioned earlier the Anti-Crime Coordinator decided that eight of the twelve youth participants should work as Security Cadets (in previous years CMHA had used CETA money to hire and train young people as security

guards). Two other youths were assigned to CMHA operations and the remaining two as crime prevention information specialists. RACC had decision-making control over the application review process, but the final decision was made by the DOL supervisor.

Both the residents and the Anti-Crime Coordinator wanted the participants to receive professional-level training so that the job experience would be more than the usual CETA position. In August, 1980 all the participants were hired and received appropriate training for their positions. The Security Cadets were enrolled in a 120 hour peace officer course plus a lifesaving course (CPR) from the Red Cross. The Cadets were issued batons and trained to use them as defensive weapons. Their time was divided among three activities: conducting Operation I.D., showing crime prevention films to the elderly, and participating in Operation I-Spy (youths with binoculars who were stationed on the upper floors of the Riverview high rise to watch for criminal activities). Strict work standards were demanded by the DOL Coordinator and the Anti-Crime Coordinator and, as a result, several cadets were fired for failing to meet these standards. Others quit, some because of peer harassment from wearing police uniforms. The elderly were generally suspicious and disapproved of the idea of giving the youths free access to their building. Indeed, many felt that CMHA had put the criminals in charge of security.

Although the program was successful in providing "saleable" skills for many of the participants, but the program suffered from a high turnover rate; even the DOL Coordinator had to be replaced shortly after the program began. Vacancies were not quickly filled so that, toward the end of the program, CMHA realized there might be a shortfall. The remaining funds were then used to hire additional Emergency Maintenance Technicians, which created a new problem when

the regular maintenance staff perceived this as a threat to their job and protested in the form of a short-lived strike.

Perhaps the most newsworthy event associated with the YCCIP program involved the property identification project. In August, 1982, two housing police officers, while patrolling Riverview, observed two young men carrying a television set. Since the young men could not satisfy the officers' questions about where the television set came from and where they were taking it, the television set was taken to the Authority's control office. Upon inspection, someone noted the inscription of a social security number on the back and then checked the files for a name and address. The housing police followed up by dispatching a unit to an apartment in the high rise building. These officers found the apartment door slightly ajar and knocked. When no one answered, they walked in and saw an elderly man lying on the kitchen floor, obviously assaulted and close to death. The ambulance got the victim to the hospital in time to save his life, and the two young men, who later identified a third individual involved in the crime, were arrested for attempted aggravated murder. The Anti-Crime Coordinator feels that this incident alone justifies the property identification project.

E. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims and Witnesses

In the revised proposal, CMHA promised a drug abuse program, expansion of an existing youth recreation program at the two estates, in-kind services from the county youth services council, a victim/witness program, a property identification program, and a family violence program. Generally, the only programs implemented during the demonstration period were those activities already in existence before UIACP. The sole exception to this was the property

identification effort conducted by the YCCIP youths. The individuals in charge of the youth programs at the target sites were simply not interested in the drug abuse proposal. As for the recreation activities, RACC participated in publicizing events and raising local funds, but otherwise these activities had no relationship to the Anti-Crime Program.

The same person directed the victim/witness and family violence programs in Cleveland, and he agreed to assign one counselor to serve both estates. In the spring of 1980, the counselor held meetings with residents to explain his role and availability. The counselor withdrew after the first few months because he received very few calls for service. The demonstration participants, both CMHA RACC and staff, were unsuccessful in promoting these services.

F. Increased Use of Better Trained Police Officers

CMHA is in a position different from most other PHAs inasmuch as it has a police department independent of the city's. In addition to the three new patrolmen who were assigned to the two estates by the Authority's Department of Safety and Security, the Cleveland Police Department (CPD) agreed to deploy special two-person response units to concentrate on Riverview and Lakeview. The three new officers were hired by the Authority and the response units served as promised, although in reality, these units were operating prior to UIACP and it is difficult to say whether the demonstration estates received more attention than in the past. The proposal had also called for sensitivity/orientation sessions, and a two-day session was conducted prior April, 1980. However, CPD involvement in the demonstration estates was minimal, due in part to a policy supported by the mayor that matters related to public housing security should be handled exclusively by CMHA police.

