

ORIGINAL

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EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

DADE COUNTY, FL, CASE STUDY

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The views and conclusions
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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Final Report

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program:

Baltimore, MD, Case Study
Charlotte, NC, Case Study
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PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/ private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

I. PROGRAM SETTING

A. The City

Dade County has recently experienced a number of significant challenges to its social and economic stability. From 1950 to 1980 Dade County's population increased from just under 500,000, 244 people per square mile, to a current population of 1,745,000, 855 people per square mile. During the same period, the ethnic mix of the community changed from 83% white, 13% black, and 4% Latin to 44% white, 17% black and 39% Latin.

Southern Florida saw a dramatic increase not only in its population but also in drug trafficking and violent crime. It is estimated that 80% of the marijuana, 70% of the cocaine, and 90% of the quaaludes smuggled into the U.S. pass through Dade County. Correspondingly, violent crimes in Southern Florida have increased from just under 6,000 in 1971 to over 17,000 in 1980, a year in which Miami experienced the nation's highest recorded murder rate--70 per 100,000 residents.

During 1980 and 1981, law enforcement agencies attempted to combat the problems with increases in personnel. The Dade County Public Safety Department increased by 1,000 its 1,726 member force; U.S. Customs Service Agents increased their numbers in southern Florida by one hundred; and Florida State Government lent an additional 100 state troopers to Miami in 1981. Although the increases were initiated after the awarding of the UIACP grants, they are a comment on the magnitude of the emerging problems in Dade County.

The political makeup of Dade County's 2,042 square miles makes combating crime with a coordinated law enforcement effort difficult. Dade County is separated into 27 different municipal government's which in total comprise 129 square miles of Dade County. In 1959 Dade County strove to reduce

the political chaos by combining such common services as transportation and sewer systems. However, the twenty-seven towns still raise their own taxes, pass their own zoning ordinances and run their own police and fire departments. As a result, consolidated efforts at reducing the myriad of problems affecting Dade County are hindered. The remaining 1,844 square miles is an unincorporated area whose law enforcement responsibilities and social services agencies fall under the jurisdiction of Dade County. Within this unincorporated area lie the two housing projects chosen as the sites for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program--Little River Terrace and Larchmont Gardens.

B. The Demonstration Site

Larchmont Gardens was developed as private housing, but later (1959) purchased and rehabilitated for use as public housing. It consists of 329 two-story townhouse units of one, two, three, four, and five bedroom apartments. A total of 1,125 people live in the 329 units--an average of 3.6 members per household. Ethnic distribution is 72.8 black, 9.6 white, and 17.6 Latin.

Little River Terrace, built in 1958 as conventional public housing, consists of 110 one-story duplex units divided similarly to Larchmont Gardens. The greatest number of units being, as is true for both projects, 2 and 3 bedroom units. One hundred six families with an average of 4.7 members per household live in Little River Terrace. The ethnic distribution is 30.2 black, 17.0 white, and 52.8 Latin.

Vacancy and turnover rates for Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace are consistent with other public housing in Dade County. Both projects have a large number of children and teenagers--67% of the total resident population is under the age of 21, with 44% between the ages of 9 and 21.

Adults, ages 21 to 61, make up only 23% of the population, and the elderly only 4%.

Treated as one project by both management and the governing Tenant Council, Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace are, nonetheless, two separate but contiguous housing projects, covering approximately 7 city blocks within unincorporated Dade County. Situated 5 blocks north of the Miami city limits, Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace are certainly affected by the greater Dade County/Miami crime and drug problems, but to some degree, they are insulated from them by the surrounding moderate to middle income, integrated neighborhoods, of mostly single family, owner-occupied structures. Interstate 95 borders the projects to the west and creates a barrier separating them from the mixed residential-commercial uses west of the highway.

Poverty is the largest single influence on the lives of the tenants. Ninety-five percent of the households report an income of less than \$9,400, with 63% reporting less than \$4,700. The average household size in Larchmont Gardens is 3.6 and in Little River Terrace 4.7--the 1979 poverty level for a family of 4 is \$7,412. The single largest reported source of income is Aid to Families with Dependent Children; only 26% of the residents reported wages as a source of income. Many of the teenagers have dropped out of school. They, and other unemployed residents, have few marketable job skills and little chance of employment in an already overcrowded job market. Free time is plentiful with frequent opportunities to participate in nonproductive or criminal activity. Drug and alcohol abuse among tenants of all ages is high.

Physical improvements at Larchmont Gardens, since the extensive renovation work completed in 1959, includes installation of new windows, a drainage system, sewer pumping stations, street lighting system, curbs and

gutters, vinyl asbestos floor tile, new roofs and construction of a community building. Improvements at Little River Terrace include installation of new roofs, new rear doors, and security screens on front doors.

Community programs available to the Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace tenants include (1) a recreation program run by Dade County Parks and Recreation Department at the community building; (2) JESCA (James E. Scott Community Association), which operates an infant and day care center with slots for 15 infants and 75 children, 80-85% of whom are residents of Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace; (3) the Streetworkers Program, also operated by JESCA, a limited peer counseling program geared toward youth and their related problems; (4) The Dade County Department of Youth and Family Development program geared to youth with school related problems; (5) the Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace Tenant Council; and the (6) Dade County Public Safety Department's Safe Streets Unit, made up of specially trained and volunteer officers who specialize in family crisis intervention, community relations, and crime prevention.

II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The Dade County Housing Authority (DCHA), having been aware of the pending issuance of an Anti-Crime Request for Proposal (RFP) was prepared, when in April 1979, it received the federal government's RFP. At that time the Dade County Criminal Justice Council, a planning unit located in Miami, was informed of the program and a packet of application information requested. The Dade County Anti-Crime Program proposal was written primarily by four persons working at different times. A member of the Criminal Justice Council (CJC) provided the general direction for grant writing, assisted by 2 Dade County Housing Authority employees and the Dade County Housing Authority Assistant

Director for Human Resources who played a major role in the eventual direction of the DCHA program. The police and crime prevention planner with the CJC, who later became the Public Safety Coordinator (PSC) contributed only minor technical assistance for the general grant, although later he became the major contributor of the Family Violence Program proposal. The Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace Tenant Council, prior to April 1979, was not politically active nor was it a powerful or influential voice for the tenants. A central core of active officers, but few, if any, residents attended meetings to discuss important project concerns.

Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace were selected for a variety of reasons: the population was felt to be representative of a wider sample of ethnic, social, and economic households than other projects; the high crime rate, although not significantly different from other projects, was felt to constitute a major problem; and the site was located within the Public Safety Department's Central District. The Central District maintained a Safe Streets Unit which specialized in family crisis intervention and crime prevention, a unit felt to have a high degree of credibility in the community. Of considerable importance was the manageability of both the size and physical design of the two contiguous housing developments, which would allow for a reasonable chance of success.

An extremely important factor in the selection of Dade County by HUD for Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (UIACP) funding, was the location of Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace in Senator Claude Pepper's district. Senator Pepper was the force behind inception of the UIACP, which developed from

his concern for the safety of the many elderly and criminally vulnerable persons living in his district's public housing. That concern was lost, both by HUD and DCHA, in selection of Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace. Neither had a substantial elderly population--Larchmont Gardens had only 3% and Little River Terrace just over 5%. The DCHA proposal does not directly address the elderly, nor were services provided to them other than those provided to all of the residents through general programs.

The DCHA proposed to reduce crime in the housing project's mostly through incorporation into the AC Program of already existing agencies and programs. These were, in most cases, incorporated without change except in the source and size of funding.

The proposal called for \$500,000 of federal funds to be allocated in the following manner:

- A) \$275,000 from HUD for Modernization (MOD) in the form of:
 - 1) security screen installation,
 - 2) landscaping, and
 - 3) site hardening of the community building and recreational space;
- B) \$153,600 from DOL/YCCIP to be used to:
 - 1) hire twenty-one (21) part-time youth workers,
 - 2) one full-time youth worker, and
 - 3) one half-time supervisor; and
- C) \$71,000 from CDBG to be used to:
 - 1) hire the PSC,
 - 2) hire an administrative assistant to the PSC, and
 - 3) provide funds to the Tenant Council to hire two social worker aids.

The federal grant was to be complimented with \$256,650 of local match funds. Of that amount \$153,150 from the local Community Development was to be used to support a Youth Leadership program and \$103,500 from local CEA monies, was to be used to run a Safety and Security Aide Program in which:

- 1) one full-time supervisor,
- 2) eight aides, and
- 3) one clerk-typist were to be hired.

The DCHA also received \$100,000 from OJJDP to support a Family Violence Program. The funds were approved in June 1980, nine months after the other funds had been approved, which raised the total figure for federal monies to \$599,600.

From its own funds and resources, DCHA was to rehabilitate a residential unit to house the on-site Anti-Crime Program office and a liaison officer was to be hired from the DCHA operating budget to facilitate better relations with the DC Public Safety Department. In addition, a Project Skills Bank was to be implemented to assist in the placement of tenants into suitable employment.

The DC Anti-Crime Program proposal also included a number of "no-cost" activities such as improvement of tenant-mangement relations, distribution and grouping of residents into clusters, and improvement of a tenant screening procedure through the creation of a review board.

The proposal was approved by the Board of County Commissioners in June 1979 then submitted to Washington, D.C. for consideration. Although the proposal closely followed the federal guidelines and only a few minor revisions were required, the proposal did not provide a unified, coherent strategy for fighting crime. It is not known whether DCHA grant writers perceived any

general themes within the federal guidelines (RFP's), however, if basic themes were recognized, the proposal fails to communicate that recognition. HUD, on the other hand, required no revisions that may have unified the DC program. The proposal, for the most part, is merely a "laundry list," a roster of intended program activities without a central theme to tie those elements together.

The DCHA received notification of their semi-finalist status in August 1979 at which time the required minor revisions and itemized listing of local match funds were submitted. In September 1979, MOD and CDBG awards were granted. In addition, the DOL application was submitted and the grant awarded.

It is evident that the DCHA had addressed most of the component areas of the AC Program in piece-meal fashion prior to the program through its own departments and utilization of community resources. The proposal reflects the continuation of this piece-meal approach to the problems in the targeted projects. The overall impression that arises is that the DCHA viewed the grant primarily as a vehicle for the maintenance of existing individual programs.

III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Improved Management of Public Safety by the PHA.

The DCHA proposed to improve management of crime prevention by attacking the problem on many fronts. The central core around which the program would revolve was the position of Public Safety Coordinator (PSC). The PSC, reporting directly to the Executive Director of the DCHA, would be responsible for a wide range of proposal objectives and serve to bring the various program components together in a smooth concerted way. Specifically, the PSC was to plan, implement, monitor, evaluate, supervise, and direct all safety and security activities, in addition to directly administering the Youth Leadership

Program, S & S Aide Program, and Family Violence Program. The means by which all of the separate components were to be brought together was never stated. Most programs proposed by DC were neither new nor innovative; most, in fact, were a continuation of programs previously established within the Housing Authority. To expect that the PSC alone could bring the sometimes duplicitous and frequently uncoordinated elements together under the new AC umbrella, anymore successfully than they had been brought together previously by the more powerful HA, was to expect too much. In addition, all of the PSC's duties were to be carried out with only the minimal assistance provided by an Administrative Officer whose responsibilities were to be budgeting and report preparation. Structured into the proposal, therefore, was a high likelihood of failure, regardless of the PSC's qualifications. Apparently, it was a likelihood that both HUD and DC failed to recognize.

The Executive Director, concerned from the beginning that the project not operate outside of the housing authorities regular management and chain of command, assigned responsibility for the program to the Assistant Director for Human Resources. Contrary to HUD's specifications, the PSC reported to the Assistant Director not directly to the Executive Director. A conflict arose almost immediately between the Assistant Director and the PSC over program direction. Fulfilling the desires of the Executive Director, the Assistant Director incorporated anti-crime components into the DCHA structure. The PSC, on the other hand, felt the program had been developed as an independent, demonstration project--one that was not to be merged into the larger housing authority. This conflict became, according to the PSC, a struggle between DCHA "survival and maintenance" procedures, and Anti-Crime Program "root causes" concerns. The PSC further felt that all power and control had been vested in

the Assistant Director and HUD, leaving him with responsibility for the program's success--but no authority to direct it.

One by one the various aspects of the anti-crime program were consolidated into the DCHA structure. From the beginning, the PSC's Tenant Council responsibilities were assigned to the Community Organization Unit and Unit Supervisor. In November 1980, the DOL/YCCIP Youth Employment Program was assigned to the Employment Outreach Supervisor. That same month responsibility for the S & S Program was transferred from the PSC to the Security Department Supervisor, and the Youth Leadership Program was reassigned to the Affirmative Action Officer. The rate of this consolidation, prompted originally by the Executive Director's opposition to a parallel operation, was accelerated by concern about the PSC's demonstrated lack of administrative experience. In fact, the PSC had never administered a program of this magnitude prior to taking the Dade County position. His skills were more those of planning programs and providing social services than supervision and administration. Adding to the PSC's difficulty with inexperience was his lack of office support. The Administrative Officer lacked budget expertise and report writing ability--the two essential ingredients of the position. Much of the PSC's time was spent training, supervising and educating his assistant.

