

Rental Assistance and a Fresh Start to Spur Criminal Desistance: Evidence From a Pilot Housing Experiment

David S. Kirk

University of Oxford

The Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development of the National Institutes of Health supported the research reported in this article under award number R03HD081515, as did the Leverhulme Trust through the Leverhulme Centre for Demographic Science. The content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health or the Leverhulme Trust. Similarly, the findings in this article do not reflect the views of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services or its constituent agencies.

Abstract

Much of the research literature on prisoner reentry focuses on the importance of individual determinants of reintegration of the formerly incarcerated back into society, such as education, job training, and addiction treatment. Less studied are the consequences of housing and neighborhood context. Still, research shows that the formerly incarcerated tend to have unstable residential patterns, and their places of residence are often in close proximity to the same locations where they got into trouble with the law in the past. This article argues that stable housing, particularly in an environment that provides an opportunity for a fresh start and a separation from past criminal associates, is a crucial foundation for successful prisoner reentry. Evidence in support of this argument is garnered from a pilot housing mobility program called the Maryland Opportunities through Vouchers Experiment, or MOVE, which aimed at lessening the risk of recidivism by using housing subsidies to provide participants with housing in geographic areas some distance from where they lived in the past. This article reports on the outcome of the pilot, including an assessment of the likelihood of rearrest and a qualitative comparison of the post-release experiences of treatment and control group participants.

Introduction

I send this letter in the sincere hope that I can obtain your assistance. I am scheduled to be released back into the band of society and I am without a place to stay. I do not desire to return to the area that I lived in the city of Baltimore prior to my incarceration, as this would cause me to jeopardize my probation. I would appreciate your assistance in obtaining a housing voucher in the Prince George's County area, as this would afford me a fresh start toward becoming a good member of the community.

—Charles Dupree

Letter to the Maryland Opportunities through Vouchers Experiment (MOVE), September 15, 2015

Mr. Dupree's (a pseudonym) letter was one of more than 100 the author received from people incarcerated in state prisons in Maryland requesting participation in MOVE, an experimental housing mobility program for the formerly incarcerated that the author piloted in Maryland in 2015 and 2016. As a pilot program, the recruitment and outreach efforts were minimal, consisting solely of contacting the four participating prisons in advance of periodic recruitment visits to the institutions to inquire which individuals were to be released from prison during the next 90 to 180 days. The program was not advertised, yet word of mouth about the program quickly spread. Although the program was implemented in four male institutions, the author received correspondence from individuals housed in prisons throughout the state, including occasional letters from incarcerated women. The steady stream of letters, received even after the pilot had ended, speaks to the intense demand for housing among the incarcerated and formerly incarcerated.

Mr. Dupree's letter touches on two challenges people exiting prison face. First, many individuals do not have a stable place to live. For instance, Harding, Morenoff, and Herbert (2013) observed that parolees in Michigan move an estimated 2.6 times per year for the median parolee. Second, most people exiting prison end up living within a few miles of where they resided prior to incarceration, effectively returning to the very environments where they got into trouble with the law in the past (Glaser, 1969; Harding, Morenoff, and Herbert, 2013; Kirk, 2020). Yet many people exiting prison recognize that returning to familiar settings can be detrimental to their rehabilitation, often leading to a return to criminal behavior. Many express a desire to move to different residential locations to avoid the temptations and troubles associated with familiar neighborhood settings (Visher and Farrell, 2005).

The MOVE program was designed to address these twin challenges by offering subsidized housing to individuals newly released from prison in locations distant from where they resided prior to imprisonment. This article reports on a randomized pilot of MOVE, including a description of the program design, an assessment of rearrest outcomes, and an analysis of participants' experiences post-incarceration via repeated qualitative interviews. Before proceeding with a discussion of the program, the article first provides further background on the theoretical and empirical rationale for the development of MOVE.

Background

The era of mass incarceration since the 1970s in the United States has been characterized by an astonishing likelihood that individuals will serve time in prison at some point in their lives, particularly undereducated males. Roughly 1 in every 4 African-American men in the United States born in the late 1970s served time in prison by age 34, as well as 1 in 8 Latino males and 1 in 20 White males (Western and Pettit, 2010). For African-American male high school dropouts, the figure balloons to 68 percent. In terms of raw counts, approximately 1.2 million individuals were serving time in state and federal prisons and another 636,000 in local jails in 2021, figures that actually represent substantial declines relative to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Carson, 2022; Zeng, 2022).

A rapid increase in the number of individuals exiting prison each year coincided with the rise of hyperincarceration. In 1979, roughly 166,000 prisoners were released from state and federal prisons back into the community. By 2009, that number had reached 740,000, before declining to 614,000 a decade later (BJS, 2023).

The sheer scale of individuals exiting prison each year in the United States strains a deeply oversubscribed system of affordable housing, resulting in the twin challenges addressed at the outset of the article: (1) High levels of housing instability and (2) a return to familiar environments given limited access to housing elsewhere, even if doing so exposes individuals to the criminal peers and criminal opportunities that could undermine one's attempt at desistance. On the first challenge, numerous studies have found that housing instability is common among formerly incarcerated individuals, with evidence of variation by race. For instance, Makarios, Steiner, and Travis (2010) found that Ohio parolees live, on average, in two different residences in the first year after release from prison, and 30 percent lived in three or more locations. Drawing on data from the Fragile Families data collection, Geller and Curtis (2011) found that 31 percent of sampled urban fathers with a history of incarceration experienced housing instability, such as eviction or time in a shelter, versus 14 percent of otherwise similar fathers without an incarceration history. Herbert, Morenoff, and Harding (2015) tracked the residential situations of parolees in Michigan, finding that most periods of residence for the parolees lasted only a few months, with one-half lasting at most 8 weeks. Using nationally representative data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Warner (2015) found that only for formerly incarcerated African-American individuals is residential instability significantly greater post-imprisonment relative to their preprison experience. Also drawing on NLSY data, Bryan (2022) examined whether housing instability among the population of criminally convicted individuals is attributable to their felon status, even in the absence of incarceration. She concluded that a felony conviction, independent of whether it led to a punishment of incarceration, induces housing instability, and that the association between incarceration and housing stability observed in many studies is likely to be driven by individuals' felony conviction status rather than the actual experience of incarceration.