G. Stronger Linkages With Local Government and Other Agencies

In addition to the projected local linkages discussed above (such as the drug abuse program, training for residents at a local college, the victim/witness program), there was a statement in the proposal that the city would use community development money for some assistance in anti-crime activities (such as "concentrated" crime patrols) in the neighborhood where the target estates were located. Aside from the response units deployed by CPD, there is no evidence of other special neighborhood efforts. Other community development funds (\$50,000) were promised and approved by city council to renovate the Lakeview Community Center, but work has yet to begin (a similar proposal for Riverview was rejected by the city council).

The city's representative on the ACOT tried to develop a "sweat equity" project, whereby project residents would request money from the city for site improvements and delineate how residents would contribute time and effort. The city had made such "contracts" with residents from other neighborhoods in the city, such as Ohio City. However, as the ACOT member pursued the idea with city decision makers, it became clear that there was a general reluctance to experiment with such block grants in public housing.

Two other local linkages were promised. The first was that Rapid Recovery, a non-profit organization dedicated to cleaning up and beautifying Cleveland's rapid transit, received \$5,000 from the National Endowment of the Arts to conduct a feasibility study for Riverbend Park, which would border Riverview. Although the study was completed, the city did not support the idea. The second linkage was a Needs Analysis of Riverview elderly residents conducted by the West Side Mental Health Center. However, there was no follow-up in terms of linking services with needs.

IV. PROGRAM AWARENESS AND PARTICIPATION

A. Program Awareness

The first wave of resident interviews, conducted in the summer of 1981, well after the demonstration was underway, awareness of the program components among those interviewed, provides evidence of the awareness of the program components among those interviewed. Eighty-seven percent of the respondents in the Riverview high rise said that they were aware of on-site crime prevention meetings. The large majority (nearly eighty percent) of Riverview low rise and Lakeview low rise respondents also knew of such meetings. In contrast to the demonstration sites, the level of awareness of such meetings at Cedar Apartments, the comparison site, was low (11 percent).

The level of awareness of youth employment programs was not as high as for crime prevention meetings, but the differences between Lakeview and Riverview were greater. Sixty-seven percent of the respondents in the Lakeview high rise were aware of such programs; 54 percent among the Riverview low rise respondents. Only 39 percent of those in the Lakeview low rise and 22 percent in the Riverview high rise knew of a youth employment program. Again, Cedar Apartment respondents' awareness of such a program was low (15 percent). While these percentages are higher at the demonstration site than at the comparison site, thus suggesting there was a program effect on levels of awareness, the difference between Riverview and Lakeview runs counter to expectations. Youths were selected from both sites, but they worked only at Riverview, so, one would have expected the Riverview respondents to be more aware of the program than the Lakeview respondents. Moreover, the Riverview elderly protested the idea of permitting project youth in their building. Such protests, it would seem, should have made more than one-fifth of the high rise group aware of the YCCIP program.



The pattern of awareness of Operation I.D. was different: respondents in both high rise buildings were more aware than those in the low rise apartments. Sixty percent of the Lakeview high rise and 49 percent of the Riverview high rise respondents said they knew of a property identification program. The proportion is much lower (about 30 percent) among the two low rise groups but still well above that found at Cedar Apartments (only one percent).

Although CMHA did not receive a HUD alcohol and drug abuse grant, there were several such programs operating in the near west side. Thus, the percentages of awareness were are fairly high: forty-seven percent among the Lakeview high rise and 12 percent among the Lakeview low rise respondents; at Riverview, 20 percent among the high rise and no one among the low rise respondents. Nine percent of the respondents at Cedar Apartments reported knowing about an alcohol or drug abuse program.

Also, no HUD Victim/Witness funds were awarded, but the city did agree to assign a counselor to work at Riverview; however, he discontinued the program after only a few weeks because of apparent resident apathy. It is not surprising then, that only fifteen percent of the two high rise groups said they had heard of the program, and that no one in the Riverview low rise and only 9 percent in the Lakeview high rise indicated cognizance.

#### B. Program Participation

In 1981, half of the respondents in the Riverview low rises said they, or someone in their household, had participated in a crime prevention meeting. About one fourth of the respondents in the two high rise buildings indicated participation. Only 12 percent of the Lakeview respondents indicated participation, which is about the same as Cedar Apartments (seven percent). Again, since most of the software activities were being implemented at

Riverview, these results are consistent with expectations of positive program effects.