The Executive Director brought with him to Miami a contingent of capable and experience staff from his previous assignment as Executive Director of Public Housing in New Haven, Connecticut. He surrounded himself with administrators well versed in the public housing structure who required no training and little direction. The PSC, on the other hand, came from a social services field, and although those contacts were valuable assets to bring to the PSC's position, he was also in need of assimilation into the public housing

structure, a process he completed more by trial and error than formal training. The PSC expressed a feeling of isolation with only minimal support or direction--feelings only exacerbated by the continuing conflict between himself and the Assistant Director.

Although it could be argued that recognition came, albeit too late, that the PSC, either because of program design or his lack of ability, could not adequately administer the anti-crime program and steps were taken to correct the problem, it can more strongly be argued that the DCHA's intention from the beginning was to incorporate the program into the greater housing authority structure.

Whether because of his lack of authority to "coordinate" the program, his own stated lack of political maneuvering skills, or the failure of HUD and Dade County to provide a unified program, the PSC never managed to pull the different aspects of the anti-crime program into a cohesive whole. The PSC was terminated in April 1981, although his position had, according to the proposal to HUD, been a permanent one. The reason cited was lack of funds. Most persons familiar with the program, however, concluded that disagreements between the PSC and the Assistant Director over management styles and responsibility, as well as the direction and purpose of the program, led to the PSC's dismissal.

Of all the programs proposed to improve management of crime prevention, the S & S Aide program operated with the greatest degree of success. Aides were visible throughout the projects and well received by the tenants. The PSC credits them with eliminating assaults and threats to school children on the El Portal Bridge. (For more discussion of the S & S Aide Program see Section III-D.)

Other programs met with much less success. Neighborhood clusters, within which many of the anti-crime program components were to operate, were given only cursory and haphazard attention by all of the program participants. Improvement of tenant selection procedures via formation of the Project Review Committee never developed. The committee, to be made up of the PSC, Project Manager, Maintenance Supervisor and Social Services Supervisor, was never formed and tenant selection procedures remain as they were prior to the UIACP.

Interagency contacts by individual program supervisors and the PSC were made, but little coordination of activities took place. There is no record that the training program to teach maintenance foremen and management to identify and remedy potential security problems, took place. The Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace manager did not take an active part in the anti-crime program and was, indeed, a weak link and at times a hindrance, throughout the program.

The "poor communication and cooperation with law enforcement agencies" stated in the Dade County Anti-Crime Proposal, the "lack of coordination in mobilizing local resources and social services around resident needs," and the "poor integration (of Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace) into the surrounding community," that existed prior to UIACP, were little improved at the end.

B. Rehabilitation to House Anti-Crime Activities and Improvement of Physical Design to Make Buildings and Spaces Harder Targets.

Due to the level of funds available only three improvements were selected for implementation with HUD AC MOD funds: installation of security screens for residential units (\$180,240), site hardening of the community building and recreation space (\$17,020), and landscaping (\$77,740). The total authorized budget was \$275,000.

In addition, DCHA included in the AC proposal an extensive list of improvements to be made under a \$739,906, 3-Year Modernization Plan covering such projects as installation of smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, mailboxes, clotheslines, and improved lighting for all units. A large portion of funding from the 3-Year plan (\$143,750), was allocated for installation of fences to create private spaces in the rear of all Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace units, and delineation with suitable materials, of front yard space at Larchmont Gardens. None of the improvements to be made within the 3-Year Modernization Plan would use AC MOD funds.

Finally, the DCHA proposed renovation of on-site units for office space to house AC programs and activities. The cost was to be absorbed into the DCHA operating budget at no cost to the AC Program.

Dade County was authorized for MOD funds as early as September 1979 but final budget approval by HUD was not given until September 1980, creating a long delay in implementation of the modernization program. A DCHA employee was appointed MOD Project Supervisor. The MOD Component of the AC program was administered through their existing hardware department and was never integrated into the overall AC program.

Since renovation of on-site units for AC program office space did not require HUD approval, that work began in January 1980. In May 1980 the offices were completed and all AC program staff moved in.

After a year of budget negotiations between HUD and DCHA, installation of the screens finally began in April 1981 and was completed in August 1981. Residents reacted positively to the idea of security screens but felt that only inexperienced trespassers would be deterred since the screens had been installed on the outside of the windows allowing for easy removal with nothing more

sophisticated than a screw driver. It was determined by the on-site observer that higher quality indoor screens made from heavier gauge wire were available retail for approximately 1/4 of the cost of the installed screens. In addition, installation of the screens on the outside of the windows would have increased the resistance to intrusion from the outside, thereby lessening the opportunity for criminal activity. A \$5,000 cost overrun was incurred in the bidding process. The extra expense was paid by a transfer of funds allocated to landscaping.

Although \$17,020 of MOD money was allocated for site hardening around the community building and recreational space in the form of high intensity outdoor lighting, fencing, and landscaping, none of these improvements were initiated. The only observable anti-crime MOD improvement, other than the security screens, was the outside painting of the duplex structures. Tenant input into what improvements should be made, although solicited, was disregarded. Tenants, primarily concerned with health matters, wanted leaky plumbing fixed, rat infestation controlled, and poor sanitation improved, all problems the DCHA project manager was unattentive to. An issue not effecting their health or well being, and consequently of much lessor concern, was the outside painting of structures. They felt, and later actions confirmed, that it would be only a short time before the walls were again covered with graffiti.