With respect to the second challenge related to residential location, research focusing on Louisiana found that normally about 75 percent of people exiting from prison originally from the New Orleans metropolitan area return to the same parish (that is, county) where they resided prior to imprisonment (Kirk, 2020). In research in Michigan, Harding, Morenoff, and Herbert (2013) found

that roughly one-third of newly released prisoners resided within 0.5 miles of their preprison place of residence, and that 60 percent resided within 5 miles of their preprison residence. In a study of individuals released from federal prison, Glaser (1969) found that 45 percent returned to the same neighborhood where they resided prior to incarceration, and another 38 percent returned to a different neighborhood in the same metropolitan area where they lived in the past. Only 17 percent of former federal prisoners in his sample moved to different metropolitan areas than where they had resided immediately prior to incarceration, but most of these individuals had at some point in their past resided in the metropolitan area where they returned, even if it was not the location where they were residing immediately prior to incarceration. Hence, people exiting prison do not necessarily return to the exact houses and neighborhoods where they resided prior to incarceration, but it is very common for them to return to familiar environments in close proximity to where they resided in the past.

Thus far, this article has described the twin challenges of housing instability and residence in the familiar environments of one's past. Of what consequence are these challenges for outcomes such as recidivism? A growing body of research has addressed this very question, finding that residential instability increases the likelihood of recidivism, as do periods of homelessness (Makarios, Steiner, and Travis, 2010; Meredith, Speir, and Johnson, 2007; Metraux and Culhane, 2004; Steiner, Makarios, and Travis, 2015). Hence, it reasons that financial housing assistance could lower the likelihood of recidivism by facilitating residential stability, yet relatively little research has rigorously tested this question (see Hamilton, Kigerl, and Hays, 2015; Lutze, Rosky, and Hamilton, 2013).

Similarly, recent research suggests that residential change, away from the geographic locations of one's past, can lead to a reduction in recidivism. For instance, in prior work, the author used the neighborhood destruction in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina as a natural experiment to investigate the potential effect of residential change on reincarceration (Kirk, 2020, 2012, 2009). He found that individuals who moved away from their former parishes were 13 percentage points less likely to be reincarcerated through 8 years post-release.

Other studies similarly find some benefit to moving, at least when the distance is substantial enough for a fresh start. For instance, in a study of Chicago-area youths, Sharkey and Sampson (2010) found that among adolescents who moved to different neighborhoods within Chicago (that is, a short distance) that their likelihood of violent offending increased. However, moving outside of Chicago reduced violent behavior. Similarly, in a study of delinquency in London, Osborn (1980) found that those who moved away from London were significantly less likely to be reconvicted of a crime than individuals who stayed in London.

Why exactly might moving to a new city or county lead to a change in someone's behavior? Laub and Sampson's (2003) life-course theory provides a theoretical rationale (see also Sampson and Laub, 1993). Among the notable findings from their multidecade project is that individuals desist from criminal activity in response to structurally induced turning points, such as work and marriage. Turning points provide opportunities for individuals to separate from the people and situations that facilitated prior criminal behavior. Moving to a new location, if of sufficient distance away from familiar locations of one's past, may provide helpful separation from nefarious temptations and criminal opportunities and an opportunity to change one's routine activities (Kirk, 2018).

This logic of turning points is intuitively appealing. Indeed, Mr. Dupree, in the opening quote of the article, was implicitly using turning-point logic in describing his hopes for finding housing away from Baltimore, the site of his legal troubles. However, what are the barriers to securing stable housing in a new environment for people exiting prison?

Barriers to Housing

A fundamental challenge to finding secure and stable housing is a lack of income, which is a function of the relatively poor employment prospects of formerly incarcerated individuals and restrictions on welfare benefits to individuals with criminal convictions (Geller and Curtis, 2011; Harding et al., 2014; Herbert, Morenoff, and Harding, 2015; Kirk, 2019). A related challenge is the collateral consequences of punishment, which refer to the “legal and regulatory sanctions and restrictions that limit or prohibit people with criminal records from accessing employment, occupational licensing, housing, voting, education, and other opportunities” (ABA, 2013; see also Kirk and Wakefield, 2018). For instance, individuals convicted of certain felonies may be banned, some permanently, from receiving public housing benefits or vouchers.

Stigma and both legal and illegal discrimination are also barriers to housing. Easy access to criminal background information makes it readily possible for landlords, property owners, and lenders to use such information when evaluating prospective tenants and customers (Evans and Porter, 2015; Lageson, 2020). Moreover, because of the racial and ethnic disproportionality in the use of criminal justice punishments, the use of criminal background information in housing decisions has civil rights implications in accordance with the Fair Housing Act (HUD, 2016, 2015).

Another barrier to housing for the formerly incarcerated is the lack of affordable housing. The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University (2022) reported that 30 percent of all U.S. households are cost burdened, meaning they pay more than 30 percent of their incomes on housing. Fourteen percent of households spend more than 50 percent of their income on housing. This substantial rate of cost-burdened households is a function of many factors, including soaring costs of housing in the rental and owner-occupied markets and inflation in recent years that has far exceeded average wage growth. Additionally, rental vacancy rates in the apartment stock reached an all-time low of 4.8 percent in the third quarter of 2021, with rates just slightly higher in 2022 (JCHS, 2022). When vacancy rates are low, individuals with criminal records, many of whom also have bad credit histories, are competing with others for relatively few affordable housing options. Federal assistance to offset the cost burden of housing or the lack of supply of affordable units is not nearly adequate to cover need. Indeed, Fischer and Sard (2017) found that only one-fourth of families who are eligible for federal rental assistance actually receive it.

In sum, hyperincarceration and its collateral consequences, in combination with stagnant investment by the federal government in assisted housing and the troubling state of affordable housing development in the United States, have created and perpetuated a housing crisis for individuals with criminal records, with consequences for public safety. To follow, this article presents a model for how to provide a foundation for desistance from crime among formerly incarcerated individuals through the provision of housing assistance. The Discussion section later addresses possibilities for funding the subsidies without a net increase in overall government spending.

MOVE Background and Design

MOVE is a voluntary program designed to incentivize and facilitate opportunities for housing and residential moves among people exiting prison by providing participants a housing subsidy and housing search assistance. The housing subsidies were geographically restricted, such that they could only be used in geographic areas different from where the participant resided prior to incarceration.