With respect to property identification, 27 percent of the high rise respondents said they had participated; among the low rise, 17 percent at Lakeview and 12 percent at Riverview. Only one percent at Cedar said they had engraved their valuables.

Few respondents at either site indicated participation in programs to assist victims and witnesses, reflecting the fact that the program operated for only a short period of time. There was no acknowledged participation in Cedar Apartments.

#### IV. PROGRAM IMPACT

##### A. Resident Survey Analysis

Two resident surveys were conducted, one between May 22 and August 14, 1981 (when the demonstration was well underway) and the other between June 28 and August 26, 1982 (several months after the program's official termination). Survey data were collected not only for the high rise and low rise apartments at Riverview and Lakeview, but also for the high rise and low rise apartments at the comparison project--Cedar Apartments--and for the three "neighborhoods" surrounding each project. The basic analytic strategy was to ascertain whether the demonstration sites showed evidence of program benefits, as demonstrated by more notable positive changes in the demonstration projects than in the comparison project or in the surrounding neighborhood.

To provide the strongest comparison between the 1981 and 1982 results, certain people were interviewed both in 1981 and in 1982. The number of these reinterviewed persons, the panel sample, is shown below.

<u>Site</u>	<u>Completed Panel Interviews</u>
Lakeview High Rise	21
Riverview High Rise	40
Riverview Low Rise	12
Lakeview Low Rise	63
Cedar Low Rise	52
Cedar High Rise	18
Riverview Neighborhood	48
Cedar Neighborhood	100

What follows is a description of relative comparisons among the 1981 and 1982 results in the demonstration projects, the comparison projects and the neighborhoods surrounding them. "Regression change score analysis" was conducted to produce comparisons which control the 1981 results. Table 1 provides a summary of these comparisons. Brief descriptions of the results are presented below.

1. Lakeview Low Rises and Riverview Low Rises vs. Cedar Apartments Low Rises

A positive program effect was detected in the extent of change in residents' fear of crime between 1981 and 1982. Feelings of being unsafe had diminished significantly among residents of the Lakeview and Riverview demonstration low rises, while a similar change was not evident among those living in the Cedar Apartments comparison low rises ( $p < .05$ ). However, the demonstration projects did not differ from each other in the extent to which this change took place.

A negative program effect was associated with a change in the number of precautionary measures residents employed when planning to be away from home for

a few days. Between 1981 and 1982, the increased use of these anti-crime measures by comparison site residents significantly exceeded any increase evident among Lakeview and Riverview low rise residents ( $p < .01$ ). Moreover, the demonstration projects did not differ from each other in the extent to which any change in precautionary behavior was undertaken.

There were no other program effects identified when the demonstration sites were compared to the comparison site nor when compared with each other.

2. Lakeview High Rise and Riverview High Rise vs. Cedar Apartments High Rise

Overall, the Lakeview and Riverview demonstration high rises did not differ from the Cedar Apartments comparison high rise in the extent to which residents' perceptions of the crime problem changed from 1981 or 1982. Nevertheless, there was a marginally significant positive program effect for the Riverview high rise when the demonstration sites were compared with each other ( $p < .11$ ). When adjusted mean change was examined, the perceived severity of crime problems diminished slightly more among Riverview high rise residents than they did among Lakeview high rise residents.

The program effects regarding changes in the perceived severity of disorder were similar to those reported for the perceived severity of the crime problem. Overall, the demonstration sites did not differ from the comparison high rise in the extent to which residents' perceptions of disorder changed from 1981 to 1982. There was, nonetheless, a marginally significant positive program effect for the Riverview high rise when the demonstration sites were compared with each other ( $p < .09$ ). The perceived severity of disorder diminished more among Riverview high rise residents than any change that occurred among those in the Lakeview high rise. (However, it is noteworthy that perceptions of severity

'had' little room to improve among the Lakeview residents since they viewed disorder as almost no problem at all, on the average).

A negative program effect was associated with a change in the number of precautionary measures household members employed to protect the home from crime. Between 1981 and 1982, the increased use of these anti-crime measures by residents living in the comparison site significantly exceeded any increase found among Lakeview and Riverview low rise households ( $p < .01$ ). Moreover, the demonstration projects did not differ from each other in the extent to which any change in household precautionary measures was undertaken.