A significant portion of the DC MOD allocation, \$77,740, was budgeted for landscaping at both Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace. Originally, nothing more specific than "landscaping" was proposed. As early as July 1979, a consultant to HUD commented on the ambiguous term "landscaping" and suggested that greater detail was necessary. However, it was not until May 1980, that HUD requested more detailed information. June 3, 1980 the DCHA responded that

"landscaping" was "providing 18 shrubs for each apartment at a cost of \$8 per shrub and one tree (per unit) at a cost of \$60." Only 332 of the original 439 units were now included. No reason for this reduction was given. It was also not clarified, nor did HUD inquire further, whether those 332 units were located entirely at Larchmont Gardens or scattered proportionately between Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace. From this point, landscaping is discussed as "landscaping and fencing"--as one and the same. Although this DCHA response did not specify whether the shrubs would be arranged in a fencing pattern or randomly planted, the number of shrubs per unit, and the number of housing units involved, as well as information gained from personal interviews, leads to the conclusion that DCHA, in June of 1980, shifted--with HUD approval--funding for fence materials from the 3-Year Modernization Plan to AC MOD monies. Other than landscaping around the community building and recreational area, no other landscaping plans were presented. Extensive improvements originally proposed to be completed within the 3-Year Modernization Plan--were now shifted to the ambiguously defined AC MOD category. AC funds would, therefore, pay for improvements originally budgeted through other DCHA sources.

In September 1981, the screens were completed and \$83,000 remained in the MOD budget. Although this was an adequate amount to cover landscaping and site hardening as proposed, with only minor adjustments, DCHA became concerned about possible additional cost overruns. The DCHA and DC Parks Department worked together on a reduced landscaping plan in which only twelve units would be fenced and landscaped. Interestingly, a reduction in the number of shrubs from 18 to 16 would have reduced costs by approximately \$5,000 and allowed continuation of the full 332 unit plan.

During the summer of 1981, tenants became increasingly concerned by what they viewed as inappropriate modernization activities. Improvements they desired, plumbing repairs and rodent control, were not planned; promised improvements, anti-crime and 3-year plan projects had not been implemented. Few improvements were visible--and money was running out. Explanations by DCHA of MOD expenditures were viewed with distrust by Tenant Council members.

When presented with the new landscaping plan, Tenant Council members became vociferous over what they considered a gross mis-appropriation of modernization funds by the DCHA; a belief they felt had now been confirmed by the need to reduce the landscaping proposal to only twelve units.

A number of Tenant Council meetings were held in October and November 1981 with DCHA personnel in an effort to explain modernization expenditures and develop Tenant Council approval for the reduced landscaping plan. In November 1981 the Tenant Council finally approved the new plan. After questioning only the use of DOL youth to plant the shrubs, the regional HUD office granted approval. The need for a revised plan was not questioned.

From the beginning, HUD approved an extremely vague MOD landscaping proposal, and inclusion in the AC program of a very specific and independent, 3-Year Modernization Plan. During the year long budget negotiations, the MOD landscaping proposal continued to receive only cursory attention from HUD. Whether any of the 3-Year projects were initiated, or completed, is unimportant when reviewing Dade County's compliance with HUD AC MOD expenditure

requirements. What is significant, however, is that the differences between what was originally presented as two distinct program components, with equally distinct funding sources, eventually blurred and became one--with HUD's approval.

C. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

The DCHA proposed to produce greater tenant participation through two previously established tenant organizations: the Protect Our Project Program (PROP) and the Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace Tenant Council. PROP was to provide for tenant education on security and crime prevention techniques and promote cooperation among residents, tenant council groups, local law enforcement officials, and other community agencies. In addition, it was to be responsible for preparation of victimization reports and management of field surveys. Unfortunately, the CETA monies allocated to fund PROP were terminated at the national level and consequently PROP AC programs never materialized. The Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace Tenant Council was then the only organization through which tenant involvement could be coordinated.

The Tenant Council, incorporated as a non-profit association since 1971, had, in March 1979 formed a Tenant Council S & S Committee, through which project anti-crime efforts were to be directed. The Dade County Housing Authority Anti-Crime Program proposed to increase tenant participation by strengthening the S & S Committee. No involvement by the committee in the anti-crime program occurred however until the newly named, but structurally the same, Tenant Council Anti-Crime Committee was formed in October 1980. This change did not have a profound effect on the functioning of the Tenant Council. The Tenant Council and Tenant Council-Anti-Crime Committee, although holding separate meetings, functioned as one body.

In addition, DCHA included in the AC proposal an extensive list of improvements to be made under a \$739,906, 3-Year Modernization Plan covering such projects as installation of smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, mailboxes, clotheslines, and improved lighting for all units. A large portion of funding from the 3-Year plan (\$143,750), was allocated for installation of fences to create private spaces in the rear of all Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace units, and delineation with suitable materials, of front yard space at Larchmont Gardens. None of the improvements to be made within the 3-Year Modernization Plan would use AC MOD funds.

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Since renovation of on-site units for AC program office space did not require HUD approval, that work began in January 1980. In May 1980 the offices were completed and all AC program staff moved in.

After a year of budget negotiations between HUD and DCHA, installation of the screens finally began in April 1981 and was completed in August 1981. Residents reacted positively to the idea of security screens but felt that only inexperienced trespassers would be deterred since the screens had been installed on the outside of the windows allowing for easy removal with nothing more

Neighborhood Clusters, the fundamental structure within which most Anti-Crime Program components would function, were determined early in the program. Although assigned the responsibility of organizing clusters, the Tenant Council did not address the issue until December 1980 and organization did not begin until April 1981. Although some of the small number of residents involved in the Tenant Council attended a variety of conferences and workshops dealing with anti-crime issues, budgeting, parliamentary procedure, the conducting of meetings, and interviewing techniques, the Tenant Council functioned essentially as it had in the past. Tenant participation, which had been minimal and inconsequential, by and large, remained so.

Adding to the ineffectiveness of the Tenant Council was a lingering battle for control of the council itself. The Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace Tenant Council was led by a group of 5 or 6 resident leaders elected during regularly held tenant elections. Two officers had dominated Tenant Council efforts for years and were consistently at odds with each other. Logs of a number of meetings indicate that little transpired beyond a continuation of this feud. Eventually animosity overwhelmed the Tenant Council, bringing activity to a temporary halt. Tenant Council activities have since been revived but operate at an even lower level than before.

The only activity in which the Tenant Council exerted an influence on an Anti-Crime Component was in their participation on the selection board for DOL youth. Both the Tenant Council president and vice-president sat on the board. After the formal announcement of the program, the Tenant Council coordinated the distribution of informational flyers to each project residence. Applications were then accepted at the STOPP office and 58 applications were reviewed by the board. They selected 44 youths for oral interviews and the

remaining fourteen were sent to STOPP for counseling, GED classes, and stipend employment.