Given the two forms of intervention core to the MOVE model—housing subsidies and residential relocation—optimally, an evaluation of the program would include at least three experimental groups (randomly assigned): (1) A group of movers with a housing subsidy, (2) a group of stayers with a housing subsidy, and (3) a group of stayers without a housing subsidy. A comparison of the first two groups would yield an estimate of the effect of moving to a new residential location. A comparison of the latter two groups would yield an estimate of the effect of the offer of a housing subsidy. Although such a design would be advantageous for a full-scale implementation and evaluation, resource constraints prohibited the implementation of a three-group evaluation during the pilot phase of the program.

Two different designs of the program were implemented during the pilot, as exhibit 1 shows. In each design, the treatment group received a housing subsidy equivalent to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) fair market rent, with the aforementioned geographic restriction that it could only be used in a designated geographic area. Specifically, individuals originally from the city of Baltimore were offered a subsidy for housing in Prince George's (PG) County, Maryland, which is adjacent to Washington, D.C., roughly 40 miles from Baltimore. Individuals who resided in PG County prior to their time in prison were offered a housing subsidy for use only in the city of Baltimore. The impetus behind the multilocation design was to guarantee that each jurisdiction would send and receive the same number of individuals, with no net increase in total parolees in any area (that is, the number of formerly incarcerated people moving to Baltimore from PG County would be the same as the number leaving Baltimore).

Exhibit 1

	Design A	Design B
Treatment group	6-month housing subsidy to move to a new jurisdiction	6-month housing subsidy to move to a new jurisdiction
Control group	6-month housing subsidy in home jurisdiction	No housing subsidy
Nature of intervention (i.e., difference between treatment and control)	Moving to a new city	Moving to a new city and receiving free housing
Sample size	6 Treatment, 9 Control	8 Treatment, 7 Control
Recruitment period	2015	2016

The rationale for specifying a 40-mile distance between pre and post-prison locations for the treatment group relates to the importance of distance from one's past for facilitating a true change in circumstances. If an individual moved only a short distance, then he or she could easily maintain ties with criminal peers even after a move and still have ready access to criminal

opportunities back in the old neighborhood (Kirk, 2018). Indeed, long-term findings from HUD's Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program, which found no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of arrest or incarceration between experimental group movers and the control group, may be explained by the fact that many, if not most, experimental families moved a relatively short distance from their origin neighborhoods (Rosenbaum and Zuberi, 2010; Sampson, 2008; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011). Moving to an adjacent neighborhood is likely too short a distance to expect a real change in circumstances or to sever ties with a criminogenic social network. In fact, in their evaluation of MTO, Briggs, Popkin, and Goering (2010: 18) summarized the problem well: "Changing the social relations of participants was not a primary aim of the MTO experiment [...] But many of the hoped-for positive outcomes anticipated changes in exposure to particular kinds of peers, adult role models, and more successful neighbors."

The implication of the MTO studies and research on the Gautreaux housing mobility program and more recent research on forced displacement from public housing demolitions is that residential relocation may foster desistance from crime, but there must be enough distance between the origin and destination locations to provide a true catalyst for change (Chyn, 2018; Keels, 2008; Rosenbaum and Zuberi, 2010). Forty miles is arguably sufficient distance so that an individual is not regularly immersed back in a preprison neighborhood environment, yet not so far that prosocial ties could not be maintained.

Within Design A of the pilot, the control group received a housing subsidy of equivalent value to the treatment group, and the subsidy could be used in the location where they resided immediately prior to incarceration. For instance, individuals who resided in the city of Baltimore prior to incarceration were offered a housing subsidy that could be used in Baltimore.

In Design B, however, the control group did not receive a housing subsidy. With this design, the control group represented the status quo in terms of the typical circumstances that people exiting prison confront. To deliver some benefit to all participants in Design B of the program, both treatment and control group participants received a \$100 gift card, which they could use for necessities.

Housing Subsidies

Whereas the housing subsidies in the MOVE program were privately funded by a foundation grant, the program was developed to resemble aspects of HUD's Housing Choice Voucher program (that is, Section 8) so that the housing subsidies were to be used in the private rental market. Another motivation was to design the program similarly enough to existing housing assistance programs so that public housing authorities could replicate the model with relative ease if they wished to do so.

Given the importance of housing search assistance and landlord outreach for the placement of lower-income groups into decent housing, MOVE program staff facilitated residence in private-market dwellings by providing housing location assistance to participants (Bergman et al., 2020). Whereas participating landlords knew that the program guaranteed payment of the rent for a defined period, participants signed their own leases. A key difference with the Housing Choice Voucher program is that MOVE vouchers were time limited because of finite resources for the pilot.

Determining the duration of subsidies for the pilot included balancing available funding resources against research ethics and providing enough incentive for individuals exiting prison to participate in the program and recruiting a sufficient number of prospective landlords. In terms of ethics, as the preceding sections describe, research reveals a positive association between residential instability and the likelihood of reoffending and recidivism, so MOVE sought to avoid contributing to residential instability and, therefore recidivism, which might have happened if the program had provided only very temporary housing (for example, 3 months or less; Makarios, Steiner, and Travis, 2010; Steiner, Makarios, and Travis, 2015; Vogel, Porter, and McCuddy, 2017). Moreover, in outreach efforts to prospective landlords and property owners in the design phase of the pilot, it became apparent that less than 6 months of a housing subsidy was often going to be an insufficient incentive for landlords to rent to participants, given their interest in signing at least a 6-month lease with participants (and ideally a 1-year lease). Prospective landlords were concerned that after the rent subsidy from the MOVE program ended, participants would be unable to pay rent. Hence, for the design MOVE ultimately implemented, the program provided 6 months of free housing up to the HUD fair market rent rate for a one-bedroom dwelling for a geographic area (in 2015, the rate for a one-bedroom dwelling in Baltimore was \$985 per month and \$1,230 per month in PG County).¹

Given that a key element of MOVE for the treatment group was residence in a different location relative to where participants lived in the past, it is a legitimate question whether 6 months is sufficient time away from an old environment to produce a turning point in the life-course of crime. The program did not stipulate that participants needed to remain in their new locations after the subsidy ended, although there may be benefits in doing so. Even if criminal opportunities and access to drugs are nearly ubiquitous with little effort, residential change to a new environment may provide a short-term disruption to an individual's access to drugs and criminal opportunities, thereby reducing the likelihood of recidivism. Indeed, Osgood et al. (1996) argued that motivation for crime is situational. An individual's persistence in criminal activity is a function of the situational contingencies that provide opportunities for crime in the absence of social controls. Living in a new environment, even for only 6 months, may promote desistance from crime by disrupting access to illicit temptations and criminal opportunities in the crucial period right after someone exits prison.