There was also a marginally significant negative program effect associated with a change in the number of precautionary measures employed by household members when they planned to be away from home for a few days. Between 1981 and 1982, the increased use of these anti-crime strategies by comparison site households slightly exceeded any increase evident among Lakeview and Riverview high rise households ( $p < .10$ ). However, there was a positive program effect for the Riverview high rise when the demonstration sites were compared with each other; households in the Riverview high rise increased the number of crime prevention strategies used when occupants were gone significantly more than did households in the Lakeview high rise ( $p < .01$ ). Thus, while the Cedar comparison site showed the greatest improvement overall, Riverview did improve significantly more than did Lakeview.

There was no other program effects identified when the demonstration sites were compared to the comparison site nor when compared with each other.

3. Riverview High Rise and Riverview Low Rise vs. Riverview Neighborhood

A negative program effect was found in the change in residents' assessment of the crime trend. The attitude shift of residents in the Riverview neighborhood was positive and significantly greater ( $p < .05$ ) than any change which may have occurred in the generally negative evaluation of the crime trend made by Riverview residents, regardless of whether they lived in the high rise or low rises.

When adjusted mean change was examined, a positive program effect was detected in the extent of change in residents' property crime victimization between 1981 and 1982. The change in victimization was significantly greater in the Riverview neighborhood than in either of the two demonstrations ( $p < .01$ ). Property crime had worsened among neighborhood residents. Riverview high and low rise households did not differ in the extent to which their victimization experiences changed during the same period; a slight decrease was noted in each instance.

A marginally significant positive program effect was also detected in the extent of change in residents' perceptions of the trend in their quality-of-life. The attitude shift was somewhat greater among neighborhood residents than it was among project residents ( $p < .10$ ); quality-of-life was perceived in slightly less positive terms in the neighborhood than it had been in preceding years. Riverview high and low rise residents did not differ in the extent to which their slightly negative attitudes changed during the same period.

B. Recorded Crime Analysis

Figures 1 through 9 present monthly recorded crime rates for the Riverview, Lakeview and Cedar projects and for the neighborhoods

surrounding them. Changes in the recorded personal and property crime rates within each demonstration project are discussed below and compared to those in the surrounding neighborhood and the comparison project.

o Recorded Personal Crime

- Riverview Estates High Rise

Although the recorded personal crime rate had risen dramatically during the three year period (1977-1979) prior to the UIACP, the rate decline slightly in 1980, largely due to low levels early in the year, before the Anti-Crime program began. Crime, then proceeded to rise again to a level somewhat above that which prevailed in 1979. There is, therefore, no evidence of any impact due to program implementation. In the comparison project, Cedar Apartments High Rise, the recorded personal crime rate declined from 1977 to virtually zero in 1979, remained there in 1980 and rose in 1981 at about the same rate of increase as was found at the Riverview High Rise. In the Riverview neighborhood, the recorded personal crime rate remained more or less constant from 1977-1981. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest an effect due to the Anti-Crime program, either directly, in the project itself, or indirectly, in the surrounding neighborhood.

- Riverview Estates Low Rise

The recorded personal crime rate had, despite a slight increase in 1978, decreased somewhat between 1977 and 1979. In 1980, however, the rate increased substantially, largely due to high levels during the second half of the year, after the UIACP effort had begun. In 1981 the rate further increased somewhat. There is, therefore, no evidence of positive program effects. In Cedar Apartments Low Rise, the comparison project, the recorded personal crime rate had followed almost exactly the same pattern as found at Riverview Low Rise

between 1977 and 1980 but rose dramatically in 1981. In the Riverview neighborhood, the recorded personal crime rate remained more or less constant from 1977-1981. Thus, the level of recorded crime in the Riverview Low Rise during the implementation period was somewhat higher than that found during the previous three years but increased less than at the comparison project. In light of the failure to find significant program effects on other impact measures, and the lack of correlation with program implementation, it would be difficult to attribute this difference to the Anti-Crime program. Finally, the program did not appear to have had an indirect effect on the surrounding neighborhood.