D. Increased Full and Part Time Employment of Tenants

The Dade County Anti-Crime Program emphasized work experience opportunities aimed at delinquent and high-risk youths through the DOL/YCCIP program. Employment would be supported by job and educational skill training provided through the Youth Leadership Program (YLP) with a focus toward permanent, mainstream employment. Supporting both the DOL/YCCIP and YLP, would be the development of a job skills bank, funded with CETA funds, for tenant employment referral. A Safety and Security (S & S) Aide program, also CETA funded, was proposed to provide 8 tenants with mid-level skill training and employment, and provide the residents with increased security through crime prevention patrols. To insure equal distribution of jobs to all segments of the community, employment slots were to be allocated according to neighborhood clusters.

Two additional programs were also proposed to operated with CETA funds. PROP and the Home Management Aides Program. Two Home Management Aides would be hired with CETA monies to augment the DCHA Home Management Training--Residential Information Services. The two aides would provide to Larchmont Gardens/ Little River Terrace residents counseling and training to improve parent/child relationships, counseling on money management and housekeeping practices, and information referral to agencies for special problems requiring specialized services. A freeze on CETA funds prevented implementation of PROP and the Home Management Aides program.

The DCHA also proposed to apply for HEW or CSA monies for two programs: and Emergency Home Management Service to provide crisis intervention, and an Alcoholic and Drug Abuse Program to provide substance abuse counseling.

Of the eight programs proposed by DCHA to increase tenant employment, only three functioned at any level of success--DOL/YCCIP, S & S Aide, and Youth Leadership. Those three programs covered 3/4 of the proposed tenant employment opportunities offered in the Dade County Anti-Crime Program.

The major anti-crime component to address the employment problem was the DOL/YCCIP Youth Employment Program. The time consuming and cumbersome process of budget approval adhered to in Dade County caused numerous start-up delays in the program. In addition, the PSC considered it the weakest AC component and resisted implementing it. These delays, in turn, caused frustration, and even anger, on the part of the residents who saw the delays as just more of the same in the way of unfulfilled government promises.

In spite of the continued delays by Dade County and the PSC, the DOL program once announced to the Tenant Council in April 1981, received an enthusiastic response. It is one of the few activities in which a variety of anti-crime programs worked together. A youth selection panel--consisting of the Tenant Council President and Vice President, the Superintendent of the Family Violence Program, the Director of Project STOPP; and two members of the DCHA--worked with the DOL/YCCIP Supervisor throughout the entire selection process. The Tenant Council coordinated distribution of flyers announcing the program to the residents and Project STOPP received the applications. Interviews were conducted by the panel and selections made.

During the process the original 3 capacities in which youth were to be employed--as modernization workers, performing landscaping and painting chores;

as aides to the Tenant Council, primarily as cluster organizers; and as an aide to the PSC's office--were later expanded to include assignment to the FVP and Project STOPP.

Personal knowledge of applicants by panel members heavily influenced the final decisions concerning employment, reflecting a preference for rewarding "deserving" youth instead of targeting delinquent or high-risk youth as had originally been proposed. In addition, the Director of STOPP made it clear that he preferred to hire youths that were presently involved in his program to fill the slots allocated to STOPP. Apparently that influence was felt; those youths had a much better chance of being hired.

Designed to work in concert with DOL/YCCIP was the Youth Leadership Program (YLP), sub-contracted to STOPP, a local non-profit crime prevention organization active in the area since 1975. Developed and run by ex-offenders, STOPP was selected to run the YLP because of the similarities between its objectives and those of the anti-crime program.

A broad array of programs addressing the potential youthful offender were offered by STOPP. The PSC states that the YLP was responsible for significantly reducing the incidence of vandalism within the projects and keeping Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace relatively quiet during the riots in May 1980. For STOPP's director and counselors, their forte was direct street-wise contact with the housing project youth. In that capacity they were an influential and powerful force. In contrast, supervision of DOL youth and administration of the program was poor. It must be realized that an agency such as STOPP, whose greatest benefit is the ability to develop trust and exercise influence with clients may not also be the same agency to provide administrative services such as record keeping or job placement and training. The portion of

the Dade County Anti-Crime Program designed to provide greater youth employment may have been better served by retaining job placement and training efforts within the Youth Employment Program than subcontracted to an agency whose expertise was peer contact. Many observers felt that STOPP was little more than a sophisticated baby sitting service, that, while occupying the youths' time, provided little substance. Employment involved little more than sweeping floors and answering phones. Although credit is taken by STOPP for numerous referrals to CETA, the State Employment Office and Miami Dade Community College, actual mainstream employment for tenant youth was not provided.

The S & S aide program, funded by CETA rather than AC monies, was nonetheless a major component of the DC AC proposal, and as such had the greatest success moving personnel on to mainstream employment. Three youth quit during the course of the program to take better positions and two S & S aides were hired by the DCHA Security Department at the end of the program. One of the first components of the anti-crime program to be initiated, the S & S Aide program began in February 1980 and ran through June 1981. The PSC, concerned that a program requiring a high level of skill and emotional maturity would be run with CETA employees and a minimum of training, developed personnel as crime prevention aides rather than security guards. Aides attended a variety of workshops on family violence, crisis intervention, individual and family behavior and CPR training. Their time was divided between project patrols, educating tenants in crime prevention behavior, and assessing problem areas and tenant concerns.

Unfortunately, the S & S aide program was not coordinated with the Dade County Public Safety Department other than the training that department provided. Increased patrols by the Public Safety Department, long a concern of

the tenants, were not started until March 1982, long after the Aide program ended.

All three of the components that operated with some degree of success to increase full and part-time employment of tenants were designed to function within the Neighborhood Cluster structure. However, the YLP, for the most part, did not function in that way; neither did the Youth Employment Program. The S & S Aide program, according to the PSC, was prepared to develop the Neighborhood Cluster Crime Watch Programs but was delayed for over 6 months waiting for other elements to be implemented. The Tenant Council, as previously stated, did not address the clusters issue until December 1980 and organization did not begin until April 1981. The S & S aide program ended June 1981.

E. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist
Victim/Witnesses

Numerous services to combat crime or assist victims and/or witnesses were proposed in the Dade County Housing Authority Anti-Crime program. Eight of the nine have been previously discussed. Five of those eight did not materialize--The Emergency Home Management Services, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program, Home Management Aide Program, and PROP. One of the eight operated at a minimal level--the Tenant Council Cluster Organizers. Only two became operational--the S & S Aide Program and Youth Leadership Program.

One additional program, mentioned inconspicuously under the responsibilities of the Tenant Council, now received emphasis, that of the Tenant Council newsletter. Details of what was intended are lacking, but it can be assumed that a newsletter was to be published and distributed with some regularity to the residents, keeping them generally informed of the various activities within the projects and, specifically, about the progress of the Anti-Crime Program,.