Whereas criminological research generally finds that families can be a positive influence and a source of support to the formerly incarcerated, family reunification is not universally beneficial (Harding, Morenoff, and Wyse, 2019; Hassan, Kirk, and Andersen, 2022; La Vigne, Visher, and Castro, 2004; Leverentz, 2014; Visher, La Vigne, and Travis, 2004). Fontaine and Biess (2012: 4) explain—

Considering that some share of formerly incarcerated persons' family members also struggle with substance abuse issues, their own criminal histories, limited incomes, and other issues, housing with family might be a less-than-ideal housing option for many individuals recently released.

Nevertheless, recognizing the potential benefit of living with family members (and the potential negative consequences of living in isolation), MOVE participants were not required to live alone.

¹ The program also provided a 1-month security deposit if necessary. All subsidy payments were provided directly to landlords, as opposed to a cash transfer to participating individuals.

They had the option and choice to reside with other individuals, including immediate family members. The program also offered a supplemental \$100 per month in housing subsidy for individuals residing with dependent children to help offset the cost of renting a larger dwelling.

As noted, in addition to the housing subsidy, participants received housing location assistance from a case manager employed by Quadel Consulting, a housing specialist firm with broad experience working with public housing authorities to administer housing voucher programs. Quadel also offered post-release case management services to participants to help with transition back into the community. One reason to do so was to be aware of any effects of social isolation among the individuals who moved to an unfamiliar area.

Participant Eligibility

For the pilot, MOVE specifically avoided “creaming” the sample to only those individuals most motivated and ready to change their behavior following incarceration. Furthermore, eligibility was not restricted to people with relatively short incarceration histories to the exclusion of individuals with repeated stints of incarceration. Although undoubtedly some individuals might benefit more from the housing and a new environment, the author’s prior work in Louisiana revealed that both first-time releases and individuals with multiple incarcerations benefit from residential relocation, as do individuals with a history of addiction and those without (Kirk, 2020). Therefore, MOVE attempted to limit any restrictions on the pilot sample. That said, should a housing authority or other housing provider seek to replicate MOVE, it may be advantageous to use modern risk prediction tools available via data science to target finite resources at those individuals most highly predicted to recidivate in the absence of housing or in the absence of a move to a new location.

In terms of the few eligibility exceptions, because of the two-site design and the goal of producing no net change in the number of parolees in Baltimore or PG County, participants must have been residents of one of those locations immediately prior to incarceration. MOVE excluded those individuals from participation who had a detainer in another jurisdiction that would prevent their actual release from incarceration (for example, if they were required to serve a sentence in another state or the District of Columbia). Per an agreement with the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS), felony sex offenders and individuals screened as very high risk of violent recidivism by Maryland’s Violence Prevention Initiative forecasting system were ineligible for the program. Finally, the pilot only included men. MOVE excluded women from the pilot phase of the project because of the combination of the small sample size and the relatively small proportion of women among the prison population in Maryland.

Most prisoners in Maryland are released either through a decision by the parole board or mandatory release following the diminution of their sentence through good time credit (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015). Although the mandatory release mechanism is not subject to the approval of a parole board, people exiting prison via mandatory release are still supervised by a parole officer in the community until the expiration of their full criminal sentence. For logistical reasons, the MOVE pilot was limited to mandatory releases. It is challenging to plan for the timing of the release of an individual when a parole board makes the decision. It is useful to know when an individual will be released from prison, so that information can be communicated to a potential landlord to

initiate the apartment search process prior to the individual's release. Therefore, the pilot focused on individuals released via mandatory release.

As a final comment about eligibility, with Design A of the pilot, the age range of participants was not restricted, and participants ranged in age from 22 to 53, including 6 (out of the 15 total) participants over 45 and only 2 in their 20s. Many participants were likely well past their crime-prone years. Although a housing subsidy could surely be beneficial, it might be unnecessary for curtailing recidivism if most participants were already well past the ages of typical criminal activity. Accordingly, Design B restricted the age range of participants from 18 to 45 to target participants most at risk of recidivism.

Recruitment, Sample, and Take-Up Rate

For the pilot study, MOVE recruited 30 participants from four Maryland prisons, three in central Maryland and one in southern Maryland. The four particular prisons were chosen because they admit and release a relatively large number of individuals from the city of Baltimore and PG County.

In 2015 MOVE recruited 15 new participants into Design A of the program out of 17 invited to participate (88 percent enrollment). Program staff randomly assigned six participants to the treatment group and nine to the control group. As a reminder, with Design A, the treatment group received a housing subsidy for use only in a jurisdiction that is more than 40 miles from their place of residence prior to prison, and the control group received a housing subsidy back in the same jurisdiction (the city of Baltimore or PG County) where they resided prior to incarceration. In terms of take-up, three of the six treatment group participants (50 percent) and all nine of the control group were placed in housing. The 50 percent take-up rate is lower compared with the performance of the Housing Choice Voucher program, which has an estimated take-up rate of nearly 70 percent (Finkel and Buron, 2001). However, it is comparable with or higher than recent experimental and quasi-experimental programs designed to use housing vouchers to foster residential mobility among lower-income households (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).

As noted, Design B sought to compare the treatment condition (that is, housing subsidy plus moving) with the status quo (that is, without housing subsidy). MOVE also hoped to increase the take-up rate into housing relative to Design A. Whereas MOVE staff encouraged people to enroll only if they were willing to reside in either the city of Baltimore or PG County, it was possible for a prospective Design A participant to determine that he could sign up in the hopes of getting 6 months of free housing in his preferred location, then just drop out without penalty if he did not get his preference. With Design B, however, which provided no possibility of obtaining free housing back in a home jurisdiction, the program would presumably appeal only to individuals who would at least consider moving to a new area.