- Lakeview Estates High Rise

After remaining stable during 1977 and 1978, the level of recorded personal crimes increased notably in 1979. A further increase occurred in 1980, largely after the Anti-Crime program had begun, and in 1981. There is thus no evidence of any reduction attributable to program implementation. In the comparison project, Cedar Apartments High Rise, as noted earlier, the rate had declined from 1977 to virtually zero in 1979 and 1980, and increased somewhat in 1981. In the Lakeview neighborhood, the rate increased systematically from 1978 through early 1981, declined briefly, then rose again. Therefore, there is no evidence to indicate that the Anti-Crime program had any direct or indirect effect on levels of recorded personal crimes.

- Lakeview Estates Low Rise

After dropping somewhat between 1977 and 1978, the rate rose in 1979 and again in 1980; in 1981, however, a large decline occurred. This decrease took place during the late stages of implementation of the Anti-Crime program. This contrasts sharply with the dramatic rise in 1980 and 1981 which occurred at



the comparison project, Cedar Apartments Low Rise. As indicated earlier, the rate in the neighborhood surrounding Lakeview Estates experienced a steady rise during 1980 and 1981, with the exception of a brief decline early in the latter. There are, therefore, indications of possible positive program effects.

o Recorded Property Crime

- Riverview Estates High Rise

After dropping from 1977 to 1978, the level of recorded property crime rose notably in 1979, declined slightly in 1980 and rose again in 1981. There is thus no evidence of significant program impact. In the comparison project, Cedar Apartments High Rise, the level of recorded personal crime rose consistently--and dramatically--between 1977 and 1980, then fell sharply in 1981. In the surrounding neighborhood, the property crime rate has been declining since 1978. Thus, there is no evidence of any effect, either direct or indirect, due to the Anti-Crime program.

- Riverview Estates Low Rise

After dropping slightly in 1978 and 1979, the crime rate remained almost exactly the same for three years, including the period during which the Anti-Crime program was implemented. At Cedar Apartments Low Rise, after erratic shifts between 1979 and 1980, a marked increase occurred in 1981. As indicated above, the level in the surrounding neighborhood declined between 1978 and 1981. Thus, there are no indications of any effects due to the Anti-Crime effort.

- Lakeview Estates High Rise

The property crime rate rose slightly in 1978, fell in 1979, then rose dramatically in 1980, largely due to an unusually high number of burglaries

which occurred soon after the Anti-Crime program began. In 1981, however, the rate fell to a level lower than that found during any other year examined. At Cedar Apartments High Rise, as noted above, a similar notable decline occurred in 1981. Thus, the drop at Lakeview High Rise cannot readily be attributed to the Anti-Crime effort. Property crime in the neighborhood, after declining during 1977 and 1978, rose between 1979 and early 1981, at which time a decline occurred. Again, these results do not lend support to the idea that the Anti-Crime program produced a significant positive effect.

- Lakeview Estates Low Rise

After declining somewhat in 1978 and 1979, property crime rose in both 1980 and 1981, although less sharply than occurred at the comparison project, Cedar Apartments Low Rise. These results provide no clear evidence of any significant direct effect due to the Anti-Crime program. Similarly, the decline noted above in the surrounding neighborhood during 1981, provides no evidence of any indirect effect.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the CMHA can point to a number of program accomplishments in each of the seven program areas. In terms of improving public safety management, the PHA is currently receiving background information on housing applicants from a local social services clearing house, but the effects of this screening mechanism has thus far been limited. However, the PHA has improved upon its eviction procedures with the purchase of a computer and the implementation of a "Notice to Violators" ticket system. With respect to formal training, both PHA personnel and residents attended a few workshops.

With respect to the Modernization program, few of the work items have been implemented. An office for the Anti-Crime program was constructed, a CCTV

system was installed, new outdoor lights were put up, and the PHA purchased various equipment for the housing police. The vandal-resistant mailboxes are almost finished, but the other, more significant improvements (Riverview's lobby redesign plan, the site improvements, and the new windows and security screens) have yet to reach the implementation stage.

Resident participation was facilitated through the creation of a special organization, the Resident Anti-Crime Commission, which resulted in greater resident involvement in the Modernization program than the PHA had previously experienced. This organization made attempts to form block clubs, presented a number of slide shows, and published a newsletter, but the effectiveness of this group was weakened when the PHA failed to come through with the training and technical assistance promised in the application. RACC, however, continues to function as a resident anti-crime body.