The Tenant Council Newsletter was published irregularly and seldom. The Tenant Council relied on flyers announcing special events and projects.

Only one new service was proposed in the contract to combat crime or assist victims and/or witnesses, the Victim Services Program. Application was to be made to the HEW Office of Victim Services for a \$50,750 grant to be administered under contract with the existing Dade County Victims Advocate Program to provide both crisis intervention services, and longer-term counseling to several distinct types of victims. Comprehensive education for tenants and other crime prevention program personnel would be provided. The Dade County/Victim Services program would also carry contractual responsibility for Emergency Homemaker Services. The DCHA never submitted the grant request, citing the unavailability of HEW funds as the reason. The only program designed specifically to assist victims and/or witnesses was the Family Violence Program (FVP). The FVP application presented the need to investigate the correlation between family violence and juvenile delinquency. The proposal, which asked for \$100,000 in grant monies from the OJJDP, involved a research component, a prevention component, and a treatment component. The program was to be an auxiliary to the YLP and was to be co-led by a Research Director and the YL Director. The two directors were to work with an advisory board and a community research team. In reality the FV Coordinator worked independently of the YL Director and advisory board.

The research component of the FV program began as soon as the Coordinator was hired in July 1980. Library research and program plan development occurred for the first four months. As soon as the library research was completed, the program office was broken into, vandalized, and all the paperwork was stolen. Much of the next several months was spent trying to make

up for the loss while attempting to stay on schedule for the other two aspects of the program, prevention and treatment.

The tenant education plan, which was to account for the prevention component, was proposed to begin in May 1981. Films, lectures, and a local resource directory are the only activities that transpired in tenant education.

Treatment was to consist of identifying problem families and, through interview evaluations, referring the individuals or families in need to a nearby existing agency. The FVP did some, but very little, of its own counseling, typically referring clients to Victims Advocates and Safe Space, both local victim-services agencies.

Although it provided for prevention and treatment, the major emphasis of the FVP was on research. It is clear that the original intention of the coordinator was to produce research in an area heretofore untapped and, therefore, the bulk of her time was spent in that area. There was no significant direct benefit to the tenants.

F. Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers

HUD, in the UIACP RFP, sought an emphasis in three areas:

1. increased police services,
2. use of specially trained police officers, and
3. improved resident/police relations.

These would, it was hoped, result in better law enforcement and reduced crime and fear of crime in the projects. The DCHA addressed those areas by proposing three objectives:

1. to inform police dispatchers of the AC and S & S programs
2. maintain contact with the Dade County Public Safety Department (PSD), recommending management changes to the DCHA as necessary, and

3. to review all reports of calls for police assistance in Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace and the police response.

It is reasonable to ask if the DCHA objectives had any direct relationship to what HUD desired. All of the Dade County objectives were met, yet, there was no significant increase in police services or use of specially trained police officers. By 1981 police-resident relations were at an all time low. Dade County's proposal to increase the use of better trained city police officers is not a well constructed, realistic plan and reflects insufficient consideration of those steps necessary to improve police service in public housing. The importance of this component to the program's overall success apparently was given only minimal attention by Dade County when the section was written and by HUD when it was approved. Greater emphasis appears to have been given to those areas generating additional funds instead of those requiring expenditures of time and commitment.

In spite of the meagerness of the proposal, efforts were made to improve and increase police services. The PSD committed itself to cooperation with the anti-crime program primarily through its Safe Streets Unit. This unit operated in the Central District within which Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace were located, specializing in family crisis intervention, community relations, and crime prevention. Experienced officers volunteered for assignment to the unit and received intensive training in those area mentioned in addition to sensitivity training. A detective from the SSU was assigned as liaison and attended most of the Tenant Council meetings, primarily to organize Crime Watch. Reaction to this police officer, who sometimes attended Tenant Council meetings on his own time, was unanimously positive.

Residents, however, were more concerned with the implementation of team policing. Tenants and the PSD felt it was something that not only had been promised by the PSD early in the program, but was a component essential to the AC program's success. Residents became upset when it did not materialize. The PSD spent the greater share of its efforts trying to initiate Crime Watch. For the most part, tenants were disinterested. Tenants, on the other hand, continued efforts to initiate team policing. The PSD was unresponsive. (Eventually, through participation on the Citizens Advisory Council team policing was started in Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace in February 1982). In August 1981, Tenant Council relations with the PSD were at an all time low. Joint meetings between the two were temporarily cancelled.

At this time, Dade County was experiencing a rapid rise in crime, PSD resources were dwindling, and personnel allocation was being reviewed. The PSD withdrew from participation in the Anti-Crime Program. The Tenant Council interpreted the PSD's action as an indication of a lack of commitment to the area. The PSD gave the reason for its discontinuance as the lack of tenant interest and participation. In reality it is difficult to say which combination of the explanations accounts for this discontinuation. Each organization, the PSD, DCHA, and TC, contributed to the ineffectual and predominantly stormy, relationship among them. There was no binding contract with the PSD to participate in the ACP. Strong commitments were centered in individuals. Department commitment was based on ease of execution. The PSD withdrew from a commitment for team policing; this withdrawal, compounded by tenant apathy, prevented any concerted Crime Watch effort. It is impossible to speculate whether an increase in tenant involvement with Crime Watch might have occurred

had policing teams been assigned to the projects at the beginning of the Anti-Crime Program.

G. Stronger Linkage With Local Government and Other Agencies

The DCHA proposed to maintain contact, through the PSC, with the Dade County Economic Development Administration in order to coordinate activities and expenditures in the housing projects and surrounding areas by local governments during the course of the grant. There is no indication that any programs were targeted to the area specifically in coordination with the anti-crime program.

The Dade County Office of Community Development provided local anti-crime match money to the Dade County Department of Parks and Recreation for the purpose of converting the vacant strip of land behind the Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace projects into a park and recreation area. Tenant input was to be solicited. In addition, HUD and the Parks Department funds were budgeted for renovation of the Community Building. In February 1980 the PSC requested that the Parks Department allow tenant participation in the planning and coordination of the park.

The third specific proposal was for the PSC to seek cooperation from the Little River Business Association to determine the feasibility of a Federal Crime Insurance Program to the Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace area. The program was determined to be impractical and application was not made. There is no evidence that the Little River Business Association was involved in the determination.