For Design B, 15 pilot participants were recruited in 2016. Eight individuals were randomly assigned to the treatment group and seven to the control group, with a 50 percent take-up rate again in the treatment group. Accordingly, it might be concluded that only about one-half of treatment group participants can typically be placed in housing. That said, the 50 percent take-up

rate could be an anomaly of the small pilot sample, and it should, therefore, be investigated further during a full implementation of the program.

Qualitative Interviews

MOVE staff completed up to four interviews with the final nine participants recruited into the program, with one interview prior to release, one within 2 weeks after release from prison, and two more at approximately 3 and 6 months post-release. Six participants completed all four interviews, two participants completed three interviews, and one participant completed two interviews.

The interviews intended to understand the reentry experiences of participants in the program. Specifically, through the interviews, MOVE staff sought to understand whether moving facilitated any change in behavior and, if so, to identify mediating mechanisms that explain why residential change may lead to a reduction in the probability of recidivism. These mechanisms may include a change in routine activities, a change in peer associations, a reduction in criminal opportunities, exposure to more opportunities for employment or social services, identity change, and a decrease in the level of scrutiny by the police. Interviews also sought to examine the role of social supports and the potential consequences of social isolation in a new environment.

Pilot Results

Whereas the main purpose of the Maryland Opportunities through Vouchers Experiment pilot was to verify the procedures and design of the program so that adjustments could be made in advance of a full-scale implementation, this section provides a descriptive summary of rearrest rates among sample participants.² Rearrest is defined as an arrest anywhere in the State of Maryland in the 12 months immediately following an individual's release from incarceration. MOVE staff obtained rearrest data from the DPSCS and double-checked these data with online records from the Maryland Judiciary Case Search portal.

For Design A, in which both the treatment and control groups received 6 months of housing and the housing location distinguished the groups, none of the participants in either group were rearrested within the 1-year followup period. The proportion rearrested in both groups (0 percent) is the same whether comparing the full sample (that is, the so-called "intention-to-treat" sample) or the subset with those participants who were able to use the MOVE housing subsidy to take up housing (that is, the three out of six individuals in the treatment group and all nine individuals in the control group). As a point of comparison, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that, nationally, an average of 37 percent of people released from prison are arrested within 1 year of their release, and in Maryland, 20 percent are reincarcerated within a year (DPSCS, 2022; Durose and Antenangeli, 2021). Hence, the 0-percent rearrest rate is far from the norm.

Findings could indicate that free housing, offered to both groups in Design A, is a key contributor to reducing the likelihood of recidivism, regardless of the location of that housing. An alternative (or additional) explanation is that because the sample of participants included several individuals well past the typical crime-committing age, the sample may have been filled with some individuals who


² The author is presently exploring opportunities and funding for continued implementation of MOVE, including in locations beyond Maryland.

would not have been rearrested regardless of whether they had received a housing subsidy. In fact, the median age in the treatment group in Design A was 35.5 and 46 in the control group. Hence, particularly among control group participants, age may partially explain why no one was rearrested.

For Design B results, recall that eligibility is capped at age 45. Exhibit 2 reveals that 25 percent of the treatment group were rearrested within 1 year of release from prison versus 57 percent in the control group. As in the results for Design A, the proportion rearrested in both groups is the same whether comparing the full sample (that is, the intention-to-treat sample) or subset with those participants who were able to use the MOVE housing subsidy (that is, the four of eight individuals in the treatment group). Whereas the small sample size means that hypothesis testing lacks statistical power, a one-tailed hypothesis test of the difference in proportions across groups using the intention-to-treat sample yields a z-statistic equal to -1.268, with a p-value equal to 0.102, which is slightly outside the typical range used to denote marginal significance.

Exhibit 2

One-Year Rearrest Rate in Maryland Opportunities Through Vouchers Experiment Design B



Qualitative Findings

Although findings presented thus far are suggestive of the value of housing assistance for reducing the likelihood of recidivism, it is less clear whether residence in a new environment provided sufficient separation from one's past and a new set of routine activities to facilitate desistance from crime (Laub and Sampson, 2003). Still, qualitative interview data can be used to unpack the results. Evidence from participant interviews reveals several reasons underlying the differences in rearrest between treatment and control group members, including housing instability, destructive relationships, and idle time.

Housing Instability

Pierre, a PG County resident prior to incarceration and in his mid-30s as of his release, was a control group member under Design B and, therefore, did not receive a housing subsidy. He was open to the idea of residing somewhere besides PG County, and he attempted to enroll in a different government-sponsored transitional housing program in Baltimore on release. However, he stated that he was denied entry into the housing program because he was not from Baltimore. These types of restrictions on housing program eligibility, presumably stipulated because of finite resources available to house the formerly incarcerated, have the consequence of encouraging individuals to return to the communities from which they came, even if it is detrimental to do so. That is what Pierre did.

Pierre has a sister in PG County where he could stay as a last resort, although she has four children and little room for him. As an alternative, he occasionally scraped together enough money for a night at a motel but tended to stay with friends and acquaintances from PG County a few days at a time. A highly unstable housing situation, embedded in his old surroundings, characterized his limited time out of prison.

Perhaps as a result of his housing instability, Pierre struggled to find work. Without work, he did not have the income to look for stable housing. This situation is the sort of catch-22 that characterizes so many individuals in the period soon after prison release. Because he did not have a place of his own, he felt awkward just hanging around at whoever's house where he was staying. Accordingly, he would find something to do out of the house each day. Sometimes that meant going to the library so that he could access the internet and look for work. Other times, it meant hanging out with friends and acquaintances. None of these individuals were big-time criminal offenders, but the regular drinking and minor drug use caught up to him. He was rearrested approximately 6 weeks after his release from prison on three drug charges.

Destructive Relationships

Eddie's experience, a control group participant in his early 30s at the time of his release, resembles that of Pierre. Eddie resided the bulk of his life in a town just outside the Northeast section of the District of Columbia. He exited prison after serving time on a robbery conviction. On the day of his release, his actual exit was delayed by several hours, and by the time he got out, his mother was busy at her church, so he went to his father's house (his father and his mother had long been divorced), where he resided prior to incarceration. His father lives in the area that had been a frequent site of his criminal activity.