Resident employment was achieved largely through RACC and the DOL-sponsored youth employment program. A tenant leader was selected to serve as RACC Program Director and two other tenants as aides. The DOL youths received rigorous training in public safety and the PHA fulfilled its commitment to go beyond conducting a "make-work" program. Six youths were retained as full-time PHA security guards after the program ended.

As far as social services provided by the city agencies is concerned, the drug abuse program never materialized and the victim/witness project was short-lived. The only new service established was property identification. The plans to involve the Cleveland Police Department in crisis intervention and sensitivity training did not materialize. The city's police response units occasionally participated in Anti-Crime activities but, as a whole, their involvement appears to have been quite limited. The only notable exception is

that officers from each of the eleven response units attended a two-day session on getting oriented to public housing environments.

With respect to establishing linkage with outside organizations, the city's community developments are earmarked to renovate the Lakeview Community Center, but no work has been done. The city did elect to spend some of these funds on repairing the streets inside Lakeview, and a local mental health center conducted a tenant needs assessment. Also, a feasibility study was conducted to develop recreation opportunities along the Cuyahoga River, but the city has not taken any action on the study's recommendations.

While several positive developments can be discerned, the mass of evidence from the different sources of information (process reports, surveys, and police records) does not show that the Anti-Crime program has had a significant impact on crime, fear of crime, or quality of life at Riverview Estates or Lakeview Estates. This generally negative conclusion, however, must be considered within the context of several intervening events that shaped the program and possibly influenced its impacts.

To begin with, there were two demonstration sites, which is not the same as saying that there was one demonstration that involved two sites. The distinction hinges on the extent to which the activities and events in one place influenced those in the other. There appears to have been little cross-fertilization, perhaps because in reality the sites were not contiguous. The Lakeview Anti-Crime program consisted primarily of two components-- Modernization and the assignment of three new patrolmen. Lakeview may still benefit from changes in CMHA's new resident screening and eviction strategies, but it is too early to evaluate these changes. In addition, tenant participation in the form of RACC may yet become a vehicle for grass-roots

participation in public safety planning. Finally, when local community development funds are released to renovate the community center, co-targeting of other local resources may become more effective. Aside from the visibility of some of the physical improvements, the large majority of Lakeview residents were unaware of program activities (in spite of flyers being distributed to every household), and opportunities to participate in the program were available only to a handful of individuals: those who joined tenant councils or were hired to work at Riverview.

In the case of the Riverview demonstration, it is not easy to dismiss weak program effects by pointing to insufficient program implementation. Nor can one point to administrative incompetence. While some of the management personnel and residents who were charged with implementation responsibilities left the program at early stages, they were replaced by caring and able implementors who performed well.

Nor is it easy to generalize to all program elements. Certain implementation activities fell short of promise (such as CMHA's plan to provide RACC with sweeping authority and the necessary organizational skills), some activities were not used regardless of need (such as the victim/witness office), others may have been underfunded (such as a youth employment program that provided jobs for just 12 persons), and still others may require more time before benefits can be discerned (such as the Notice of Violation tickets). The Authority could adopt a stance that, in spite of the observed implementation difficulties, the true benefits will accrue with time. Not only was the impact assessment period too brief, the demonstration itself was forced to end before the anti-crime changes were institutionalized and refined.

There is, however, little evidence of short-term benefits. It did not demonstrate the hypothesized synergistic effects of co-targeting federal funds. The demonstration resources were not used to create new local partnerships and gain access to new resources. The only truly effective partnership was between HUD and the Authority. In exchange for capital improvement funds, CMHA agreed to implement some social service and employment projects. HUD's effectiveness in encouraging local agencies and institutions to contribute and the PHA's ability to use the Anti-Crime demonstration to leverage funds from the federal agencies, such as LEAA, DOL, or HHS were non-existent. It is possible that the legacy of UIACP in Cleveland will be some computer hardware, window security screens, a lobby television monitor, and a variety of marginal changes outdoors. As yet, one cannot point to permanent institutional changes of any kind, much less changes that promise to reduce crime in two estates where the problem is getting worse every year.