Although the DCHA directly addressed only the Dade County Development Administration, the Dade County Department of Parks and Recreation, and the Little River Business Association in its anti-crime proposal, it is obvious

throughout the proposal that development of strong linkages with many agencies, public and private, would be necessary to fulfill the mandate of the anti-crime program. Development of most community linkage was heavily dependent on the individual component coordinators. The FVP relied heavily on existing public agencies for referral. Services for substance abuse and family crisis support, because the specific programs did not develop, required professional services elsewhere in the community. Information on these services was disseminated primarily through the S & S aides.

As previously discussed, a linkage crucial to the success of the program, that of coordination with the PSD, was attempted, weakly supported and poorly structured, and in the end, due to its failure, caused more antipathy than existed prior to the program.

IV. PROGRAM IMPACT

A. Resident Survey Analyses

Because no Dade County site existed with demographic characteristics comparable to Larchmont Gardens or Little River Terrace, there is no comparison project. Interviews were conducted May 22-July 24, 1981 in both the demonstration sites and the Larchmont/Little River neighborhood. At the time the interviews were conducted, most of the DC AC components had been incorporated into the DCH structure and were being supervised by DCHA supervisors. The Public Safety Coordinator had been terminated in April 1981, and the position, although funded to be ongoing, was terminated also. In April 1981, STOPP's contract was renewed for an additional year. Installation of screens, and therefore the greatest portion of youth hiring, began in April 1981 and continued throughout the interviewing schedule. Neighborhood Watch activity in four clusters was initiated for the first time in July 1981. Police-tenant

relations were hostile, centering around the Public Safety Department's unwillingness to assign police teams to the projects.

1. Program Awareness. Fifty-three percent of the Larchmont Gardens residents and 37% of the Little River Terrace indicated an awareness of youth employment programs. This was the highest level of awareness among all components of the DC/AC program surveyed. The Youth Employment Program was the component considered to generate the most resident participation. In that respect, the awareness figures must be viewed with dismay. Awareness should be a necessary prerequisite to participation. That no program had a greater awareness level than 53%, predetermined a high risk of failure at implementation.

Residents were asked if they were aware of any crime prevention meetings and/or workshops that had taken place in the housing project during the year preceding the survey. After more than a year of various AC program activities only 50% of the Larchmont Gardens residents and 34% of the Little River Terrace residents stated they were aware of such workshops/meetings. During that time the Tenant Council Anti-Crime Committee scheduled bi-weekly meetings--although on-site observations show they took place with much less regularity and little public notice. Considering the multitude of areas targeted for attention, and the emphasis that was to be placed on tenant participation, it is indeed disappointing that so few of the residents were aware of anti-crime programs.

No independent measure of the Family Violence Program was made as this was a program unique to Dade County. However, the bulk of the Family Violence proposal was devoted to research, having little direct effect on the residents, and could be expected to reflect a low level of awareness.

Approximately 33% of the residents at both Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace answered positively when asked if they had heard of residents watching each other's apartments during a neighbor's absence. Only 20% of the Larchmont Gardens residents and a mere 8% of those at Little River Terrace, were aware of any formal Neighborhood Watch programs. Neighborhood Watch activity was initiated for the first time in July of 1981, during the time in which the interviews were conducted. Taking into consideration the awareness levels for other components of the DC AC program as well as the awareness level of Neighborhood Watch at its inception, it is reasonable to conclude that publicity about AC activities was not intense. Although 8 Youth Employment Program workers and 2 CDBG workers were assigned to the Tenant Council to organize clusters and neighborhood watches, only minimal results are evident.

2. Program participation. 30% of the total Larchmont Gardens/ Little River Terrace households reported participating informally in watching a neighbor's apartment. 18% of the Larchmont Gardens households report participating in the more formal Neighborhood Watch while only 7% of the Little River Terrace households report doing so. Although awareness levels for the Youth Employment Program and crime prevention meetings and/or workshops is somewhat lower at Little River Terrace than Larchmont Gardens the participation levels for both sites are nearly equal. Approximately 20% of the households at either site report participation in the Youth Leadership Program; an equal number report participation in crime prevention meetings and/or workshops.

3. Fear and Victimization. Residents perceived crime to be a very big problem. Robbery, burglary, and both the selling and use of drugs were seen as major problems. By contrast, however, the victimization survey revealed low levels of burglary (Larchmont Gardens 8.3%--Little River Terrace 3.1%), robbery (Larchmont Gardens 1.5%--Little River Terrace 1.8%), and property theft (Larchmont Gardens 2.9%--Little River Terrace 5.4%). The burglary figures for the surrounding Larchmont/Little River neighborhood are similar at 7.5%, although robbery and property crimes are lower--0.4% and 0.8% respectively. 8.3% of the residents at Larchmont Gardens, 3.6% of the Little River Terrace residents, and only 1.2% of residents in the surrounding neighborhood, had been victims of a violent crime. Correspondingly, residents showed a high level of apprehension over someone walking behind them or an unexpected knock on the door.

Residents indicated they were only somewhat worried that they would be victimized by burglary or have their auto stolen or damaged. Results for the surrounding are comparable.

4. Perceived Change. Residents were asked two questions which allowed them to compare current conditions to those that prevailed a year ago. When asked whether the project had become a better or worse place to live, residents of Little River Terrace indicated that conditions had greatly deteriorated. Deterioration was indicated by residents of Larchmont Gardens also, but to a lesser degree.

When asked specifically whether crime had become more or less of a problem, residents of Little River Terrace responded that crime had become a considerably greater problem than in the previous year. Residents of Larchmont

Gardens also thought crime had become more of a problem, although not to the extent indicated by Little River Terrace residents.

They perceive as the greatest deterrent to crime an increase in police visibility followed by increased use of security guards. Residents felt there was very little they could do to reduce crime. This apathy is reflected in the low level of Neighborhood Watch participation and the overall disinterest shown for the AC program. Residents disliked living in the projects and were reluctant to recommend either Larchmont Gardens or Little River Terrace to their friends.

As the survey results indicate, there were both legitimate and perceived problems in the projects, upon which the AC should have impacted. The timing of the 1981 resident survey was such as to allow measurement of several possible program impacts, but which in effect showed minimal positive results. Based on this evidence, it was decided to dispense with a second wave of surveys in 1982 as not being cost-effective. Such a survey would have occurred well after most program elements had ceased to function and thus was judged to be able to add only marginally to the evaluation of the program.