Eddie's release from prison was an occasion for an impromptu party at his father's house. Eddie explained, "They [my father, stepmom, and their friends] was just partying. I drank a few, but I drink one every hour or so, and then I drink water. I'm not trying to get drunk. They're still doing that." Hence, within a couple of hours of his release, Eddie was back in his old neighborhood, reluctantly at a party hosted by his alcoholic father with many of Eddie's acquaintances from the neighborhood.

That party at his father's was the first of several occasions that reconnected Eddie to his old neighborhood and network. At his interview less than 2 weeks after release, he noted that his old

neighborhood peers were already tempting him with drugs, both for use and to sell, which he initially tried to resist. He explained to his friends that he was on parole and subject to urinalysis twice a week, and thus needed to abstain from the drugs offered to him, such as cocaine. Perhaps it is telling that rather than communicate to his peers that he was abstaining from drug use because of a choice to leave that behavior in the past, he mentioned on more than one occasion in the interview that his abstinence was out of necessity to avoid getting caught through the urinalysis.

At his interview roughly 2 weeks post-release, Eddie explained that he was trying to spend as much time as he could with family, particularly his former girlfriend and their 5-year-old son. He described how he did not want to let his son down and did not want him to follow the same path to criminality that he did. Eddie also said that he and his son's mother had begun to rekindle their relationship. Still, during the interview, he also recounted how they had already had a couple of arguments, because he was hanging out with other people rather than her and their son. Before too long, repeatedly confronted with temptations and opportunities to return to his old life, Eddie was rearrested. During the next couple of years, he continued to get in trouble with the law, with several relatively low-level arrests and convictions. These arrests, combined with his criminal history and parole revocations, meant that he continued to be in and out of prison.

Structured Versus Idle Time

Pierre's experience after his release reveals the ways in which housing instability may contribute to poor employment prospects and, therefore, a lot of idle time. And Eddie's experience reveals how easy it can be to return to old relationships and the routines, sometimes criminal, embedded in those relationships. In contrast, Randy's post-incarceration situation reveals that structured time through employment, facilitated by having a stable place to reside, is important for avoiding trouble with the law.

Randy, a 24-year-old treatment group member, lived in PG County prior to incarceration but moved to Baltimore through the MOVE program, with the 6 months of free housing. In contrast to Pierre, whose pre-incarceration friends supported him with places to stay after his release but also served as companions as he returned to drinking and drug use, Randy avoided the social ties of his past once he was released. He explained—

I cut off almost everybody other than family. The friends that I did have, we weren't really doing what we were supposed to be doing [in the past]. I don't want to go back to old relationships. I don't want to go back to old friendships. I just think it was unhealthy then. I need to focus more on other things now.

In contrast to Pierre, Randy's ability to cut off his negative peers was facilitated by the fact that he had a stable place to live post-release. On the very few occasions he reconnected with his old friends, one of them offered to get him into drug distribution. Randy resisted, which is perhaps easier to do, because he was not immersed in his old environment in PG County.

Randy's post-release neighborhood in Baltimore was not crime free by any means, but he says he was able to keep to himself rather than "hanging in the streets," as he did in his old neighborhood in PG County. By his 3-month interview, he was working at a fast-food restaurant, and by his

6-month interview he had added another job, as a stocking clerk at a discount store. Neither were well-paying jobs, but by working a lot of hours, Randy was trying to save money to continue paying rent after his MOVE housing subsidy ended. Hence, it appears that a very structured life with little idleness facilitated Randy's transition post-incarceration.

When asked about the potential benefits of receiving housing through the MOVE program, Randy replied simply, "it means that there is one less thing I need to worry about." Indeed, that is an intent of the housing first model of social service delivery. Without the worry of securing housing, Randy could then focus on finding gainful employment.

Discussion

On exiting prison, formerly incarcerated individuals tend to lack access to safe and stable housing and, partly as a result, return in proximity to the neighborhoods where they resided before incarceration for opportunities to shelter with family, friends, or acquaintances. Prior research has shown that housing instability and returning to familiar residential environments contribute to the cycle of recidivism (for example, Kirk, 2009; Steiner, Makarios, and Travis, 2015). MOVE was designed to address these twin challenges.

This article described the design of the MOVE program and its pilot evaluation and provided a preliminary assessment of its feasibility and efficacy. With the caveat that findings are based on a small sample and firm inferences are necessarily premature, the descriptive results in this study, including those in exhibit 2, preliminarily suggest that provision of 6 months of housing may lower the likelihood of recidivism, and that the residential moves to a new city or county facilitated by that housing may also reduce the likelihood of recidivism. Qualitative evidence presented in this article suggests that housing subsidies allowed individuals to focus attention on the many other challenges they face when exiting prison, including a quicker transition to employment. Moreover, when housing was away from previous residential locations, it helped MOVE participants avoid the routines and temptations associated with their old environments and peer networks.

Ultimately, if the hypotheses underlying the MOVE program are subsequently supported through full-scale implementations, then strategies to increase access to housing assistance for people exiting prison may be worth pursuing. However, given that only about one-fourth of families who are eligible for federal rental assistance presently receive it (Fischer and Sard, 2017), how would it be possible to fund housing for people coming out of prison?

One idea for funding rental assistance for the formerly incarcerated could be a version of justice reinvestment—for example, reinvest the criminal justice savings from reduced use of incarceration into housing subsidies for formerly incarcerated individuals for some defined time period depending on resource availability. To maximize the benefit of finite resources, one possibility is to use modern risk prediction tools via machine learning to target subsidies at individuals who would be most at risk of recidivism in the absence of stable housing. It is worth noting that the average yearly cost to imprison someone in Maryland in 2015, when MOVE launched, was \$44,601 (equivalent to \$122 per day per imprisoned individual; Mai and Subramanian, 2017). By comparison, recall that study participants housed in Baltimore received a subsidy of \$985

per month, and participants in PG County received \$1,230 per month, for an average of slightly more than \$1,100 per month in cost (or \$13,200 per year). Although a stable place to reside will not resolve everyone's criminal behavior, it is nevertheless far cheaper to house someone in the community than behind bars.