Perhaps the conceptual foundation of the program, as defined in the May, 1979 Notice, was inappropriate for the implementors in Cleveland. There was a certain amount of reluctance within the Authority to mix community and criminal justice perspectives, deterrence and social reform, human relations and environmental design. Perhaps the program goals became blurred as the mandate wavered between addressing causes of crime (unemployment, lack of community cohesion, poor access control, etc.) and symptoms (selling drugs, gambling, household larceny, threats, etc.) To the extent that one can assert that the implementors were not faithful to the conceptual framework and rationale of the Anti-Crime program, one can also note that the federal agency violated a cardinal rule: it failed to encourage locally tailored solutions. CMHA accepted HUD's program-related suggestions, but the extent of the changes that

were forced on the Authority, between the submission of the original application in June, 1979 and June, 1980, when the confirmed Cooperative Agreement was signed, are significant enough so that CMHA could legitimately say that its Anti-Crime program was imposed on the Authority by federal officials. For example, there is a large difference between what CMHA, with its reputation for being insensitive to resident needs and wishes, proposed as a mechanism for grass-roots participation, and what HUD, with its emphasis on participatory democracy (at least within the UIACP office), did not permit the Authority to try, ostensibly because of budget constraints. This is not to suggest that tenant participation would have worked better if CMHA had its way (strengthening the organizational capacity of RACC), but the chances of reform in this area were not helped when HUD chose not to act as a federal facilitator.

The fact that the program designers were told that they had to settle for less than what they wanted in developing resident organizational skills probably did not disturb the PHA as much as when HUD said that there would be virtually no federal money for the one program area deemed most important to CMHA: augmenting and expanding police services. Instead, the Authority was told to use its own operating subsidy to contract with the city police, a proposition that Cleveland's mayor had rejected publicly. With three patrolmen assigned to each site, as CMHA originally proposed, and with adequate sensitivity training, an effective deterrence force might have been created. Although one might question the cost effectiveness of the traditional logic that more police will deter more crime, CMHA was most comfortable with the traditional law enforcement approach, and, it is unlikely that the assignment of six officers would have exceeded the point of diminishing returns with a ratio of one patrolman for every 268 units. This ratio is in fact higher than CMHA's average

(approximately one patrolman for every 214 units) and more than twice as high as it is for the New York City Housing Authority, which also has its own police force (approximately one patrolman for every 120 units). Thus, it is quite possible that, with only three officers assigned to both estates (a ratio of one patrolman for every 536 units), even with good opportunities for surveillance and cooperative residents, the impact on crime could hardly be expected to be significant.



Table 1  
Program Effects


Comparison	Change in Crime Prob.	Personal Victim.	Property Victim.	Perc. Sev. Crime	Perc. Sev. Disorders	Fear of Crime	Hshd. Perc.	Other Prec.	Quality of Life	Nbhd. Satis.
Lakeview-Hi vs. Riverview-Hi	0	0	0	-	-	0	0	-	0	0
Lakeview-Hi and Riverview-Hi vs. Cedar-Hi	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	0	0
Lakeview-Lo vs. Riverview-Lo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lakeview-Lo and Riverview-Lo vs. Cedar-Lo	0	0	0	0	0	++	0	-	0	0
Riverview-Hi vs. Riverview-Lo	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0
Riverview-Hi and Riverview-Lo vs. Riverview NBHD	-	0	++	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	+	-

Note: Table indicates significant program effects when taking into account "regressed change scores;" "++" represents a significant positive program effect; "+" represents a marginally positive program effect. "0" represents no significant/marginal effect; "-" represents a marginally negative program effect; and "--" represents a significant negative program effect. "NA" indicates that no test could be made for this dependent measure.

CLEVELAND 39  
Riverview Estates Low Rise


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



CLEVELAND <sup>40</sup>  
Riverview Estates High Rise


**RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




**RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




**RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




**RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units**



CLEVELAND  
Riverview Neighborhood 41


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



CLEVELAND  
Lakeview Estates Low Rise


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



CLEVELAND  
Lakeview Estates High Rise


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



CLEVELAND  
Lakeview Neighborhood 44


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



CLEVELAND  
Cedar Apartments Low Rise


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units






# CLEVELAND

## Cedar Apartments High Rise


**RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




**RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




**RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




**RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units**



# CLEVELAND Cedar Neighborhood


### RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




### RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)



### RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



### RECORDED BURGLARIES Per 10,000 Occupied Units