B. Recorded Crime Analysis

The recorded incidences of crime (both personal and property) per 10,000 persons increased in Dade County during the years 1978 and 1979, and showed a dramatic increase during 1980. The rate of property crimes in the combined Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace project during the same time period remained well below the county wide rate. In contrast, the rate of recorded personal crime from 1977 through 1979 was approximately 3 1/2 times that of the overall rate for Dade County, and 2 1/2 times Dade County's 1980 year end rate.

At the end of 1980, Dade County began to experience a steady decline in all crime; a decline which carried through 1981. At the same time, Larchmont Gardens and Little River Terrace showed a dramatic increase in recorded property crimes--the rate nearly doubling in Little River Terrace in 1981. Property crime in Little River Terrace rose with little fluctuation from a rate of 250/10,000 in 1978 to well above 1,100/10,000 in 1981. By December 1981, Larchmont Gardens had nearly returned to its 1978 high of approximately 660/10,000 after experiencing a low of 250/10,000 in 1979. The rate of personal and property crime in the surrounding Larchmont/Little River neighborhood, during the period from January 1978 to December 1981, remained constant.

Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace trends appeared to operate independently from Dade County proper. While crime county-wide increased, crime in the projects decreased. When, in 1981, the crime rate in Dade County decreased, crime in Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace rose. In 1981, property crimes increased dramatically in the projects. Personal crimes also rose, but not as dramatically. Meanwhile, crime in the surrounding Larchmont/Little River neighborhood showed little discernable difference.

It could be argued that the AC program was responsible for an increase in tenant awareness and improved police/tenant relations, promoting an increase in crime reporting. But a comparable crime rate increase in 1978, a full year prior to the AC program, cannot be explained in such a manner, and it must be remembered that police/tenant relations in 1981 were tenuous and antagonistic, producing negative, rather than positive, results. Such an argument has little support.

Some support does exist, however, to support the effectiveness of screens installed with MOD funds. Crime rate figures for burglaries per 10,000 occupied units show a dramatic rise during the summer months of 1981 after which they start a decline back to 1980 levels. Screen installation was completed in October 1981 and may account for the decline, although, figures beyond 1981 are not available and a determination cannot be made as to whether the decline was temporary or a trend which continued through 1982.

During the 1979 selection of project sites for the UIACP the rate of personal crimes in Larchmont Gardens/Little River Terrace was approximately 2 1/2 times that of Dade County; the property crime rate a little more than half. The Dade County proposal attacked the incidences of property crime, clearly not the area requiring immediate attention. Fences, private space, and target hardening, in addition to tenant employment and training, were the mainstays of the proposal. Those programs which would deal more specifically with personal crime--Home Management Training, expanded anti-social behavior procedures, Emergency Home Management Services, victim/witness services, and alcohol/drug abuse programs--received only cursory attention in planning, and none advanced beyond the proposal stage. The only Dade County anti-crime component specifically targeted toward personal crime was the Family Violence Program and it, unfortunately, did not move past the research stage. Although property crime rates increased much more quickly than did those for personal crime, they continued to be similar to Dade County. Personal crime continues to be well above. Little documented effect is evident from anti-crime expenditures.

The Dade County UIAC proposal did not provide a unified program to combat crime or make crime prevention a priority concern of the Housing Authority, but rather, was a fragmented list of existing Dade County programs

for which the Housing Authority sought funding--without, at the same time, proposing a way to mold the fragments into a unified whole.

Implementation was equally fragmented and at no time did the DCHA ACP operate as other than a multitude of independent components, each operating toward different objectives: the Family Violence coordinator to do research, the DCHA to increase resources, STOPP and the Tenant Council to further their own individual causes, and HUD to satisfy a local Congressman without consideration of the merits of the proposal. The PSC, without previous experience and lacking the necessary resources and skills, was unable to bring the program together.

From the beginning the Executive Direction showed a desire to incorporate the Dade County Anti-Crime Program into the basic Housing Authority structure, and little inclination to maintain it as a demonstration project. A conflict arose immediately between the PSC and the Housing Authority over the purpose and direction of the program. The conflict was never satisfactorily resolved. Eventually the anti-crime program was incorporated into the DCHA structure and after 18 months the PSC position was terminated. Those responsibilities were shared for the remainder of the program by the Assistant Director for Human Resources, the DCHA Community Organization Unit Supervisor, and a DCHA Community Organization Specialist.

Various components of the program were quickly assimilated into--or lost within--the myriad of other programs for which the DCHA supervisors were responsible. Already overburdened by programs to administer, the supervisors quickly lost sight of the UIACP goals. The AC program became one more of a number of programs to be administered through the established DCHA structure, generally receiving attention only after problems developed.

The Dade County program relied heavily on CETA monies to sustain supporting components. According to DCHA, major CETA cutbacks prevented implementation of the PROP and Home Management Aides programs, although, the S & S Aides Program, also CETA funded, was initiated. In addition, many ongoing DCHA programs, extended to the anti-crime program, were also supported by CETA funds. With the withdrawal of CETA monies, the programs were no longer available.

Initiated under the DC AC proposal, in addition to S & S aides and the YLP contract, were only those programs for which Dade County received HUD UIACP funds: establishment of the PSC position, increased tenant employment, a Family Violence Program, modernization in the form of "landscaping," and money to the Tenant Council to increase tenant participation. Previously existing DCHA programs, proposed as support services and funded from within the DCHA budget, never materialized. In fact, it appears, that funds for one UIACP component, modernization, actually paid for a previously established Dade County program, the 3-year Modernization Plan. The proposed UIACP components met with little success. The bulk of the FVP consisted of research, resulting in little direct benefit to the tenants. Although it was a goal of the Youth Employment Program to channel tenant participants into mainstream employment, very little was accomplished in that regard. The high unemployment existing in Dade County and the poor economic condition of most businesses, created an almost nonexistent job market. Complicating the transition was the lack of appropriate training that would enable tenants to move into mainstream employment. The position of PSC was terminated after 18 months and never reinstated. Lastly, the infusion of money into the Tenant Council did not significantly increase or improve tenant participation.


The Dade County Anti-Crime Program was implemented as it was conceived, a diverse and disjointed collection of proposed and existing programs, with no

unifying component. As a means to increase DCHA funds, it was successful. As an innovative demonstration project to increase crime prevention awareness and reduce crime, it was not successful. The DCHA ACP ended up where it began, within the DCHA structure, undistinguished from the multitude of other programs.

DADE COUNTY Larchmont Gardens


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES Per 10,000 Occupied Units



DADE COUNTY Little River Terrace


**RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




**RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




**RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



**RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units**




DADE COUNTY

Larchmont/Little River Neighborhood


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)



RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units