It may be a hard political sell to dramatically increase funding for housing for people coming out of prison, even if it can be shown to enhance public safety. Hence, an alternative idea is to make a concerted effort to expand affordable housing opportunities for low-income households in general, with some formerly incarcerated individuals benefitting from the greater availability of affordable housing. One strategy for doing so is to expand the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. The LIHTC program, which HUD (2018) described as "the most important resource for creating affordable housing in the United States today," provides tax incentives to real estate developers to encourage affordable housing development. Since its inception in 1986, approximately 50,000 LIHTC developments totaling more than 3 million housing units have been placed in service. Research shows that the tax incentives have indeed worked to spur affordable housing development in low-income neighborhoods (Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009). Research also reveals that low-income housing development in impoverished neighborhoods is associated with significant declines in violent crime (Freedman and Owens, 2011). Whereas a variety of routes exist for expanding housing opportunities for people exiting prison, evidence from the MOVE pilot and its intellectual precursors suggests that stable housing for the formerly incarcerated in a location that facilitates a fresh start in life will help break the cycle of recidivism (Kirk, 2020).

Acknowledgments

The author relied heavily on the dedicated employees of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services to implement the MOVE program and is grateful for their support. The author would like to thank Geoff Barnes, Jordan Hyatt, and Quadel Consulting for their assistance with the implementation of the MOVE program. The author would also like to thank Brook Kearley and Dana Segev for their assistance with collecting and initial analysis, respectively, of the qualitative interview data presented in this article.

Author

David S. Kirk is a professor in the Department of Sociology and Professorial Fellow of Nuffield College, University of Oxford.

References

American Bar Association (ABA). 2013. "National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction." Chicago, IL: American Bar Association. <https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/the-national-inventory-of-collateral-consequences-of-conviction/>.

Baum-Snow, Nathaniel, and Justin Marion. 2009. "The Effects of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments on Neighborhoods," *Journal of Public Economics* 93 (5–6): 654–666. <https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.jpube.2009.01.001>.

Bergman, Peter, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz, and Christopher Palmer. 2020. *Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice*. NBER Working Paper No. 26164. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w26164>.

Briggs, Xavier de Souza, Susan J. Popkin, and John Goering. 2010. *Moving to Opportunity: The Story of an American Experiment to Fight Ghetto Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bryan, Brielle. 2022. "Housing Instability Following Felony Conviction and Incarceration: Disentangling Being Marked From Being Locked Up," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-022-09550-z>.

Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). 2023. "Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT) – Prisoners." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. <https://csat.bjs.ojp.gov/>.

Carson, E. Ann. 2022. *Prisoners in 2021 – Statistical Tables*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. <https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/p21st.pdf>.

Chyn, Eric. 2018. "Moved to Opportunity: The Long-Run Effect of Public Housing Demolition on Children," *American Economic Review* 108 (10): 3028–3056. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161352>.

Durose, Matthew R., and Leonardo Antenangeli. 2021. *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 34 States in 2012: A 5-Year Follow-Up Period (2012–2017)*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. <https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/rpr34s125yfup1217.pdf>.

Evans, Douglas N., and Jeremy R. Porter. 2015. "Criminal History and Landlord Rental Decisions: A New York Quasi-Experimental Study," *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 11: 21–42. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-014-9217-4>.

Finkel, Meryl, and Larry Buron. 2001. *Study on Section 8 Voucher Success Rates. Volume I. Quantitative Study of Success Rates in Metropolitan Areas*. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates. <https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/sec8success.pdf>.

Fischer, Will, and Barbara Sard. 2017. *Chart Book: Federal Housing Spending is Poorly Matched to Need*. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. <https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/federal-housing-spending-is-poorly-matched-to-need>.

Fontaine, Jocelyn, and Jennifer Biess. 2012. *Housing as a Platform for Formerly Incarcerated Persons*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. <https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25321/412552-Housing-as-a-Platform-for-Formerly-Incarcerated-Persons.PDF>

Freedman, Matthew, and Emily G. Owens. 2011. "Low-Income Housing Development and Crime," *Journal of Urban Economics* 70 (2–3): 115–131. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2011.04.001>.

- Geller, Amanda, and Marah A. Curtis. 2011. "A Sort of Homecoming: Incarceration and the Housing Security of Urban Men," *Social Science Research* 40 (4): 1196–1213. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.03.008>.
- Glaser, Daniel. 1969. *The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System (Abridged Edition)*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hamilton, Zachary, Alex Kigerl, and Zachary Hays. 2015. "Removing Release Impediments and Reducing Correctional Costs: Evaluation of Washington State's Housing Voucher Program," *Justice Quarterly* 32 (2): 255–287. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.761720>.
- Harding, David J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Claire Herbert. 2013. "Home is Hard to Find: Neighborhoods, Institutions, and the Residential Trajectories of Returning Prisoners," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 647 (1): 214–236. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716213477070>.
- Harding, David J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Jessica J. B. Wyse. 2019. *On the Outside: Prisoner Reentry and Reintegration*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Harding, David J., Jessica J. B. Wyse, Cheyney Dobson, and Jeffrey D. Morenoff. 2014. "Making Ends Meet After Prison," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 33 (2): 440–470. <https://doi.org/10.1002%2Fpam.21741>.
- Hassan, Said, David S. Kirk, and Lars H. Andersen. 2022. "The Importance of Living Arrangements for Criminal Persistence and Desistance: A Novel Test of Exposure to Convicted Family Members," *Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology* 8: 571–596. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40865-022-00211-0>.
- Herbert, Claire W., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and David J. Harding. 2015. "Homelessness and Housing Insecurity among Former Prisoners," *The Russell Sage Foundation Journal* 1: 44–79. <https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2015.1.2.04>.
- Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University (JCHS). 2022. *The State of the Nation's Housing: 2022*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. <https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/state-nations-housing-2022>.
- Keels, Micere. 2008. "Second-Generation Effects of Chicago's Gautreaux Residential Mobility Program on Children's Participation in Crime," *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 18: 305–352. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7795.2008.00562.x>.
- Kirk, David S. 2020. *Home Free: Prisoner Reentry and Residential Change after Hurricane Katrina*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2019. "The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration for Housing." In *Handbook on the Consequences of Sentencing and Punishment Decisions*, edited by Beth M. Huebner and Natasha Frost. New York: Routledge.

———. 2018. “The Effect of Neighborhood Context and Residential Mobility on Criminal Persistence and Desistance.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology*, edited by David P. Farrington, Lila Kazemian, and Alex R. Piquero. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2012. “Residential Change as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Crime: Desistance or Temporary Cessation?” *Criminology* 50 (2): 329–358. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2011.00262.x>.

———. 2009. “A Natural Experiment on Residential Change and Recidivism: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina,” *American Sociological Review* 74 (3): 484–505. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400308>.

Kirk, David S., and Sara Wakefield. 2018. “Collateral Consequences of Punishment: A Critical Review and Path Forward,” *Annual Review of Criminology* 1: 171–194. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032317-092045>.

Lageson, Sarah. 2020. *Digital Punishment: Privacy, Stigma, and the Harms of Data-Driven Criminal Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laub, John H., and Robert J. Sampson. 2003. *Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives: Delinquent Boys to Age 70*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

La Vigne, Nancy G., Christy Visher, and Jennifer Castro. 2004. *Chicago Prisoners’ Experiences Returning Home*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. <https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42831/311115-Chicago-Prisoners-Experiences-Returning-Home.PDF>.

Leverentz, Andrea. 2014. *The Ex-Prisoner’s Dilemma: How Women Negotiate Competing Narratives of Reentry and Desistance*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Lutze, Faith E., Jeffrey W. Rosky, and Zachary K. Hamilton. 2013. “Homelessness and Reentry: A Multisite Outcome Evaluation of Washington State’s Reentry Housing Program for High Risk Offenders,” *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 41 (4): 471–491. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854813510164>.

Mai, Chris, and Ram Subramanian. 2017. *The Price of Prisons: Examining State Spending Trends, 2010-2015*. New York: The Vera Institute of Justice. <https://www.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends>.

Makarinos, Matthew, Benjamin Steiner, and Lawrence Travis, III. 2010. “Examining the Predictors of Recidivism among Men and Women Released from Prison in Ohio,” *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 37 (12): 1377–1391. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854810382876>.

Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS). 2022. *Recidivism Report*. Annapolis, MD: DPSCS. https://dpscs.maryland.gov/publicinfo/publications/pdfs/2022_p157_DPSCS_Recidivism%20Report.pdf.

Meredith, Tammy, John C. Speir, and Sharon Johnson. 2007. "Developing and Implementing Automated Risk Assessments in Parole," *Justice Research and Policy* 9 (1): 1–24.

<https://doi.org/10.3818/JRP.9.1.2007.1>.

Metraux, Stephen, and Dennis P. Culhane. 2004. "Homeless Shelter Use and Reincarceration Following Prison Release: Assessing the Risk," *Criminology & Public Policy* 3 (2): 139–160.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2004.tb00031.x>.

Osborn, S. G. 1980. "Moving Home, Leaving London and Delinquent Trends," *British Journal of Criminology* 20 (1): 54–61. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23636282>.

Osgood, D. Wayne, Janet K. Wilson, Jerald G. Bachman, Patrick M. O'Malley, and Lloyd D. Johnston. 1996. "Routine Activities and Individual Deviant Behavior," *American Sociological Review* 61 (4): 635–655.

The Pew Charitable Trusts. 2015. "Maryland Data Analysis Part II: Community Corrections Drivers." Presentation to the Justice Reinvestment Coordinating Council, Annapolis, MD, July 29.

<http://goccp.maryland.gov/jrcc/documents/presentation-20150818-community-corrections.pdf>.

Rosenbaum, James E., and Anita Zuberi. 2010. "Comparing Residential Mobility Programs: Design Elements, Neighborhood Placements, and Outcomes in MTO and Gautreaux," *Housing Policy Debate* 20 (1): 27–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10511481003599845>.

Rubinowitz, Leonard S., and James E. Rosenbaum. 2000. *Crossing the Class and Color Lines: From Public Housing to White Suburbia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sampson, Robert J. 2008. "Moving to Inequality: Neighborhood Effects and Experiments Meet Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology* 114 (1): 189–231. <https://doi.org/10.1086/589843>.

Sampson, Robert J., and John H. Laub. 1993. *Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points Through Life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sanbonmatsu, Lisa, Jens Ludwig, Lawrence F. Katz, Lisa A. Gennetian, Greg J. Duncan, Ronald C. Kessler, Emma Adam, Thomas W. McDade, and Stacy Tessler Lindau. 2011. *Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration Program: Final Impacts Evaluation*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/mtofhd_fullreport_v2.pdf.

Sharkey, Patrick, and Robert J. Sampson. 2010. "Destination Effects: Residential Mobility and Trajectories of Adolescent Violence in a Stratified Metropolis," *Criminology* 48 (3) 639–681.

<https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1745-9125.2010.00198.x>.

Steiner, Benjamin, Matthew D. Makarios, and Lawrence F. Travis, III. 2015. "Examining the Effects of Residential Situations and Residential Mobility on Offender Recidivism," *Crime and Delinquency* 61 (3): 375–401. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128711399409>.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 2018. “Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html>.

———. 2016. *Application of Fair Housing Act Standards to the Use of Criminal Records by Providers of Housing and Real Estate-Related Transactions*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF

———. 2015. *Guidance for Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) and Owners of Federally-Assisted Housing on Excluding the Use of Arrest Records in Housing Decisions*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. <https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PIH2015-19.PDF>

Visher, Christy, and Jill Farrell. 2005. *Chicago Communities and Prisoner Reentry*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. <https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42891/311225-Chicago-Communities-and-Prisoner-Reentry.PDF>

Visher, Christy, Nancy La Vigne, and Jeremy Travis. 2004. *Returning Home: Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry, Maryland Pilot Study: Findings from Baltimore*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. <https://webarchive.urban.org/publications/410974.html>.

Vogel, Matt, Lauren C. Porter, and Timothy McCuddy. 2017. “Hypermobility, Destination Effects, and Delinquency: Specifying the Link between Residential Mobility and Offending,” *Social Forces* 95 (3): 1261–1284. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sow097>.

Warner, Cody. 2015. “On the Move: Incarceration, Race, and Residential Mobility,” *Social Science Research* 52: 451–464. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2015.03.009>.

Western, Bruce, and Becky Pettit. 2010. “Incarceration & Social Inequality,” *Daedalus* 139 (3): 8–19. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00019.

Zeng, Zhen. 2022. *Jail Inmates in 2021 – Statistical Tables*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. <https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/ji21st.pdf>.